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Moehler, Johann Adam,
1796-1838.
Symbolism, or, Exposition of
the doctrinal differences
between Catholics and

SYMBOLISM,

BY

JOHN ADAM MOEHLER, D.D.

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SYMBOLISM:

OR,

EXPOSITION

OF THE

DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES

BETWEEN

Catholics and Protestants,

AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR SYMBOLICAL WRITINGS.

BY

Johann
JOHN ADAM MOEHLER, D.D. 1796-1838

DEAN OF WURZBURG, AND LATE PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

WITH A MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,

PRECEDED BY AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE STATE OF PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICISM IN GERMANY FOR THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS,

BY

JAMES BURTON ROBERTSON, ESQ.

TRANSLATOR OF SCHLEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

Second Edition.

VOL. I.

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TO THE

RIGHT REV. THOMAS GRIFFITHS, D.D.

BISHOP OF OLENA, AND VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE
LONDON DISTRICT,

THIS TRANSLATION IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

AS A TESTIMONY OF PROFOUND RESPECT,

BY HIS LORDSHIP'S MOST HUMBLE AND DEVOTED SERVANT,

THE TRANSLATOR.

INTRODUCTORY NOTICE

BY

THE TRANSLATOR.

Some years ago I presented the public with a translation of Frederick Schlegel's Philosophy of History, which may be termed a sort of "Discourse on Universal History," adapted to the actual state and wants of Catholic science. I now venture to bring forward a translation of a work that has been called by a French critic a necessary supplement to Bossuet's "History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches"—a work well suited also to the present necessities of the Catholic Church, and fitted for the existing state of controversy between the two great religious parties in Europe.

The kind reception which my former task experienced from the British public, at a time when all Catholic productions were still viewed with peculiar distrust and aversion, encourages me to hope that now, when so happy and so remarkable a change has come over the Protestant mind of England, the same indulgence will not be refused to my present effort. The work, indeed, whereof a translation is now offered to the public, enters far more deeply into the discussion of those great questions, which divide the minds and the hearts of our countrymen. The moral wound that for three centuries hath disfigured the aspect, crippled or misapplied the energy, and exhausted the vital forces of our country, is here probed with a firm and dexterous, though most gentle hand. Yet Dr. Möhler's book is more historical, explanatory, and analytical, than really polemical. And the spirit of eminent charity, which breathes through his pages—the mild accents wherewith error is rebuked—the aversion from all exaggeration, that will never push beyond their legitimate bearing the words of an adversary—the exquisite sense of justice, that never fails to award to merit, wherever it is found, its due recognition; that is ever ready to make allowance for human frailty; that amid the greatest aberrations of the human mind, points with pleasure to the truths which tempered them, as well as to the truths which they abused; that even in the most hideous caricatures of fanaticism loves to seek out some trait of the Divine original, which that fanaticism strove to realize or restore;—all these qualities, I trust, will not fail to obtain from the author, even from the most prejudiced Protestant, an impartial and attentive hearing.

A distinguished English Protestant writer once characterized Bossuet's "History of the Variations," as a book "where a Catholic might study his religion, and a Protestant learn logic." The same remark applies in an equal, perhaps more eminent, degree, to Möhler's Symbolism; yet with this difference, that the latter is a work, where a Protestant, too, may study his religion.

The Protestant of every denomination may here see the tenets of his own religious community on the controverted points stated and explained according to the most solemn and unexceptionable of all authorities—the public formularies of that religious community itself. The declarations of such formularies are placed in juxta-position with those of the Catholic Church. By this means, the better understanding of the doctrines of either Church is promoted; mutual misconceptions are obviated; the points of agreement, as well as the points of divergence, are more prominently brought out; the means for the reconciliation of religious parties are at once laid open and facilitated; and as a clearer knowledge of error leads of necessity to a better appreciation of truth, the return to the true Church is thus at once rendered more easy and more certain.

This work, in its apologetical parts, noticing but cursorily or incidentally the historical and traditionary proofs of the Catholic faith, and confining itself in general to an *a priori* vindication of our tenets, I recommend the Protestant reader, who happens to be totally unacquainted with writings of Catholic controversy, to consult, prior to the perusal of the *Symbolism,* one or more of the approved books of Catholic evidences; where the external, as well as intrinsic, arguments in favour of our Church are more fully and elaborately entered into. Among these, I may particularly recommend three excellent works, which, though differing in their plan, will furnish the Protestant with the proofs required. I mean the Right

Rev. Dr. Milner's solid and instructive book, *The End of Religious Controversy;* Dr. Kirk's learned work, *The Faith of Catholics;* and the ingenious, learned, and eloquent *Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church*, by my illustrious friend, the Right Rev. Dr. Wiseman. If, besides one or other of these works, the Protestant reader has leisure to consult the history by Bossuet, above referred to, he will then derive from the perusal of the *Symbolism* more spiritual advantage and intellectual profit; and will find but few passages that will present a difficulty. In the course of perusal it will be well for him frequently to refer to the decrees of the Council of Trent.

The word "Symbolism," or, as the Germans say, "Symbolik," has, it is proper to observe, a two-fold signification. Sometimes it means the science, that has for its object to explain the symbol, or outward signs used in the religions of antiquity; and in this sense it is employed by Creuzer, as the title to his celebrated work on that subject. At other times, the word is used by German divines, Catholic and Protestant, to signify the science of comparative inquiry into the Confessions, or Symbolical writings, of the different Christian Churches; and this is the sense it bears in the title to the book here translated.

There is a small, but learned work, entitled *Confessions of Faith*, by my lamented friend, the late Mr. Charles Butler, where the reader will find an interesting literary history of the formularies of the different Christian communities.

It was my wish that this translation should have appeared two years ago; but other literary occupations have, contrary to my hope, retarded its publication. The Protestant mind, however, I flatter myself, is now better prepared for the reception of the work, than at the period referred to; and if, in the great moral ferment which now pervades my country, it should be the means of allaying and reconciling, in any degree, the agitated elements of religious strife; if it should extricate but one spirit from the difficulties, the distractions, and the anguish of doubt, wherein so many are now involved, and should help him on to the solution of that great problem, whereon all depends, I shall consider my labour to be more than sufficiently recompensed. May He, from whom every good gift descends, shed His blessing on the present undertaking, and enable all to come to the perusal of the work with the suitable dispositions!

WURZBURG, BAVARIA,
August, 1843.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

EVERY book has a two-fold history; a history before, and a history after its publication. The first can be described only by the author himself; and respecting this, the public imposes on him the duty to make no mystery, and, accordingly, to relate to it partly the outward occasions that induced him to undertake the composition of his work; and partly to assign the more intrinsic reasons, by which he was determined to the undertaking. Hereupon I have now to communicate to the indulgent reader the following remarks.

The present work has arisen out of a course of lectures, that for several years I have delivered on the doctrinal differences between Catholics and Protestants. On this subject it has been the custom, for years, in all the Lutheran and Calvinistic universities of Germany, to deliver lectures to the students of theology; and highly approving of this custom, I resolved to transplant it to the Catholic soil, for the following reasons. Certainly those, who are called to take the lead in theological learning, may be justly expected to acquire a solid and comprehensive knowledge of the tenets of the religious communities, that for so long a time have stood opposed to each other in mutual rivalry, and still endeavour to maintain this their position. Justly are they required not to rest satisfied by any means with mere general, uncertain, obscure, vague, and unconnected notions upon the great vital question, which has not only, for three hundred years, continually agitated the religious life of Europe, but has in part so deeply and mightily convulsed it.

If the very notion of scientific culture makes it the duty of the theologian to enter with the utmost possible precision and depth into the nature of the differences that divide religious parties; if it imperiously requires him to set himself in a condition to render account of, and assign the grounds for, the doctrinal peculiarities of the different communions; so, regard for his own personal dignity and satisfaction of mind, presses the matter on him; nay, on every well-instructed Christian, with a still more imperious claim. For what is less consistent with our own self-respect, than to neglect instituting the most careful and accurate enquiry into the grounds and foundation of our own religious belief; and convincing ourselves whether, and how far, we stand on a firm footing, or whether we have not placed ourselves on some treacherous covering, that conceals beneath it an enormous abyss? How is it possible to enjoy a true and solid peace of the soul, when in the midst of great ecclesiastical communities, that all pretend alike to the possession of the pure and unmutilated truth, we stand almost without reflection, and without possessing any adequate instruction? There is, indeed, in this respect, a quiet, such as they possess, in relation to a future life, who are utterly heedless whether there be such a state. This is a quiet that casts deep, indelible disgrace on any being endowed with reason. Every man, accordingly, owes it to himself, to acquire the clearest conception of the doctrinal peculiarities, the inward power and strength, or the inward weakness and untenableness of the religious community, whereof he acknowledges himself a member; a conception which entirely depends on a very accurate and precise knowledge of the opposite system of belief. There can even be no solid acquisition, nor confident use of the arguments for any communion, unless they be conceived in relation to the antagonist system. Nay, a solid acquaintance with any confession, must necessarily include its apology, if at least that confession make any pretensions to truth. For every educated Christian possesses such general notions of religion and Christianity—he possesses such general acquaintance with Holy Writ—that so soon as any proposition be presented to him in its true light, and in its general bearings, he can form a judgment as to its truth, and immediately discern its conformity or its repugnance to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

We are also at a loss to discover, how a practical theologian, especially in countries where conflicting communions prevail, can adequately discharge his functions, when he is unable to characterize the distinctive doctrines of those communions. For public homilies, indeed, on matters of religious controversy, the cycle of Catholic festivals, conformably to the origin and the nature of our Church, happily gives no occasion. All the festivals established by her have reference only to facts in the life of Jesus Christ, and to those truths, whereon all our faith and all our hopes depend; as well as to the commemoration of those highly meritorious servants of God, who hold a distinguished place in the history of the Church, such, in particular, as were instrumental in the general propagation and consolidation of Christianity, and in its special introduction into certain countries. For the office of preaching, accordingly, the Catholic pastor, with the exception of some very rare and peculiar cases, can make no immediate use of his knowledge of other creeds. On the other hand, we may hope that his discourses on the doctrines of the Catholic faith, will be rendered more solid, more comprehensive, more animated, and more impressive, when those doctrines have been studied by him, in their opposition to the antagonist confessions in the strict sense of that word. That the highest class of catechumens should receive solid instruction, nay, a far more solid one than has hitherto been given, on the dogmas controverted between Christians; nay, that in this instruction, the doctrinal differences should be explicitly, and as fully as possible attended to, is a matter on which I entertain not the slightest doubt. Whence proceeds the deplorable helplessness of many Catholics, when, in their intercourse with Protestants, the concerns of religious faith come under discussion? Whence the indifference of so many among them towards their own religion? From what other cause, but from their almost total ignorance of the doctrinal peculiarities of their Church, in respect to other religious communities? Whence comes it, that whole Catholic parishes are so easily seduced by the false mysticism of their curates, when these happen to be secretly averse to the doctrines of the Church? Whence even the fact, that many curates are so open to the pietistic errors, but because both, priest and congregation, have never received the adequate, nay, any instruction at all, respecting the doctrinal differences between the Churches? How much are Catholics put to shame by the very great activity which Protestants display in this matter! It is of course to be understood, that instruction on these points of controversy must be imparted with the utmost charity, conciliation, and mildness, with a sincere love of truth, and without any exaggeration, and with constantly impressing on the minds of men, that however we be bound to reject errors (for the pure doctrine of Jesus Christ, and the Gospel truth, is the most sacred property of man), yet are we required by our Church to embrace all men with love, for Christ's sake, and to evince in their regard all the abundance of Christian virtues. Lastly, it is clear, that opportune and inopportune questions, consultations, and conferences, on the doctrines controverted between the Churches, will never fail to occur; but, most assuredly, the appropriate reply, the wished-for counsel, and the instructive refutation, will be wanting, in case the pastor be not solidly grounded in a knowledge of the respective formularies of the Christian communities.

But if what I have said justifies the delivery of academic courses, on the doctrinal peculiarities of the different communions, yet it proves not the necessity of their publication, at least as regards their essential substance. On this subject I will take the liberty of making the following remarks. In the Protestant Church, for many years, a series of manuals, on Symbolism, have been published. The elder Plank, Marheineke (in two works, a larger and a smaller), Winer, Clausen, and others, have tried their efforts in this department. The Catholics, indeed, on their part, have put forth a great multitude of apologetic and such like works, having for their object to correct the misrepresentation of our doctrines as set forth by non-Catholics. But any book containing a scientific discussion of all the doctrinal peculiarities of the Protestant Churches, has not fallen within my knowledge. Accordingly, in communicating to the public the substance of my lectures, I conceived I should fill up a very perceptible void in Catholic literature.

During my researches into the authorities required by the subject of my lectures, I thought I had further occasion to observe, that the territory I had begun to explore, had not by any means received a sufficiently careful cultivation, and that it was yet capable of offering much useful and desirable produce. This holds good even when we regard the matter from the mere historical point of view. But it cannot fail to occur, that by bringing to light data not sufficiently used, because they were not thoroughly understood, or had been consigned again to oblivion; the higher scientific judgment, on the mutual relations of the Christian communities, will be rendered more mature and circumspect. Whether my enquiries, in either respect, have been attended with any success, it is for competent judges to decide. Thus much, at least, I believe I may assert, that my labours will offer to Catholic theologians especially, many a hint, that their industry would not be unrepaid, if in this department they were to devote themselves to solid researches. For several decades, the most splendid talents spend their leisure, nay, give up their lives, to inquiries into the primitive religions and mythologies, so remote from us both as to space and time; but the efforts to make us better acquainted with ourselves, have evidently been more rare and less perseverant, in proportion as this problem is a matter of nearer concern than the former. There are not, indeed, wanting a countless multitude of writings, that dilate in prolix dissertations on the relations between the different Churches. But alas! their authors too often possess scarcely the most superficial knowledge of the real state of facts; and hereby it not unfrequently comes to pass, that treatises, which would even perhaps merit the epithet of ingenious, tend only to render the age more superficial, and to cause the most important questions that can engage the human mind and heart, to be most frivolously overlooked. Such sort of writings are entitled "Considerations;" while, in truth, nothing (objective) was at all *considered;* but mere phantoms of the brain that passed before the writer.

Pacific objects, also, induced me to commit this work to the press; and these objects I conceived I should be able to attain, by giving the most precise and the most unreserved description of the doctrinal differences. I did not, indeed, dream of any peace between the Churches, deserving the name of a true reunion, as being about to be established in the present time. For such a peace cannot be looked for in an age, which is so deeply degraded, that even the guides of the people have oftentimes so utterly lost sight of the very essence of faith, that they define it as the adoption of what appears to them probable, or most probable; whereas its nature consists in embracing, with undoubting certainty, the revealed truth, which can be only one. As many men now believe, the heathens also believed; for they were by no means devoid of opinions respecting divine things. When in so many quarters there is no faith, a reunion of faith is inconceivable. Hence, only an union in unbelief could be attained; that is to say, such a one wherein the right is mutually conceded to think what one will, and wherein there is therefore a mutual tacit understanding, that the question regards mere human opinions, and that it is a matter left undecided, whether in Christianity God have really revealed Himself or not. For with the belief in Christ, as a true envoy of the Father of light, it is by no means consistent, that those who have been taught by him, should be unable to define in what his revelations on divine things consist, and what, on the other hand, is in contradiction to his word and his ordinances. All things, not this or that in particular, appear, accordingly, opposed to a religious union. A real removal, therefore, of the differences existing between the Christian communities, appears to me to be still remote. But in the age in which we live, I flattered myself that I might do something towards bringing about a religious peace, by revealing a true knowledge of the great dispute; in so far as by this knowledge, men must come to perceive, that that contest sprang out of the most earnest endeavours of both parties to uphold the truth,—the pure and genuine Christianity in all its integrity. I have made it therefore my duty, to define, with the utmost possible precision, the points of religious difference; and nowhere, and at no time, to cloak and disguise them. The opinion sometimes entertained, that the differences are not of importance, and affect not the vitals of Christianity, can conduce only to mutual contempt; for opponents, who are conscious of not having adequate grounds for opposing each other, and yet do so, must despise one another. And, certainly, it is this vague feeling, of being an adversary of this stamp, that has in modern times given rise to violent sallies on the part of many Protestants against Catholics, and *vice versâ;* for many, by a sort of self-deception, think by these sallies to stifle the inward reproaches of their conscience, and mistake the forced irritation against an opposite communion, for a true pain on account of the rejection of truth on the part of its adherents. Even the circumstance is not rare, that an ignorance of the true points of difference leads to the invention of false ones. And this certainly keeps up a hostile, uncharitable, spirit of opposition between parties, far more than a just and accurate knowledge of the distinctive doctrines could do; for nothing wounds and embitters more than unfounded charges. From the same cause it so frequently happens, that men on both sides charge each other with obduracy of will, and with a selfish regard to mere personal and transitory interests, and ascribe to these alone the divisions in religious life. Protestants are uncommonly apt, without hesitation, to ascribe to what they denominate hierarchical arrogance and the plan of obscuration, any resistance in the Catholic Church to the full influx of Protestant light. Many Catholics, on the other hand, are of opinion, that, in the same way as at the commencement of the Reformation, political interests, and the desire to exercise over the Church an absolute domination, were the sole inducements that engaged princes to embrace and encourage the Protestant doctrines; and domestic ease, sensual gratifications, hollow arrogance, and a frivolous love of independence, were the only motives that brought over Churchmen to the new opinions; so this is for the most part the case, even at the present day. These charges, indeed, of pride, arrogance, and the rest, which parties bring against each other, cannot, alas! be entirely disputed. We know, moreover, from experience, that everywhere there are very zealous men, who, in their conduct towards opposite communions, are not actuated by quite base motives, yet have immediately in view only the interests of a party, a faction, or a system, and not the cause of Divine truth, especially in its living manifestation in Christ Jesus, who should alone be the object of our love, and all else, only in so far as it is nearly or remotely connected with that love. All this, indeed, is unquestionably true. Yet it would betoken very great narrowness of mind, if the duration of the mighty religious contest were not sought for in deeper causes than in those assigned. Under these circumstances, I conceived it were no small gain, if I should succeed in drawing back attention entirely to the matter itself, and in establishing the conviction, that in the conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism, moral interests are defended; a conviction, which, as it implies in the adversaries earnestness and sincerity, must lead to more conciliatory results, and is alone calculated to advance the plan, which, in the permission of so fearful a strife, Divine Providence had in view.

Lastly, I must mention also a phenomenon of the age, which, if I remember right, first inspired me with the thought of committing to the press my treatises on the distinctive doctrines of the Christian communions. For a long time Lutheranism seemed to have entirely disappeared from Germany,—at least to possess no voice in public opinion; in fact, it was scarcely represented in literature by a single theologian of any name. In our thoughtful Germany, the gloomier Calvinism never found itself really at home; and when it penetrated into some of its provinces, it was almost always with considerable modifications. Its real home has always been a part of Switzerland and of France; next Holland, England, and Scotland.

Through the great revolution in public affairs during our times, the old orthodox Protestantism has again assumed new life, and not only finds many adherents among the clergy and laity, but in the number of its partisans can reckon very able theologians. As was natural to be expected, it immediately marked out its position relatively to the Catholic Church, and assailed the latter with all the resources it could command. The more this party visibly increases, and, partly by its junction with the Pietistic movement that had previously existed, partly by the encouragement of one of the most influential cabinets in Germany,* begins again to constitute a power; the more must Catholics feel the necessity of taking up their right position in respect to it, and of clearly discerning the true nature of the relation wherein they stand towards it. This, however, is not so easy, as we might at the first view imagine. For when from Rationalism and Naturalism we must turn our thoughts to the old Protestantism as represented in the symbolical books, we are required to transport ourselves into a totally different religious world. For while for the last fifty years Catholics have been called upon to defend only the Divine elements in Christianity, the point of combat is now changed, and they are required to uphold the human element in the Christian religion. We must now march precisely from one extreme to the other. Yet the Catholic has this advantage, that his religious system embraces as well what constitutes an object of one-sided or exclusive reverence with the rationalist, as what the orthodox Protestant, with an equally one-sided or exclusive veneration, adheres to in Christianity. In fact, these two contrarieties are in the Catholic system adjusted, and perfectly reconciled. The Catholic faith is as much akin to one principle, as to the other; and the Catholic can comprehend the two, because his religious system constitutes the unity of both.

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* Prussia is here alluded to.—*Trans.*

The Protestant rationalists are indebted to Luther, only in so far as he acquired for them the right to profess completely, the reverse of what he himself, and the religious community he founded, maintained. And the orthodox Protestants have with the rationalists no tie of connexion, save the saddening conviction, that Luther established a Church, the very nature whereof must compel it to bear such adversaries with patience in its bosom, and not even to possess the power of "turning them away." The Catholic, on the other hand, has with either party a moral affinity, inherent in his very doctrines: he stands higher than either, and therefore overlooks them both. He has alike what distinguishes the two, and is therefore free from their one-sided failings. His religious system is no loose, mechanical, patchwork combination of the two others, for it was anterior to either; and when it was first revealed to the Church, organically united the truth, which in the other two is separated. The adverse parties seceded from the Catholic Church, breaking up and dividing its doctrine—the one appropriating the human, the other the divine principle in Christianity; just as if the indivisible could be at pleasure divided!

I have further to observe, that German solidity, or German pedantry, or German distrustfulness, call it by what name we will, appeared to me to require that I should give the passages I quoted at full length. The reader is thus enabled to form his own judgment, by the materials brought before him, or at least is furnished with the means for testing the judgment of the author. I was bound to suppose, that to by far the greater number of my readers the symbolical books of the Protestants, the writings of Luther, Zwinglius, and Calvin, were inaccessible; and if I were unable to preserve the true medium between an excess and a deficiency in quotations, I preferred to offend by the former. He, who is unable to read the quotations, which are for the most part thrown into the notes, can easily pass them over. On the other hand, it cannot be said, that he who would feel desirous to make himself acquainted with the passages cited, could have easily collected these himself.

Tubingen, 1832.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

From the attention with which the theological public have been pleased to favour this work, I have conceived it my duty to endeavour, as much as the small space of time that intervened between the first and the second edition, allowed, to improve and even to enlarge it. In the first part, there are few sections, which, whether in the language, or whether by additions or omissions in the texts, or in the notes, have not undergone changes advantageous, as I trust, to the work. Under the article of faith, the seventeenth section has been newly inserted; and the twenty-seventh section, which contains a more precise definition of the real distinctive points in the theological systems of Luther and of Zuinglius, was not found in the first edition. The article on the Church has undergone considerable changes; the addition of the thirty-seventh section appeared to me peculiarly calculated to render more clear the theory of the Catholic Church.

In the second part, the article on the Methodists has been entirely recast, as I have now been able to procure Dr. Southey's *Life of Wesley*. Clarkson's *Portraiture of Quakerism*, which, in despite of many endeavours, I had been unable to obtain in time for the first edition, but which has since come to hand, has been less useful for my purpose than I had expected.

In the Introduction, it has appeared to me expedient to enter into more particulars as to the use, which, in a work like the *Symbolism*, is to be made of the private writings of the Reformers. I have deemed it useful also to point out there the important distinction, which, in all Symbolical researches, should be observed between the use of the private writings of the Reformers, and that of the works of Catholic theologians.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

The information of my publisher, that the second edition is out of print, was too sudden to allow me to bestow on this third edition those improvements which I would fain have made, and whereof it stood in so much need. There is but one article I can name, which has undergone an important amelioration; it is the eighth section, on original sin; for in the former editions, there were some historical notices, touching the Catholic views of that doctrine, that much needed correction.

The very ponderous criticism on my *Symbolism*, which in the meanwhile Professor Baur has put forth, I will leave unnoticed in the present work, for the necessary discussions would occupy proportionally too great a space, to find insertion either in the notes or in the text. I have therefore preferred to write a separate reply, which, please God, will soon be sent to press.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

After the publication of the third edition, which appeared at the beginning of the year 1834, I saw myself compelled to compose a defence of the *Symbolism*. It has already appeared, under the title, *New Investigations*, etc. (*Neue Untersuchungen*.) In this work, many subjects having reference to the controversy, and which in the *Symbolism* had been only lightly, or not at all, touched upon, were more fully treated; while not a few articles have been investigated under a new point of view, others more precisely defined, and several more fully established. From this book nothing has been transferred to the fourth edition of the *Symbolism*. I held it to be my duty to make no essential alteration in the form, under which the present work was originally presented to the public, and under which it has been favoured with their indulgent attention. To notice in the body of the work the various writings, treatises, and reviews, that have been directed against it, I conceived to be in every way unsuitable; independently even of the fact, that I was unwilling to see the pacific tone of the *Symbolism* converted into an angry and warlike tone. Yet some things have been amended in this fourth edition ; others have been added. These are changes which could be made without any external provocation, and without any alteration of my original plan, and as have formerly been made in every new edition.

By God's providence the *Symbolism* has hitherto produced much good fruit, as from many quarters has been related to me, partly by word of mouth, and partly by writing. Even Protestant periodicals, as, for example, the *Evangelical Church Gazette* (*Evangelische Kirchen Zeitung*) of October 1834, do not in their peculiar way call this fact in question. May it be still further attended with the blessing of the Saviour, who from the beginning hath ever chosen weak and imperfect things for the instruments of his glorification !

PREFACE OF THE GERMAN EDITOR TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

WHILE the fifth edition of this work was in the press, the Catholic Church of Germany had the affliction to see its illustrious author snatched away from her by an untimely death. If his loss for Catholic literature be an event so deeply to be deplored, it is so especially in reference to the *Symbolism*. The lamented author had intended to introduce many amendments into this new edition, and so to render it more complete,—partly by transferring into it several things from his work, entitled, *New Investigations of Doctrinal Differences*,—partly by incorporating with it the results of new researches. As regards a very considerable part of the work, his intention he has happily been able to carry into effect. Many articles and sections—as, for example, that on original sin—have received from him extension or greater precision, or have been entirely recast. The like he had designed in respect to the articles on the doctrine of the sacraments, and the following sections. Down to the close of his life, this concern of his heart ever occupied him; but the final execution of his design was not permitted by Divine Providence.

May this new edition produce those blessed effects, which had ever been intended by the author, and that have, doubtless, gained a rich recompense for him before the throne of God!

Munich, 21 *June*, 1838.

DOMINICAN COLLE

MEMOIR OF DR. MOEHLER.

Many of the facts related in the following biographical sketch, rest on the authority of two short memoirs of the illustrious writer, the one by Dr. Ruhn, professor of Catholic theology at the university of Tübingen, the other by the anonymous author of the interesting introduction prefixed to the fifth German edition of the *Symbolism*. For many other particulars, I have been indebted to the kindness of Dr. Reithmayr, professor of divinity at the university of Munich, as well as to that of Dr. Benkert, dean of Würzburg, and of Dr. Dux, rector of the ecclesiastical seminary in the same city.

The following memoir is preceded by an historical survey of the state of Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany during the last hundred years. To enable the English reader the better to understand the general scope and tendency of the work I have translated, as well as the many allusions and references it contains to the great changes that in modern times have occurred in the Protestant theology of Germany, I have endeavoured, according to my humble ability, to take a rapid historical view of those changes. Though, indeed, only the elder Protestantism, in its opposition to the Catholic Church, is analyzed in this work, and the Rationalism, which sprang up in Germany towards the middle of the eighteenth century,—and which has almost entirely superseded the old Lutheranism,—is, for the reasons assigned by the author himself, not here formally investigated; still, as frequent comparisons are instituted between the older and the more modern systems of German Protestantism, some degree of acquaintance with the latter is evidently highly useful for the better understanding and appreciation of the work now translated. But this great revolution in the German Protestant Church can be comprehended in all its bearings, and estimated in all its results, only through a comparison with the state of German Catholicism during the same period. Under this impression, I have placed, beside the representation of German Protestantism, a corresponding picture of the Catholic Church. I conceived, too, that by such an historic portraiture of the latter, the moral and intellectual influence of the illustrious divine, whose biography I have attempted to trace, would be better discerned and more fully appreciated.

In drawing up this preliminary historic sketch, the authorities I have consulted, are, on the Catholic side, Dr. Döllinger's continuation of Hortig's *Church History*,* the *Compendium of Ecclesiastical History*,† by Dr. Alzog, and Görres's *Historico-political Journal*;‡ and on the Protestant side, the Rev. Mr. Rose's *Lectures on the State of Protestantism in Germany*,§ Professor Tholuck's essay, entitled, *Historic Sketch of the Revolution, which, since the year* 1750, *has occurred in*

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* Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, fortgesetzt von J. Döllinger. Landshut, 1828.

† Universal-Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche. Mainz, 1841.

‡ Historisch-politische Blätter, von Phillips und Görres.

§ Cambridge, 1825.

German Theology,* and the *Manual of Church History*,† by Dr. Hase.

In a work which has recently appeared in Germany, and is attributed to the pen of an eminent Protestant, we find a passage, where the history of German Protestantism, from the commencement of the Reformation, down to the middle of the eighteenth century, is traced in a few brief, vigorous, and masterly strokes. This passage I prefer to cite, rather than attempt on my part any delineation of the same subject. "The first fifty years," says this writer, "that followed on the outbreak of the Reformation, witnessed incessant wranglings, disputes, and mutual anathematizings, between the several Protestant parties; first between Luther and Zwinglius, next between the rigid Lutherans and the Crypto-Calvinists, and so on. When, after long intrigues, and tedious negotiations, the Chancellor of Tübingen, James Andrea, succeeded, about the year 1586, in abtaining acceptance for the so-called *Formulary of Concord*, the theological strife receded from the arena of public life into the school; and for the whole century that followed, the Protestant Church was distinguished for a narrow-minded polemical scholasticism, and a self-willed, contentious theology. The Lutheran orthodoxy, in particular, degenerated more and more into a dry, spiritless, mechanical formalism, without religious feeling, warmth, and unction. The same authors of the new faith, that had with so much violence contested the Church's prerogative of infallibility and her tradition, desired now to claim for their own symbolical books a divine origin, and an exemption from error. They, whose religious community was founded in the principle of recognizing Scripture as the sole standard of faith, now disputed its right to be the exclusive depository of the Divine Word. They, who had refused to the Catholic Church infallibility, now pretended to an absolute and immutable possession of revealed truth.

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* Abriss einer Geschichte der Umwälzung, welche seit 1750 auf dem Gebiete der Theologie in Deutschland statt gefunden. Vermischte Schriften von Dr. Tholuck. Hamburg, 1839.

† Kirchengeschichte von Dr. Karl Hase. Leipzig, 1841.

In opposition to this Protestant orthodoxy, that had fallen away from the fundamental principle of the Reformation, and therefore clung with the greater obstinacy to the letter of its symbolical books, Spener insisted upon a living faith rooted in the regenerate will, and undertook to revivify religion, that had perished in the stiff forms of a mechanical orthodoxy. But from his very confined views on philosophy and speculative theology, from his aversion to all settled and defined religious notions, from his indifference about dogmas in general, from his deficiency in a solid ground-work of learning, and an undue propensity to a false mysticism (whereby he bears a remote affinity to the Quakers, and other sects); from all these defects, Spener was unable to bring about the completion of the Reformation, which he had promised, although on several leading points he entertained convictions, which fitted him for reforming the Lutheran doctrines.

The Protestant orthodoxy having succeeded, by anathemas and persecution, in reducing to temporary silence the first commotions of the yet impotent Rationalism, sank into soft repose on its pillow. But, in the midst of German Protestantism, an alliance had been formed, which at first appeared to be of little danger, nay, to be even advantageous, but which soon overthrew the whole scaffolding of doctrine, that the old Protestant orthodoxy had raised up, and precipitated Protestant theology into that course, which has in the present day led it entirely to subvert all the dogmas of Christianity, and totally to change the original views of the Reformers."*

The principle of rationalism is inherent in the very nature of Protestantism; it manifested itself in the very origin of the Reformation, and has since, to a greater or a less extent, and in every variety of form, revealed its existence in almost every Protestant community. In the less vigorous constitution of Lutheranism, it had fewer obstacles to encounter than in the Calvinistic Churches, and more particularly in the Anglican establishment. It entered too, undoubtedly, into the designs of Providence, that the people, which had been the first to welcome the so-called Reformation, should be also the first to pay the bitter penalty for apostacy; that the land, which had first witnessed the rise of the Protestant heresy, should be likewise the first to behold its lingering, painful, and humiliating dissolution.

But the several causes, which, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, brought about this great moral distemper in the Protestant Churches of Germany, as well as the forms, which the malady successively assumed, I will now endeavour to describe.

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* Der Protestantismus in seiner Selbst-Auflösung, von einem Protestanten. (Protestantism in its Self-dissolution, by a Protestant.) Schaffhausen, 1843, pp. 291-3, vol. ii. This work, which now excites no inconsiderable sensation in Germany, was at first attributed to the pen of the illustrious Hurter; but it is written by another eminent Protestant, who, it is confidently stated, is on the eve of embracing the Catholic faith.

It was in the department of biblical exegesis, that this movement of rationalism first displayed itself. The school of Michaelis, with its false, over-fastidious, worldly-minded criticism, treated the Scriptures with levity and even disrespect, denied the inspiration of some portions of the Bible, and debased and vulgarized its doctrines. The same views were carried out with much greater boldness and consistency by Semler, who, abusing the right principle that in the interpretation of Scripture regard should be had to the language wherein it is written, and to the history of the times at which it was composed, degraded the dignity of the Bible, by circumscribing its teaching within mere local and temporary bounds, diluted its doctrines, and attached importance to those parts only, where a moral tendency was clearly visible. From this period the Lutheran divines became divided into three classes. There were, first, those who remained true to the symbolical books; secondly, those who, like Nösselt and Morus, insisted more particularly on the ethics of Christianity, and without positively rejecting all its peculiar dogmas, declared them to be of no essential importance; and thirdly, those who, like Reimarus and the elder Eichhorn, systematically pursuing the work commenced by Semler, not only assailed the inspiration of the Bible, but rejected its prophecies, denied most of the miracles it records, and refused to acknowledge in Christianity aught else than a mere local and temporary phenomenon. Nay, two celebrated theologians of Berlin, Teller and Spalding, did not hesitate to enter into a secret confederacy with professed infidels, like Nicolai, Engel, Sulzer, and the rest, for the purpose of purifying, as they professed, the doctrines of the Christian religion. This confederacy was entitled,

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"Association for the diffusion of light and truth." And this is the place to say a few words respecting "the popular philosophers," as they were called, who openly and recklessly attacked that revelation, which the theologians I have described were insidiously and covertly undermining.

The writings of the English Deists, in the early part of the eighteenth century, exercised a very pernicious influence in Protestant Germany; and later, the contemporaneous literature of the French infidels, so much encouraged by Frederic II, excited there a spirit of disastrous emulation. A society was formed so early as the year 1735, by Knatzen and Edelman, for the diffusion of irreligious pamphlets and writings, in which not only all Christianity was decried, but the most daring atheism unblushingly avowed. Nicolai, whose name has already occurred, established, about the year 1765, at Berlin, a literary review, with the object of propagating the pernicious doctrines of a shallow illuminism; and in that infancy of German literature, when this periodical had scarcely a rival to encounter, the influence it exerted was more extensive, than can at present be even conceived. Bahrdt and Basedow, at the same time, in cheap and popular tracts, scattered among the lower classes the poison of infidelity; and they, as well as Nicolai, were in close communication with Weisshaupt, who, in Bavaria, had founded the order of the Illuminati, for the purpose of undermining the foundations of the throne and the altar. I may here observe, that in Catholic countries infidelity assumes a very different aspect, and is forced to pursue a very different policy, than among Protestant nations. In the former countries, unbelief, reprobated by the Church, driven from her communion, finding her on every point a vigilant, unassailable, unrelaxing, unrelenting adversary, is compelled to hide its head in secret societies, or if it brave the daylight, it then wages fierce, immitigable warfare with Catholicity. But in Protestant states, such a mode of warfare, on the part of infidelity, is neither necessary nor expedient for its purpose. As it springs out of the very root of Protestantism; as it is but a natural and necessary development of its doctrines; as it differs from the latter not in essence, but in degree only, it is its policy (and we see it practise it invariably), to flatter the Protestant Church, to court its alliance, to mingle with its teaching, to soften down its own principles in order the better to diffuse them, and, when threatened with exclusion, to appeal to Protestant principles, and defy condemnation.

It is objected, that infidelity abounds as much in Catholic as in Protestant countries, and that therefore it cannot be said, that Protestantism is more favourable to its growth than the rival Church. But a few remarks will suffice to show the futility of such an objection. In the first place, it is true that Voltaire, like Luther, went out of the Catholic Church; but while the Coryphæus of French infidelity extolled the Reformation, eulogized the Reformers, and boasted that he himself came to consummate the work they had left incomplete, he waged the fiercest hostility against the Catholic Church and her ministers. And the Deists of England and Protestant Germany, though they came into less immediate collision with that Church, than Voltaire and his disciples, well knew where their most powerful and formidable antagonist was to be found. Secondly, if Protestantism were not more favourable than Catholicity to the growth of unbelief, how doth it happen that in those ages, when the Catholic Church exerted the greatest influence over mind and manners, over public and private life—ages, too, be it remembered, often distinguished for a boldness, an acuteness, and a depth of metaphysical inquiry, that have never been surpassed—how doth it happen, I say, that in those ages, infidelity was a thing so rare, so obscure, so insignificant? How doth it happen, that it followed so closely in the wake of the Reformation; that history makes mention of a sect of Deists in Switzerland, at the close of the sixteenth century; that in Protestant England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Deism assumed an attitude of such boldness, and attained to such fearful vigour and expansion; that at the commencement of the eighteenth century, the Protestant Bayle first introduced it into Catholic France; that Voltaire and the Encyclopedists confessed they borrowed the weapons for their anti-Christian warfare from the armoury of the English Deists; and that Rousseau, the most dangerous of the French infidels, was a Protestant by birth, and only developed the principles of Protestantism, and more than once declared, that if the divinity of the Christian religion could be demonstrated to him, he would not hesitate to embrace the Catholic faith?

Thirdly, it will not be denied, that Socinianism leads by easy gradations to unbelief; that some classes of Unitarians are distinguished from Deists only by their belief in the general credibility of the Bible;* and that therefore any Church, which will show itself indulgent towards Socinianism — any Church which openly or covertly, in a greater or less degree, will foster its tenets, proves itself thereby favourable to the propagation of Deism. Now Socinianism, like a poisonous plant, cast off from the Catholic soil of Italy, took root and flourished in the Protestant communities of Poland, attained during the eighteenth century to a most rank luxuriance in the Church of Geneva,* and at the same time cast a blighting shade over the Episcopal Establishment of England.

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* A learned prelate of the Established Church, the late Bishop Heber, characterized Unitarianism as "a system which leans on the utmost verge of Christianity, and which has been in so many instances a stepping-stone to simple Deism." See *Travels of an Irish Gentleman*, c. xliv.

Fourthly, if any doubt remained as to the intimate connexion between Protestantism and infidelity, it would be dispelled by the history of the German Protestant Churches during the last hundred years. There we see men holding important offices in the Church—pastors of congregations, superintendents of consistories, professors of theology—not only reject the authority of the symbolical books, and disavow almost all those Catholic dogmas which the Lutherans and Calvinists had hitherto retained, but openly assail the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures, deny the integrity and authenticity of large portions of the Old and the New Testament, allegorize the prophecies, and disbelieve, and sometimes even ridicule, the miracles recorded in the Bible. These opinions, professed more or less openly, carried out to a greater or a less extent, were once held by an immense majority of Protestant theologians, and even in despite of a partial reaction, are still held by the greater part. Yet they nevertheless retain their functions and dignities in the Protestant Church; they are thus enabled to propagate their doctrines with impunity; those Protestants, who protest against their opinions, still communicate with them *in sacris*: and when any attempt has been made to deprive them of their offices, it has been invariably unsuccessful. Against their orthodox opponents, they invariably appeal to the right of free inquiry, which is the fundamental principle of the Reformation; and on Protestant grounds, the position they take up is perfectly impregnable. For if the interpretation of the Bible belong to private judgment, the previous questions as to its authenticity, integrity, and inspiration, without the settlement whereof the right of interpretation becomes nugatory, must be submitted to the decision of individual reason. Thus has the most insidious and dangerous form of infidelity grown *naturally*, *immediately*, *and irresistibly*, out of the very root of Protestantism. The vampire of rationalism, while it cleaves to the bosom, and sucks the life-blood of the German Protestant Church, mocks, with a fiend-like sneer, her impotent efforts to throw off the monster—efforts which will never be attended with success, till the aid of the old Mother Church be called in. But I have digressed too long, and must not anticipate.

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* Rousseau, in his *Lettres de la Montagne*, says of the Genevese of his time, "When asked if Jesus Christ is God, they do not dare to answer. When asked what mysteries they admit, they still do not dare to answer. A philosopher casts a rapid glance at them, and penetrates them at once; he sees they are Arians or Socinians." A similar account of the Genevese is given by the Protestant writer, Grenus.

While obscure writers, like Nicolai, Bahrdt, and Basedow, were carrying on with the most reckless violence, and with the weapons of a most shameless ribaldry, the warfare against Christianity, which the Protestant theologians had insidiously commenced, the great critic, Lessing, the founder of the modern German literature, lent his powerful support to the anti-Christian league. While librarian at Wolfenbüttel, he edited a work, exposed by Reymarus, consisting of various irreligious essays, entitled *Fragments of Wolfenbüttel*, and which, from the tone of earnestness, and dialectic acuteness wherein they were written, exerted a very prejudicial influence over public opinion.

The vigorous mind of Lessing could not rest satisfied with the shallow illuminism of the eighteenth century, and his irreligious productions seemed oftener to spring out of a desire to torment the orthodox Lutherans of his day, than to be the result of his own inmost conviction. Sometimes he pushed his unbelief even to the Pantheism of Spinoza; and sometimes again he took up the Catholic side, and with that dialectic art, in which he was so great a master, proved the necessity of tradition for the right interpretation of Scripture.

The name of Lessing leads me naturally to speak of the German literature of the eighteenth century, in its relation to religion. This literature, considered as a whole, if not always decidedly hostile, was at least perfectly alien from the spirit of Christianity. As the Protestant theology of the day was fast reviving the doctrines and morality of paganism: so this literature, consciously or unconsciously, strove to awaken an exclusive enthusiasm in behalf of the moral and social institutions, the manners, the customs, the feelings, and modes of thinking of the heathen world. We all know what injurious effects the sudden revival and too partial cultivation of the old classical literature produced in the fifteenth century! Yet if in an age, when, in despite of the growing laxity and corruption of manners, the tone of society was still eminently Catholic, and the Church yet held such an immense sway over the minds and conduct of men, an ill-directed classical enthusiasm was attended with such mischief and danger; what must be the result, at a time when Christianity was almost entirely obliterated from the minds of many; when the Protestant Church of the day, instead of checking, encouraged the advances of heathenism; and when the new Hellenic enthusiasts called up the genius of paganism, not timidly, but openly and boldly,—not in mere translations and commentaries as heretofore, but in the popular poetry, in the drama, the romance, the critical essay, and the philosophic dialogue? And when the evocators were endued with that power of seduction, those irresistible magical spells, that belonged to the genius of a Lessing, a Herder, a Schiller, a Schelling, and a Göthe?

Thus the new literature, which was a child of the new Protestant theology, tended much to confirm its authority, and extend its influence.

Of Herder, Frederic Schlegel, in his history of literature, says, "in his earlier life he had pursued a better path, and sought to find in the primitive revelation the clue to all traditions, to all sagas, to all philosophy and mythology; and so we must the more regret, that in his later years he should have abandoned that light, and at last have totally sunk down into the fashionable ways of a mere shallow and insipid illuminism."*

Schiller was one possessed of high intellectul endowments, and noble qualities of heart, which, in a more genial clime, and under kindlier influences, would have, doubtless, produced far different fruits: but, as it is, we see a generous plant, whose foliage was too often nipped and blighted by the icy breath of a rationalist theology. The most pernicious influence, however, over the public mind was exerted by the mighty genius of Göthe. His cold, worldly-minded egotism—his epicurean aversion to all energetic patriotism and self-devoted heroism—his subtle, disguised sensuality—his utter indifference for all religious belief—and, on the other hand, his false idolatry for art, and his heathenish enthusiasm, arrayed in all the charms of the most seductive poetry, were most fatal to the cause of Christianity, and of all public and private virtue. Yet Göthe, too, had occasional glimpses of the truth. In his autobiography we find an interesting description of the extraordinary love for the Catholic liturgy and ceremonial, that had captivated his heart in boyhood. And even in later years this feeling had not entirely died away; for the same work contains some splendid pages on the seven sacraments of the Catholic Church, where their mutual connexion, and their exquisite adaptation to the wants of the human heart, and the necessities of human life, are set forth with a depth of thought and a beauty of diction, not surpassed by any Catholic divine.*

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* History of Literature (in German), vol. ii. p. 284. Vienna, 1822.

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* There is just above Bingen, on the Rhine, a beautiful little Catholic church, dedicated to St. Roch, commanding a superb view of the river, and where the scene abounds with the most glorious recollections in the ecclesiastical and civil history of Germany. To this church, which Göthe several times visited, he presented an altar-piece; and on one occasion he said, "Whenever I enter this church, I always wish I were a Catholic priest." This great poet was also a fervent admirer of the old German Catholic schools of painting, of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. That eminent convert, Dr. William von Schütz, relates the following remarkable observation which Göthe once made to him on this subject. On contemplating a painting of the old German school, Göthe observed, "Down to the period of the Reformation, a spirit of indescribable sweetness, solace, and hope, seems to live and breathe in all these paintings—everything in them

But if the polite literature of this period was so propitious to the growth and spread of Rationalism, the remark applies with far greater force to the systems of philosophy, that exerted so great an influence in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and the early part of the present. " The new philosophic systems," says Dr. Döllinger, " conceived, born, and bred in Protestantism, aided and promoted the progress of Rationalism. The Kantian philosophy declares the religion of reason to be the only true one. The *ecclesiastical faith*, that is to say, faith in the truths of a positive revelation, is there opposed to the *religious faith*, whose purport may be derived from every man's own reason. Revealed religion, according to this system, can and ought to be nought else, but a mere vehicle for the easier introduction of rational religion: the ecclesiastical faith will by degrees become extinct, and give place to a pure religion of reason, alike evident to all the world. In conformity with these principles, a new rule was set up for the interpretation of Scripture; to wit, that nothing was to be looked for in the Bible, save the mere religion of reason, and that everything else was to be regarded as a mere veil, or as an accommodation to the popular notion of the time, or as the private opinion of the sacred writer. All these theories perfectly harmonized with the favourite opinions of the day; and hence we may account for the extraordinary approbation which this philosophic system received on the part of so many Protestant theologians. By the side of the Kantian philosophy, the rival system of Jacobi found

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seems to announce the kingdom of heaven. But," he added, " since the Reformation, something painful, desolate, almost evil, characterizes works of art; and, instead of faith, scepticism is often transparent."—Katholische Stimmen, p. 82.

its partisans among the Protestant divines; and this philosophy was no less incompatible with the Christian religion, than that of Kant. According to Jacobi, religion, like all philosophic science, depends on a natural, immediate faith—an indemonstrable perception of the true and the spiritual; and any other revelation besides this inward one, doth not exist. "To the true religion," says he, in his work on Divine things, "no outward form can be ascribed, as the sole and necessary shape of its substance; on the contrary, the utter absence of all forms is characteristic of its very essence. As the glory of God lay hidden in Christ, so it lies hidden in every man." Lastly, as regards the philosophy of identity,* "Some of its disciples, especially the theologian Daub, have, doubtless, more justly appreciated the speculative value of some Christian dogmas. But none have succeeded in demonstrating the compatibility of the general principles of this philosophic system with the fundamental doctrines of Christianity; on the contrary, the followers of this philosophy put forth assertions, which are at open variance with the primary dogmas of that religion. Among these we may include the doctrine, that it is only in history the absolute first becomes personally conscious of himself, and that all things divided will finally return to identity: a doctrine which annihilates all personality."†

Emboldened and confirmed by these philosophical speculations, the theological Rationalism assumed a more decided tone and pursued a more daring course. Wegscheider, De Wette, Schott, Paulus, Bretschneider, Röhr, and others, successively arose, who denied the inspiration of the Bible, disputed the authenticity of many books of the Old and New Testament, explained away the Prophecies, rejected and ridiculed the miracles recorded in the Scriptures, threw out imputations on the intentions of the apostles, arraigned the wisdom of the Divine Saviour himself, and, lastly, contested the necessity, and even possibility, of a supernatural revelation. The game of the old Gnostic sects was revived. On the most arbitrary assumptions and frivolous hypotheses, entire books of Scripture were rejected; the genuineness of the most important passages of the Bible was disputed; even the authenticity of one or other of the Gospels was assailed; till at last, as Reinhard once observed, "whoever wished to obtain the applause of the critical journals, was obliged to declare some Scripture spurious, or attack some established doctrine." But between these Rationalists and the early heretics, with whom I have compared them, there is an important difference to be observed. The latter called in question the genuineness and authenticity of various portions of Holy Writ, not on critical grounds, but from polemical motives; they were led on to these assaults on the Scripture by an impassioned fancy, heated with strange, extravagant, and perverse, though often ingenious systems of philosophy. Among their modern imitators, on the other hand, it was the cold, critical understanding, directed by a mere negative hostility to the Christian religion, which engaged in these attacks on the Bible.

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* This is the name given to the pantheistic philosophy of Schelling.

† See Döllinger, Kirchengeschichte, pp. 393-4.

The men who treated the Scriptures, that they still affected to consider as the sole source and standard of faith, with such audacious irreverence—such atrocious profanity—could not be expected to pay much regard to the doctrines they taught, not even to those for which the elder Protestants, while they tore them from all living connexion with other Christian dogmas, had professed such exclusive attachment. Accordingly, we find the great doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of our Saviour, original sin, Christ's atonement and satisfaction, justification, grace, and the efficacy of the sacraments, even of the two retained by the old Lutheran Church—baptism and the Lord's Supper—positively rejected, or explained away, or debased to the lowest point of insignificance, by these Rationalist divines. Even the dogma of the resurrection of the flesh passed for a mere figurative representation of the idea of immortality; and the eternity of future torments was pronounced to be a mere chimera.

There is always the closest connexion between the doctrinal and the ethical system of any sect. In conformity with their frightful dualism, we see the ancient Gnostics alternate between the most extravagant asceticism and the wildest lust. The Arians, by denying the divinity of the Redeemer, had narrowed and choked up all the channels of grace, and were accordingly ever remarkable for a low tone of morality. The Reformers of the sixteenth century, with their doctrine of justification, swore eternal enmity to all the heroic virtues of Christianity, and effectually dried up that mighty stream of charity, which had fertilized and embellished our European soil, and covered it with countless institutions, formed to glorify God, and solace, sustain, and exalt humanity. The Rationalists, who so far outran the early Reformers in extravagance and blasphemy of teaching, outstripped them, too, in the licentiousness of their moral code; for what was more natural than that they, who had revived the principles of Paganism, should revive her morals also? Accordingly, the theologians, Döderlein and Caunabich, among other things, roundly assert, that fornication is blameless, and is not interdicted by the precepts of the Gospel.* Every branch of theological learning was subjected by degrees to the potent dissolvents of these subtle chemists; till at last, after the process of evaporation, a substance less Christian than Mohammedanism was found as the residuum.

These doctrines of unbelief, taught by the immense majority of the Protestant clergy, penetrated by degrees among all classes of the laity, and led to the general neglect of Divine service, to the perversion of youth in the establishments of education, to the desecration of the Sabbath, the fearful multiplication of divorce, and to general demoralization.

Yet a system so void, so absurd, so repugnant to Christian sentiment, could not long subsist without provoking a powerful reaction, especially among a people, like the Germans, so remarkable for deep feeling and inquisitive intellect. This coarse and vulgar Rationalism, whose flourishing era was from the year 1790 to 1810, now met with vigorous opponents in the theologians Reinhard, Storr, Flatt, Kleuker, Tittman, and, more recently, Neander, Tholuck, Hengstenberg, and several others; who, in the various departments of dogmatic theology, exegesis, and Church history, have, with considerable learning and ability, striven to infuse more Christian principles into the minds of their fellow-religionists. In the ranks of these more orthodox divines, however, it is vain to look for uniformity of doctrine among themselves, or concurrence with the formularies of the old Lutheran Church. The articles of that Church on original sin, on the atonement, on the imputation of Christ's righteousness, on the real presence in the Lord's Supper, and on the eternity of future torments, are in part rejected by some of their number. Schleiermacher, and after him Neander, have revived the heresy of Sabellius; and Tholuck has declared the Trinity to be no fundamental article of the Christian religion, but a later invention of the schoolmen.* So we see those, who at Berlin pass for High Church divines, would at Oxford, and even at Cambridge, be looked upon as low, very low, Churchmen.

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* See this fact stated in Döllinger's *Continuation of Hortig's Church History* (in German), p. 935. Landshut, 1828.

A small party, called "Old Lutherans," and headed by a fiery preacher named Claudius Harms, is the only one now existing which upholds in all its vigour the Lutheran orthodoxy. It is in the province of Silesia, only, that these religionists appear to have taken deep root. They are strenuous opponents of the union between the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches, brought about, in 1817, by the late King of Prussia, as well as to the new liturgy, which, in consequence of that union, the same monarch enforced on all the Protestant Churches in his dominions. Refusing to hold communion with the new mongrel Church, on which his Prussian majesty had bestowed the pompous epithet of "Evangelical," these old Lutherans resorted for worship to secret conventicles, which were often broken up by the military and police. Their ministers were sometimes thrown into prison, sometimes compelled to emigrate to America, and, on the whole, a very resolute contest was carried on by them with the Prussian government, until, on the accession to the throne of the present enlightened sovereign of that country, the men whom Luther, could he return to Germany, would alone recognize as his true spiritual sons, were admitted to the blessings of full religious toleration.

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* See Döllinger, ibid. p. 942.

The late King of Prussia had long cherished the darling project of uniting the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches. Looking at the matter with the eye of a soldier, he thought the junction of two such powerful bodies would present a bolder front to the Roman adversary; and he therefore seized the opportunity offered by the celebration of the tricentenary festival of the Reformation, to carry his scheme into execution. His majesty had also, during his stay at Vienna in 1814, been much impressed with the beauty, the majesty, and the touching holiness of the Catholic liturgy. He therefore conceived, that by the introduction of some of its forms and ceremonies into the Protestant service, that service would then possess greater attractions for its followers; the churches, in consequence, would be better attended; and a new barrier thus raised up against the progress of irreligion. This was the origin of the new liturgy he devised for what has since been called "the Evangelical Church."

The union between the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches, begun in Prussia in the year 1817, was adopted in Rhenish Bavaria in 1819, in the kingdom of Würtemberg in 1820, and in the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1821.

Yet the success of this royal work was more than problematical. The more violent Lutherans, as we have seen, refusing assent to the new ecclesiastical arrangements, seceded from the Established Church of Prussia, and held separate conventicles. Even some of those, however, who adhered to the Evangelical Church, took exceptions to several forms and ceremonies introduced into the new liturgy, as being of "a too Popish character;" and thus, as regards public worship, the desired uniformity was but imperfectly attained. The wish, so creditable to the honest, but sadly misguided, sovereign, who lately swayed the Prussian sceptre, to infuse, by an imitation of parts of the Catholic ceremonial, more dignity and unction into the public service of his own religious community, was still more fallacious. The Catholic understands the secret spring whence flows that unction—that sacred charm—that awe and majesty in his worship, which rivet the senses and win the hearts of all beholders. He knows that it is the great dogma of the Eucharistic sacrifice that gives life, and significancy, and importance, to all, even the minutest forms of his public liturgy.

But such an appreciation of things is impervious to the Protestant, and most of all to the Calvinist (for the late King of Prussia was by birth and education a Calvinist); and, therefore, that a certain set of forms and ceremonies, when detached from their natural connexion, and separated from the doctrine that alone imparted to them meaning and efficacy, should not produce the same fruits in the Protestant as in the Catholic worship, was to him an incomprehensible mystery.

If from the consideration of worship we proceed to that of doctrine, we shall find that the "union" was attended with even far less happy results,. "The Calvinists, in Germany at least," says Dr. Döllinger, "no longer attached importance to their founder's doctrine of absolute predestination; and the Lutherans had for the most part given up the old Lutheran doctrine of the real presence in the Eucharist, and had adopted the

Zuinglian theory. The authority of the symbolical books was at an end; and therefore, as regarded dogmas, no important obstacle appeared in the way of the desired union. Hence, under the influence of the King of Prussia, the conjunction of the two communions, the Lutheran and the Calvinistic, was, in the year 1817, brought about without any difficulty. The differences of belief in regard to the Lord's Supper, that still prevailed among the people, might in the opinion of the theologians be still allowed to continue under the union. In the reception of the outward Eucharistic signs, every individual was allowed to think what he pleased. Thus, according to this new theory, signs are the thing essential, but what should be understood by those signs is a matter of no importance. The union was made to consist in the mere declaration, that the members were united; and the new community was decorated with the title of the *Evangelical Church*."* Thus in our times was brought about the union of two communities, differing on the most important and fundamental doctrines of Christianity—an union which, whenever proposed in the age of the Reformation, was stigmatized as an abomination by Luther and his early followers. As the very principle and constitution of such an alliance presupposes religious indifference, so it is eminently calculated to confirm and diffuse it; and what the late King of Prussia and his counsellors devised as an instrument for checking the progress of irreligion, has conduced to its further spread among all classes of the people.

But the principal element of hope in Protestant Germany is, undoubtedly, Pietism. The great reform, which, towards the close of the seventeenth century, Spener attempted, and to a certain extent brought about, in the Lutheran Church, has been ably described in the second volume of the work now translated. It was the aim of Spener to infuse into that Church more of the ethical element, in opposition to the dry and sterile dogmatism of its symbolical books; to insist on the inward, moral, and spiritual regeneration of man; and to reform discipline and morals in his own religious community. He was the first to undermine the authority of the Lutheran formularies; and thereby he unconsciously prepared the way for that great revolution of Rationalism, which, as we have seen, has shattered to pieces the fabric of Lutheran orthodoxy. In the eighteenth century, Spener's disciples united with those of Zinzendorf, and assumed ever more and more a sectarian character; but though discountenanced and reprobated by the orthodox Lutherans, they form, in the words of Moehler, "the true salt of their Church."

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* Hanbuch der Kirchengeschichte, fortgesetzt von Döllinger, p. 906-7.

In the general shipwreck of Protestantism, visible in our time, this party appeared to many to offer the only plank of safety. And hence their numbers have been swelled, and their influence and importance vastly augmented by the accession of the most able and learned Protestant theologians, who, in their war against Rationalism, have put forward the Pietists as the vanguard. This party, as now constituted, is united rather by a general conviction of the truth of Christianity and a sense of piety, than by any defined set of doctrines. The belief in a supernatural revelation, in the authenticity and inspiration of Holy Writ, and in the prophecies and miracles it relates, seems to be the only bond of union; for as to special dogmas there is much division of opinion;* and there are even some Pietists who call in question our Lord's divinity.

Like some of our own Methodists, they are distinguished for a more careful culture of the religious feelings, than the bulk of Protestants; they are assiduous in prayer and in Bible-reading, active in the dissemination of religious tracts, and liberal in pecuniary contributions towards missionary objects; and though much less numerous than the Rationalists, they make up for that deficiency, by superiority of learning and talents, greater energy of zeal, and higher moral worth. Though, like the English sectaries with whom I have compared them, they often evince a bitter sectarian hostility to the Church; yet, like them, whenever they wish to excite a devotional feeling among their followers, they are obliged to have recourse to the works of our great divines and ascetical writers. The writings of Taulerus, the great mystic of the fifteenth century, the treatises of Thomas à Kempis, the Pensées of Pascal, and the sermons of Massillon, are held by them in great estimation. On the whole, in the desolate waste of German Protestantism, this religious party is like a rivulet, which, harsh, bitter, and brackish, though its waters often be, yet is cheering and refreshing to the eye of the Christian observer.

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* In the interesting German work I have already quoted, entitled "Protestantism in its Self-Dissolution," the divisions among the Pietist theologians are thus pointed out. "The union between the Protestant theology, and the belief of congregations, is purely illusive, and the clergy have for the most part become utterly unfit for their calling. How can they preach up to their parishioners a faith, which they do not themselves possess? And when even they have one, where is the bond of unity to keep them together? Does not Neander teach very differently from Tholuck? And Tholuck differently from Hengstenberg? And Hengstenberg differently from Krummacher? And Krummacher differently from Dräseke? And Dräseke differently from Harms? And Harms differently from Ullmann? And Ullmann differently from Lücke? And Lücke differently from Olshausen? And so forth. We are wont to speak of a Protestant Church; but where is it?"

Yet among these new religionists the same phenomenon has occurred, which the history of heretical sects has so often exhibited, where religious enthusiasm degenerates after a time into the darkest, most fearful fanaticism, and an ill-directed asceticism sinks into the most undisguised sensuality.

In Konigsberg a fanatical sect sprang out of this pietistic movement, and which under the name of Muckers, held errors not unlike those of some ancient Gnostics, and perpetrated the most shameless mysteries. These scandalous scenes, in which together with others, two Lutheran pastors and several persons of rank were engaged, drew down a long judicial investigation. In Saxony a fanatical pietistic party, headed by the pastor Stephan, was forced to emigrate to America, where after he had exercised over his followers the most unbounded despotism in spiritual and temporal matters, and abused his ecclesiastical authority to the gratification of his personal lusts, the religious community was broken up.

Swabia during the present century has brought forth several singular sects,* many members whereof, on emigrating to North America—that El Dorado of all false religious enthusiasts—have boldly proclaimed and carried out their monstrous opinions, preaching up, among other things, the community of goods and community of wives.†

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* See Hase Kirchen Geschichte, p. 520.

† In the year 1823, and in a part of German and Protestant Swit-

Yet while the pseudo-mysticism of Protestantism had run into such fearful aberrations, Rationalism still pursued her destructive career. In the year 1834, a teacher of theology at Tübingen, Dr. Strauss, published a book entitled "Life of Jesus," which, written with considerable learning and ingenuity, and composed in a tone of dogmatic assurance and imperturbable phlegm, concentrated in one focus, and raised to the most intense degree of extravagance, all the monstrous hypotheses and blasphemous sophisms put forth by preceding Rationalists. Deeply sunk as religious feeling and principle are in Protestant Germany, yet it is gratifying to observe, that as the celebrated Catholic biblical scholar, Flug, observes, this work has encountered the most formidable opposition among Protestant theologians, and that not a single eminent individual of their number has entirely subscribed to its doctrines. Yet this infamous book, for which Rationalists of a less

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zerland under the influence of the Swabian pietists, a scene of dreadful religious fanaticism occurred, which since the seventeenth century is perfectly unparallelled. The following account of it is taken from the Church History of a Protestant divine, Dr. Hase of Leipzick. "Margaret Peter," says he, "the daughter of a peasant at Wildenspuch, in the canton of Zurich, had by intercourse with the Herrnhutters and with Madame de Krüdener, been prepossessed with the idea, that she was exclusively charged with the spiritual salvation of the world. Her tone of spiritual authority and decisiveness caused the pious folks of the neighbourhood to revere her as a saint; and though she even fell into the crime of adultery, her faith in her own mission remained unshaken. In this feeling of her importance, she together with her disciples combated against Satan with carnal weapons; she caused her spiritual sisters to be slain; and pretending to have received a divine command to sacrifice Christ anew in her own person, she let herself with wonderful endurance be crucified, in order to redeem many thousand souls."—*Hase, Kirchengeschichte*, page 530.

decided stamp had prepared the way, has wrought immense mischief, and precipitated many, especially among the Protestant laity, into the depths of total unbelief.*

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* The theory of Strauss is as follows : without absolutely calling in question the existence of our Saviour, he asserts that the Gospels we now possess, were not composed before the close of the second century; and that the life, ministry, and miracles of Jesus Christ, as there recorded, were purely fictitious representations, traced according to that ideal of the Messiah prevalent among the Jews.

In reply to this monstrous theory, let a few observations suffice. In the first place, it supposes that the writings of all the Apostolic Fathers, contemporaries or immediate successors of the Apostles, and which contain such clear and numerous quotations from the Gospels, and other scriptures of the New Testament, were forgeries of the third century. Secondly, it supposes, that the writings of St. Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and others still more abounding in such quotations, were also forgeries of a like, or even later date. Thirdly, that the heretical literature of the former half of the second century, numerous fragments whereof survive in the pages of the early Fathers, and which furnishes such cogent, irrefragable, testimony in favour of the authenticity, the genuineness, and sometimes the Divine authority of the Four Gospels and other New Testament scriptures;—that this heretical literature, I say, was also an orthodox fabrication of the same period. Fourthly, that the work written against the Christian religion by the Pagan philosopher Celsus about the year 176 of our era, which admits the miracles of our Divine Lord as matters of incontestible notoriety, and refers to the narratives of supernatural events, contained in the historical books of Christians, with such distinctness and accuracy, as to establish their identity with the Gospels we now possess;—that this work, I say, composed by an acute, but malignant enemy of our faith, was a Christian production of a subsequent age. Fifthly, that the Jewish Mishna, compiled in the second century of the Christian era, and which, while it seeks to ascribe to fantastic causes the miracles of Christ, unequivocally admits their reality; (miracles, be it observed, the knowledge whereof came down to the Jews of that age by a channel of tradition totally independent of Christians) that the Jewish Mishna was likewise a Christian fabrication. Sixthly, that not only did the whole Christian world at the

Strauss, deprived of his place of private teacher of Protestant divinity in the University of Tübingen, was offered a few years ago, by the revolutionary government of Zurich in Switzerland, a theological chair; but an armed insurrection of the sounder portion of the Protestant population prevented this outrage on Christianity. In Halle, two years ago, a hundred and fifty students presented a petition to the government, that a professorship should be bestowed on this infidel. In Holstein, a party called "Philalethes," and in Berlin, another denominated "Freemen," have severally formed leagues to renounce all show of outward communion with any Christian Church whatsoever.

In the year 1841, a licentiate of Protestant theology at the university of Bonn, Bruno Bauer, published a work entitled "Criticism on the Evangelical History of the Synoptics;" a work which in licentious impiety surpassed even that of Strauss. The pantheistic views of Hegel, insinuated in Strauss's book, are distinctly avowed by Bauer; the identity of the Divine and the human consciousness openly proclaimed—and the personal existence of God and the immortality of the human soul denied. The author then, absolutely and

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close of the second age receive as authentic and divine, Scriptures which were spurious, *but also believe them to have been in universal circulation for one hundred and fifty years before.* Lastly, that the Christian Church antedated her own existence by a century and a half, and succeeded in enlisting in behalf of this imposture the unanimous assent not only of her own members, but of the heterodox, the Jews, and the Gentiles.

Such are the preliminary difficulties that encounter Mr. Strauss; and when he has been clever enough to overcome these, his most arduous task remains; for the main evidences of Christianity would still remain unshaken.

without restriction, rejects the authenticity and the credibility of the whole Gospel History.

The Prussian government, naturally conceiving it most absurd and dangerous that a man holding such principles should be allowed to remain a teacher of divinity, proposed to the several Protestant theological faculties within its dominions the two following questions: "What point of view does the author of the above-mentioned work hold in regard to Christianity," and whether the *licentia docendi* should be granted to him?" In reply to the two questions proposed, the several faculties of Berlin, Bonn, Halle, Breslau, Griefswalde, and Kœnigsberg, have published their opinions; and no documents that have ever appeared throw so clear and withal so fearful a light on the present state of German Protestantism. That Bauer's book is in *opposition* to Christianity is the opinion of the Faculty of Berlin with one exception, of the entire Faculty of Bonn, of that of Breslau with one exception, and of one half the members in the Faculties of Griefswalde and Kœnigsberg. That the work is *compatible with the essence of Christianity, though opposed only to its ecclesiastical development,* is the opinion of Professor Marheincke of Berlin, Professor Middledorpf of Breslau, and one half the members in the Faculties of Griefswalde and Kœnigsberg. As to the second question, whether the *licentia docendi* should be granted to the author, the opposition to Bauer was not quite so strong as on the first question. The Faculty of Bonn, which passes for the most orthodox in Protestant Germany, made the disgraceful remark, that if Bauer were permitted to teach theology, there would be no hindrance to any member of the Evangelical Church inculcating the doctrines of invocation of saints and the papal supremacy! This, doubtless, would be a great misfortune! But a greater misfortune it is, the candid Protestant Christian will confess, to see a theological faculty, calling itself Christian, and *Evangelical* to boot, place doctrines held by the immense majority of Christians on the same level with the grossest Pantheism!![*]

Had the Prussian government proposed the aforesaid questions to some other Protestant faculty, like that of Tübingen for example, it would have found the majority of members probably pronounce a declaration in favour of Bauer's infamous book; for the majority are there pantheistic. These dreadful doctrines have obtained alarming currency among the junior members of the theological, as well as philosophical faculties at several Protestant universities.

Thus have I tracked the restless spirit of negation through all its labyrinths for the last hundred years. We have seen it first question the genuineness of certain passages and books of Scripture; next reject the theory of Divine inspiration; then deny the authenticity of several of the Apostolic Epistles, and even Gospels; and afterwards subvert, one after another, all the Christian dogmas that the elder Protestantism had retained; till at last it has reached the ultimate term of folly and wickedness, and proclaimed the essential identity of the Divine and the human consciousness.

As the old orthodox Lutherans gave way to the Rationalists of the school of Semler, and these again to the Rationalists represented by Wegscheider and Paulus, so the latter are now, by many of the rising generation, forsaken for the *Mythic* divines, as Strauss and his followers are denominated.

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[*] See "Gutachten der Evangelisch theologischen Facultäten der Preussichen Universitäten über Bruno Bauer." Berlin, 1842.

Melancholy as is the picture which has here been drawn of the state of religion in Protestant Germany, let not the reader suppose, that all hopes of a religious regeneration there are utterly extinct. The remarkable reaction, headed by her most distinguished spirits, in favour of more Christian views, he has already had occasion to observe. A far more favourable sign, is that never intermitting stream of conversions, that for the last forty years has set in towards the Catholic Church, and which every year sees flow on with a more rapid tide, and in a more expansive course.

If among the middle and the lower ranks of society, conversions be not near so numerous, relatively to the population, as in Holland and in our own country, yet in the upper and more cultivated classes, they were, until very lately, of much more frequent occurrence. Germany is peculiarly circumstanced. There are vast districts in the north, where a Catholic priest and Catholic chapel are objects as rare as in North Wales; and unfortunately, in several of those provinces, like Wurtemberg and Baden, where the two Churches come in contact, the loose opinions and disedifying conduct, which until very lately were very generally prevalent among the Catholic clergy, were not of course calculated to raise their Church in the estimation of Protestants. In other parts, like the Rhenish Province, Westphalia, Bavaria, Silesia, and parts of Austria—districts where new elements of religious life are fermenting through the whole Catholic population, conversions are exceedingly numerous, and are annually on the increase.*

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* For instance, in the hereditary states of Austria, exclusive of Hungary, though the Protestant population lies thinly scattered, five

But the solution of the great problem that perplexes Protestant Germany—the return to a higher religious life, whereof she seems to have a dim anticipation—and whereof so many noble individual examples seem to be the necessary forerunners—the solution of this great problem, I say, mainly depends on the moral regeneration of Catholic Germany herself; and this leads me to the second part of this historical sketch, wherein I propose briefly to describe the destinies of the German Catholic Church for the last hundred years.

Catholic Germany, that, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, had opposed with so much energy the progress of the Reformation, sank after the great convulsions of the Thirty Years' War into a state of moral and intellectual languor, that lasted for the period of a hundred years. Under the auspices of Catholic prelates, however, many laudable attempts were made in that interval to bring about a reunion of Protestants with the Catholic Church; and Protestant princes, such as the Landgrave Ernest of Hesse, Frederick of Brunswick, Duke of Hanover, Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, and Alexander, Duke of Würtemberg, were successively admitted into her communion.

The number of ecclesiastical principalities in Germany, though on the whole conducive to the temporal welfare of the people, were in a spiritual point of view attended with great disadvantages. The prelates, too exclusively engaged with cares of state, often entirely abandoned to their coadjutors the spiritual administration of their dioceses; and there were instances in the

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hundred and forty-eight persons of various ranks were in the year 1840 converted to the Catholic Church.

last century, where the character of the bishop seemed entirely merged in that of the prince.*

That a certain share of political power and influence is necessary to the episcopacy, for the better protection of the interests of religion and morality, as well as of the Church's proprietary rights—for the conservation of order, and the promotion of popular freedom, cannot for a moment be doubted. That, moreover, the temporal sovereignty enjoyed by the Holy See was a means devised by Divine Providence for preserving intact its spiritual independence, the most superficial glance over the page of history may suffice to convince us. But whether in bishoprics, where independence is not of the same vital importance; which possess not the same promise of indefectibility and Divine assistance, and consequently are devoid of the same guarantees against the abuses and dangers attendant on the possession of secular power, such extensive political jurisdiction be conducive to the interests of religion, is a matter exceedingly questionable.

It was not so much, however, the temporal sovereignty of the prelates, as the too exclusively aristocratic composition of the capitular bodies, that operated so prejudicially to the well-being of the Church. The priesthood, as it holds the office of mediator between all ranks of society, should itself represent the blending of all classes; and as nobility is calculated to infuse into it moderation of temper and dignity of habits, so the commonalty pours into it a perpetual stream of energy, talent, and popular sympathy. In this, as in so many other instances, the noblest example has ever been set by Rome, whose Sacred College has in every age been open to virtue and merit, in the humblest, as well as in the highest ranks of life; and where it has so often happened, as even at this moment is the case, that the son of a peasant sits clad in the Roman purple by the side of a brother of the first Christian emperor.

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* An anecdote, illustrative of the observation in the text, is related of one of the electors of Mayence in the last century. Passing in his carriage one day through the streets of his capital, he saw a man taken suddenly very ill. He stopped his carriage, and bade his footman fetch a clergyman from a neighbouring church; and seemed totally to forget that he himself was invested with powers to render the poor man spiritual aid.

Yet there were other ecclesiastical potentates (and among these the Prince-bishops of Würzburg), who to the last remained true to the spirit of their sacred profession, and spent their ample revenues in promoting the interests of religion, and the moral and temporal well-being of their subjects.

The members of the German Chapters, thus exclusively composed, were too often listless and given up to ease, indifferent to literature, little concerned about the great objects and interests of the Church, and evincing activity only in the obscure intrigues that preceded and accompanied the election of a bishop.

If we except the laudable labours of the Benedictines, and the excellent writings of the Brothers Walenburg, the theological literature of that period was mostly confined to petty polemical skirmishes; while in the schools, divinity, finding few able expositors, was taught in the most dry, tasteless, and mechanical manner.

But in the reign of the excellent Empress Maria Theresa, a better spirit arose. Popular education was considerably extended, the theological schools underwent great improvements; and the method of instruction then adopted has been found so excellent, as to be ever since retained. Towards the close of this reign, however, the Jansenists became active and influential; a spirit of unworthy distrust towards the Holy See began to display itself; the odious placet on all papal bulls was, in imitation of France, established; and the evil genius, that so often blighted all salutary reforms in the eighteenth century, here again exerted its baneful influence.

Those principles of hostility to papal and episcopal power, which characterized the French Jansenists of the eighteenth century, and distracted and convulsed the Gallican Church, at the moment when she needed all her combined energies and resources in order to resist unbelief, found their way into Catholic Germany; where the relaxation of discipline, and the growing lukewarmness among a large portion of the clergy and laity, presented a too favourable soil to the growth of such principles. They found an organ and defender in John Nicholas von Hontheim, suffragan bishop to the Elector of Treves, who under the name of Febronius, published, in the year 1763, a work against the authority of the Holy See, under the pretence that by the depression of prerogatives peculiarly odious to Protestants, the return of the latter to the Catholic Church might be more easily brought about. " Hence he asserted," says Dr. Döllinger, " that the constitution of the Church is not monarchical, that it was not Christ, but the Church, that had conferred on the Roman pontiffs the supremacy; that the pope has, indeed, an authority over all Churches, but no proper jurisdiction; that his superiority among bishops is no more than the precedency allotted to the president or speaker of a parliament; and that he can indeed make laws, but that they receive a binding force only through *the unanimous* adhesion of all bishops."* The author, moreover, counselled princes to hold back the papal bulls, in order to impede the intercourse of their Churches with Rome, and thereby to force the latter into concessions; and also, with the advice of their prelates, to take in hand the reform of those national Churches. This work, condemned by the Holy See, and proscribed by several German bishops, called forth able replies from several distinguished divines of Germany and Italy. Yet the principles it inculcated, exercised for a long time a most fatal influence over public opinion, passed into the teaching of the theological schools, furnished the secular power with most formidable weapons against the liberties of the Church, and led to the degradation and oppression of the German clergy.

While such principles were leading minds astray, a prince arose, who was destined to enforce them in public life, and, by his great power, give to them the most fatal extension and diffusion. Imbued with the maxims of this insidious Jansenism, as well as with many of the false principles of Illuminism; vain, frivolous, and egotistical, yet not devoid of benevolent feelings, the perverted philanthropy of the emperor Joseph was the curse of his subjects. While with the view of improving the happiness of his people, he ventured on crude, precipitate, violent political reforms, that often infringed on their liberties, violated their ancient customs, and were repugnant to their feelings: his ecclesiastical reforms, that originated likewise in a true or affected zeal for the advancement of piety, were still more unsuccessful. True to the counsels of Febronius, he prescribed by ordinance the royal placet as a necessary condition to the reception of all papal bulls, whether of a doctrinal or a disciplinary kind, forbade recurrence to Rome in all matters, and took upon himself to transfer the right of giving dispensations, in matrimonial cases, from the Holy See to the bishops of his own dominions. He next cut off all communication between the heads of religious houses within his states and their superiors at Rome; proscribed all the contemplative orders, and tolerated none but those dedicated to the care of souls, attendance on the sick, and the instruction of youth; and at last, with few exceptions, dissolved all the monasteries, confiscated their property, and applied it to the endowment of parishes, the foundation of schools, and the building of barracks. His reforming zeal was then exerted on the public liturgy and worship, where the innovations he introduced attested at once the littleness of his mind and his reckless arrogance. The numerous confraternities devoted to exercises of piety, and the spiritual and corporal works of mercy, this ruthless enemy of the Church abolished also. The education of clerical students was withdrawn from the eye of the bishops; episcopal authority was everywhere invaded; those prelates who resisted the impious innovations of the emperor, were, by his agents, held up to odium and contempt; and writings more or less openly directed against the discipline, the constitution, and the dogmas of the Catholic Church, were encouraged and circulated by the government. He proclaimed the dissolubility of the nuptial tie, before the civil tribunals; and while he thus undermined the constitution of the family, as established by Christianity, he thereby, to a certain extent, severed the connexion between Church and State. The celibacy of the clergy he would fain have abolished, but was compelled to yield to the remonstrances of the Austrian prelates.

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* Döllinger's Continuation of Hortig's Church History (in German), p. 871.

The venerable pontiff Pius VI crosses the Alps to check the giddy, infatuated emperor in his headlong course. His remonstrances, exhortations, and prayers are unavailing; till the loud murmurs of Austria, the menacing attitude of Hungary, and the open revolt of Flanders, rouse the monarch from his illusion. He lived to see, in part, the futility of his efforts; but his career was terminated before he could consummate the schism in Austria.

The ecclesiastical policy of this imperial revolutionist well deserves our consideration, because it has been the main source of all the evils that for the last fifty years have afflicted the German Church. Those prelates who had encouraged this monarch in his encroachments on the papal power, lived to become the victims of that policy;—the blow levelled at a higher authority recoiled on themselves; their jurisdiction was soon infringed, trampled on, and despised; and experience proved, on this, as on so many former occasions, that the safest bulwark of national Churches, against the assaults of the secular power, is in their firm adherence to the Apostolic See. In the suppression of monasteries, Joseph II was doubtless an unconscious instrument in the hands of a high retributive Justice, for the chastisement of declining piety and relaxing zeal. Yet here, as elsewhere, the abolition of those institutes left an irreparable void in society. In directing their first attacks against the *contemplative* orders, the revolutionists of the last, as of the present century, struck at the very root of the monastic life. For all outward energy,—

all zealous manifestations of love for God and our neighbour,—all heroic exercises of works of mercy, spiritual and corporal,—have their foundation in prayer and heavenly contemplation, which form the basis of all religious communities, though in some the exercise be more rigidly prescribed, and more prominently practised, than in others.

The fountains of education were now often poisoned: the instruction of youth, wrested from the hands of the vigilant guardians of virtue, was entrusted to men devoid of the same guarantees, or even the avowed partizans of schismatical and irreligious principles; while in the duties of the sacred ministry, in the care of the infirm, and in the relief and education of the poor, the secular clergy lost often zealous cooperators, and admirable models in the path of virtue.

The suppression of the religious confraternities was also a most fatal blow to the cause of public virtue. These admirable sodalities foster faith and piety among their members, inspire deeds of benevolence, keep up a holy concord among citizens of all classes, and are to laymen (even such as are not therein enrolled) what religious orders are to the secular clergy,—perpetual incentives to the practice of the higher virtues. The destruction of these pious brotherhoods was followed, in Vienna, by the establishment of various societies for the promotion of worldly gaities and profane amusements. So indestructible is the spirit of association in the mind of man!

The elaborate despotism which Joseph had contrived for the oppression of the Church, though modified by his successors, has long continued to enervate episcopal authority, to check the zeal of the inferior clergy, to thwart the efforts and weaken the influence of those religious orders that were originally retained, or have since been restored, and to dry up, among the people, many springs of spiritual life.

The spirit of distrust and alienation towards the Holy See, inspired by the writings of Febronius, and encouraged by the legislation of Joseph II, finds still, unhappily, its adherents among a portion of the Austrian priesthood, and a large body of the civil functionaries ; while in some other parts of Germany, that spirit terminated in the open profession of schismatical principles.

Lastly, the sacrilegious spoliation of monastic property on the part of this emperor, as well as the encouragement he gave to a licentious, irreligious press, coupled with his avowed contempt for all ancient customs, popular franchises and liberties, and the prescriptive rights of civil corporations, led to the loss of his Belgian provinces, facilitated the triumph of the arms and the principles of French Jacobinism, and the consequent dismemberment of the Germanic empire, and brought about that long train of calamities, disgraces, and humiliations, that Austria was destined to endure.

While the head of the empire was thus waging war against the Church, she received severe blows from those who were her natural protectors and defenders. The extensive jurisdiction, which for two centuries the papal nuncios had exercised in Germany, and which had been conferred on them in order to check the progress of the Reformation, now irritated the jealousy of some German prelates, and rendered them, in the general religious laxity of the age, but too well disposed to lend a willing ear to the doctrines of Febronius. Imbued to a certain extent with those opinions, and spurred on by the counsels and example of Joseph, the three ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, accompanied by the archbishop of Salzburg, met in the year 1786, at the baths of Ems, and there framed a series of articles, called the twenty-six points, insulting to the dignity, and derogatory to the rights, of the Holy See. They were to the effect, that episcopal jurisdiction should be freed from those restraints, whereby recurrence to Rome is rendered necessary; that the right of dispensation in matrimonial cases, down to the second degree, belonged of right to bishops; that all papal bulls and breves must first be sanctioned by the acceptance of the bishops; that annats and dues for the reception of palliums be abolished, and an equitable tax substituted; that in cases of appeal the pope must select *judices in partibus*, or leave them to the determination of a provincial council; and that the prelates, when restored to the possession of their original rights, would undertake a reform of ecclesiastical discipline.

These articles, some whereof struck at the essential rights of the papal power, others at long-established usages, sanctioned by the authority or practice of the Church, were strenuously resisted by several German prelates, as well as the Pope's nuncio at Cologne. The next year, the parties themselves, who had been implicated in these proceedings, revoked, in a formal address to the pope, the obnoxious articles; but it would be an error to suppose that the scandal and mischief of such declarations are immediately removed by a retractation.

At the moment when these attempts were made to introduce disorganizing principles into the German Church, infidelity was not behind in the concoction of her own schemes. Weishaupt, a professor at the Bavarian university of Ingolstadt, entered, as I before observed, into close communication and confederacy with Nicolai, who, in the north of Germany, was actively diffusing the principles of irreligion. The former founded, in the year 1776, the order of the Illuminati, which was destined to propagate the atheistic and anti-social principles of the French Encyclopedists, through the mysterious forms and agency of masonic lodges. The founder and first members of this destructive order were even more systematic in their schemes, and more crafty in the execution of them, than the infidels of France. A well-informed eye-witness of the time says: "The illuminati undertake to give ecclesiastics to the Church, councillors to sovereigns, tutors to princes, teachers to universities, nay, even commanders to the imperial fortresses." This formidable association was, indeed, broken up by the energy of the elector, Carl Theodore; but its principles to a certain extent survived, and wrought great mischief in Bavaria and other parts of Catholic Germany.

In this state of things did the French revolution surprise the inhabitants of Catholic Germany. A clergy partly relaxed in discipline, and tainted with Febronian doctrines,—its better members often thwarted by the despotic control of the state, in their zealous efforts for the maintenance of faith and piety; a nobility in part corrupted by the irreligious literature of France and the rationalist philosophy of Northern Germany; a third estate in many instances perverted by doctrines openly proclaimed from many university-chairs, or secretly inculcated in the lodges of the illuminati;—all these were social elements ill calculated to encounter the shock of the moral and physical energies of revolutionary France.

To these causes of moral debility, others of a political nature must be added.

The political absolutism, which from the reign of Lewis XIV had become so predominant in France, in Spain, and Portugal, and, to a less extent, in Germany (for here many remnants of ancient freedom survived), powerfully contributed to bring about the great popular commotion which now shook Europe to its centre. In the first place, by detaching the nobles from the sphere of their local power and influence, this political system drew them into the vortex of dissipation, so often incident to a court life, and thereby rendered them more obnoxious to the irreligious philosophy of the day, that ministered to sensuality. Secondly, by excluding them as a body from a participation in the conduct of public affairs, it rendered them frivolous, inexperienced, ready to concur in any hollow sophism, or adopt any rash, crude expedient, suggested or put forth by political innovators. Thirdly, it exposed the aristocracy to the jealousy and envy of the middle classes, who were at a loss to understand the meaning of surviving distinctions and privileges, when they no longer beheld the corresponding exercise of power.

Lastly, the middle classes themselves, deprived of their old, sound, historical, legitimate liberties, were the more prone to run after the illusive meteor of a false, pernicious, abstract freedom. In a word, the solitary column of royalty, unaided by the pilasters of nobility, and the strong buttresses of democracy, was found incapable of sustaining the whole weight of the social edifice. Such were some of the evils that the modern system of political absolutism brought on Church and State; and though by no means the chief, it was certainly one of the great concurrent causes of that mighty revolution, which darkened and convulsed the close of the eighteenth century, and the last shocks whereof we are ever and anon doomed to feel.

The divine Nemesis now stretched forth His hand against devoted Germany, and chastised her rulers and her people for the sins and transgressions of many successive generations. Like those wild sons of the desert, whom, in the seventh century, heaven let loose to punish the degenerate Christians of the east, the new Islamite hordes of revolutionary France were permitted by Divine Providence to spread through Germany, as through almost every country in Europe, terror and desolation. What shall I say of the endless evils that accompanied and followed the march of her armies? The desolation of provinces,—the plunder of cities,—the spoliation of Church property,—the desecration of altars,—the proscription of the virtuous,—the exaltation of the unworthy members of society,—the horrid mummeries of irreligion practised in many of the conquered cities,—the degradation of life,—and the profanation of death; —such were the calamities that marked the course of these devastating hosts. And yet the evils inflicted by Jacobin France were less intense and less permanent, than those exercised by her legislation. In politics, the expulsion of the old ecclesiastical electors, who, if they had sometimes given in to the false spirit of the age, had ever been the mildest and most benevolent of rulers,—the proscription of a nobility, that had ever lived in the kindliest relations with its tenantry,—and on the ruins of old aristocratic and municipal institutions, that had long guarded and sustained popular freedom, a coarse, levelling tyranny, sometimes democratic, sometimes imperial, established;—in the Church, the oppression of the priesthood,—a heartless religious indifferentism, undignified even by attempts at philosophic speculation, propagated and encouraged;—and through the poisoned channels of education, the taint of infidelity transmitted to generations yet unborn:—such were the evils that followed the establishment of the French domination in the conquered provinces of Germany. Doubtless, through the all-wise dispensations of that Providence, who bringeth good out of evil, this fearful revolution has partly become, and will yet further become, the occasion of the moral and social regeneration of Europe. It was thus Protestantism gave occasion to the reform of manners instituted by the Council of Trent. In both instances, the regeneration was brought about in utter opposition to the principles of the revolution that furnished occasion for reform.

By the treaty of Luneville, in 1801, and a corresponding decree of the imperial diet, in 1803, the left bank of the Rhine was ceded to France, and in order to indemnify the secular princes, who thereby lost their territorial possessions, all the ecclesiastical electorates, principalities, and landed property of bishoprics, abbies, convents, chapters, and other ecclesiastical corporations throughout the greater part of Germany, were given up to them. Thus did all the secular pomp and temporal grandeur of the German Church perish with that holy Roman empire, which had risen, and for so many ages grown up, under her auspices, and which had imparted to her, in turn, so much power and dignity. The monasteries and convents were almost everywhere suppressed, their estates confiscated, and their inmates reduced to a paltry pittance, which was often but irregularly paid. The chapters also were despoiled, their promised endowments withheld; and while their members died one after the other, the bishops were left without advisers and cooperators. The episcopal sees themselves were arbitrarily broken up, contracted, or extended in their dimensions; and as their occupants died off, or resigned, from age or other circumstances, they were replaced by vicars apostolic, who, without the same influence or authority, were incapable of repressing the abuses, or coping with the evils of the time. Every impediment was opposed to a free intercourse between the episcopacy and the Holy See; and the jurisdiction of the former was subjected to the odious shackles of a jealous legislation. Ecclesiastical seminaries were, with few exceptions, not restored; and thus one of the most efficient means for training up a pious priesthood was neglected. Altars and churches were despoiled, and pious and charitable foundations misapplied or squandered away.* Principles of irreligion, propagated by the press, or from the university-chair, met with secret encouragement or passive connivance from several governments; the popular and grammar schools were often entrusted to teachers totally devoid of religion; and in Bavaria especially, the profligate ministry of Count von Mongelas left no measure untried, in order to obliterate religion from the hearts of a most Catholic people.

To these calamities, under which the Church of Germany groaned, we must add the many and various evils attendant on the campaigns of Napoleon, — that often partook of the sacrilegious and atrocious character of the first revolutionary wars; the general prostration of moral and intellectual energy, that foreign dominion engenders; and the demoralizing effects that follow the arbitrary transfer of countries or provinces from one ruler to another; the dissolution of the sacred ties of nationality, and the breaking up of old hereditary attachments.

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* See Alzog's Church History (in German), p. 659; see also the Protestant Hase's Church History, p. 505.

Yet the hour of liberation for Germany and Europe at last sounded. "That mighty hunter before the Lord," as Görres once called Napoleon, who had been raised up by Divine Providence to chastise (in the words of Dryden) "a lubrique and adulterate generation," had now accomplished his mission of terror, and, amid the exultations of the civilized world, was himself caught in the toils which his ambition had laid for others.

On the restoration of general peace, in 1814, the several German governments saw the necessity of cooperating with the Holy See, for the establishment of a new ecclesiastical organization. In the year 1817, Bavaria entered into a concordat with the Pope; and, after long negotiations, Prussia, Hanover, Würtemberg, Baden, and the other minor states, followed her example. The stipulations in these several concordats were tolerably favourable to the Church; but in a very few instances only were they honestly carried out. The virtuous Emperor of Austria, Francis, strove to negotiate with the Papal See a concordat, whereby the many evils engendered by Joseph's policy might be removed: but owing to the fatal influence of a dignitary of the Church, this godly work was not accomplished.

It was the great merit of the Emperor Francis, that he relaxed the severity of his predecessor's legislation in regard to the Church; discountenanced impiety; restored several religious orders, and mitigated the harsh, despotic laws respecting the spiritual government and temporal administration of others, that had been retained; placed every department of education in closer connexion with the Church; and generally nominated to the episcopal dignity, and other ecclesiastical functions, men of orthodoxy, zeal, and learning. In Bavaria, the Church languished in a miserable condition, until the year 1825, when the present enlightened sovereign ascended the throne. He has made it his duty to heal his country's wounds, by restoring to religion her salutary influence. He has appointed men of eminent learning and piety to the episcopal sees; reformed the establishments of public education; revived several religious orders of either sex; encouraged all institutions of piety and charity; and laboured to bring about a holy union between the Church and art and science. Under his auspices, Catholic science has reached a magnificent pitch of development; and religious art — and especially painting—has achieved wonders unexampled since the days of Perugino, Leonardo da Vinci, and Raphael.

In Prussia, and the other German states ruling over a Catholic population, the Church, after the so-called restoration of 1814, had to encounter a long succession of secret intrigues, odious machinations, and vexatious oppressions. At times, the independence of canonical election was violated; at others, bishoprics were kept vacant; and almost always, by the influence of the state, men noted for subserviency of character, or labouring under the infirmities of age, were promoted to the episcopal office. Papal bulls, even on doctrinal matters, were for years held back by many of these governments: episcopal authority, in Würtemberg more especially, was, and is still, shackled by the most humiliating fetters; and in general every favour was evinced towards those churchmen who were most unmindful of their duties. Every attempt was made to Protestantize, or rather to uncatholicize the Catholic population, partly by the Protestant or irreligious teachers appointed to the schools, as well as by the professors nominated to the university chairs, and partly by the instrumentality of the press, under government influence. Every disfavour was manifested towards zealous Catholics, lay as well as clerical; and every encouragement given to mixed marriages, contracted under such circumstances, and with such conditions, as were calculated to promote a considerable increase in the Protestant population.

But the web, which a cunning tyranny had spun for years, the memorable night of the 20th of November 1837, saw the courageous wisdom of one man suddenly unravel. The venerable Archbishop of Cologne, Count von Droste-Vischering, forced the Prussian government out of its labyrinth of secret machinations into the path of open violence. Hereby its hypocrisy was exposed, its flatterers were put to shame, and the vigilance, energy, and religious zeal of Catholic Germany were aroused. It is here unnecessary to do more, than briefly advert to recent transactions, that must be still fresh in the reader's mind, and which I have not space to recount. The example of the illustrious Archbishop of Cologne was followed by that of the distinguished prelate who occupied the archiepiscopal see of Posen. The sovereign pontiff denounced the gross injustice of the Prussian government, in its imprisonment of the two archbishops, and applauded the firmness, prudence, and self-devotedness of the latter; while backed by that high authority, the other prelates within the Prussian dominions united in strenuous resistance against the encroachments of the secular power. This was the dawn of a new epoch on Catholic Germany. From the banks of the Rhine down to the frontiers of Hungary, a new spirit hath breathed over the German Church. A warmer, more filial attachment—the result at once of gratitude and conviction—hath sprung up towards the Holy See; the inferior clergy have rallied round their bishops, and churchmen, formerly timid and lukewarm, are now become fervent and courageous. Among the laity many have been reclaimed from tepidity, and even unbelief; the duties of religion are prosecuted with greater fervour; pious and charitable confraternities have múltiplied; and a zeal to diffuse the blessed truths of religion, to defend the doctrines of the Church against the calumnies of the press, and her liberties against the oppressions of the state, has become more and more manifest.

But before I close this account of the German Catholic Church, it is my duty to notice two parties, that disturbed her peace, and were even severally converted by Protestant governments into instruments for her annoyance and oppression. The first is the party of the so-called Liberals, or anti-Celibates; a fraction that carries to the most violent excess the principles of the old Febronians. Headed by Wessenberg, Alexander Müller, Carové, and others, it prevails chiefly in Baden, Würtemberg, and Silesia. Distinguished for a strong semi-rationalistic tone in their general doctrines, its members clamour for a German National Church, with a mere nominal dependence on the Pope; they demand (doubtless with the view of better diffusing their peculiar opinions) the celebration of the liturgy, and the administration of the sacraments in the vernacular tongue; and insist with peculiar force on the abolition of the irksome law of celibacy. While in politics they profess an ardent liberalism, they are noted in ecclesiastical matters for their mean subserviency to the state, which finds in them ready tools for the accomplishment of any clandestine or open act of tyranny against that Church, whereof they profess themselves members. In the earlier part of the present century, when so many episcopal sees were vacant, when the secular power ventured on so many encroachments upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction, this party wrought much mischief, spread pernicious doctrines among the people, suppressed many practices of devotion, and not unfrequently set the example of a scandalous violation of their sacred vows. Several of its members have gone over to Protestantism; others have been suspended for immoral conduct, or the profession of false doctrines. It is remarkable that, as in former times, schismatics generally ended by falling into heresy; so in the present age, when, on the Continent especially, heresy has little or no vitality, schism generally terminates in the profession of total unbelief. Such was the case with the old constitutional ecclesiastics of France; such is the case with their successors, the Abbé Chatel and his followers; such, too, is the case with the German clerical faction I am now describing; and examples still more melancholy might be adduced. Stigmatized by episcopal authority, reprobated by the sounder portion of laics, unsupported by a single writer of eminence, and combated, moreover, by distinguished theologians, and, among others, by the subject of this memoir, this schismatical faction, though still powerful in the Grand Duchy of Baden, is, in Würtemberg and elsewhere, rapidly sinking into insignificance; and before the daystar, which hath arisen above the German horizon, these impure and turbulent innovators, like birds of night, will, doubtless, soon disappear.

But while this party was truckling to the state, in its iniquitous invasion of ecclesiastical rights, and disturbing the Church by its endeavours to subvert an apostolic, and most salutary, and necessary ordinance of discipline, another party arose, which attempted to form a degrading alliance with Rationalism. By adopting Luther's fundamental principle of private judgment, the late Dr. Hermes, a professor of Catholic theology at the University of Bonn, deemed he could better succeed in undermining Luther's theological doctrines. Like Descartes, he proclaimed that methodical doubt was the only path to wisdom; but whereas the French philosopher had expressly limited this method of doubt to scientific objects only, Hermes extended it to all the truths of revelation, even the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the distinction between right and wrong.

“This method of doubt,” says the celebrated Klee, “is the worst system that can be devised. It is a sin against the object, which suspended in its rights on our belief, is declared to have no existence for us; it is a sin against the authority of Christ, of the apostles, and the Church, whose existence and character are hereby called in question—with whom we place our own private reason on a level, and whom we summon to the bar of our own judgment; it is a sin against God, as we hereby destroy faith, which is God's work in man, and then presume by our own energies to reconstruct it. It is a sin against the subject, who is dragged from his state of faith, which is for him a want and a duty *per eminentiam*, and *transported* into a state of scepticism, from which the escape is to many a matter extremely arduous and problematical. To conjure up the demon of scepticism is no difficult task; but to exorcise him again into his gloomy regions, is a matter that may baffle the art of the conjuror."*

This radically false and vicious method naturally led the author into many doctrinal errors more or less grievous, and which, as enumerated by the sovereign pontiff in his bull of condemnation, regard the nature of faith; the essence, the holiness, the justice, and the liberty of God; the ends, which the Most High proposed to Himself in the creation; the proofs whereby the existence of God should be established; revelation; the motives for belief; the Scriptures; the tradition and ministry of the Church, as the depository and judge of faith; the state of our first parents; original sin; the faculties of fallen man; the necessity and the distribution of Divine grace; and the rewards of merit and the infliction of punishments.

These errors, and the method which led to them, were, after a long and careful investigation, condemned by the Holy See. This system, though it numbered among its partisans no inconsiderable portion of the Rhenish and Westphalian clergy, and was countenanced by Count von Spiegel, the former archbishop of Cologne, found not many supporters among the laity, and was not upheld by any theologian of eminent talent. Had this sytem, however, been broached forty years ago, when the ecclesiastical disorganization was so great, when the Kantian philosophy exerted such sway over the public mind, and before the great regeneration of religious life and of theological science had taken place in Catholic Germany, the results would have been far more fatal. Thanks to the decision of the Holy See, and the firmness of Count von Droste, archbishop of Cologne, as well as his present able coadjutor, these pernicious doctrines, which caused some young men to make a shipwreck of the faith, have sunk into utter discredit. Many, on the other hand, who had innocently imbibed these opinions, have bowed to the sentence of the sovereign pontiff, and recanted; others (and they constitute the smaller number) have been abashed into silence; not a single work, or even pamphlet, has for the last two years been put forth in behalf of the system; the stronghold of the party—the University of Bonn—has lately been cleared of those professors who were its most obstinate defenders, and the error may be considered as all but defunct. In conclusion, it is necessary to say a few words on the relation which the literature of the present age has borne to the Catholic Church; and here the task is far more pleasing than when I had to trace the destructive consequences of the alliance between Rationalism and the literature of the eighteenth century.

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* See Klee's Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 344. Mainz, 1839.

The illustrious Count Stolberg, at the commencement of the present age, gave the first impulse to Catholic literature, and commenced that series of eminent writers, who have since adorned Catholic Germany. Deeply imbued with the spirit of Hellenic antiquity, Stolberg had in his youth published spirited translations from some of the old Greek dramatists,—while his own lyrical poems breathed a noble, chivalric spirit. After his conversion to the Catholic Church, he consecrated his genius to her exclusive service; and certainly no man ever rendered his classical acquirements more serviceable to the cause of Christianity. His great work, the History of the Christian Religion, from the origin of the world down to the fifth century, is written with considerable learning, great elegance of diction, brilliancy of fancy, and much amenity of feeling. Indeed the work may be called a noble epos of history, where the narrative is from time to time intermingled with lyrical effusions of the author's own pure and exalted feelings. At the same time arose the romantic school. The object of this school, established by the two Schlegels, Novalis, and Tieck, was, as is well known, to revive a love for Christian art and literature, and to explain the principles whereon they are founded. The founders of this school were at first, indeed, exclusively Protestant, and their aim, apparently, was purely æsthetic; yet were their labours most useful in dispelling many prejudices of their fellow-religionists, and in pointing out the ennobling influences of Catholicity on the human mind. Nor is it true, as has sometimes been asserted, that a mere literary dilettantism, and no earnest religious thoughts, were at the bottom of this remarkable intellectual movement. The great poet, Tieck, was so earnest in the matter, as to induce his wife to become Catholic; and she and her daughter are pious members of our Church. And that the great writer himself never took the step he had recommended, is only a proof of that sad discrepancy between the intelligence and the will, which is one of the melancholy consequences of the fall. The eminent piety of Novalis, and his attachment to the Catholic Church, breathe through all his writings; and those possessing the best opportunities of forming an opinion, declare,* that but for his untimely death, he would have sought a refuge in that Church which is the native home of all lofty intelligences, as well as the asylum of all bruised hearts. His illustrious friend, Frederic Schlegel, the deepest thinker of all, embraced at a mature period of life the Catholic faith; and the sincerity of that conversion, as well as the piety which subsequently characterized him, was proved, in the memoir I published several years ago, to the satisfaction of my English Protestant critics. Several of his disciples, like Adam Müller, Baron d'Eckstein, and others, were led partly by æsthetic studies, partly by historical researches and philosophic speculations, to follow the noble example which Schlegel had set. As the avenues, that led to the old Egyptian temples, were bordered on either side by representations of the mysterious sphinx, so it was through a mystical art, poetry, and philosophy, many spirits were then conducted to the sanctuary of the true Church. I am, however, far from pretending to assert, that all the followers of the romantic school were equally earnest, or that the admiration professed by many among them for the Catholic Church, went beyond a mere enthusiasm for the music of Pergolesi, the paintings of Raphael, and the poetry of Dante.

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* A friend of mine, a distinguished German writer, who saw the private correspondence that once passed between Novalis and Frederic

The heathenish fanaticism which Goethe had called up, and which was exercising such destructive sway, Frederic Schlegel opposed by a noble Christian enthusiasm. This was the aim of all his labours—this was the task of his life, and which he so gloriously accomplished. And whether we behold him pouring

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Schlegel, has assured me that in that correspondence, the Catholic sentiments of the former are still more clearly evinced than in his published writings.

forth the religious effusions of his earnest, reflective muse; or displaying in comparative philology his admirable analytic skill; or unfolding with such marvellous depth the peculiar genius of ancient and modern literatures; or tracing on the map of the world's history the workings of God's providential dispensations; or throwing out in metaphysics his rapid, searching, intuitive perceptions; or, before an audience of celebrated painters, like Schodow, Veit, Cornelius, and Overbeck, revealing the fountains of artistic inspiration,—we are lost in wonder at a mind of such depth and universality. It is no exaggeration to say, that the whole modern art, literature, and science of Catholic Germany, sprang, kindled up by the fire which this Promethean spirit stole from heaven.

Of the genius of Novalis, who was cut off at the premature age of twenty-nine, it is impossible to speak with the same confidence; but it may be asserted, that if inferior to his illustrious friend in solidity of judgment, he was endowed with nearly the same depth of understanding, and with even higher poetical imagination. His writings in prose and in poetry exhibit a mind instinctively Catholic, wrestling with the prejudices imbibed from a Protestant education. His tender piety, which among other things frequently exhibited itself in an extraordinary devotion to the glorious Mother of God, unique perhaps among Protestant writers, stamped on all his poetical conceptions a character of indescribable purity. And had his brilliant career not been so speedily terminated, he would, under the patronage of that powerful advocate, have in all probability reached the temple, after which he had so fondly yearned. As in the cloudless atmosphere of the south, the stars of heaven shine with greater effulgence, so those lights of human existence—love, friendship, patriotism—that beam along the immortal verse of Novalis, receive, as it were, a more magical glow from the exquisite purity of his devotional feelings.

The genius of Görres exhibits the same wondrous combination of deep, comprehensive understanding and lofty imagination, though not in the same beautiful harmony as we find developed in Frederic Schlegel, and as, in an immature state, was perceptible in Novalis. This combination is the rare privilege of the most favoured sons of genius; and when, as in the case of Görres, it is consecrated to the service of truth, it becomes indeed the most potent instrument of good. Görres, who devoted his energetic youth and manhood chiefly to political and historical literature, wherein he combated at once the absolutists of democracy and the revolutionists of absolutism, has in the evening of life gone into the sanctuary of the mystic theology; as, after the fatigues and agitations of the day, men love to retire into the secret oratory.

The other great thinkers of Catholic Germany, like Molitor, Windischmann, Günther, and others, have in the several departments of Jewish traditions, Oriental philosophy, and speculative theology, displayed great extent of erudition and depth of understanding, and rendered eminent services to the Church.

In this rapid survey I can notice only the most celebrated men in the most important departments; but it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that in almost every branch of literature and science, Catholic Germany has in our times produced most distinguished men, and has nobly redeemed herself from the reproach of intellectual sloth, that once deservedly attached to her.

The historical school, founded by th testant John von Müller, and continued by testants Voight, Leo, and Hurter, is more or less distinguished for impartiality, extensive research, and a noble appreciation of the social influence of the Catholic Church. This school, when we look to its general tone and spirit, particularly in its most distinguished ornament, Hurter, belongs certainly more to Catholic than to Protestant literature. And certainly in no department have German learning, genius, and rectitude, shone to greater advantage, or been attended with more beneficial results.

If the department of special history has not been cultivated by the Catholic party with such brilliant success as by the Protestant, the former, on the other hand, has produced the most celebrated men in public and constitutional law; and, among these, Haller, Adam Müller, Jarcke, and Phillips, hold the most conspicuous place.

Yet theology, the queen of sciences, was still unrepresented in the high circles of intelligence. In the last century the Jesuit Stattler,* and the Augustinian Klüpfel, and in the present age, Zimmer, Dobmayer, Bishop Sailer, Liebermann, and Breuner, had treated dogmatic theology with remarkable acuteness and learning, and some of them with great taste and elegance of diction, and clearness of method. But a high creative spirit was still wanting. Divine Providence took compassion on that afflicted German Church, and at the right moment sent her the aid she most needed. It was in the beautiful province of Swabia that (through the whole Middle Age, and down to recent times, has ever furnished Church and State, art and science, with the most distinguished men) this great luminary arose; and this leads me to the subject of my biography.

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* In the theology of Stattler, however, there were a few erroneous propositions, that were censured by the Holy See.

John Adam Moehler was born the 8th of May 1796, at Igersheim, near Mergentheim, on the confines of Franconia and Swabia, about twenty miles from Würzburg. His father, who was a substantial innkeeper of the place, resolved to give his son the benefit of a liberal education.

In his twelfth year, Moehler began to attend the Gymnasium at Mergentheim, a town two miles distant from the place of his birth, and every evening he was obliged to return home. During his four years' attendance at this school, he was distinguished as well for a peculiar gentleness of disposition, and blameless conduct, as for his diligence and love of study. Yet his mental powers were but of slow development, and gave no earnest of the intellectual eminence he was destined one day to reach. In most branches of study he was surpassed by some of his fellow-students; although the strong predilection for history, which he evinced even at this early period, and the keen interest he took in the events of the day, are well worthy of attention. Such a love for historic lore was also a characteristic trait in the boyhood of Gibbon.

It was Moehler's happiness to receive a religious education from his virtuous parents; for in Germany, more than in any other country, the task of education, in the strict sense of the word, devolves on parents far more than on the heads and teachers of schools. Under the modern system of Gymnasial instruction, which for

the last fifty or sixty years has there prev
students of all the schools, whether elementary, commercial, or Latin, are mere day-scholars, who after the prescribed hours of study must return to the paternal roof. With the exception of the catechetical instruction, which in many parts of Catholic Germany is now most solid and excellent, and with exception of the fixed hours for attendence at mass, and the frequentation of the sacraments, the moral training of the pupil, the culture of his religious feelings, and the superintendance of his moral conduct, devolve on his parent or guardian. The defects of this system, in most instances, are obvious, and are deeply deplored by the most eminent Catholics of Germany. Yet it cannot be denied that where, as in the case of the subject of this memoir, the parents are very religious, it may be attended with advantages.

Moehler had the misfortune to lose his mother very early, and his father, though a most worthy and excellent man, treated him with a certain degree of harshness. On his return from school, he would sometimes compel him to perform the household duties, and, during the vacations, to labour in the field. On one occasion a friend of his youthful days came to his house, and saw him pouring out wine for his father's customers, while on the table lay a grammar, which at every spare interval he would take up and study.

After attending the Gymnasium of Mergentheim for four years, Moehler repaired, in 1814, to the Lyceum, in the Swabian city of Ellwangen, in order to prepare for the study of theology. After remaining there some time, he began to entertain serious doubts whether he were equal to the discharge of the arduous and awful duties of the priesthood, and already revolved in his mind the project of embracing another of the learned professions. For this end the consent of his father was to be obtained; and the conduct of that father on this occasion, harsh and injudicious as it undoubtedly was, and perilous as it might have been, was, under the mysterious guidance of Providence, the means of giving a great teacher to the Church, and a most edifying minister to her altars. On his son's soliciting his approbation and support in a new professional career, the father replied, that the most fervent wish of his heart was to see his son a worthy Catholic priest; but that if he felt not a call from heaven to that state, he might give up his studies and return to the parental roof, where he would meet with kindness, and find occupation. "But," said he, "as regards any other of the liberal professions, I can never give my consent to your embracing one of them." When subsequently censured for his conduct, the father replied to a friend, "I could not possibly see my son take to the study of the law, for I have seen so many young men at the universities make a shipwreck of their faith, and lose the heritage of eternal life." When we consider the state of the German universities at that period, the pernicious doctrines which were then inculcated from so many professional chairs, the unbelief and immorality of so many of the students, we may well understand the apprehensions of this honest and simple-minded man, however we may feel disposed to condemn his severity.

But Moehler, whose talents by this time were quickly and vigorously developing, felt an irresistible attraction to learned pursuits, and, after some consideration, he returned to the study of theology. In the following year he repaired to the University of Tübingen, where the theological faculty numbered among its members distinguished professors, like Drey, Herbst, and Hirscher. Here he entered the ecclesiastical seminary, and after passing four years in the study of divinity, under the guidance of these distinguished masters, he was ordained priest on the 18th of September 1819, and thus reached the term of all his labours, and obtained the most ardent desire of his heart.

The first fruits of sacerdotal grace he wished to offer up to God by devoting himself to the pastoral ministry, and accordingly, in the following year, he officiated as assistant vicar in the successive parishes of Walderstadt and Reidlingen, in Würtemberg.

I shall here take the liberty of citing the testimony, so honourable to both parties, which his principal in the last-named parish, the now canon Ströbele, has given respecting the life and ministry of the subject of this memoir, during the period in question. "His pastoral career was characterized by such an amiable, modest, and, in every respect worthy, deportment, joined to such holy earnestness in all his functions and intercourse with men, that he won in an eminent degree the love and veneration of the whole congregation, and especially of the young scholars, whom he had to catechize. His style of preaching, simple and feeling, addressed itself more particularly to the hearts of his hearers, and thus atoned for defects in delivery. The inhabitants of Riedlingen boasted of their vicar, whose name even now is mentioned among them with love and respect. The half-year which he spent by my side, was to my friend, the then chaplain Ehinger, and myself, a period of cordial mutual cooperation. But even then his desire, I might almost say his destination, for learned pursuits, was so decided, that every hour he could devote to them was precious to him; and therefore the official writing which, as my assistant in the rural deanery, he was obliged to go through, he felt as an irksome duty. To lighten this burden as much as possible, my friend Ehinger and myself undertook a portion of his task, and said to him in jest, that we expected he would give us in return some fruits of his learned labours. I must here make mention of a visit, which at this time the venerable and celebrated Bishop Sailer honoured me with. Moehler made on the mind of this prelate a deep impression; and the manner in which he fixed his eyes on him, threw our modest vicar into great embarrassment. This amiable bishop made particular inquiries respecting this interesting young man, as he termed him, and testified the great hopes he entertained of him, which the latter afterwards so well justified. That, moreover, Moehler's way of thinking had not then the same turn, which it afterwards took, is notorious; and I well remember that on seeing some essays he had delivered at several ecclesiastical conferences, the venerable and learned curate Haass expressed with apprehension a hope, that this young man, for whom he entertained such sincere affection, might regain the path of strict orthodoxy; and the old curate Bertsch once said on a similar occasion: "Well, well, it is allowable for such a learned young man to believe a little differently from us old men; but he will later recur to our way of thinking."—*Kuhn, Biography in the Quarterly Theological Review of Tubingen,* p. 578, 580.

The pernicious influence that the Neologists had exerted over public opinion in Southern Germany, particularly in Baden and Würtemberg, I have already described. The theological faculty in the university of Tubingen, at which Moehler had studied, was, to a certain extent, and in some of its professors, infected with those doctrines; and even Hirscher, who has since become so eminent a divine, then gave in to many of those false opinions. It was not to be expected that a young man, like Moehler, should have escaped totally free from the contagion of doctrines, often put forth with seductive eloquence and learning, and then held by so many fellow-students, and the majority of the Swabian clergy. "The Church," says his friend Professor Ruhn, "had not yet won all the affections of his heart, and the objects of his enthusiasm lay, in part, beyond her circle: his views did not entirely harmonise with all her doctrines, nor agree with all her disciplinary institutions. Yet, from the outset of his career he was a conscientious priest, and preserved intact the sanctity of the sacerdotal character, and most assuredly he was devoid of all perfidy towards the Church, whose minister he had become."—*Tübinger Quartal-Schrift*, p. 580, 1838.

His passion for learning was too irresistible to keep him long aloof from the university life. After passing a year in the pastoral office, he returned on the 31st October 1820, to the University of Tübingen, where he was soon nominated to the place of tutor in the Gymnasial Institute, connected with the Convictorium, or ecclesiastical seminary of that town. During the two years he filled this place, he devoted himself with uncommon ardour and astonishing success to the study of the ancient classics, particularly the Greek philosophers and historians. The study of these ancient masters of human eloquence and speculation, brought out and developed all those faculties, wherewith nature had so richly endowed him. In this school he acquired that delicacy of taste—that solidity of judgment—that vigour and dexterity of ratiocination—that clearness and precision of language, which afterwards so eminently characterized him. The insight, too, which he hereby obtained into the nature of Paganism, as well as the acquaintance he formed with the various systems of ancient philosophy, was of the greatest service to the future speculative divine, and learned Church-historian. And in allusion to the importance of these preparatory studies for his subsequent career, Moehler used to speak jestingly "of the times when he lived in heathenism."

So strong was his love for ancient literature, that in 1822 he drew up a petition to the Würtemberg government, soliciting the nomination to a place, that had just become vacant in the philological faculty. And there is no doubt, that had he pursued this career, he would have reached the highest eminence. But Providence had reserved far higher destinies for him. While he was on the point of forwarding this petition to the government, the theological faculty, that had long observed his great talents, transmitted to him, with unanimous consent, a written invitation to accept the place of private teacher in theology—a place which is always sure in time to conduct to a professorship. Moehler hesitated not a moment—gave up his cherished plan—accepted the offer that had been so graciously made him, and thus became bound by new and more intimate ties to the interests of the Church.

His appointment to this place was, on the 22nd of September 1822, confirmed by the government, which at the same time furnished him with pecuniary means for undertaking a great literary journey through Northern and Southern Germany, in order that by visiting the most celebrated seats of learning, and conversing with distinguished professors, he might the better qualify himself for the important office he was about to enter on.

He began his journey in the autumn of 1822, and visited successively the universities of Jena, Leipzig, Halle, Berlin, Göttingen; and on his return visited those of Prague, Vienna, and Landshut. The conversation and literary advice of so many distinguished scholars and theologians, whether Catholic or Protestant, whom he met with on his journey, were, doubtless, of the greatest service to the future development of his mind; and there was one individual, in particular, from whom Moehler received lasting benefit. The celebrated Plank, Protestant professor of theology at Göttingen, had been the first to revive—I had better, perhaps, have said introduce—the study of the fathers in Protestant Germany. By his profound study of Christian antiquity, he had been led to approximate very closely to the doctrines of the Catholic Church; and it was said that more than one member of his family evinced no little inclination to embrace its faith. With Plank, Moehler held much conversation on the subject of the fathers, and of Church-history; and the result was, that several Neological opinions, which the latter had imbibed in the school of Tübingen, were dispelled by this learned and enlightened Protestant. Plank urged him also to prosecute with diligence the study of the fathers;—a study which, in the school of Hermes, and in that of the Würtemberg and Baden Neologists, had been, from their strong leaning to heretical and semi-rationalistic opinions, as well as from a conceited contempt for all former ages, grossly neglected.

The nearer insight into the essence of Rationalism, which, from his visit to Protestant Germany, Moehler had obtained—the perception of the dreadful moral ravages it had occasioned—its dry and heartless worship—its churches vacant, even during the sermons of the most celebrated preachers—the unbelief that had spread from the upper to the lower classes of society—the sight of all these evils, I say, tended heartily to disgust the subject of this memoir with all those sickly offshoots of Rationalism, that the Swabian innovators were endeavouring by degrees to engraft on the Catholic Church.

On his return to Tübingen, Moehler took Würzburg in his way, and called on his friend Dr. Benkert, then rector of the seminary, and who has since succeeded him in the deanery of that city. Dr. Benkert affirms, that he found Moehler vastly improved by this journey, and a more decided Catholic tone pervading all his theological views.

Having arrived at Tübingen in the summer of 1823, Moehler opened his theological course with lectures on Church-history, and occasionally on canon-law. Here he devoted himself with his characteristic ardour and untiring perseverance to the study of the fathers, and of ecclesiastical history. The first fruit of his labours was the work entitled "Unity in the Church, or the Principle of Catholicism," 1825. This work is now out of print, nor have I been able anywhere to procure a copy of it. "In this book," says one of his biographers, "there was much which in his riper years he no longer approved of, yet it must ever be regarded as a noble proof of his originality of mind, as well as of the depth of his feelings, and gave earnest of his future eminence in theological literature. The reputation which it soon acquired for the author, induced the Baden government to make him the following year the offer of a theological chair at the University of Freyburg in Breisgau. This honourable offer Moehler declined; but was thereupon immediately raised to the dignity of professor extraordinary at his own university.

In the year 1827, a more important work, entitled "Athanasius the Great, or the Church of his time in her struggle with Arianism," tended vastly to extend Moehler's reputation. There were many reasons, which induced him to make the Arian controversy, and the illustrious saint who played so salutary and glorious a part in that religious dispute, the subject of special investigation and description. Now, as in the age of Constantius, the cardinal mystery of Christianity, that the elder Protestantism, in its destructive march, had yet respected, was assailed with a subtlety and a violence, that even Arianism itself had never displayed. Those rationalizing views of the whole system of Christianity, but timidly put forth by the heretics of the fourth century, were developed and proclaimed with an unblushing effrontery and a recklessness of impiety, that would have startled and shocked the extremest Arian. Now, as in the former period, lukewarmness and timidity, not to say cowardice, characterised a great proportion of Catholics; while the oppression of the German Church by the secular power, if less open and violent than in the age of the son of Constantine, was far more insidious, refined, and systematic. And what more glorious model could be presented to many of the degenerate Churchmen of Germany, than that illustrious saint, who combines in himself the characters of the learned and profound theologian, the prudent and indefatigable prelate, the holy ascetic, and the intrepid confessor?

The work is divided into six books. In the first we find a very clear, learned, and elaborate dissertation on the doctrine of the ante-Nicene fathers, respecting the divinity of our Lord, and the Trinity in general.

The following five books are taken up with the public history of St. Athanasius, with a copious analysis of his various works against the heathens, the Arians, and the Apollinarists and with a very full account of the Arian heresy, from its rise, down to the death of St. Athanasius, in the year 373.

The author, by giving copious extracts from contemporary historians, and also from the letters of St. Athanasius and the other defenders of the Catholic cause, as well as from those of their Arian opponents, completely transports us into the age he describes. It is, however, to be regretted, that the narrative of events is too often interrupted by doctrinal dissertations, and analytic expositions of writings; and this defect renders the perusal of this valuable work sometimes irksome.

All the personages, who took part in this mighty conflict, are pourtrayed with much truth, life, and interest. In the hostile camp, we find the false-hearted, double-tongued Arius—the crafty Eusebius of Nicomedia—the hypocritical Valens and Ursacius—the audacious Aëtius—the weak and tyrannical Emperor Constantius—and, lastly, the pagan enthusiast, Julian, who hangs over the Church, like a dark, boding, but, happily, passing, thunder-cloud. On the side of the combatants for truth, the firmness of Pope Julius—the noble-minded character of his successor, Liberius—the intrepid fortitude of the venerable Osius—the burning zeal of Marcellus of Ancyra—the high courage, but harsh and intemperate zeal of Lucifer of Cagliari—the genius, the eloquence, the mild virtues, and unshaken constancy, of Hilary of Poictiers—and, lastly, the lofty genius and majestic character of the great Athanasius, alternately challenge our admiration, and enlist our sympathy.

Much as all Catholics are taught, from childhood, to revere the character of this great confessor, yet none can rise from the perusal of Moehler's work, without feeling increased admiration for his genius, and increased love and veneration for his virtues. In the writings of Athanasius, what marvellous acuteness of dialectic, what prodigious depth of observation, do we discover!—what intuitive insight into the mind of Scripture!—what dexterity in the application of its texts!—what knowledge in the tradition of the fathers, and what instinctive adherence to the spirit of the Church! In his life, what magnanimous intrepidity in the defence of truth!—what unwearied perseverance in the path of duty!—what unbroken constancy under persecution!—what presence of mind in the face of danger!—what sagacious insight into the wiles and machinations of heretics!—what generosity towards his enemies! How temperate, too, is his zeal, and what a spirit of conciliation, where compromise is possible, and where concession is safe! What activity and what wisdom in the government of his vast patriarchate! Watch him through all the phases of his various destinies! See him now surrounded by the love and sympathy of his Alexandrians—now confronting hostile synods—now undertaking long and perilous journeys, to defend his character from calumny, and to unmask before the head of the Church the arts of heresy—now fearlessly proclaiming the truth at the court of the tyrannical Constantius—and now banished, time after time, from his diocese, his country, his friends;

encompassed by perils from false brethren, perils from the sea, perils from the wilderness; and, while surrounded by the lions of the Lybian desert, writing those immortal letters and treatises, where he consoles the persecuted sons of the Church, confirms her wavering members, and refutes the elated heretics;—productions that to the end of time will be the solace and the glory of the Church!

Behold him now, at the close of his glorious career, after forty years' incessant toil, hardship, and suffering; with a frame unbent, and a mind unsubdued by age, still ready to fight new battles for the Lord: spared by Heaven to see the great adversary he had so long combated—the adversary of Christ—the monster Arianism—gasping and bleeding from his death-wound. Behold the veteran warrior now honoured by that degenerate court, which had so long persecuted him—consoled by the respect and sympathy of the Christian world—consulted on all important affairs by the dignitaries of the Church, near or remote—and nerving the courage, and directing the counsels, of that young, hopeful band of Christ's soldiers—the Basils, the Nazianzens, and the Nyssas, who were destined to follow up the victory he had achieved, and annihilate the great antagonist of the Church.

But Athanasius attained to this great authority *in* the Church, only because he had been most obedient and most faithful to the authority *of* the Church. It was not by his personal genius, learning, and sanctity alone, that he obtained such a prodigious ascendancy over the minds of his contemporaries, but also by the weight he derived from the sanction of the Church and its visible head.

What a glorious part doth not the holy Roman See act in this Arian contest! While orthodox prelates are driven from their sees; while some quail before triumphant heresy, and others are incautiously entrapped into the acceptance of ambiguous formularies; while the faithful are distracted by the conflicting decisions of hostile synods, and doctrine is undermined, and discipline subverted, by intruded heretical bishops, the Roman pontiffs ever uphold the authority of the Nicene Council, quash the decrees of heretical provincial synods, restore to their churches the banished prelates, condemn their adversaries, everywhere enforce canonical discipline, and sometimes overawe the hostile potentates of the earth.*

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* The inerrancy of the Holy See during this dreadful contest, which witnessed the confusion, or the fall, of so many other Christian Churches, is an historical fact that has excited the admiration of enlightened Protestants themselves. "The history of the great ecclesiastical disputes of this period," says Engelhardt, a German Protestant Church historian of our day, "will show how much the authority of the Roman See increased from the circumstance, that its bishops, almost without exception, upheld with undeviating perseverance their doctrinal views, and that these views ever bore off the final victory."* An elegant writer in the *British Critic*, after asserting "that Rome was the only apostolical see in the west, and thereby had a natural claim to the homage of those which were less distinguished," proceeds to say, "*that this preeminence was heightened by her inflexible orthodoxy amid the doctrinal controversies in which the eastern sees had successively erred*, and by the office of arbitrator and referee, which she held amid their rivalries and quarrels."—*British Critic*, No. LVIII. April 1841, p. 396.

Very many ages before the two Protestant writers made the remarks cited in the text, the Emperor Justinian said, "the bishops of ancient Rome having in all things followed the apostolic tradition, have never disagreed among themselves, but down to our days have preserved the sound and true doctrine." "Οἱ γαρ ἱερεῖς τῆς πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώμης τῇ

* Engelhardt Kirchen-Geschichte, vol. i. p. 312.

The approbation which this work universally received—the spirit of zealous orthodoxy that pervaded its pages—the immense patristic and historical learning it displayed—and the original and profound views with which it abounded, drew more and more the attention of Protestant as well as Catholic Germany towards its illustrious author.

He now began to deliver lectures on the doctrinal differences between Catholics and Protestants. The errors of his time, as I before observed—the struggles the Catholic Church had to encounter, and the oppression she had to endure, by rendering her position very analogous to her state in the age of the great Athanasius, had first induced Moehler to compose the work that has just been described. But now he resolved to grapple more closely and directly with the errors of his age.

αποστολικῇ δια πάντων ακολουθησαντες παραδόσει οὐδέποτε πρὸς ἀλλήλους διεφώνησὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθηνὴν μεχρὶ σήμερον διεφύλαξαν δόξην." —*Adv. Monophys. in Mai.* tom. vii. par. I. p. 304.

Before Justinian, the great St. Leo had spoken of those privileged bishops, his predecessors, "who for so many ages, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, had been preserved from the defilements of heresy." "Quos per tot sæcula docente Spiritû Sancto nulla hæresis violavit."—Serm. xc. viii. c. iii.

And long before St. Leo, the great teacher and martyr of the third century, St. Cyprian, had extolled that Roman Church, "which was inaccessible to false faith." "Ad quos (Romanos) perfidia habere non potest accessum."—Ep. lv.

The fall, real or pretended, of Pope Liberius, forms no exception from the truth of these remarks. In the first place, from the silence of many contemporary historians, the lapse of this pontiff is doubtful. Secondly, it is very generally agreed, that the formulary he is said to have subscribed, was susceptible of a Catholic interpretation. Thirdly, he was under personal restraint; and consequently, as Cardinal Orsi observes, he could not in that state be considered the organ and representative of his See.

Judging that the most effectual method to bring about the return of our erring brethren to the Catholic Church, as well as to awaken many Catholics themselves from their state of torpor, was to set forth with accuracy the points of doctrine which divide the Churches, he commenced a thorough investigation into the public formularies of the various Protestant communities, as well as the private writings of the Reformers, and their most eminent disciples. This was a field which had been but partially tilled by preceding labourers, and which offered much to reward the industry of a new cultivator. The course of lectures which, in the year 1828, Moehler opened on this important subject, soon attracted a crowded auditory; and every year they were received by the students with increasing interest and attention. The fame of these lectures getting abroad, the Prussian government made to Moehler the offer of a theological professorship at the University of Breslau in Silesia—an offer which he immediately declined. The Würtemberg government now nominated him professor ordinary of theology at the University of Tübingen—a nomination that was confirmed by the theological faculty, which, at the same time, conferred on him the honour of doctor of divinity.

At length, in the year 1832, the great work, whose fame the public had long anticipated, issued from the press, under the title, "Symbolism, or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their Symbolical Writings." The sensation it produced throughout all Germany, Protestant as well as Catholic, was prodigious; perhaps unparallelled in the history of modern theological literature. Hailed by Catholics with joy and exultation, its transcendant merits were openly acknowledged by the most eminent and estimable Protestants. The celebrated Protestant theologian and philosopher, Schleieruracher, declared it to be the severest blow ever given to Protestantism. Another very distinguished Protestant professor of philosophy at Bonn, candidly confessed, that none of the Protestant replies at all came up to it in force of reasoning.

"Germany," says a French journal of high merit, "so parcelled out into different states, so divided in religious belief—Germany, where opinion is not centralized in a single city, but where the taste of Vienna is checked by the critics of Göttingen, Munich, or Berlin,—Germany with one voice extols the merits of Moehler's 'Symbolism.'"—*L' Université Catholique,* p.75, vol. xi.

That this testimony is not exaggerated, the rapid sale of the work will show; for in the course of six years it passed through five editions, each consisting of from three to four thousand copies, which were nearly as much sought for in Protestant as in Catholic Germany. It was adopted by several universities as a textbook, was translated into Latin and Italian by the papal nuncio of Switzerland, and into French by M. Lachat.

The same French critic, as was before observed, termed the *Symbolism* "an indispensable complement to Bossuet's immortal History of the Variations."* This has suggested to me a parallel between the two works. Looking to the plan and the matter of the two books, I may call the work of the illustrious French prelate a more *external*—that of the German theologian, a more *internal,* history of Protestantism. In the first place, the bishop of Meaux points out with admirable skill the endless variations and inconsistencies of Protestantism; so does the German professor; yet the inconsistencies and variations, which, in the pages of the former, appear isolated, unconnected, accidental phenomena, the latter shows to be bound by the ties of a necessary, though secret, connexion. In a word, Moehler, not content with proving the many mutations and self-contradictions of Protestantism, and its repugnance to reason and revelation, sets forth its *consistency* also—I mean the filiation of its doctrine, and the concatenation of its errors. Secondly, the French prelate confines his attention to the two leading sects of the Reformation—the Lutheran and the Calvinistic, and expressly informs us in the preface to his work, that his intention is "not to speak of the Socinians, nor of the several communities of Anabaptists, nor of so many different sects, which in England and elsewhere have sprung up in the bosom of the Reformation;" a resolution, that was the more to be regretted, as the description of these sects would not only have lent a fresh charm to his historic narrative, but have vastly increased the weight, and extended the compass, of his argument. And that sagacious mind, which, in the funeral oration on Queen Henrietta, had cast such an intuitive glance into the history of our domestic troubles, would, doubtless, have given an admirable portraiture of the various and multitudinous sects of the Cromwellian era. Yet we must remember that, in the course of his work, Bossuet had more particularly in view the Calvinists of his own country. This void is supplied in the *Symbolism*, where the history and the dogmas of the minor sects of Protestantism are fully analyzed and described: a portion of the work, which is certainly not the least important, and, to the

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* L'Université Catholique, tom. ii. p. 75.

English reader, perhaps the most interesting and attractive. Thirdly, Bossuet, who lived at a period when Protestantism had just entered on the second stage of its existence, not only with the most masterly skill traced its progressive development, from its birth down to his own days, but foretold the course of its future destinies.

From his lofty eyrie the eagle of Meaux beheld the whole coming history of Protestantism ; he snuffed from afar the tempestuous clouds of irreligion, that were to spring from its already agitated waters, and the whirlwind of impiety, that was to convulse Christianity to its centre.*

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* In an immortal passage of the *Variations*, Bossuet has recorded the moral and social evils, which the Reformation, up to his own day, had already brought forth, and the still greater ones wherewith it was pregnant. After noticing the prophetic words of Melancthon, " Good God ! what tragedies will posterity witness, if one day men shall begin to stir those questions, whether the Word, whether the Holy Ghost, be a person," the eloquent prelate exclaims : " On commença de son temps à remuer ces matières: mais il jugea bien, que ce n'était encore qu'un faible commencement; car il voyait les esprits s'enhardir insensiblement contre les doctrines établies, et contre l'autorité des décisions ecclésiastiques. Que seroit-ce s'il avoit vu les autres suites pernicieuses des doutes, que la Réforme avoit exités ? tout l'ordre de la discipline renversé publiquement par les uns, et l'indépendance établie, c'est-à-dire sous un nom spécieux et qui flatte la liberté, l'anarchie avec tous ses maux ; la puissance spirituelle mise par les autres entre les mains des princes ; *la doctrine Chrétienne combattue en tous ses points; des Chrétiens nier l'ouvrage de la création et celui de la redemption du genre humain ; anéantir l'enfer; abolir l'immortalité de l'âme ; dépouiller le Christianisme de tous ses mystères, et le changer en une secte de philosophie, toute accommodée aux sens; de là naitre l'indifférence des religions, et ce qui suit naturellement, le fonds même de la religion attaqué ; l'écriture directement combattue ; la voie ouverte au Déisme, c'est-à-dire à un Athéisme deguisé, et les livres où seroient écrites ces doctrines prodigieuses, sortir du sein de la Réforme,*

Moehler, on the other hand, cannot be said to bring the history of the Reformation down to his own times; for with the exception of the Herrnhutters, the Methodists, and the Swedenborgians, the sects whose doctrines he has examined were not posterior to the age of Bossuet. The new and prodigious forms, which, within the last sixty years, Protestantism, in Germany especially, has assumed; the doctrines of Rationalism and Pietism, that, as the reader has already seen, have quite superseded those of the elder Protestantism, are, as was before stated, for the reasons assigned in the work itself, left unnoticed by the author of the *Symbolism.* It may, at first sight, appear singular, that a work which has excited so prodigious a sensation throughout Germany, which has been read by Protestants as well as Catholics, with an avidity that proves it responded to a want generally felt, should have left untouched the existing forms of Protestantism, and been exclusively engaged with the refutation of those antiquated doctrines that, though in certain Protestant countries they may still retain some influence and authority, can count in Protestant Germany but a small number of adherents. How is this fact to be accounted for? I must observe that, although the *Symbolism* abstains from investigating the modern systems of Protestantism, yet it presupposes throughout their existence; and the work itself could never have appeared, if Protestantism had not attained its ultimate term of development. The

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et des lieux, où elle domine. Qu'aurait dit Mélancton, s'il avait prévu tous ces maux, et quelles auraient été ses lamentations? Il en avait assez vu pour en être troublé toute sa vie. Les disputes de son temps et de son parti suffisaient pour lui faire dire, qu'à moins d'un miracle visible, toute la religion allait être dissipée."—vol. i. p. 215-16. ed. Venise, 1738.

present forms of Protestantism, moreover, being only a necessary development of its earlier errors, a solid and vigorous refutation of the latter must needs overthrow the former. But there is yet another, and more special reason, which, in despite of first appearances, rendered this work eminently opportune. A portion of the German Protestants, as we have seen, recoiling from the abyss, to which Rationalism was fast conducting them, sought a refuge in falling back on the old symbolical books of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches, whose authority for upwards of sixty years had been totally disregarded. This movement of minds was seconded by some Protestant princes, particularly by the late King of Prussia, who had learned, from bitter experience, the disastrous political consequences which the doctrines of Rationalism are calculated to produce. This sovereign, who was as skilful an ecclesiastical, as he was a military, tactician, in order to escape from the two enemies, Catholicism and Rationalism, who were galling his flanks, sounded the trumpet for retreat, and, assisted by an able staff of theologians, was making a rapid retrograde march on the old formularies—the bulwarks of Protestant orthodoxy, which, for more than half a century neglected and dilapidated, had remained utterly untenanted. Moehler watched his moment—fell with terrific onslaught on the retreating forces—blew up the old Protestant strongholds—compelled the enemy to retrace his steps, and brought him at last into such straits, that he must now either make an unconditional surrender to the Church, or be swept down the abyss of Pantheism. This is the origin and the meaning of the present book—this is in part the cause of its prodigious success. *Thus, it not only presupposes the extinction of the elder, more orthodox Pro-*

testantism, but, in so far as any human production can accomplish such a thing, it effectually will prevent its revival.

Fourthly, if we look to the form of these two remarkable productions of the human mind, which I have ventured to compare, the *History of the Variations* is characterized in an eminent degree by logical perspicuity; the *Symbolism*, at least equal to it in dialectic force, is vastly superior in philosophic depth. The learning displayed in the former work, is quite sufficient for its purpose; and when we consider the period at which it was written, the comparative paucity of materials accessible to its illustrious author, and the then state of historical researches, we are astonished at the extent and the critical soundness of the learning there exhibited. Mr. Hallam, however, in his *History of Literature*, complains that Bossuet had not given his citations from Luther in the Latin original; so that he himself had often been unable to verify his quotations. This complaint at least he will be unable to prefer against the *Symbolism*, where the Latin citations from Luther and the other patriarchs of the Reformation are given with a fulness and an exactness, that must satisfy—*perhaps rather more than satisfy*—our fastidious critic. The erudition displayed in the *Symbolism* is admitted on all hands to be most extensive and profound. Its style is clear, forcible, and dignified; but in point of eloquence, the Bishop of Meaux ever remains the unrivalled master.

The *Symbolism* called forth many replies from Protestant theologians, such as Nitzch, Marheineke, and Dr. Baur of Tübingen. The work of the latter, which was the longest and most elaborate, was entitled "Opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism, according to the leading dogmas of the two religious systems, with special reference to Moehler's *Symbolism*," Tübingen, 1833. Of this work a writer in the *Conversation's Lexicon** thus speaks: "That Protestant writers should stand up in defence of a Church, to which Moehler denies every right, save that of political existence, was very natural. But it is equally certain, that in an enquiry, wherein the symbolical writings only of the different Churches possess a decisive authority, an Hegelian,† with his subjective views, and the attempt to enforce these as the doctrine of the Evangelical Church, could play no brilliant part. Yet in this false position we find Dr. Baur, whose writing, moreover, is not exempt from personal attacks against his adversary."

Moehler replied without delay, and in a tone of suitable dignity, in a work entitled, *New Investigations into the doctrinal differences between Catholics and Protestants:* Mayence, 1834. This work will be found a most valuable appendix to the *Symbolism;* although no inconsiderable portion of it has been incorporated into the edition from which the present translation has been made.

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* Conversation's Lexicon, p. 699. Leipzig, 1840.

† The system of Hegel is that of a logical Pantheism. His leading doctrine is, that the Deity is the impersonal Reason, and in the human mind only attains to self-consciousness. He and his earlier disciples affected to reestablish the union between faith and science, and employed the language of the Bible and the Church in a sense totally different from what was meant by either. But the younger Hegelians have rejected the hypocritical artifices of their master, and proclaimed, in the most cynical language, the most undisguised Pantheism. It is just, however, to observe, that there are some, though the number is small, who combine Christian views with this system of philosophy.

As to Dr. Baur of Tübingen, he has, since his controversy with Moehler, shown himself a decided Pantheist. Yet this is the man whom the Würtemberg government decorated with orders, while it loaded Moehler with affronts, that forced him to leave the country. *Ex uno disce omnes.*

The personal acrimony, which Dr. Baur had infused into his controversy with the subject of this memoir, as well as the intrigues set on foot to alienate the Würtemberg government from the latter, who was represented as a disturber of religious peace, rendered his abode at Tübingen daily more unpleasant and irksome. The Prussian government, probably apprised of this state of things, renewed negotiations with Moehler, in the view of obtaining his services for one of its universities. Yet these negotiations, creditable to the prudence and discernment of the Prussian government, a second time failed, through the opposition of the Hermesian party. This party had already a most formidable opponent to encounter in the celebrated Klee, professor of theology at Bonn ; and it was evident that the accession of Moehler to that theological Faculty, or, indeed, to any other in the Prussian states, would be most detrimental to the influence, and adverse to the projects, of the party. Count Von Spiegel, then Archbishop of Cologne, and predecessor to that illustrious confessor, whose humiliation prepared the triumph of the German Church, and whose captivity was the prelude to her liberation—Count Von Spiegel, I say, a worldly-minded courtier, little acquainted with theology, was alternately the tool of the Hermesians and the Prussian government. His sanction, as Archbishop of Cologne, was necessary for the confirmation of Moehler's appointment to a theological chair at Bonn. To the latter he addressed a letter, requiring as the condition to such a sanction, the public retractation of the work entitled *Unity of the Church* ; just as if Möhler, with Hermesian obstinacy, had continued to defend in the face of the Church, and as the doctrine of the Church, what its highest tribunal had formally and solemnly condemned. He wrote back to the archbishop of Cologne, that the mistakes, such as they were, in his first work, were entirely rectified in his subsequent productions: and it may be added, that he had never been called upon by the competent authorities to make a public recantation of any opinions therein contained. It was indeed truly ridiculous, that, while purity of doctrine and glowing love for the Church, as well as profound genius, were claiming for the illustrious author of *Athanasius* and the *Symbolisms* the respect and admiration of Germany and Europe, the organ of a party that had for years broached pernicious doctrines, evinced a marked disrespect for ecclesiastical tradition, and subsequently displayed a most obstinate resistance to the authority of the Church, should, forsooth, take exceptions to Moehler's orthodoxy!

Here it may be proper to make a few remarks on the position which he had taken up in relation to this party. It has sometimes been asked, why he did not appear in the lists against the Hermesians? Many reasons may be assigned for his not taking an active part in this controversy. In the first place, his opposition would have been ascribed to motives of personal resentment against a body of men, through whose intrigues he had been twice thwarted in the attainment of an honourable and lucrative professorship. Secondly, the Hermesian system, unsupported by a single theologian of eminence, had been prostrated by the vigorous arm of Klee. Thirdly, the Holy See having pronounced a solemn sentence of condemnation, the view which all Catholics were to take of this system, could no longer be problematic. Fourthly, the utterly disgraceful part that the Hermesians had played in the tyrannical proceedings of the Prussian government against Count von Droste Vischering, the venerable archbishop of Cologne, drew down upon them the general odium of Catholic Germany. Lastly, the tactics of this party was to avoid an open, dispassionate, scientific discussion of principles; and to drag into the controversy matters of personal dispute, and even of ecclesiastical administration—a course of warfare, where even victory was somewhat ignoble, and which, above all things, was abhorrent to the gentle disposition and elevated feelings of Moehler.

But there was another party in the Church, with whom he came into more immediate contact—the so-called Liberals of Catholic Germany, whom I have already had occasion to describe. This party, whose principal seat was in Baden and Würtemberg, had, as has been already observed, exerted some influence over the youthful mind of Moehler; and the last faint tinge of their principles is traceable in his first production, *Unity of the Church.* But his maturer genius—his more extended acquaintance with ecclesiastical antiquity—and, above all, his advances in piety, had revealed to him the hollow pretensions and dangerous tendencies of this party. In the year 1827, he published his celebrated essay on "sacerdotal celibacy," that inflicted on this party a wound, from which it has never since recovered. In this masterly production he proves the apostolic antiquity of clerical celibacy; its conformity with reason and with the most ancient traditions of nations; its close connexion with the most sacred dogmas and essential institutions of the Church, as well as the occasions that led to a partial deviation from the law; and, after showing why the enemies of sacerdotal celibacy must necessarily be the foes to ecclesiastical independence and the papal supremacy, he stigmatizes the Baden churchmen for their shallow theological learning, in despite of all their high pretensions to general knowledge—for their carnal-minded tendencies—their often profligate habits, and their political harlotries with the secular power. This essay was, in the year 1829, followed up by another, entitled "*Fragments on the False Decretals*;" where, with much skill and learning, the author wrested from the enemies of the papal authority, one of their most favourite weapons of attack. The rage of the anti-celibates was, as we may suppose, wound up to the highest pitch; Moehler was denounced as an apostate, an ultramontanist, a Roman obscurantist; and his fame, which grew from year to year, served only to embitter the animosity, and stimulate the assaults, of this paltry faction. While the great genius of the illustrious author of *Athanasius* and the *Symbolism* was hailed with joy by Catholic, and recognized with respect by Protestant Germany, these false brethren had discovered, that he was devoid of talent and erudition; they openly gave the palm of victory to his Protestant opponent, Dr. Baur, and, in one of their periodicals,* were shameless enough, while they denominated the *Symbolism* a violation of religious peace, to avow their satisfaction with the mythical theory of the blasphemous Strauss,—a proof, if further were wanting, how utterly many of these so-called "Liberals" had apostatized from the principles of that Church, whose communion they still so audaciously profaned!

It was not, however, by his writings only that this excellent man opposed the progress, and defeated the projects, of a dangerous faction. By his amiable disposition and engaging manners, as well as by his great reputation, he had gained an extraordinary influence over the minds of his pupils; and this influence he employed to inspire these young theologians with a zeal for the cause and interests of the Church,—a deep veneration for the Holy See,—a love for the duties of their future calling,—and a noble passion for learning. Nor was the beneficial influence of his example and exhortations confined to his pupils alone. During the ten years he filled the professorial chair at Tübingen, a complete change came over the Catholic theological faculty of that university. Such of its members as had hitherto been sound in doctrine, but timid in its avowal, like Dr. Drey, took courage by Moehler's example; and such who, like Hirscher, had been to some extent led away by Neological doctrines, were now, partly through that example, partly by their own researches, gradually reclaimed. The evidence of this change is afforded by the *Theological Quarterly Review* of Tübingen, which, from the year 1828, breathes a very different spirit, and which, supported as it was by Moehler and his most distinguished colleagues and disciples, has remained, down to the present day, by its orthodoxy, its learning, and its philosophic spirit, an ornament to literature and the Church. The noble attitude which, in the present struggle for the liberties of their Church, the younger members of the Swabian clergy have taken—the zeal and courage wherewith they defend their spiritual rights, and rally the people round that sacred standard—the talent and learning they evince in defence of their religion, are all, according to a recent public acknowledgment of the prime minister of Würtemberg in the assembled states, mainly attributable to the influence of Moehler.

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* "Die Freimüthige Blätter."

Yet, the spot which was dear to him from so many early associations—where the Lord had blessed his labours—where he had won so many brilliant victories over the enemies of the faith—he was now, for the reasons above adverted to, about to quit. At the commencement of the year 1835, a theological chair at Munich became vacant; and the King of Bavaria, with that enlightened zeal which makes him ever attentive to the promotion of the interests of the Church, and the advancement of Catholic learning, solicited, on this occasion, the services of Moehler. To this proposal the latter immediately acceded; and, deeply regretted by his friends, his colleagues, and the academic youth, he quitted Tübingen, and arrived at Munich in the spring of the same year. Warmly welcomed by his friends in the Bavarian capital, and enthusiastically greeted by its students, he immediately opened a course of lectures on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, which was soon followed up by others on Church-history, patrology, as well as commentaries on various epistles of St. Paul.

This seems to me the most proper place to speak of the various theological aud historical essays, that Moehler contributed to periodical publications, and especially to the *Theological Quarterly Review* of Tübingen. These essays have since his death been collected by his friend, Dr. Döllinger, and published in two volumes. They are as follows:— I. An investigation of the dispute between St. Jerome and St. Augustine, on the fourteenth verse of the second chapter of Galatians. II. A critical enquiry into the period of publication of the Epistle to Diognetos, usually attributed to St. Justin, and an analysis of its contents. III. An historical sketch of St. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, and his times. IV. An essay on clerical celibacy. V. Short considerations on the historical relation of Universities to the State. VI. Fragments on the false decretals. VII. An essay on the relation of Islam to the Gospel. VIII. An essay on the origin of Gnosticism. The second volume contains the following:—I. Considerations on the state of the Church, during the fifteenth, and at the commencement of the sixteenth century. II. An essay on St. Simonianism. III. Fragmentary sketches of the abolition of slavery. IV. Letter to the Abbé Bautaur of Strasburg, on his system of philosophy. V. Rise and first period of Monasticism: a fragment. VI. Two articles on the imprisonment of the Archbishop of Cologne.

It does not enter into the plan of this memoir to give an analysis of these collected essays, which certainly furnish new evidence of the author's great historical, as well as theological learning; his critical acuteness, his depth of observation, and elegance of style.

The most remarkable pieces in this miscellaneous collection, are the already noticed essay on clerical celibacy, that on Gnosticism, the beautiful fragment on the early history of monasticism, which was to form part of a large work on the monastic orders of the west, and the essay on Islam, that has received its due meed of praise from one of our own Protestant critics. "This essay of Moehler's," says a writer in a number of the *Quarterly Review*, that appeared two years ago, "was composed with an express view towards the progress of Christianity in the east, and the question how it might be offered in the most commanding and persuasive manner to Mahometans. It is written with so much learning, judgment, and moderation, that it might be well worthy of translation in some of our religious journals."*

The lectures which Dr. Moehler delivered on patristic literature, have since his death been collected and edited by his friend Dr. Reithmayr, Professor of Theology at the University of Munich. Of this work, three parts only have as yet appeared, embracing the first three centuries of the Church, and containing nearly a thousand pages of print in small octavo. After some very interesting and profound preliminary reflections on the Greek and Roman languages and literatures, and their relation to Christianity, and some general views on the nature of patristic literature; the author, in the first part, treats of the lives and writings of the Apostolic Fathers, from Pope St. Clement, down to Papias. In the second part, the lives and writings of the Fathers of the second century, from St. Justin martyr, down to Pantenus; and in the third, the lives and writings of the fathers of the third century, from St. Clemens Alexandrinus down to Lactantius, are described, analyzed, and appreciated.

In this work, the plan of the author is to prefix to each century general views on its ecclesiastical and literary character; then under a special section devoted to each particular father, to trace a short sketch of his life, where the materials for such exist; next to give an analysis of his various works, accompanied with a critical enquiry into the age, or the authenticity of such writings as have been disputed; then to furnish a summary of the father's doctrine, and lastly to pronounce judgment on his literary merits. To each biographical section, the editor has appended notices of the best editions of the works of the father. It should be added, that the account of the fathers of the second century is closed with a notice of the most celebrated martyrologies; and that of the fathers of the third century with a short dissertation on the spurious gospels, and a more lengthened one on the sybils.

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* See No. cxxxvi. p. 410. Murray, London. 1841.

A more useful, as well as more engaging introduction to the study of patristic literature, cannot be, perhaps, recommended than the present work. The author's prodigious knowledge in ecclesiastical history, as well as in the writings of the fathers; his power of clear exposition and acute analysis; and his depth and originality of genius, which enabled him easily to enter into, and duly to appreciate, the conceptions of the great thinkers of Christian antiquity, eminently qualified him for the execution of this task. And although the work be posthumous, and did not therefore receive a careful revisal from its author, yet its every page evinces the hand of the master. Among the various dissertations I may notice those on St. Justin martyr, St. Irenæus, Origen, and St. Cyprian, as peculiarly able and elaborate. From its posthumous character, there were, of course, many gaps and omissions in it, which the talented editor has, in the true spirit of the author, endeavoured to fill up; supplying biographical notices of those ecclesiastical writers whose works have perished, and carefully citing the authorities for statements and assertions in the text, as well as making various other additions.

Everything contributed to render Moehler's abode at Munich most agreeable. Surrounded by the distinguished Catholic professors, whom the king had assembled in that capital; living amid a people that in despite of all the efforts made during the late reign to pervert it, was still eminently Catholic; in a city, too, where the theological faculty was undisturbed by the opposition of any rival; where the Catholic Church could unfold all her salutary influences, and all her pomp of worship, and where art was making the noblest efforts to minister to the splendour of that worship;—Moehler might confidently look for still more blessed results from his literary labours. And during the first eighteen months of his residence in the Bavarian capital, the contentment he enjoyed, had, in despite of the severe climate of the place, re-established his health, which of late years had been much impaired.

At length, in the autumn of 1836, came that dreadful scourge, the cholera, that for six months, without intermission, exercised the most dreadful ravages at Munich. Though the prevailing epidemic affected Moehler but in a slight degree, yet he experienced a general debility, that incapacitated him from prosecuting his public duties.

This indisposition was succeeded in the following spring by an attack of influenza, that confined him for two months to his bed; and did not quit him, without leaving behind most dangerous symptoms of a disease on the lungs. On rising from the bed of sickness, he was not permitted by his physicians to pursue his ordinary duties; but on their urgent advice, he took a journey to southern Tyrol, where the genial climate of Meran, the use of whey, and the cheering society of the Benedictines of that place, whose learning and piety he made a constant theme of eulogy to his friends, soon produced the most beneficial effects on his health. After passing the whole summer of 1837 in that beautiful country, he returned in the autumn to Munich, to resume his public functions. But the hopes which his friends had entertained of his complete recovery, were soon to undergo a bitter disappointment. On the first of November his indisposition returned, and symptoms of a decided pulmonary complaint became even more manifest. Again, to his grief, and to the regret of his numerous auditors, his promised course of lectures must be put off. The bleak climate of the Bavarian capital was, at that season especially, little propitious to one labouring under such a disorder; and most unfortunately, towards the close of the month a calamitous event occurred, which, while it threw the whole German church into mourning, and convulsed Westphalia and the Rhenish provinces to their centre, filled the soul of Moehler with a disquietude and dismay, that operated most prejudiciously on his health—the imprisonment of the venerable archbishop of Cologne, on the 20th of November 1837, is the event to which I allude.

This act of reckless and violent tyranny, which put the seal to that long series of intrigues, machinations, and oppressions, that for five-and-twenty years had been directed against the Catholic Church in Prussia, Moehler appreciated in all its vast importance. He saw the evils with which it was fraught, the fearful and general persecution against the German church, that it seemed to portend; and yet with a prophetic eye he discerned the good that Providence would one day bring out of that evil—the triumph and regeneration of that Church, so long betrayed, insulted, and oppressed. These apprehensions and these hopes he has recorded in two remarkable essays, which he published in February 1838, in the *Universal Gazette*, of Augsburg; the last which he ever wrote—the last effusions of that heart, which, amid the languor of sickness, yet beat quick and strong to all that concerned the glory of its God.

At this time, the Prussian commissary, Bruggemann, who was sent to Rome on a diplomatic mission from the court of Berlin, received instructions to hold an interview with Moehler on his passage through Munich, and to tender to him, in the name of his sovereign, a prebendal stall in the cathedral of Cologne, and if he pleased, a professorship at Bonn. The reader will observe, that this was the third attempt made by the Prussian government to enlist the professorial services of Moehler. What could be the meaning of these repeated endeavours on the part of a hostile government, to obtain for one of its universities the greatest theologian of Germany? How do these attempts agree with the well-known policy of a government, that by every species of intrigue, machination, encroachment, and crafty tyranny, had endeavoured to Protestantize its Catholic subjects, and which in some parts of its dominions, like Silesia, had too well succeeded in its endeavours—and that at the very moment when it made this proposal to Moehler, had torn from his diocess, and plunged into prison, an illustrious prelate, for having courageously unmasked and defeated its designs? To the honour of the Prussian government, it must be said, that it was its pride and boast to fill its universities with eminent men; and that hostile as it was to Catholicism, its respect and love for learning exceeded that hostility. Thus in the very heyday of Hermesianism, it appointed its great antagonist Klee to a theological chair at Bonn; and in its conflict with the archbishop of Cologne, it artfully pointed to the nomination of this eminent divine, as a proof that it wished to give no exclusive encouragement to any particular school of theology.

But at the conjuncture at which we have arrived, the Prussian government had a peculiar inducement to make the proposal whereof I speak. The general discontent that reigned in its Catholic provinces, the ever-growing indignation of Catholic Germany at the treatment they had experienced, and the precarious relations wherein Prussia stood with Belgium and France—neighbours to whom her fatal policy had unbarred her own weakness and disunion; this state of things rendered the redress of public wrongs, and the allaying of public irritation in her Catholic dominions, a matter of the most imperious necessity.

In this posture of affairs, as a professor of theology must needs exercise great influence over the rising members of the priesthood, and in an ecclesiastical question over the lay members also of the university, a sort of political importance now attached to a theological chair at Bonn. And unless the Prussian government were prepared to close the door irrevocably against all justice and conciliation, it could not have selected a man, who by his high reputation and zealous attachment to the interests of the Church, as well as by his amiable and conciliatory disposition, was fitter than the subject of this memoir to be the medium of any safe and honourable negotiation.

The offer of M. Brüggemann, Moehler, however, immediately declined. This refusal was dictated not only by the precarious state of his health, as well as by the distracted condition of affairs in the Rhenish province, but also by a feeling of attachment to Bavaria. This feeling his Bavarian majesty delicately appreciated, by conferring on him the knightly order of St. Michael.

His health seemed to rally for a while, so as to enable him for a few weeks to resume the delivery of his lectures; but towards the end of January a violent catarrh ensued, which soon terminated in inflammation of the chest.

The following account of his last illness is from the pen of an eye-witness, and friend; and the tone of mournful earnestness, wherein it is written, must challenge the sympathy of every reader.

"The experience of late years," says the anonymous biographer, "convinced the physicians that the injurious influence of the Munich climate, combined with the arduous duties of the professorial charge, afforded no certain prospect of the preservation of Moehler's life; and that it was only by changing his abode for some milder climate, any chance for his recovery existed. The King of Bavaria, informed of the condition of the illustrious patient, and anxious to preserve a life so valuable to Church and State, nominated Moehler, by a decree dated March 1838, to the just vacant dignity of Dean in Würzburg. Moehler was deeply affected by this mark of his sovereign's delicate attention and forethought; yet his joy was not unalloyed. He had entered with uncommon ardour on the professorial career, for which heaven had favoured him with the highest qualifications, and wherein his efforts had been blessed with the most signal success. The very idea of the abandonment of that career, had inspired him with the deepest melancholy. He anticipated something more than a mere change of employment. To a friend, who congratulated him on the promotion to his new dignity, he expressed himself in the following remarkable words: "I have often observed in history," said he, "that men whom God hath highly favoured in life, He often on the eve of their separation from this world, invested with the glimmer of some temporal honour. I cannot without being guilty of great ingratitude, deny that Providence hath loaded me with many favours; but the prognostic which I here advert to, may now be realized in me also." This anticipation, alas! was too soon verified; that very day the fever returned; a week later, suddenly at night, catarrh and the critical symptom of hoarseness ensued, and then a few days afterwards the physicians observed all the signs of a violent hectic fever. His nights especially, were attended with great suffering; on the seventh of April he felt himself again better, and desired that for his entertainment a favourite book of travels should be read to him. This was done, not without a fearful presentiment, that that wish was the prelude to another and a more distant journey, and so it happened. At the beginning of Holy Week, the fever assumed the character of typhus, and the mind of the patient from time to time slightly wandered in delirium. Feeling his end approach, he again, on the tenth of April, prepared by the reception of the sacraments for appearing before his Almighty Judge. The sacraments appeared to exert a beneficial influence on his health, for on the following day he felt much relieved, and hope began to revive in the bosom of his friends. But he no longer looked forward to recovery, and on the same day he made his last testamentary arrangements in regard to his temporal concerns. The following night dispelled all hopes of a change for the better. On the morning of the twelfth of April, he felt great oppression at his chest, he became somewhat restless; the heavy ice-cold sweat-drops gathered about his brow and temples; the last struggle had come on. His confessor, Dr. Aloysius Buchner (now a prebendary at Passau), never left his side. At one o'clock in the afternoon, he awoke from a gentle slumber, clasped both hands to his head, and exclaimed, "Ah! now I have seen it—now I know it—now I would like to write a book,—this must be written down,—but now it is gone." He then laid himself calmly down, a look of serene and winning love passed again over his countenance, as if the soul were evidently making an effort gently to sever the last bonds of life. He then gasped violently three times, and the soul bursting her fetters, sprang upwards to her God. The sad event took place on Maundy Thursday, the 12th of April 1838, at half past two o'clock in the afternoon. His remains were interred on Holy Saturday, the 14th day of April; and his death was mourned by his king, deeply bewailed by his friends, and regretted by all."*

Thus died this celebrated man, in the midst of his career, at a crisis so eventful for religion, and at a moment when he could be so ill spared by the Church and by his country. His career, though brief, had been eminently useful as well as brilliant; and his life, though not full of years, had been replete with good works. He might, at the close of his course, exclaim with the great apostle, "Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi, reposita est mihi corona justitiæ." "Happy, saith the Scripture, are they who die in the Lord!" And happy, thrice happy, we may add, are they, who die, before the enemy hath snatched from their hands the fruit of their morning's toil! And when we are tempted to lament the untimely end of this great luminary of the Church, we should assuage our sorrow with the reflection, how infinitely more enviable was his fate, than that of his celebrated contemporary—the once great Gamaliel in the Church of France. For, whereas death, we may confidently hope, brought to one the garland of eternal life, existence hath cast over the other, the blight and desolation of death. In abandoning the glorious mansions of the Church for those bleak and desolate regions, where the grisly phantoms of erring fancy dwell, that unhappy spirit hath abandoned, too, the sweet recollections of early days, and the sacred ties of friendship, and the merit and the glory of all his victories over heresy and unbelief, and the inestimable peace of the soul; in a word, all the earthly charms, and all the heavenly hopes, that cheer and sustain existence, and solace and sweeten death. And as a great writer once said, that the fall of the rebel archangel cast a sadness over all creation, whereof the traces are even now perceptible; so the fall of this mighty spirit hath saddened the Church in this the morning of her reviving hope and joy.

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* See memoir by anonymous biographer, p. 27.

Moehler's countenance, deportment, and manner, were perfectly indicative of his moral and intellectual qualities. The perfect harmony or equilibrium of his mental powers was expressed in the serenity of his countenance, in the modulations of a most pleasing voice, and in the dignity of his carriage. The same exquisite sense of justice—the same aversion from all exaggeration, which characterized his writings, were perceptible in his conversation. Yet, though endowed with this natural benignity of temper, which, in him, was exalted and sanctified by motives of Christian charity, he was not slow to the perception of defects of character; and whenever the meaner passions crossed his path, his instinctive abhorrence would find vent in the sallies of a subdued, yet pungent satire.

His personal appearance has thus been described by one of his biographers: "Tall in stature, he was of a slight and delicate frame; his outward bearing was most decorous and dignified; his features were delicate, regular, and prepossessing; in his large, dark eye beamed a gentle fire, which shed over a pallid countenance an indescribable charm. His voice, like his bodily frame, was weak and slender, yet harmonious; his pronunciation was pure, without the alloy of any peculiar dialect. Whoever, therefore, saw him for the first time, was ever most agreeably prepossessed with his general appearance."*

During the first years of his professorship, and before he had quite thrown off some of the lax opinions already adverted to, he was not so assiduous in prayer, nor so diligent in the celebration of the holy sacrifice, as might be desired. Then too exclusively occupied with science, he did not seek out with sufficient ardour that heavenly wisdom, without which, all human learning, like the grass of the field without the refreshing dew, will soon become arid and unprofitable.

A friend concluded at that time all his letters to him with an earnest exhortation to the habit of frequent prayer. These exhortations, as well as the diligent perusal of the writings of the holy fathers, which are no less powerful in cherishing the feelings of piety, than in confirming and enlivening faith, wrought, under the Divine blessing, the happiest change in Moehler's devotional exercises; for, in subsequent years, he never let a day pass without celebrating the holy sacrifice, and with a tenderness of devotion, that excited universal edification.

With the laborious duties of the professorial office, he combined, to some extent, the functions of the sacred ministry; and to many of the academic youth he acted as spiritual director.

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* Lebensskizze, p. 28.

Not content with personally discharging the obligations of his sacred calling with the strictest fidelity, and an irreproachable purity of conduct, he strove by example and conversation, as well as by his writings and his lectures, to stem the tide of corruption that had burst into the Swabian Church, and was, it is confidently asserted, the means of guarding many a young clergyman against the evil counsels and evil practices of the anti-celibate party.

His zeal for the glory of God and the interests of His Church, while it was the animating and sustaining principle of all his intellectual exertions, often communicated itself with electrical effect to his youthful auditors. Yet that zeal, which consumed him for the house of his Lord, was exceeded, if possible, by a spirit of mildness, modesty, and humility—qualities which, while they endeared him to Heaven, made him, too, the favourite with men.

Adorned with all the sacerdotal virtues, he possessed at the same time a winning amiability of manner, that caused his society to be courted by men of various ranks and professions, and even of the most opposite religious and political principles. Protestants as well as Catholics, laymen as well as churchmen, consulted him personally or by letter on every variety of subject,—religious, political, literary, or domestic; and had his life been prolonged, he would probably have become one of the most influential men in Germany.

Having thus briefly described the moral character of this remarkable man, it remains for me to sum up his intellectual qualities.

He was distinguished for an uncommon clearness, precision, and vigour of ratiocination, that shows how well he had profited by the example of those Attic masters, to whom his youth had been so sedulously devoted. His plan is to let his adversary bring forward his strongest arguments, and dispose them in the most advantageous order; then, without stopping to refute him in detail, he wrings from him some reluctant concession, or forces him unconsciously into some false position, whereby he is enabled at a single stroke to shake or overthrow the whole system of his antagonist's reasoning.

In depth of reflection and comprehensive grasp of generalization, he equals Frederic Schlegel; and if inferior to him in the fervour of a poetic imagination, he yet possesses, partly from nature, partly from the severer training of theological discipline, a superior force and precision of reasoning. Like the great writer to whom I have compared him, Moehler was eminently endowed with the faculty called by critics *diathesis*—the faculty of seizing on the main points of his subject, divesting it of its subordinate or accessory parts, and in a few bold strokes tracing a perfect outline.

The learning of Moehler was most profound and various. Though he died at the premature age of forty-three, he yet had mastered every branch of theological science; and in patristic literature and the writings of the schoolmen, as also in the works of the Reformers, and the later Protestant divines of various sects, he was preeminently versed. His acquaintance with profane history and modern literature was most extensive; and his acquirements in classical philology were so great, as to call forth the astonishment and admiration of the most learned professors in that faculty.

His style reflects the calm, equable dignity of his soul; clear, flowing, and stately: if it seldom rises to eloquence, it never sinks into dryness, or loses itself in obscurity.

Yet all these high intellectual endowments were rendered still more effective, because, as was above said, they were tempered, chastened, exalted, and sanctified by an amiable modesty, a deep, unaffected humility, a glowing zeal, and a piety serenely bright, that like a light within a beautiful vase, brought out all those mental ornaments into bolder relief.*

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* As it may be interesting to the reader to hear the opinion entertained of this remarkable man, by those who are far more competent than myself to pronounce a judgment on his merits, I will here subjoin the following critical remarks from some of the ablest literary and theological periodicals in Germany. My own opinion, it is just to premise, was formed before I had seen the passages in question.

From the Historisch-politische Blätter.

"As in life he was full of the most tender-hearted mildness and forbearance, full of an unpretending modesty and kindliness of feeling, which won him the hearts of all men; so his moral character was reflected in his literary labours. Free from the arrogance and coldheartedness of an idle science, his bosom glowed with a pure and mild enthusiasm, and the calm and unruffled clearness of his spirit was evinced, as with the eye of thoughtful sensibility, he contemplated the agitated scenes of history, and their chequered phenomena, so calculated to mislead and confuse the judgment. Gifted with an untiring industry, and with a penetrative mind, that, amid the mass of details, never lost sight of the whole, he yet, in his humble modesty, never forgot the deficiencies and the narrowness of all human science. All one-sided exaggeration—all passionate attacks, grated on him as a discord; and all merit he would acknowledge, and present to it with a cheerful brow and feeling heart, the homage of his praise."—vol. x. p. 564-5.

In a communication which Dr. Reithmayr has had the kindness to make to me, he writes as follows: "Brief as was the period of Moehler's labours in Munich, yet it is difficult to describe the good he wrought, and the seed for still greater good which he sowed. Powerful as his influence over Southern Germany had become, great as was his authority, honoured as was his name, and mighty as was the impulse he had given to the public mind, he was yet far from entertaining the thought of wishing to form a school, in so far as we thereby understand a certain peculiar theological system, whether its nature consist in a special theoretical method, or in the adoption and more precise development of certain opinions. His faith was of a much too positive kind; he was too removed from all hollow speculation; and his whole intellectual cultivation was too strongly historical, and he was withal too modest, to wish to bring his own person thus prominently forward, or to stamp upon other

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From the Conversations-Lexicon.

"If we combine in a single focus all the particular traits of this remarkable man, we shall find that his most eminent peculiarity consisted in the utter abandonment of that pretension, after which so many strive, to be the head of a sect, or even a school. Moehler devoted his faculties purely and entirely to the objective and divinely-established institution of the Church. To this service he gave up his whole being—his high natural endowments—his penetration of intellect—his often overpowering logic, and his great erudition. And as he made it the business of his life, to set forth the Church in all her truth and beauty, so the Church, in her turn, transfigured his whole existence, and made him that model of purity, humility, and conscientiousness,—that mirror of all human and sacerdotal virtues, which called forth the enthusiastic admiration of all, who had the good fortune to come into nearer or remoter intercourse with him."—No. XXI, p. 700, vol. iii. Supplement to Eighth Edition. Leipzick. 1840.

minds the impress of his own individual conceptions. If anything can be said to characterize, or distinguish in any degree his auditors and admirers, it is a certain idealism in the treatment of science, an enthusiasm for the institutes and interests of the Church, abhorrence of all sectarianism, and a closer attachment to the mother Church of Rome."

The new school of German Catholic divines is characterized by the union of great patristic learning and high philosophic speculation; by severe orthodoxy and warm attachment to the Church, coupled with a singular spirit of conciliation and tenderness in the treatment of controversy towards the erring brethren. This spirit is of course modified according to the peculiar temper and genius of different individuals; but such is the general characteristic of the new school.

The more celebrated theological contemporaries of Moehler were Klee, Döllinger, Drey, Hirscher, and Veith; and among his scholars, Staudenmaier, Ruhn, Hefele, and Reithmayr, have attained to great eminence.

Klee has treated every branch of theology. His works are characterized by vast erudition, great metaphysical depth, and a consummate power of dialectic. This very acute thinker and eminently learned man, will ever exercise the greatest influence in the school; but as he was deficient in grace of style and power of imagination, his influence will be less perceptible in the great republic of letters.* Döllinger, whose excellent

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* With Professor Klee the writer of these pages was most intimately acquainted. He was a most amiable and excellent clergyman, and delightful companion. He informed the writer, that he had read all the works of the fathers, and some of them twice over. With the writings

Church History is known to the English reader from Dr. Cox's elegant translation, combines extraordinary learning in theology and canon law, with great historical research, critical acumen, and clearness of method and style. Drey has proved himself a very learned and philosophic apologist for Christianity. Of Hirscher I can speak with less confidence, as I possess but little acquaintance with his writings. He cultivates chiefly moral theology, and unites, it is said, uncommon unction of feeling to originality of thought and extent of learning. Some prejudices, however, which he has still retained, tend somewhat to impair the influence his genius and piety would otherwise command. Veith has distinguished himself more particularly in pastoral theology, and combines in an eminent degree eloquence, deep thought, and high asceticism. Ruhn is distinguished for great depth of philosophic speculation; and Staudenmaier displays great fertility of ideas and amenity of feeling. Hefele and Reithmayr, both as scholars and thinkers, bid fair to tread in the footsteps of their illustrious master.

The number and excellence, too, of the theological periodicals and smaller essays and treatises, as well as of the more extended works, that now appear in Catholic Germany, evince the vigour and productiveness of her religious genius. Divine Providence, when He

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of the mediæval divines, he possessed still greater acquaintance than Moehler. He was uncommonly well versed in history, had read all the Greek and Roman classics, and was familiar with the best productions of English, French, and Italian Literature. He succeeded Moehler in the professorship of theology at the University of Munich; but after one year's residence in that city, he died, at the age of forty-three. His loss, like that of his predecessor, will be felt in Germany for long years to come.

suffered the German Church to be despoiled of her temporal riches and political greatness, repaid her with all the abundance of moral and intellectual wealth.

Last year, in the public cemetery of Munich, a beautiful Gothic sepulchral monument was erected over the spot where Moehler's remains lie interred. Moehler is represented in a kneeling posture, and robed in sacerdotal garments. His likeness is said to be admirably caught. On one side is represented the Blessed Virgin, holding the Divine Infant, who graciously extends his arm to bless the priest, sunk down in adoration before him. On the other side is Moehler's guardian angel, presenting to the Divine Infant certain writings of the deceased. The monument is decorated with other beautiful devices, allusive to the life and writings of this great man. It bears the following appropriate inscription:—

JOHANNES ADAMUS MOEHLER.
S. THEOLOGIÆ DOCTOR . ET PROFESSOR P. O. IN
UNIVERSITATE TUBINGENSI : ET MONACENSI .
CAPIT. CATHEDR. WIRCEBURG : DECANUS DESIGN :
ORDIN : ST. MICHAEL PRO MERITIS EQUES.
NATUS IGERSHEMII IN WUERTEMBERGA.
PRIDIE NON. MAJAS 1796.
DEFENSOR FIDEI.
LITERARUM DECUS. ECCLESIÆ SOLAMEN.
OBIIT MONACHII. PRIDIE IDUS. APRIL 1838.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

NATURE, EXTENT, AND SOURCES OF SYMBOLISM.

By Symbolism we understand the scientific exposition of the doctrinal differences among the various religious parties opposed to each other, in consequence of the ecclesiastical revolution of the sixteenth century, as these doctrinal differences are evidenced by the public confessions or symbolical books of those parties. From this definition it follows:

First, that Symbolism has directly and immediately neither a polemical nor apologetical aim. It has only to give a statement, to furnish a solid and impartial account, of the differences which divide the above-mentioned Christian communities. This exposition, doubtless, will indirectly assume, partly a defensive, partly an offensive, character; for the personal conviction of the writer will involuntarily appear, and be heard, sometimes in the tone of adhesion and commendation, sometimes in the tone of reproof and contradiction. Still, the mere explanatory and narrative character of Symbolism is thereby as little impaired, as that of the historical relation, in which the historian conceals not his own personal opinion respecting the personages brought forward and the facts recounted. The claims of a deeper science, especially, cannot be satisfied unless the exposition occasionally assume, in part a polemical, in part an apologetical, character. A bare narrative of facts, even when accompanied with the most impartial and most solid historical research, will not suffice; nay, the individual proportions of a system of doctrine must be set forth, in their mutual concatenation and their organic connection. Here, it will be necessary to decompose a dogma into the elements out of which it has been formed, and to reduce it to the ultimate principles whereby its author had been determined; there, it will be expedient to trace the manifold changes which have occurred in the dogma: but at all times must the parts of the system be viewed in their relation to the whole, and be referred to the fundamental and all-pervading idea. During this analytic process,—without which a true, profound, and vivid apprehension of the essential nature of the different confessions is absolutely impossible,—the relation of these to the gospel, and to Christian reason, must necessarily be brought out, and the conformity of the one, and the opposition of the other, to universally acknowledged truths, must follow as a matter of course. In this way, indeed, Symbolism becomes the most cogent apology, or allusive refutation, without designing to be, in itself, either the one or the other.

Secondly, in the definition we have given, the limits and extent of our course of Symbolism have been expressed. For, as they are only those ecclesiastical differences that sprang out of the convulsions of the sixteenth century, that form the subject of our investigations, so all those religious communities that have arisen out of earlier exclusion or voluntary secession from the Church, even though they may have protracted their existence down to our times, will necessarily be excluded from the range of our enquiries. Hence, the course of doctrinal disputes in the Oriental Church will not engage our attention. The religious ferment of the sixteenth century, and the ecclesiastical controversies which it produced, are of a totally different nature from the contest which divides the Western and Eastern Churches. The controversy, agitated in the West, regards exclusively Christian anthropology; for it will be shown, that, whatever other things may be connected with this, they are all mere necessary deductions from the answer, given to the anthropological question mooted by the Reformers. The controversy, on the other hand, agitated in the East, has reference to Christology; for it would be strange indeed, if the orthodox Greek Church, whose dispute with the Catholic regards no doctrine of faith, were alone to claim attention; while the Nestorians and the Monophysites, who are separated from Catholics, orthodox Greeks, and Protestants, by real doctrinal differences, were to be excluded from the enquiry. But the special objects of our undertaking neither occasion nor justify so extended a discussion. An account of these doctrinal differences has, moreover, appeared to us uncalled for, since even the most abridged ecclesiastical history furnishes, respecting all these phenomena, more information than is requisite for practical purposes. In fact, no present interest conducts us to the Oriental Church and its various subdivisions; for, although the ancient disagreement of these communities with the Catholic and Protestant Churches still continues, it is at present without real and vital influence.

On the other hand, the doctrinal peculiarities of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, in opposition to the Catholic Church, as well as to each other, must be set forth with the utmost precision, and in every possible bearing, as must also be the positions of the Catholic Church against the negations of the two former. It might, indeed, appear proper to presuppose a general acquaintance with the Catholic dogmas, as asserted and maintained against the Reformers, in the same way as Plank, in his *Comparative View of the Churches*, has presupposed the knowledge of the Lutheran system of doctrine. But, as the tenets of Protestants have sprung only out of opposition to Catholic doctrine, they can be understood only in this opposition: and, therefore, the Catholic thesis must be paralleled with the Protestant anti-thesis, and compared with it in all its bearings, if the latter would be duly appreciated. On the other hand, the Catholic doctrine will then only appear in its true light, when confronted with the Protestant. The present comparative view of the differences between the Christian confessions, is besides, as indicated in the Preface, destined for Protestant readers also; but that these on an average possess more than a superficial acquaintance with Catholic doctrine, we cannot here reasonably suppose.

The various sects which have grown out of the Protestant Church, like the Anabaptists or Mennonites, the Quakers, Methodists, and Swedenborgians, could the less pass unnoticed by us, as they only further developed the original Protestantism, and have in part alone consistently carried out its principles, and pushed them to the farthest length. Hence, although all these sects did not spring up in the sixteenth century, we still regard them, as in their inward purport, belonging to that age.

The Socinians and Arminians, also, will claim our attention. These appear, indeed, as the opposite extreme to primitive Protestantism. For, while the latter sprang out of a strong, but one-sided, excitement of feelings, the former, as in the case of the Socinians, either originated in a one-sided direction of the understanding; or, as in the case of the Arminians, terminated in such a course, completely rejecting the fundamental doctrines of the Reformation; so that in them one extreme was replaced by another, while Catholicism holds the just medium between the two. Whether, moreover, the Socinians are to be numbered among Protestant sects, is a matter of dispute among the Protestants themselves. It is, however, really unquestionable, that Socinianism ought not to be looked upon as an appendage to orthodox Protestantism, as was strongly pointed out by us, when we just now called the Socinian conception of Christianity the precise opposite to the old Protestant view. But, as the Protestants have not yet succeeded in dismissing the Rationalists from their community (to use the language of Mr. Hahn), we do not see why they should now, at least, refuse admittance to the Socinians. Nay, every one who abandons the Catholic Church, who only ceases to be a Catholic, whatever in other respects may be the doctrines which he believes, or refuses to believe, though his creed may stand ever so low beneath that of the Socinians, is sure to find the portals of the Protestant Church thrown open to him with joy. It would therefore not be praiseworthy on our parts, if in the name of Protestants we were to exercise an act of intolerance, and deny to the Socinians the gratification of seeing, in one writing at least, the object of their ancient desire attained. On the other hand, the doctrines of the Rationalists cannot be matter of investigation here, because they form no separate ecclesiastical community, and we should have to set forth only the views of a thousand different individuals, not the tenets of a church or sect. They have no symbol, and therefore can claim no place in our Symbolism. Röhr has, indeed, put forth such a one, and Bretschneider has passed on it no unfavourable judgment; but that it has been in any place adopted by any one community, we have not learned.

Still less could any notice be taken of the Saint-Simonians, for they are not even to be numbered among Christian sects. In order that a religious party may be deemed worthy of that place of honour, it is at least requisite that it should revere Christ, as Him through whom mankind have attained to their highest degree of religious culture; so that all which, from Him downwards, has been thought or felt in a religious spirit, should be regarded only as the further expansion of what, in germ at least, He had imparted to His followers. Hence, the Carpocratians are by no means to be included in the class of Christian sects, because they placed Christ merely on a level with Orpheus, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. The same honour must be refused to the Mohammedans also, because they exalt the Arabian prophet above Christ, although the latter they still revere as a Divine envoy. The same now holds good of the Saint-Simonians. According to them, Christianity, like heathenism, comprises only a one-sided conception of the religious idea. It is, indeed, according to their principles, a necessary point of transition, but still *only* a point of transition, to attain to what they please to term absolute religion; in which every preceding form, as a mere transitory phase, is abolished. As they have thus exalted themselves above Christianity, they have thereby absolutely excluded themselves from her pale.

Thirdly, the definition we have given establishes the limits, within which the characterization of the different ecclesiastical communities, that fall within the compass of the present work, must be confined. Treating only of doctrinal differences, it is the object of the present work solely to unfold the distinctive articles of belief, and to exclude all liturgical and disciplinary matters, and, in general, all the non-essential ecclesiastical and political points of difference; although, even thus, the peculiarities of the communities to be described must find a general explanation in our Symbolism. In this respect, Symbolism is distinguished from the science of comparative liturgy, ecclesiastical statistics, &c. It is only in a few cases that an exception from this principle has appeared admissible.

Fourthly and lastly, the sources are here pointed out from which Symbolism must draw. It is evident that the public confessions, or symbols, of the ecclesiastical communities in question, must, above all, be attended to, and hence hath the science itself derived its name. Other sources, meanwhile, which offer any desirable explanation, or more accurate decisions, in reference to the matters in hand, must not be neglected. To liturgies, prayers, and hymns, also, which are publicly used, and are recognized by authority, Symbolism may accordingly appeal; for in these the public faith is expressed. In appealing to hymns, however, great prudence is necessary, as in these the feeling and the imagination exert a too exclusive sway, and speak a peculiar language, which has nothing in common with dogmatic precision. Hence, even from the Lutheran church-songs, although they comprise much very serviceable to our purpose, and some peculiar Protestant doctrines are very accurately expressed in them, as also from Catholic lays, hymns, and the like, we have refrained from adducing any proofs.

That even those writings of the Reformers, which have not obtained the character of public confessions, must be of great importance to our inquiries into Symbolism, must be perfectly clear. Reference must especially be made to these, when the internal signification and the worth of Protestant dogmas is to be apprehended. In the same way, Catholic theologians of acknowledged orthodoxy, and, above all, the history of the Council of Trent, offer many satisfactory and fuller elucidations of particular decisions in the Catholic formularies. Yet the individual opinion of one or more teachers belonging to any confession must not be confounded with the doctrine of the confession itself; a principle which must be extended even to the Reformers, so that opinions which may be found in their writings, but have not received any express public sanction, must not be noted down as general Protestant tenets. Between the use, however, of Catholic writers and of the Reformers, for the purpose of proof and illustration in this Symbolism, a very observable difference exists. The importance of the matter will render deeper insight into this difference necessary. The relation, namely, wherein the Reformers stand to the religious belief of their followers, is of a very peculiar nature, and totally different from that of Catholic teachers to Catholic doctrine. Luther, Zwingle, and Calvin, are *the creators* of those religious opinions prevalent among their disciples; while no Catholic dogma can be referred to any theologian as its author. As in Luther the circle of doctrines, which constitute the peculiar moral life of the Protestant communities, was produced with the most independent originality; as all who stand to him in a spiritual relation, like children to their parents, and on that account bear his name, draw from him their moral nurture, and live on his fulness; so it is from him we must derive the most vivid, profound, and certain knowledge of his doctrines. The peculiar emotions of his spirit, out of which his system gradually arose, or which accompanied its rise; the higher views, wherein often, though only in passing, he embraced all its details, as well as traced the living germ, out of which the whole had by degrees grown up; the rational construction of his doctrine by the exhibition of his feelings; all this is of high significancy to one, who will obtain a genuine scientific apprehension of Protestantism, as a doctrinal system, and who will master its leading, fundamental principle. The Protestant articles of faith are so livingly interwoven with the nature of their original production in the mind of Luther, and with the whole succession of views, which filled his soul, that it is utterly impossible to sever them. The dogma is equally subjective with the causes, which co-operated in its production, and has no other stay nor value than what they afford. Doubtless, as we have before said, we shall never ascribe to the Protestant party, as such, what has not been received into their symbolical writings. But although we must never abandon this principle, yet we cannot confine ourselves to it. For this religious party was generally satisfied with the results of that process of intellectual generation whereby its doctrines had been produced; and, separating by degrees those results from their living and deepest root, it rendered them thereby for the most part unintelligible to science; as the bulk of mankind are almost always contented with broken, unsubstantial, and airy theories. But it is for science to restore the connexion between cause and effect, between the basis and the superstructure of the edifice; and, to discharge this task, the writings of Luther, and, in a relative degree, of the other Reformers, are to be sedulously consulted.

It is otherwise with individual Catholic theologians. As they found the dogmas, on which they enlarge, which they explain, or illustrate, *already pre-existing*, we must in their labours accurately discriminate between their special and peculiar opinions, and the common doctrines declared by the Church, and received from Christ and the apostles. As these doctrines existed *prior to* those opinions, so they can exist *after* them, and can therefore be scientifically treated *without* them, and quite *independently* of them. This distinction between individual opinion and common doctrine presupposes a very strongly constituted community, based at once on history, on life, on tradition, and is only possible in the Catholic Church. But, as it is possible, so also it is necessary; for unity in its essence is not identity. In science as in life, such scope is to be afforded to the free expansion of individual exertion, as is compatible with the existence of the common weal; that is to say, so far as it is not in opposition to it, nor threatens it with danger and destruction. According to these principles the Catholic Church ever acted; and by that standard we may estimate not only the oft-repeated charge, that, amid all their vaunts of unity, Catholics ever had divisions and various disputes among themselves, but also the Protestant habit of ascribing to the whole Church the opinions of one or more individuals. Thus, for instance, it would argue a very defective insight into the nature of Catholicism, if any one were to give out, as the doctrine of the Church, Augustine's and Anselm's exposition of original sin, or the theory of the latter respecting the vicarious atonement of Christ, or Anthony Günther's speculative enquiries on those dogmas. These are all very laudable and acute endeavours to apprehend, as a conception of reason, the revealed doctrine, which alone is binding upon all; but it is clear that it would be gross ignorance to confound them with the teaching of the Church itself. For a time, even *a conception of a dogma*, or an opinion, may be tolerably general, without, however, becoming an integral portion of a dogma, or a dogma itself. There are here eternally changing individual forms of an universal principle, which may serve this or that person, or a particular period for mastering that universal principle by way of reflection and speculation—forms which may possess more or less of truth, but whereon the Church pronounces no judgment; for the data for such a decision are wanting in tradition, and she abandons them entirely to the award of theological criticism.

From what has been said, it follows that such a distinction as we speak of between dogma and opinion must be extremely difficult for Protestants. As their whole original system is only an individuality exalted into a generality ; as the way in which the Reformers conceived certain dogmas, and personally thought and lived in them, perfectly coincided, in their opinion, with those dogmas themselves; so their followers have inherited of them an irresistible propensity everywhere to identify the two things. In Luther, it was the inordinate pretension of an individuality, which wished to constitute itself the arbitrary centre, round which all should gather,—an individuality which exhibited itself as the universal man, in whom every one was to be reflected,—in short, it was the formal usurpation of the place of Christ, who undoubtedly as individual represents also redeemed humanity,—a prerogative which is absolutely proper to Him, and, after Him, to the universal Church, as supported by Him. In modern times, when the other opposite extreme to the original Reformation has in many tendencies found favour with the Protestants, not only are all the conceivable individualities and peculiarities, which can attach themselves to dogma, willingly tolerated, but even all the peculiar Christian dogmas are considered only as doctrines, which we must tolerate, and leave to individuals who may need them for their own personal wants; so that, if Luther raised his own individuality to the dignity of a generality, the generality is now debased into a mere individuality, and thus the true relation of the one to the other can never be established. In the consistent progress of things, every one considered himself, in a wider circle, the representative of humanity, redeemed from error at least—as a sort of microcosmic Christ. But in order that this phenomenon might not appear too strange, for it is no easy matter to reconcile one Christ with the other, an expedient of compromise was discovered, by leaving to each one his own—that is to say, by permitting him to be his own Redeemer, and to represent himself, as also to consider the extreme points, wherein all individuals concur, as representing redeemed humanity. The common property of Protestants could only now consist of some abstract formulas, which must be acceptable to very many non-Christians. As every one wished to pass for a Christ, the true Christian, the real scandal to the world, necessarily vanished; for as each one redeemed himself, there was no longer a common Redeemer.

To this we may add the following circumstances, whereby was formed that peculiar kind of individuality, which the Protestants would fain confound with the universal principles of the Catholic Church. Protestantism arose partly out of the opposition to much that was undeniably bad and defective in the Church; and therein consists the good it has achieved, although this was by no means peculiar to it, since hostility to evil upon Church principles existed before it, and has never ceased to exist beside it. Protestantism, too, sprang partly out of the struggle against peculiar scientific expositions of doctrine, and against certain institutions in ecclesiastical life, which we may comprehend under the expression of a mediæval individuality; but a change in this respect was the object of many zealous churchmen since the latter half of the fourteenth century. As the contest grew in vehemence, it came to pass, as passion views every thing in a perverse light, that matters took such a shape in the eyes of the Reformers, as if the whole pre-existing Church *consisted* of those elements of evil, and of those individual peculiarities—as if both constituted the *essence* of the Church. This opinion having now been formed, the two things were further set forth in the strongest colours of exaggeration; for in this course of proceeding there was a manifest advantage, since with such weapons the Catholic Church was most easily combated. Accordingly, among the Reformers, we very frequently find (if we except some rare but gratifying avowals in Luther's writings), not only the necessary distinction between the dogmas of the Church, and the individual views or conceptions of particular writers and periods of time, entirely overlooked, but the latter so pointedly brought forward, that the former not seldom sink totally into the back-ground. The nature of the origin of any institution determines in general its duration. If, accordingly, Protestants would enter into the distinction in question; if, in their estimate of Catholicism, they would look only to what was universally received, what was laid down in her public formularies, and leave all the rest to history; then as their first rise would have been impossible, their separate existence even now would be essentially endangered. The complaint here adverted to, a complaint which has so often been made by Catholics, appears, therefore, to be so intimately interwoven with their whole opposition against Protestantism, that it is only by the cessation of that opposition the complaint will ever be set aside.

Though from this it will be evident, that, in the course of our symbolical enquiries, an use is to be made of the works of the Reformers, which cannot be made of those of any Catholic writer, we must nevertheless now draw attention to some peculiar difficulties attending the use of Luther's and Melancthon's writings. Luther is very variable in his assertions. He too often brings forward the very reverse of his own declarations, and is, in a surprising degree, the sport of momentary impressions and transient moods of mind. He delights also in exaggerations, willingly runs into extremes, and likes what are called energetic expressions, in which oftentimes, when taken by themselves, his true meaning is certainly not easy to be discovered. The most advisable course, under these circumstances, is, by a careful study of his writings, to learn the key-note, which pervades the whole: individual passages can in no case be considered as decisive in themselves; and a sort of average estimate, therefore, naturally recommends itself to our adoption. With Melancthon we have fewer difficulties to encounter. He, indeed, is involved in contradictions of greater moment than Luther, but, for that very reason, he lightens for us the task of separating in his works the genuine Protestant elements from their opposites. In this respect, his reforming career may be accurately divided into two distinct parts. In the first, being yet a young man, little familiar with theological studies, and versed only in classical literature, he was by degrees so subjugated in religious matters by the personal influence of Luther, as to embrace without any qualification his way of thinking; and it was in this period that the first edition of his most celebrated work, the *Loci Theologici*, appeared. When his ripening talents, his more extended theological learning, and a more enlarged experience of life, had pointed out to him the abyss before which he had been conducted, he receded by degrees, but yet was never able to attain to a decided independence of mind; for, in the flower of his years, he had given himself up to foreign influences that confined and deadened his spirit. He now, on one side, vacillated without a compass between Catholicism and Lutheranism; on another side, between Lutheranism and Calvinistic opinions. Hence, we have felt no difficulty in making use only of his above-mentioned work in the edition described: and in opposition to those, who may be of another opinion, we appeal to the controversies that have been agitated among the Lutherans respecting the *Corpus Philippicum*, and to the final settlement of the question. In respect to Zwingle and Calvin, there are no such difficulties; as the former for the most part has only an historical importance, and the latter is ever uniform with himself.

PART II.

SYMBOLICAL WRITINGS OF CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS.

I.—The Catholic Formularies.

Before we proceed to the treatment of our subject, we must enquire into the public confessions of Catholics as well as Protestants. It is a matter of course that those formularies only are here understood, wherein the peculiar and opposite doctrines of the two confessions are set forth, and not by any means those, wherein the elder class of Protestants, in accordance with Catholics, have expressed a common belief. The Apostolic, Nicene, and Athanasian Creeds, and in general all the doctrinal decrees, which the first four general councils have laid down in respect to the Trinity, and to the person of Christ, those Protestants, who are faithful to their Church, recognize in common with Catholics; and on this point the Lutherans, at the commencement of the Augsburg confession, as well as in the Smalcald articles, solemnly declared their belief. Not less explicit and public were the declarations of the Reformed. These formularies constitute the common property of the separate Churches—the precious dowry which the over-wise daughters carried away with them from the maternal house to their new settlements: they cannot accordingly be matter of discussion here, where we have only to speak of the disputes which occasioned the separation, but not of those remaining bonds of union, to which the severed yet cling. We shall first speak of those writings, wherein, at the springing up of dissensions, the Catholic Church declared her primitive domestic laws.

1. *The Council of Trent.* Soon after the commencement of the controversies, of which Luther was the author, but whereof the cause lay hidden in the whole spirit of that age, the desire from many quarters was expressed, and by the Emperor Charles V. warmly represented to the Papal court, that a general council should undertake the settlement of these disputes. But the very complicated nature of the matters themselves, as well as numerous obstacles of a peculiar kind, which have seldom been impartially appreciated, did not permit the opening of the council earlier than the year 1545, under pope Paul III. After several long interruptions, one of which lasted ten years, the council, in the year 1563, under the pontificate of Pius IV, was, on the close of the twenty-fifth session, happily concluded. The decrees regard dogma and discipline. Those regarding the former, are set forth, partly in the form of treatises, separately entitled *decretum* or *doctrina*, partly in the form of short propositions, called *canones.* The former describe, sometimes very circumstantially, the Catholic doctrine; the latter declare in terse and pithy terms against the prevailing errors in doctrine. The disciplinary ordinances, with the title *Decretum de Reformatione,* will but rarely engage our attention.

2. The second writing, which we must here name, is the Tridentine or Roman catechism, with the title *Catechismus Romanus ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini.* The fathers of the Church, assembled at Trent, felt, themselves, the want of a good catechism for general use, although very serviceable works of that kind were then not altogether wanting. These, even during the celebration of the council, increased to a great quantity.

None, however, gave perfect satisfaction; and it was resolved, that one should be composed and published by the council itself. In fact, the council examined the outline of one prepared by a committee; but this, for want of practical utility and general intelligibleness, it was compelled to reject. At length, when the august assembly was on the point of being dissolved, it saw the necessity of renouncing the publication of a catechism, and of concurring in the proposal of the Papal legates, to leave to the Holy See the preparation of such a work. The holy father selected, for this important task, three distinguished theologians, namely, Leonardo Marino, archbishop of Lanciano; Egidio Foscarari, bishop of Modena; and Francisco Fureiro, a Portuguese Dominican. They were assisted by three cardinals, and the celebrated philologist, Paulus Manutius, who was to give the last finish to the Latin diction and style of the work.

It appeared in the year 1566, under pope Pius IV, and, as a proof of its excellence, the various provinces of the Church,—some even by numerous synodal decrees,—hastened publicly to introduce it. This favourable reception, in fact, it fully deserved, from the pure evangelical spirit which was found to pervade it; from the unction and clearness with which it was written, and from that happy exclusion of scholastic opinions, and avoidance of scholastic forms, which was generally desired. It was, nevertheless, designed merely as a manual for pastors in the ministry, and not to be a substitute for children's catechisms, although the originally continuous form of its exposition was afterwards broken up into questions and answers.

But now it may be asked, whether it possess really a symbolical authority and symbolical character? This question cannot be answered precisely in the affirmative; for, in the first place, it was neither published, nor sanctioned, but only occasioned, by the Council of Trent. Secondly, according to the destination prescribed by the Council of Trent, it was not, like regular formularies, to be made to oppose any theological error, but only to apply to practical use the symbol of faith already put forth. Hence, it answers for other wants, and is accordingly constructed in a manner far different, from public confessions of faith. This work, also, does not confine itself to those points of belief merely, which, in opposition to the Protestant communities, the Catholic Church holds; but it embraces all the doctrines of the Gospel; and hence it might be named (if the usage of speech and the peculiar objects of all formularies were compatible with such a denomination), a confession of the Christian Church in opposition to all non-Christian creeds. If, from the reason first stated, the Roman catechism be devoid of a formal universal sanction of the Church, so it wants, from the second reason assigned, all the internal qualities and the special aim which formularies are wont to have. In the third place, it is worthy of notice, that on one occasion, in a controversy touching the relation of grace to freedom, the Jesuits asserted before the supreme authorities of the Church, that the catechism possessed not a Symbolical character; and no declaration in contradiction to their opinion was pronounced.

But, if we refuse to the Roman catechism the character of a public confession, we by no means deny it a great authority, which, even from the very circumstance that it was composed by order of the Council of Trent, undoubtedly belongs to it. In the next place, as we have said, it enjoys a very general approbation from the teaching Church, and can especially exhibit the many recommendations, which on various occasions the sovereign pontiffs have bestowed on it. We shall accordingly often refer to it, and use it as a very important voucher for Catholic doctrine; particularly where the declarations of the Council of Trent are not sufficiently ample and detailed.

3. The *Professio Fidei Tridentina,* stands in a similar relation.

4. Shortly after the times of the Council of Trent, and in part during its celebration, there arose within the Catholic Church doctrinal controversies, referring mostly to the relation between grace and freedom, and to subjects of a kindred nature; and hence, even for our purposes, they are not without importance. For the settlement of the dispute, the Apostolic See saw itself forced to issue several constitutions, wherein it was obliged to enter into the examination of the matter in debate. To these constitutions belong especially the bulls, published by Innocent X, against the five propositions of Jansenius, and the bull *Unigenitus,* by Clement XI. We may undoubtedly say of these constitutions, that they possess no symbolical character, for they only note certain propositions as erroneous, and do not set forth the doctrine opposed to the error, but suppose it to be already known. But a formulary of faith must not merely reject error; it must state doctrine. As the aforesaid bulls, however, rigidly adhere to the decisions of Trent, and are composed quite in their spirit; as they moreover have reference to many important questions, and settle, though only in a negative way, these questions in the sense of the above-named decrees; we shall occasionally recur to them, and illustrate by their aid many a Catholic dogma.

It is evident from what has been said, that the Catholic Church, in fact, has, in the matters in question, but one writing of a symbolical authority. All that, in any respect, may bear such a title, is only a deduction from this formulary, or a nearer definition, illustration, or application of its contents, or is in part only regulated by it, or in any case obtains a value only by agreement with it, and hence cannot, in point of dignity, bear a comparison with the original itself.

II.—The Lutheran Formularies.

THE first symbolical book of the Lutherans is the Augsburg confession : it owes its rise to the following circumstances. The schism in the Church, which had proceeded from Wittenberg, had already engaged the attention of several diets ; but the decrees, framed against it at Worms, in the year 1521, appeared impracticable at Spires, in the year 1526, and three years later led to a very critical dissension, in the assembly of princes which, in March 1529, was again convoked at the last-mentioned place. Those states of the empire, which had protested against the demand to give no further extension to Luther's Reformation, and had expressed a decided repugnance to tolerate, as the Catholic party proposed, those Catholic peculiarities of doctrine and practice yet subsisting in their dominions, now formed close leagues with each other ; and nineteen articles, framed at Schwabach, composed the doctrinal basis of the association, without the recognition whereof no one could become a member. At Torgau, the above-mentioned articles were confirmed. Out of these elements was formed the Augsburg Confession.

Charles V. summoned a diet to be held at Augsburg, in the year 1530, which, after an impartial and earnest examination of the doctrine of either party, was to secure peace to the Church and the empire. This laudable object was in no other way to be attained, than by letting the Protestant states set forth their doctrinal views, and allege what they found offensive in the rites and discipline of the Church, as hitherto practised. Melancthon received a commission to state in a brief essay, afterwards called the *Augsburg Confession*, the opinions of his party; for Luther was generally deemed unfit for the office of pacification.

Although the author of this confession had altered, in many respects, the articles of Schwabach and Torgau, and on the whole had very much softened down, and really improved, the assertions of Luther, yet much was still wanting to make it acceptable to Catholics. Hence, a refutation of the Protestant confession, that had been read out, was composed, and in like manner delivered before the assembly of the princes. But this also failing to carry conviction to the minds of the Lutheran states, Melancthon wrote an apology for his confession, which, although no public use could be made of it at the diet, was yet subsequently honoured as the second symbolical writing of the Lutherans.

The object of the emperor to restore peace and concord in Germany was not attained, although special conferences between the most pacific and moderate theologians of the two parties were still instituted at Augsburg. On several articles, indeed, they came to an understanding; but, as the conciliation had been forced by circumstances, it remained merely outward and apparent. All hope, meanwhile, had long been fixed on a general council, and such a one was now convoked for Mantua, by Pope Paul III. Even the Protestant states received an invitation to attend it; and, in the year 1537, Smalcald was selected by them, in order, among other things, to confer with each other, and with the imperial and Papal deputies, Held and Vorstius. Luther had previously been charged with drawing up the propositions, which were to express the Protestant sentiments, form the basis of some subsequent reunion, and note down the points, which might perhaps be conceded to the Catholics. At Smalcald, these propositions received the sanction of the Protestant princes, as well as of several theologians, summoned for advice. These propositions were, indeed, never employed for the purpose designed; for, from a concurrence of obstacles, occasioned by the circumstances of the time, the council was not assembled. The Lutherans, however, had thus another opportunity of expressing their opinions in regard to the Catholic Church; and, under the name of the Smalcald articles, a place among the Protestant symbolical books was conceded to this essay of Luther's.

Already, during these manifestoes against the Catholics, the seeds of a great inward conflict were laid among those to whom Luther had given his name and his doctrine; yet it was only after his death that these seeds were really brought to maturity. The subject of the dispute, and the persons engaged in it, will be noticed in the course of the present work; but we cannot here refrain from observing, that, after long and stormy dissensions, it was Andrew, chancellor of Tubingen, to whom the honour eminently belongs of discovering a formulary, which, in opposition to the attempted innovations, so expressed itself in favour of the genuine orthodoxy, as to be every where received for the only correct exposition of the Lutheran faith,—which consolidated concord for ever, and secured the orthodox doctrine against future falsifications. After long and very doubtful efforts, which taxed his patience to the severest lengths, this person at last succeeded, with the aid of Chemnitz (a highly respectable theologian of Brunswick), in establishing, in the year 1577, the intended formulary. It is commonly called *the Formulary of Concord*, or sometimes the *Bergen Book*, from the monastery Bergen, in the vicinity of Magdeburg, where the above-mentioned theologians, aided by Sellnecker, put the finishing hand to the work. This Confession consists of two pieces,—a short outline of the orthodox doctrine, called the *Epitome*, and a very diffuse exposition of the same, which is commonly cited under the name of the *Solida Declaratio*. Moreover, this writing, however much conceived in the spirit of Luther's original doctrines, and, singularly enough, even because it was so conceived, was by no means universally accepted.

Lastly, to the aforesaid symbolical writings must be added the larger and the smaller catechism of Luther,—called, by the Epitome, *the Bible of the Laity*. These two catechisms in themselves, though, as we may conceive, they comprise the contents of the Lutheran formularies, were not intended to be symbolical books ; yet it has pleased the Lutheran Church so to revere them.

III.—The Calvinistic and Zwinglian Formularies.

If the symbolical books of the Lutheran confession were adopted by all the particular Churches that embraced the views of the Wittenberg Reformers,—a fact which only in regard to the Formulary of Concord admits of an exception,—the Reformed communities, on the other hand, possess no confessions received with the like general respect. The reason is to be sought, partly in Zwingle's conception of the doctrine of the holy Eucharist, which too deeply wounded the profounder religious feelings of the sixteenth century, to gain a permanent, or even a very extensive, reception, and partly in Calvin's doctrine of predestination, which, revolting as it was to the sense of Christians, could not in like manner penetrate into all the Reformed Churches. Hence, as no general harmony existed among the Reformed communities, no such general harmony could possibly be expressed in a common formulary. Add to this the peculiar circumstances of the Anglican Church, wherein the divine institution of episcopacy was asserted against the Presbyterian system of the other partisans of Zwingle and Calvin, and wherein consequently, in accordance with this view, a liturgy more approximating to that of the Catholic Church was introduced.

Thus it happened that nearly every Reformed national Church had its own formulary, or even several formularies differing from each other. The more remarkable are the following :

1. *The Confessio Tetrapolitana*, which was presented by the four cities,—Strasburg, Constance, Memmingen, and Lindau,—to the diet of Augsburg, in the year 1530, but was not attended to by that assembly, because the Protestant states refused these cities, on account of their leaning to the Zwinglian view of the Lord's supper, admission into their league. The above-mentioned cities having, some years later, out of pure political motives, subscribed to the Augsburg confession, the *Confessio Tetrapolitana* was, in a short time, abandoned by every one.

2. *The three Helvetic Confessions.* The Helvetic Confession, that stands at the head of the collection of

the Reformed symbolic writings (accordingly the first), was, in the year 1536, composed by Henry Bullinger and Leo Judas, Myconius and Simon Grynæus; but, in the year 1566, was revised and published in the name of all the Helvetic Churches, those of Basle and Neufchatel excepted. The second confession is the first we have named, but in its original form. The third is the Confession of Mühlhausen, published by Oswald Myconius, in the year 1532; it is also denominated the Confession of Basle.

3. *The Thirty-nine Articles,*—the formulary of the Anglican Church. In the year 1553, under king Edward VI, forty-two articles had been composed, probably by Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, and Ridley, bishop of London, as the Confession of the English Church. But under Elizabeth they were, in the year 1562, reduced to Thirty-nine Articles, and were confirmed by a London synod.

4. The French Calvinists framed their confession of faith in a synod at Paris, which Antoine de Chantieu, a Calvinistic preacher at Paris, had, on a bidding to that effect, convoked.

5. The disciples of Calvin in the Netherlands received, in the year 1562, a confession of faith, composed in the French tongue by Guy de Bres and Hadrian Saravia, with the aid of several other co-operators, and soon after translated into Flemish. But these men not having been publicly charged with this undertaking, this formulary obtained only by degrees a symbolical authority; which (especially after the synod held at Dort, in the year 1574, had, with the exception of a few unimportant particulars, given it their sanction), could not fail to occur.

6. Far more celebrated and more notorious, however,

were the decrees of another Calvinistic synod, held likewise at Dort, in the years 1618 and 1619. Calvin's rigid theory of predestination could not long be maintained, without encountering opposition even in the bosom of the Reformed. This lay in the very nature of things. But the majority of Calvinists showed themselves as little inclined to suffer one of the fundamental dogmas of their Church to be called in question, as did the Lutherans in Germany. Hence, when Arminius, a preacher in Amsterdam, and, after the year 1603, a professor in Leyden, together with other men of a similar way of thinking, called in doubt Calvin's opinions (and these again were vehemently defended by his colleague Gomar), a very eventful contest arose,—the settlement whereof the above-mentioned synod attempted, while in reality it only confirmed the dissension. The Arminians, or Remonstrants, though very much persecuted, maintained themselves as a distinct sect. Meanwhile, the decrees of Dort met with a very favourable reception out of Holland, even in Switzerland, among the Calvinists in France, and in other parts; while in England they were formally rejected, and in other countries were not approved of.

7. Frederick III, Count Palatine on the Rhine, who renounced the Lutheran for the Calvinistic creed, and forced upon his subjects his own cherished opinions, caused, in the year 1562, a catechism to be composed, which has also been included in the number of Calvinistic symbolical books. It is commonly called the *Heidelberg* or *Palatine Catechism*, and has met with so much approval, that many reformed communities have adopted it as a school-book.

8. The Protestant princes mostly entertained the same view of their prerogative as the Count Palatine Frederick,

and thought they were bound to decide for their subjects all religious controversies, and to make their own individual opinions the property of all. On his death, this prince was succeeded, in the year 1576, by his son Lewis, who in his turn expelled the Calvinistic preachers, and, together with the Lutheran creed, re-established the Lutheran service; until his successor, Frederick IV, in the year 1582, a second time restored the peculiar doctrines and practices of Calvinism, and inflicted on the ministers and professors of the again outlawed confession the same fate, which, under his predecessor, those of Calvinism had sustained. Even the decrees of Dort were obliged to be believed in the Palatinate. The like occurred in the principality of Anhalt. John George, from the year 1586, Prince of Anhalt-Desau, believed it his duty to purge his land from Luther's opinions and institutions, and to enforce the introduction of Calvinism. In the year 1597, appeared a formulary, comprised in twenty-eight articles; and no other alternative was left to the preachers, but subscription, or banishment from the country. When, however, prince John, in the year 1644, assumed the reins of government, he reestablished by as violent means the Lutheran confession. In Hesse-Cassel, after the Landgrave Maurice had changed his creed, the Calvinistic confession, indeed, was enforced, and the preachers of Lutheran orthodoxy were deposed; yet (a circumstance which must excite great astonishment) no special symbolical book was proposed to the acceptance of believers. Perhaps such a formulary would not have failed to appear, had not belief in the doctrinal decisions of Dort been, shortly afterwards, ordained.

9. On the other hand, the Margrave of Brandenburg, John Sigismund, on abandoning the Lutheran for the

Calvinistic Church, was unable to refrain from the pleasure of publishing a special formulary. It is known under the name of the *Confession of the Marches.*

10. Lastly, we must observe, that the altered confession of Augsburg not only possesses a symbolical authority in the German Calvinistic Churches, but is in general highly esteemed by all Calvinists. Melancthon, in fact, approximated in his latter years to the Calvinistic view of the Lord's supper ; and, for that reason, introduced into the editions of this confession, revised by him from the year 1540, certain alterations, which must the more recommend it to Calvinists, as uninstructed persons, at least, might be led to suppose, that Calvin's opinion was favoured by the primitive orthodoxy of the Lutheran Church. More details on this subject hereafter. On the confessions of Poland, Hungary, Thorn, and other places, as we learn nothing of a peculiar nature from them, it is unnecessary here to dwell at any length.

The symbolical writings of the smaller Protestant sects, or those other books whence their system of belief can be derived, it will be more proper to notice in the chapters devoted to the consideration of those sects.

BOOK I.

THE DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG CATHOLICS, LUTHERANS, AND THE REFORMED.

PART I.

DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN AND THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

§ I.—Primitive State of Man, according to the Catholic Doctrine.

In proportion as we consider the history of mankind, or even of individual man, from the Catholic or Protestant point of view, very different conclusions will in part be formed respecting our common progenitor—conclusions which will affect the destinies of his whole race, even to their passage into the next life: and even the first degrees of that life take a very different form, according as we regard them in the light either of Catholic or of Protestant doctrine.

The parties, indeed, originally were not conscious of the full extent of their divisions; for ecclesiastical, like political, revolutions, are not conducted according to a preconcerted, fully completed system: but, on the contrary, their fundamental principles are wont to be consistently unfolded only in and by practical life, and their heterogeneous parts to be thereby only gradually transformed. Hence, at the commencement of the ecclesiastical revolution of the sixteenth century, reflection was not immediately directed towards the origin of our kind, nor even to its passage into eternity ; for a more minute explanation of these articles of doctrine appeared in part to possess but a very subordinate interest, and many points seemed only brought forward to fill up the breaches in the general system of belief. The great contest, which now engages our attention, had rather its rise in the inmost and deepest centre of human history, as it turned upon the mode whereby fallen man can regain fellowship with Christ, and become a partaker of the fruits of redemption. But from this centre the opposition spread backward and forward, and reached the two terms of human history, which were necessarily viewed in accordance with the changes introduced in the central point. The more consistently a system is carried out, and the more harmoniously it is framed, the more will any modification in its fundamental principle shake all its parts. Whoever, therefore, in its centre assailed Catholicism, whose doctrines are all most intimately intertwined, was forced by degrees to attack many other points, also, whose connection with those first combated, was in the beginning scarcely imagined.

We could now have started from the real centre of all these disputes, and have shown how all doctrines have been seized and drawn into its circle ; and undoubtedly the commencement of our work would have much more excited the interest of the reader, had we immediately placed him in the midst of the contest, and enabled him to survey the entire field, which the battle commands. But we conceive that the controverted doctrines may be stated in a simpler and more intelligible manner, when we pursue the contrary course, and, by following the clue presented by the natural progress of human history, bring under notice these doctrinal differences. Hence, we begin with the original state of man, speak next of his fall, and the consequences thereof, and then enter on the very central ground of the controversy, as we proceed to consider the doctrine of the restoration of man from his fall through Christ Jesus. We shall afterwards point out the influence of the conflicting doctrines, respecting the origin and nature of the internal life of those united with Christ, on their external union and communion with each other, and thus be led to enlarge on the theory and essence of this outward communion, according to the views of the different confessions; and we shall conclude with the passage of individuals from this communion, existing on earth, to that of the next world, as well as with the lasting mutual intercourse between the two.

The first point, accordingly, which will engage our attention, is the primitive state of man.

Fallen man, as such, is able, in no otherwise, save by the teaching of divine revelation, to attain to the true and pure knowledge of his original condition: for it was a portion of the destiny of man, when alienated from his God, to be likewise alienated from himself, and to know with certainty, neither what he originally was, nor what he became. In determining his original state, we must especially direct our view to the renewal of the fallen creature in Christ Jesus; because, as regeneration consists in the reestablishment of our primeval condition, and this transformation and renewal is only the primitive creation restored, the insight into what Christ hath given us back affords us the desired knowledge of what in the origin was imparted to us.

This course has been at all times and by all parties pursued, when the original condition of man was to be traced.

As regards the Catholic dogma, this embraces the whole spiritual as well as corporeal existence of the Paradisaic man, extending not only to his preeminent endowments of soul and body, but to those gifts which he possessed in common with all men, so far at least as the doctrinal controversies of the sixteenth century required a special explanation, on this latter point. Accordingly, in the higher portion of his nature, he is described as the image of God, that is to say, as a spiritual being, endowed with freedom, capable of knowing and loving God, and of viewing every thing in him.* As Adam had this divine similitude in common with the whole human race, the distinction, which he enjoyed herein, consisted in his being what the simple expression of the Council of Trent denominates, *just and holy;* in other words, completely acceptable to God.† Or as the school says, in language, however, not quite expressive enough, " His inferior faculties of soul, and bodily impulses, acted unresistingly under the guidance of his reason, and therefore everything in him was in obedience to reason, as his reason was in obedience to God;" and accordingly he lived in blessed harmony with himself and with his Maker. The action of the faculties and impulses of the body was in perfect accord with a reason devoted to God, and shunned all conflict with her: it was, moreover, coupled with the great gift of immortality, even in man's earthly part, as well as with an exemption from all the evils and all the maladies, which are now the ordinary preludes to death.*

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* Catechism. ex decret. Concil. Trident. ed. Col. 1565, p. 33. " Quod ad animam pertinet, eam ad imaginem et similitudinem suam formavit (Deus), liberumque ei tribuit arbitrium: omnes præterea motus animi atque appetitiones ita in eâ temperavit, ut rationis imperio nunquam non parerent. Tum originalis justitiæ admirabile donum addidit," etc.

† Concil. Trident. Sess. v. decret. de peccat. origin. The council says only, " Justitiam et sanctitatem, in quâ constitutus fuerat."

The ideal moral state, in which Adam existed in paradise, the theologians of antiquity knew by the name of "original justice"; on the notion and nature whereof it will be proper to make some further remarks, partly of an historical kind, in order to explain the opposition, which, in this article of doctrine, the Catholic Church has had to encounter from the Protestants.

The essential and universal interest of the Christian religion, in determining the original condition of our common progenitor, is, by the above-stated brief doctrine of the Church amply satisfied. Herein consists the interest—on one hand to guard against evil in the world being attributed to a Divine cause, and the dogma of the supreme *holiness* of God, the creator of the world, being disfigured;—and on the other hand, to establish on a solid basis the principle of a totally unmerited redemption from the fall—that practical fundamental doctrine of Christianity—by most earnestly inculcating, that God had endowed the first man with the noblest gifts, and that thus it was only through his own deep self-guiltiness he fell. Upon both points, however, there exist more stringent, and by no means superfluous, definitions of the Church. Theologians, likewise, taking as their standard the ecclesiastical doctrine, clearly based as it is on Scripture and tradition, and following certain hints which particular passages of holy writ, and some dogmas, appear to furnish, have endeavoured to fathom more deeply the nature of original justice; and the Church has viewed with pleasure the attention and love bestowed on the consideration of the holy work, and permitted, within the determined limits which revelation itself has marked out, the freest scope to speculation.

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* Catechism. ex decret. Concil. Trident. p. 33. "Sic corpore effectum et constitutum effinxit, ut non quidem naturæ ipsius vi, sed divino beneficio immortalis esset et impassibilis." Very well, observes St. Augustine (de Genes. ad lit. vi. c. 25) "Aliud est, non posse mori, aliud posse non mori," etc.

When the Church attributes to Adam, in his original state, *holiness* and justice, she by no means merely means, that he was unpolluted with any alloy adverse to God, or contrary to his natural impulse and bearing to God, but, what is far more, that he stood in the most interior and the closest communion with his Maker. Now, it is an universal truth, holding good of all even the highest orders and circles of intellectual creatures, that such a relation to God, as that of the paradisaic man, is no wise to be attained and upheld by natural powers; that consequently a special condescension of the Almighty is required thereto; in short, that no finite being is holy, save by the holy and sanctifying spirit; that no finite being can exist in a living moral communion with the Deity, save by the communion of the self-same holy spirit. This relation of Adam to God, as it exalted him above human nature, and made him participate in that of God, is hence termed (as indeed such a denomination is involved in the very idea of such an exaltation) a supernatural gift of divine grace, superadded to the endowments of nature. Moreover, this more minute explanation of the dogma, concerning the original holiness and justice of Adam, is not merely a private opinion of theologians, but an integral part of that dogma, and hence, itself a dogma.*

The following observation will not, perhaps, appear unimportant. So often as from a mere philosophical point of view,—we mean to say, so often as without regard to, or knowledge of, revealed truth,—the relation of the human spirit to God hath been more deeply investigated, men have seen themselves forced to the adoption of a *homousia*, or equality of essence between the divine and the human nature; in other words, to embrace pantheism, and, with it, the most arrogant deification of man. How, on the other hand, the doctrinal system of the Catholic Church obviates the objections of pantheism, and, while filled with the spirit of humility, satisfies those cravings after a more profound science, which a profane pantheistic philosophy vainly endeavours to supply, is apparent from what has been above stated. What man, as a creature, by the energy of his own nature abandoned to itself, was unable to attain, is conferred on him as a grace from his Creator. So exceedingly great is the goodness and love of God!

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* Popes Pius V. and Gregory XIII. have condemned the following propositions: "Art. XXI. Humanæ naturæ sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium divinæ naturæ debita fuit integritati primæ conditionis, ac proinde naturalis dicenda est, non supernaturalis. Art. XXVI. Integritas conditionis non fuit indebita naturæ humanæ exaltatio, sed naturalis ejus conditio."

The opinion put forth in the earlier editions of this work, that the doctrine of the *donum supernaturale primi hominis*, though generally received among theologians, and grounded in the whole Catholic system, had not, however, received a formal sanction from the Church, must now be corrected.

The blessing above described, which knit the bonds of an exalted, holy, and happy communion between God and the paradisaic man, is founded on the supposition that a struggle would by degrees have naturally arisen between the sensual and the spiritual nature of man, characterised by many theologians as that power, whereby the sensual and supersensual parts of Adam were maintained in undisturbed harmony. The same divines necessarily suppose, that on Adam the supernatural gifts were bestowed simultaneously with his natural endowments; that is to say, that both were conferred at the moment of his creation.*

Other theologians, on the other hand, distinguishing undoubtedly between justice and holiness, prefer the opinion that Adam was created as a sound, pure, unpolluted nature (with the harmonious relation of all his parts); and that he was favoured with the supernatural gift of a holy and blessed communion with God at a later period only, to wit, when he had prepared for its reception, and by his own efforts had rendered himself worthy of its participation. This latter opinion possesses the advantage of more accurately distinguishing between the two orders of nature and grace, and is moreover recommended by the fact, that what nature is in itself, and what it is enabled to accomplish of itself, is pointed out with great clearness. That the spiritual nature of man, as being in its essence the image of God, hath the faculty and the aptitude to know and to love Him; nay that, to a certain extent, it is of itself really capable of loving Him, and that the desire after the full union with the Deity is a want inherent in his very nature, are truths very well pointed out in this theory. Thus the natural and necessary points of contact for the higher communications of grace are here very finely brought out. The same opinion also distinguishes Adam's original justice from his *internal* sanctity and acceptance before God, considering the former to be the attribute of pure nature, as it came from the hand of the Creator; the latter to be only the gift of supernatural grace. The advocates of this opinion are thus in a condition successfully to prove, that it was not the creation as such, which gave occasion to any incongruity in the relation of man to God,—any interruption of the former's freedom; but that every such incongruity, every such disturbance, had its rise only in the abuse of freedom. (Compare Sect. v.) Further, this theory significantly implies, that without any antagonism of evil, man could yet have attained to the consciousness of his own nature and the wants extending beyond it, as well as of the manifestations of Divine favour and grace—a doctrine which is of the highest importance. Lastly, the possible condition of man after his fall, and the course of his conversion and regeneration, are here prefigured.

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* Thom. Summa, P. I. q. 95, art. 1. "Manifestum est, quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis; alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in dæmonibus data naturalia post peccatum manserint. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratiâ soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quòd per gratiam in animâ existentem inferiora ei subdebantur." Bellarmine (de grat. primi hom. c. v.) adds: "Ex hoc loco aperte discimus, hominem in puris naturalibus conditum habiturum fuisse rebellionem illam carnis ad spiritum, quam nunc post amissum justitiæ originalis donum omnes experimur. Quandoquidem obedientia carnis ad spiritum non fuit in primo homine naturalis et gratuita. Proinde justitia originalis divinitus homini collata non conservavit solum, sed attulit et fecit rectitudinem partis inferioris."

Moreover, both these opinions regard the justice and sanctity of Adam as accidental qualities. The Council of Trent has not pronounced itself either for or against either of them, but has employed such expressions, that both may co-exist within the pale of the Church. The first declaration of the council, regarding our great progenitor, was couched in the following terms: "the justice and sanctity, wherein he (Adam) was *created*" (*conditus*). This form was afterwards in so far modified, that, instead of the word "created", that of "established" (*constitutus*) was selected.*

§ II.—The Lutheran doctrine on man's original state.

LUTHER by no means called in question the fact that Adam was positively holy and just. On the contrary, he was totally unacquainted with the later negative conceptions of a state of mere innocency—an indifference between good and evil, wherein the paradisaic man is represented to have existed; and was accordingly far removed from those opinions, which make the doctrine of the fall a foolishness, and make the human race adopt a course, which is the necessary entrance into evil, in order to serve as a transition to a self-conscious return to good.† Unhappily he fell into other errors, which, considered in their consequences, outweigh at least those we have mentioned.

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* Pallavic. hist. Concil. Trident. lib. vii. c. 9. p. 275, ed. Antw. 1675. He says this change was made at the suggestion of Pacecus. "Paceco monente, non esse citra controversiam, an Adamus interiorem sanctitatem obtinuerit primo quo creatus fuit momento; unde patet, quam infirma a quibusdam deducatur probatio ad id affirmandum ex verbis concilii, quæ nunc extant."—Sess. v. decret. de peccat. origin.

† *A trial* of Adam was doubtless necessary, that man should make his own decision, and thereby attain to a complete self-consciousness of the good which he already possessed, and especially of his freedom; but the fall was by no means necessary. Undoubtedly the fall brought

Respecting original justice, Luther brought no new and peculiar views into vogue. He only selected, out of the rich store of theories which the fruitfulness of scholasticism had produced, the one which seemed most favourable to his own opinions, handled it with no great dexterity, and, in the form which it assumed under his hands, interwove it in such a way into his whole system of doctrine, that the latter, without it, cannot be at all understood. Hence, it is only later that its full importance in the whole Lutheran sýstem will become perceptible. Against those theologians, who called Adam's acceptableness before God, supernatural, Luther asserted it to be natural; and in opposition to the schoolmen, who regarded it as accidental, he conceived it to be essential to human nature—an integral and constitutive part of the same; *esse de naturâ, de essentiâ hominis.*[*] He meant to say, the pure nature of man, as it sprang forth at the omnipotent word of the Creator, comprised absolutely in itself all the conditions to render it pleasing unto God; that the various parts of Adam's nature, by the peculiar energy inherent in them, were maintained in the most beautiful harmony, and the whole man preserved in his due relation to God. The religious

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about the self-conscious and free possession of truth and goodness, because, by God's grace, even evil must conduce towards the promotion of good. But the bare assertion that the fall was necessary, exalts evil itself into goodness.

[*] Luth. in Genes. c. iii. Op. ed. Jen. tom. i. p. 83. "Quare statuamus, justitiam non esse quoddam donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatumque a natura hominis [so the schoolmen never expressed themselves], sed fuisse vere naturalem, ut natura Adæ esset diligere Deum, credere Deo, cognoscere Deum," etc.

faculty, especially of the first man, in virtue of an inborn fulness of energy, expanded itself in a way acceptable to the Deity, so that, without any supernatural aid, he truly knew God, believed in Him, loved Him perfectly, and was holy. The religious and moral disposition of Adam, together with its practical development, the Reformers called the image of God, without drawing any distinction between the bare faculty itself, and the exercise of that faculty in correspondency to the divine will. From the very fact that Adam possessed this faculty, he was, according to them, truly religious, truly pious, devoted in all things to God and His holy will, and perfectly united with Him.* Catholic theologians, on the other hand, distinguished very exactly between the one and the other; so that, to determine rightly the distinction, they commonly termed the religious faculty, "the image of God;" but the pious exertion of that faculty, "the likeness unto God."* We shall later see what mighty consequences were involved in these, at the first view, trifling doctrinal differences, that seemed merely to concern the schools; and we must, in the meanwhile, prepare ourselves to expect, on the part of Luther, a most singular doctrine respecting original sin. Moreover, the non-distinction adverted to, had partly its foundation in the endeavour of the Reformers to be in their teaching very practical and generally intelligible. Hence, they avoided, with as much care as possible, all distinctions and abstract expressions, as a scholastic abuse, but thereby frequently fell into a strange and most pernicious confusion of ideas.

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* Apol. de peccat. origin. §. 7, p. 56. "Itaque justitia originalis habitura erat æquale temperamentum qualitatum corporis, sed etiam hæc dona: notitiam Dei certiorem ,timorem Dei, fiduciam Dei, aut certe rectitudinem, et vim ista efficiendi. Idque testatur scriptura, cum inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei conditum esse. Quod quid est aliud, nisi in homine hanc sapientiam et justitiam effigiatum esse, quæ Deum apprehenderet, et in qua reluceret Deus, hoc est, homini dona esse data notitiam Dei, timorem Dei, fiduciam erga Deum et similia." They thus understand by what God gave to Adam, as well real acts of the spirit (timorem Dei, fiduciam) as the faculty for these (vim ista efficiendi). Very remarkable is Gerhard's assertion, that according to the Lutheran doctrine the divine image in man is not anything substantial, but merely a condition of human substance, a quality of it. (Joann. Gerhard, loci theolog. ed. Cotta, 1765, tom. iv. p. 249, seq. Compare ejusdem Confess. Cathol. lib. ii. art. xx. c. 2, p. 349.) It is observable he refutes himself by saying, that conscience in man is still a remnant of the divine image. As he adds, conscience is not to be explained from any supernatural action of God on man, so it follows it must be a substantial faculty of the latter, and consequently the image itself. But he says the latter is, "concreata humanæ substantiæ integritas, perfectio ac rectitudo, et proinde in categoria qualitatis collocanda." Loci theol. lib. c. p. 268. Comp. Chemnit loc. theol. pt. I. p. 217, ed. 1615.

The second main point of difference between the two confessions, in the matter under discussion, is the doctrine of free-will. Luther asserted (and he would have this assertion maintained as an article of faith), that man is devoid of freedom; that every (pretended) free action is only apparent; that an irresistible divine necessity rules all things, and that every human act is at bottom only the act of God.* Melancthon taught the same. He also comprised all things in the circle of an unavoidable necessity and predestination, declared the doctrine, that God is the sole agent, to be a necessary part of all Christian science, for thereby the wisdom and cunning of human reason were duly repressed and condemned, and he repeatedly insisted, that the word "freedom of election" was unknown to Scripture, and that its meaning must be rejected by the judgment of the spiritual man. He added, that this expression, like the very pernicious word, "reason," to which he declared equal hostility, had been introduced through philosophy into the Christian Church. From no other cause did he deem himself so well justified in daring to apply to the professors of the theological faculties in the middle age,—the so-called schoolmen,—the terms sophists, theologues, and the like, as on account of their crime in having established among Christians the doctrine of human free-will so firmly, that, as he complained, it was scarcely any longer possible to root it out.* Perceiving, after more diversified experience, and maturer reflection, especially after the controversy with the Catholics, the prodigious abyss into which such a doctrine must precipitate the Church, he subsequently abandoned, and even combated it.† On the other hand we are unacquainted with any such recantation on the part of Luther; and the formulary of concord gives an express sanction to the writing of the latter against Erasmus. This doctrine of the servitude of the human will has had the greatest weight; and its influence, according to Melancthon's assurance, pervades even the whole religious system of the Lutherans.*

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* Bellarm. de grat. prim. hom. c. ii. lib. c. p. 7. "Imago, quæ est ipsa natura mentis et voluntatis, a solo Deo fieri potuit: similitudo autem, quæ in virtute et probitate consistit, a nobis quoque, Deo adjuvante, perficitur." God can give us no actions. Further on Bellarmine says: "Ex his igitur tot patrum testimoniis cogimur admittere, non esse omnino idem imaginem et similitudinem, sed imaginem ad naturam, similitudinem ad virtutes pertinere." The well-known passage in Genesis may, or may not, bear such an interpretation; but the distinction has a value in itself, independently of all scriptural interpretation.

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* Luther. de servo arbitrio adv. Erasm. Roterod. Opp. ed. Lat. Jen. tom. iii. f. 170. "Est itaque et hoc imprimis necessarium et salutare Christiano nosse, quod Deus nihil præscit contingenter, sed quod omnia incommutabili et æternâ infallibilique voluntate et providet, et proponit, et facit. Hoc fulmine sternitur et conteritur penitus liberum arbitrium. Ideo qui liberum arbitrium volunt assertum, debent hoc fulmen vel negare vel dissimulare, aut aliâ ratione a se abigere." (fol. 171.) "Ex quo sequitur irrefragabiliter, omnia quæ facimus, etsi nobis videntur mutabiliter et contingenter fieri et fiant, et ita etiam contingenter nobis fiant, reverá tamen fiunt necessario et immutabiliter, si voluntatem Dei spectes." (fol. 177.) "Alterum paradoxon: quidquid fit a nobis, non libero arbitrio, sed mera necessitate fieri." The book closes with these words (fol. 238). "Ego vero hoc libro non contuli, sed asserui et assero, ac penes nullum volo esse judicium, sed omnibus suadeo, ut præstent obsequium." The *Solida Declaratio* (ii. de libero arbitrio, p. 639) sanctions this book, and especially approves what it says "de absolutâ necessitate contra omnes sinistras suspiciones et corruptelas," and thus concludes: "Ea hic repetita esse volumus, et ut diligenter legantur, et expetantur omnes hortamur."

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* Melancth. loc. Theol. ed. August, 1821. "Sensim irrepsit philosophia in Christianismum, et receptum est impium de libero arbitrio dogma. Usurpata est vox liberi arbitrii, a divinis literis, a sensu et judicio spiritûs alienissima......additum est e Platonis philosophiâ *vocabulum rationis æque perniciosissimum.* (p. 10.) In quæstionem vocatur, sitne libera voluntas et quatenus libera sit? Respons. Quandoquidem omnia, quæ eveniunt, *necessario* juxta divinam prædestinationem eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostræ libertas." (p. 12.)

† This he did in the editions of the *Loci Theologici*, dating from the year 1535. It is a remarkable fact, that he now reproaches the schoolmen with having taught the doctrine of an absolute necessity, but observes a total silence respecting himself and Luther, while in the earlier editions of the same work he had charged these very schoolmen with an arrogant assertion of the tenet of free-will. "Et quod asperior paulo sententia de prædestinatione vulgo videtur, debemus illi impiæ sophistarum theologiæ, quæ inculcavit nobis contingentiam et libertatem voluntatis nostræ, ut a veritate scripturæ molliculæ aures abhorreant." This is the language of the first edition: but on the other hand in the editions from the year 1535 down to 1543, we read as follows: "Valla et plerique alii non recte detrahunt voluntati hominis libertatem." Who are then these *plerique?* A vast number of such indecencies do we meet with in the writings of the Reformers. In the editions dating from the year 1543, this doctrine is referred to the Stoics. "Hæc imaginatio orta ex Stoicis disputationibus, etc."

In regard to the original constitution of the human body, both confessions are agreed; and if the Lutheran formularies speak not expressly of that property of Adam's body, whereby, if he had never sinned, he would have remained exempt from death, this silence is to be ascribed to the total absence of all controversy on the matter.†

§ III.—The Calvinistic doctrine on the primitive state of man.

In enlarging on the spiritual condition of the paradisaic man, Calvin, by representing it, with Luther, as one devoid of supernatural graces, set himself up in opposition to the Catholic Church; but, by expressly ascribing to the first man the gift of free-will, he equally opposed the Lutherans.‡ In other respects, we find in this article no difference of doctrine; and the same remark will hold good of the confessions of the reformed Churches.§ In respect to the injurious consequences produced by the sin of our first parent on his corporeal existence, and that of his posterity, most of the formularies of the reformed expressly teach, with Calvin, that death is the fruit of Adam's transgression.*

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* Melancth. l. c. p. 13. "In omnes disputationis nostræ partes incidet."

† Cf. Gerhardi loc. theolog. tom. iv. p. 268 (loc. ix. c. iv. § 99).

‡ Calvin. Institution. l. i., c. 15. § 8. fol. 55. ed. Gen. 1559. "Animam hominis Deus mente instruxit, qua bonum a malo, justum ab injusto discerneret; ac quid sequendum vel fugiendum sit præeunte rationis luce videret; unde partem hanc directricem τὸ ἡγημονικόν dixerunt Philosophi. Huic adjunxit voluntatem, penes quam est electio. His præclaris dotibus excelluit prima hominis conditio, ut ratio, intelligentia, prudentia, judicium non modo ad terrenæ vitæ gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderent usque ad Deum ad æternam felicitatem. In hac integritate libero arbitrio pollebat homo, quo si vellet adipisci posset æternam vitam."

§ Helvet. i. c. vii. (Corpus libr. symbol. eccles. reform. ad August.

But the question here occurs, how Calvin could feel himself justified in attributing free-will to Adam, when, in common with Zwingle, he completely shared Luther's doctrine touching a divine necessity of all occurrences, and even pushed this opinion to the extremest verge. Conscious of this discrepancy, he observes undoubtedly, that the question as to the mysterious predestination of God is here unseasonably mooted; for the matter at issue is not what could have happened, but how man was originally constituted.† In despite of this express demand, to hold the two doctrines distinct,—that of a divine necessity, of an absolute eternal destiny, which enchains and holds all things together, and that of the freedom of man, prior to his fall, we are at a loss to discover how this claim can be satisfied; for these two doctrines are in fact incompatible; and with the adoption of the one, the other must be abandoned; unless to the word "freedom" a notice be attached, which in reality destroys its very existence. And such is really

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1817) p. 16; ii. p. 95; iii. p. 103. Yet without any minuter definition they merely say, man was created after God's image, and except in the first Helvetic Confession, they make no mention of free will. The Scottish Confession (art. ii. l. c. p. 145) accords to Adam freedom: the Gallic and the Anglican are silent on the subject; and the Belgic again concedes this gift to the first man (c. xiv. p. 128). These are differences which may be easily accounted for.

* Helvet. i., c. viii. l. c. p. 17; Belg. c. xiv. 178. "Quo (peccato) se morti corporali et spirituali obnoxium reddidit."

† Calvin. l. c. § 8. "Hic enim intempestive quæstio ingeritur de occulta prædestinatione Dei: quia non agitur, quid *accidere* potuerit, necne, sed qualis fuerit hominis natura."

the case; for, as we shall have occasion to show, Calvin, evidently after Luther's example, makes, not inward necessity, but outward constraint, the opposite to freedom.[*] On the other hand, Melancthon has expressed himself openly and honestly on the mutual correlativeness of these two articles of doctrine, and declared that, from that very correlativeness, they should be simultaneously treated.[†]

We shall find, moreover, that Calvin even teaches an eternal, immutable predestination of the fall of the first man; an opinion which is certainly quite incompatible with the proposition, that Adam was free, that is to say, could have avoided sinning. Hence it has happened that, though some symbolical writings of the reformed communities have with Calvin expressly ascribed free-will to Adam, others have judged it more expedient, in what they teach respecting the paradisaic man, to pass this matter over in silence; and this was evidently the most consistent course.

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[*] Luther. de servo arbitrio ad Erasm. Roterod. l. i. fol. 171. "Optarim sane aliud melius vocabulum dari in hac disputatione, quam hoc, Necessitas, quod non recte dicitur, neque de divina, neque de humana voluntate: est enim nimis ingratæ et incongruæ significationis pro hoc loco, quandam velut coactionem, et omnino id quod contrárium est voluntati, ingerens intellectui: cum tamen non hoc velit causa ista quæ agitur. Voluntas enim, sive divina sive humana, nulla coactione, sed mera lubentia vel cupiditate quasi vere libera, facit quod facit, sive bonum sive malum. Sed tamen immutabilis et infallibilis est voluntas Dei, quæ nostram voluntatem mutabilem gubernat, ut canit Boetius: 'stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.'" This is a very inappropriate citation, for Manlius Torquatus Boethius was no believer in Luther's doctrine of necessity.

[†] Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 13. "Sed ineptus videar, qui statim initio operis de asperrimo loco, de prædestinatione disseram. Quamquam quid attinet in compendio, primo an postremo loco id agam, *quod in omnes disputationis nostræ partes incidet.*"

We think it still proper to direct attention to the internal reasons, which Calvin alleged in behalf of the doctrine of an absolute necessity destructive of all human freedom, partly because it will then follow, that it ought not, at least absolutely and immediately,* to be confounded with the Pagan *fatum*, and partly because a knowledge of this reasoning will be of importance in later investigations. If Melancthon, after indulging in harsh assertions, could assign no other practical ground for this doctrine, than that the relation of man towards God adverted to was very useful towards subduing† human arrogance, Calvin, on the other hand, observed, that the knowledge not merely that God guided the affairs of the world in small, as in great things, but that nothing whatever could occur without the express ordinance of God *(destinante Deo)*, comprised a very abundant source of consolation; for it is only in this way man feels himself secure in the hands of an all-wise, all-ruling, powerful, and indulgent Father.‡ Hence, the idea of a divine permission, and such a conduct of things, that ultimately every thing, even evil, in the world, conduces to the benefit of those who serve God, did not satisfy him. He believed the elect insecure, and the notion of a divine providence not sufficiently defined, unless, for example, the assaults of the enemy on an elect were absolutely willed and ordained by God. Moreover, even the public confessions of the reformed occasionally adopt this view, which Calvin here enforces, of the providential guidance of all things, mitigating considerably, however, this opinion, and evincing a very laudable dread of stamping on their articles the harsh spirit of Calvin.* By the latter however, as well as by his disciple, Theodore Beza,† the opinions adverted to, respecting divine providence, were held with such tenacity, and carried out with such con-

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* Calvin (Instit. rel. Christ. lib. i. c. 16, n. 8) takes notice of this parallel, and observes as follows: "Non enim cum stoicis necessitatem comminiscimur ex perpetuo causarum nexu et implicitâ quadam serie, quæ in natura contineatur: sed Deum constituimus arbitrum ac moderatorem omnium, qui pro suâ sapientiâ ab ultimâ æternitate decrevit quod facturus esset, et nunc suâ potentiâ, quod decrevit, exsequitur." A special defence against the charge of fatalism, laid to Calvin's doctrine, was written by Beza. Abstersio calumniarum, quibus aspersus est Joan. Calvinus a Tillemanno Heshusio, a Lutheran professor in Heidelberg, p. 208, seq.

† Melanct. lib. c. "Multum enim omnino refert ad premendam damnandamque humanæ rationis tum sapientiam, tum prudentiam, constanter credere, quod a Deo fiant omnia."

‡ Calv. Instit. rel. Christ. lib. i. c. 17, § 3. Yet Luther, in this matter, had prepared the way for him with some hints. Luther. de

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servo arbitrio. Opp. tom. iii. fol. 171, b. "Ultra dico, non modo quam ista sint vera, de quo infra latius ex scripturis dicetur, verum etiam, quam religiosum, pium, et necessarium sit, ea nosse; his enim ignoratis, neque fides, neque ullus Dei cultus consistere potest. Nam hoc esset vere Deum ignorare, cum quâ ignorantiâ salus stare nequit, ut notum est. Si enim dubitas, aut contemnis nosse, quod Deus omnia, non contingenter, sed necessario et immutabiliter præsciat et velit, quomodo poteris ejus promissionibus credere, certo fidere, ac niti? Cum enim promittit, certum oportet te esse, quod sciat, possit et velit præstare, quod promittit; alioqui eum non veracem, nec fidelem æstimabis, quæ est incredulitas et summa impietas et negatio Dei altissimi."

* Confess. Belgic. c. xiii. in Augusti. Corp. libror. symbol. eccles. reform. p. 177, seq.

† Theod. Bezæ quæstionum et respons. christian. lib. ed. 4to. 1573, p. 105. (N. B. Place where printed is not named.) "Quæso, expone, quid providentiam appellas? Resp. Sic appello non illam modo vim inenarribilem, quâ fit, ut Deus omnia ab æterno prospexerit, omnibusque futuris sapientissime providerit, sed imprimis decretum illud æternum Dei sapientissimi simul et potentissimi, ex quo quicquid fuit, fuit; quicquid est, est; et quicquid futurum est, erit, *prout ipsi* ab æterno decernere libuit."

sistency, that they found it a matter of extreme difficulty to convince the world, nay, in despite of all their eloquence and dialectic art, they utterly failed to convince very many, that they did not in fact refer all evil to God. We are bound to enter more fully into the investigation of this subject.

§ IV.—On the cause of moral evil.

In all the more important doctrinal manuals and polemical writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—in the works of Bellarmine, Becanus, Chemnitz, Gerhard, and others, nay even in several public confessions, the reader meets with a special and copious chapter, bearing the title of the present section. As, in the second and third centuries of the Church, no writer could enlarge on the religious concerns of his times without entering upon the question, "whence is evil;" so the same question was now again most anxiously investigated; and it soon became apparent that the opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism could not be duly appreciated, and that the inmost essence of the latter would remain eternally misconceived, if the different replies which had been made to that question, were not well considered.

No subject in the first times of the Reformation so embittered the Catholics against the authors of that revolution, as their doctrine respecting the relation wherein the Deity stands to moral evil. It was precisely on this account the Catholic Church laid down again, with so much earnestness and emphatic energy, the proposition, that man was created with the endowment of freedom, in order that, without any restriction and without subterfuge, the guilt of evil in the world might fall on the head of man. For the denial of free-will on the part of Luther, Melancthon, Zwingle, and Calvin, was calculated to excite an apprehension, that, in consequence thereof, the Catholic doctrine of God's perfect sanctity, to whom sin is an abomination, would be thrown into the shade, and, on the other hand, that even the most vicious man would be thus sheltered from all responsibility. And, in fact, Melancthon, in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, in the edition of the year 1525, had the hardihood to assert, that God wrought all things, evil as well as good; that He was the author of David's adultery, and the treason of Judas, as well as of Paul's conversion. Now howsoever strange and prejudiced a notion an individual may have formed of the errors of the Catholic Church, we ask him, would he dare to assert, that all these errors put together can outweigh the single enormity here uttered by Melancthon? And yet Chemnitz, to whom we are indebted for the original passages in question (for in the later editions of Melancthon's aforesaid work they have disappeared)—Chemnitz, we say, excuses his teacher, Melancthon. And how does he excuse him? In so complicated a matter, he says among other things, all in the beginning could not be systematically and properly treated, more especially as, on the part of Catholics, the doctrine of free-will had been exaggerated.* Just as if the question "whence is evil," had only in the sixteenth century first excited attention;—just as if holy writ left us at all in doubt how that question was to be answered;—just as if in the second and third centuries the question had not been really settled by the Church! However, in this matter, Melancthon merely spoke after Luther, as the writing of the latter against Erasmus will show. But it was Melancthon's assertion the council of Trent had in view, when it anathematized the proposition, that God works evil as well as good, and that it is not in the power of man to abstain from wickedness.*

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* Martin. Chemnit. loc. theol. ed. Leyser. 1615. P. I. p. 173. The words of Melancthon are: "Hæc sit certa sententia a Deo fieri omnia, tam bona, quam mala. Nos dicimus, non solum permittere Deum creaturis, ut operentur, sed ipsum omnia proprie agere, ut sicut fatentur, propriam Dei opus fuisse Pauli vocationem, ita fateantur, opera Dei propria esse, sive quæ media vocantur, ut comedere, sive quæ mala sunt, ut Davidis adulterium; constat enim Deum omnia facere, non permissive, sed potenter, i. e. ut sit ejus proprium opus Judæ proditio, sicut Pauli vocatio."

In proportion, however, as the notions, which the Saxon Reformers, especially Melancthon, had entertained respecting free-will, became purer, they abandoned the opinion, that God was the author of evil; and the last-named writer had even the courage to revoke in the Augsburg confession his former doctrine.† The later formularies of the Lutherans are in perfect accordance with this amelioration in opinion.‡ But it was quite otherwise with the Swiss Reformers, who remained obstinately addicted to their errors. The importance of the subject calls upon us to describe at greater length the nature of their opinions. In his writing on Providence, addressed to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse (anno 1530), Zwingle asserts, that God *is the author, mover, and impeller to sin;* that also He makes the sinner; that by the instrumentality of the creature He produces injustice, and the like.* In numberless places Calvin uses the expression, man, at the instigation of God, doeth what it is unlawful to do; by a mysterious divine inspiration, the heart of man turneth to evil; man falleth, because the providence of God so ordaineth.† If these principles fill us with just detestation, they were pushed still further by Theodore Beza; although what he brought forward was only deduction, and indeed a necessary deduction, from the doctrines just adduced. This leader of the Reformed, after Calvin's death, is not satisfied with repeating, that God incites, impels, and urges to evil; but he even adds, that the Almighty creates a portion of men as His instruments, *with the intent* of working evil through them.*

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* Sess. vi. Can. vi. "Si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala opera ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissive solum, sed etiam proprie et per se, adeo ut sit proprium ejus opus non minus proditio Judæ, quam vocatio Pauli, anathema sit."

† Art. XIX. p. 81. "De causâ peccati docent, quod tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum, videlicet diaboli et impiorum, quæ, non adjuvante Deo, avertit se a Deo, sicut Christus ait (Joan. viii. 44): cum loquitur mendacium, ex ipso loquitur."

‡ Solid. declar. I. § 5, p. 613. "Hoc extra controversiam est positum, quod Deus non sit causa, creator, vel auctor peccati, sed quod operâ et machinationibus satanæ, per unum hominem (quod est diaboli) in mundum sit introductum."

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* Zwingli de providentiâ c. vi. Opp. tom. i. (without date or place) fol. 365, b. "Unum igitur atque idem facinus, puta adulterium aut homicidium, quantum Dei auctoris, motoris, impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est, quantum autem hominis est, crimen ac scelus est." fol. 366, a. "Cum movet (Deus) ad opus aliquod, quod perficienti instrumento fraudi est, sibi tamen non est, ipse enim libere movet, neque instrumento facit injuriam, cum omnia sint magis sua, quam cujusque artificis sua instrumenta, quibus non facit injuriam, si nunc limam in malleum, et contrà malleum in limam convertat. Movet ergo latronem ad occidendum innocentem, etiamsi imparatum ad mortem."

† Calvin institut. lib. iv. c. 18, § 2. "Homo justo Dei impulsu agit quod sibi non licet." Lib. iii. c. 23, § 8. "Cadit igitur homo, Dei providentiâ sic ordinante." With this proposition Calvin found himself in a singular situation. On one hand, he held the maintenance of it as theoretically necessary, and practically useful; and, on the other, he was extremely incensed if any one attempted to deduce from it the consequences which it involved. I have scarcely ever read any work clothed in coarser language, than the reply which Calvin made to an anonymous, but very learned, theologian, who in fourteen theses had condensed all contained in the doctrine of Calvin respecting the origin of evil, and then furnished copious illustrations on each article. We find the writing and the reply in "Calumniæ nebulonis cujusdam, etc. Joannis Calvini ad easdem responsio." Genev. 1558. Calvin concludes his reply with these words: "Compescat te Deus, Satan. Amen."

The reasoning attempted in support of these notions is quite of a character with them. In order to show that God, although he urge to wicked actions, doth nevertheless not sin, but only man, Zwingle observes; God, as the just one, is subject to no law; for it is written, the law is not given for the just! Thus, should God *make* an angel or a man transgress the law *(cum transgressorem facit)*, He himself doth not transgress it; but the creatures, whom the law oppresses and accuses.† A more pitiable train of reasoning it would be impossible to invent, whether we consider the notion which Zwingle here gives of the just man (for, according to the meaning of the passage in St. Paul adverted to, the just man is in himself the living moral law, and therefore does not stand in a mere extraneous relation to its precepts, but bears them in himself and constantly fulfils them), or whether we look to the essence of the Deity, from whose wisdom and holiness the moral law is only an emanation, and which in pure and eternal glory He realizes; or whether, lastly, we contemplate the moral law in itself alone, which Zwingle, however much he may incidentally exalt it, treats as an arbitrary, and merely positive code.*

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* Beza Aphorism. xxii. "Sic autem agit (Deus) per illa instrumenta, ut non tantum sinat illa agere, nec tantum moderetur eventum, sed etiam incitet, impellat, moveat, regat, atque adeo, quod omnium est maximum, *et creat, ut per illa agat, quod constituit.*"

† Zwingl. de providentia, c. v. "Cum igitur Angelum transgressorem facit et hominem," etc. c. vi. fol. 365, b. "Quantum enim Deus facit, non est peccatum, quia non est contra legem; illi enim non est lex posita, utpote justo, nam justis non ponitur lex, juxta Pauli sententiam. Unum igitur atque idem facinus, puta adulterium aut homicidium, quantum Dei auctoris, motoris, ac impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est, quantum autem hominis est, crimen est ac scelus est. Ille enim lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur."

The Reformer of Zurich completely destroys the objectiveness of evil, and has not a perception of a holy moral government of the world, even in those passages where he seems to speak in such a sense. For these reasons he did not perceive, that, if God were to impel to the transgression of a moral law given by Himself, He would then be in contradiction with Himself, and would violate His own nature, and not merely an outward rule; that is to say, the Reformer did not see that his theory destroyed the very notion of the Deity. The injurious influence of this doctrine on public morality, is evident of itself, and was strongly represented to Calvin.*

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* Zwingli de provid. c. v. lib. i. p. 364, b. "Duobus exemplis id fiet luculentius. Habet pater familiæ leges quasdam domesticas, quibus liberos a deliciis ac desidiâ avocet. Lecythum mellis qui tetigerit, vapulato: calceum qui non recte induxerit, aut inductum passim exuerit ac dimiserit, discalceatus incedito,—et similes. Jam si mater familiæ, aut adulti liberi mel non tantum attrectaverint, sed etiam insumpserint, non continuo vapulant, non enim tenentur lege. Sed pueri vapulant, si tetigerint, illis enim data est lex. Taurus si totum armentum ineat et impleat, laudi est. Herus tauri, si unam modo præter uxorem agnoscat, reus fit adulterii. Causa est, quia huic lex est posita, ne adulterium admittat; illum nulla lex coercet. Ut breviter, verissime, sicut omnia, Paulus summam hujus fundamenti pronuntiaverit, ubi non est lex, ibi non est prævaricatio. Deo, velut patri familiæ, non est lex posita, idcirco nec peccat, *dum hoc ipsum agit in homine*, quod homini peccatum est, sibi vero non est."

Zwingle still endeavours to justify his unhappy doctrine by the pretence, that God is ever guided by pure intentions, that consequently the end sanctifies the means, and, in a somewhat strange connexion with this matter, he adds, that David's adultery, whereof God was the author, could as little convict God of a bad action, as when a bull impregnates a whole herd of cows.† Here he only overlooks the circumstance, that man is no more a cow, than God is a bull; that, accordingly, if man had been instigated by God to adultery, this could not occur without a violation of man's moral nature, and consequently the guilt would revert to God. Zwingle's conception, more nearly examined, consists herein, that God wrought on the sensuality of David, which by its power overmastered his will; that, in consequence, God performed only the outward work indifferent in itself, and not the evil in it,—the work, which, in the nuptial union as well as in adultery, is identical. But how could he distinguish between the temptations of Satan, and such an agency as here described?

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* Calumniæ nebul. Calv. resp. p. 19. "Hæc sunt, Calvine, quæ adversarii tui de doctrinâ tuâ perhibent, admonentque homines, ut de doctrinâ istâ ex fructu judicent. Dicunt autem te et tuos discipulos ferre multos fructus Dei tui: esse enim plerosque litigatores, vindictæ cupidos, injuriæ tenaces et memores, cæterisque vitiis, quæ Deus suggerit, præditos......Jam vero doctrinâ Christi qui credebant, reddebantur meliores, sed tuâ doctrinâ, aiunt, homines manifeste fieri deteriores. Præterea quum dicitis, vos habere sanam doctrinam, respondent, non esse vobis credendum. Si enim Deus vester sæpissime aliud cogitat et vult, metuendum esse, ne vos, Deum vestrum imitantes, idem faciatis, atque homines decipiatis."

† L. c. "Quod Deus facit, libere facit, alienus ab omni affectu noxio, igitur et absque peccato, ut adulterium David, quod ad auctorem Deum pertinet, non magis Deo sit peccatum, quam cum taurus totum armentum inscendit et implet." What a comparison!!

Reverting to the observation which Zwingle deemed calculated to justify the Deity, that, in alluring to bad actions, God had good objects in view, it must be said that this notion was shared by Calvin and Beza; though, by the latter, it was put forth with more acuteness. Hence it will be our duty to state the opinions of these two Reformers. Calvin admits, that the opinion, according to which God determines man to moral corruption and impels him to sin, is not compatible with the known will of the Deity. Hence, like Luther, in his book against Erasmus, he has recourse to a hidden will of God, whereby His mode of proceeding is indeed very just, though its equity be not obvious to our perception.* If this be the ordinary way wherein Calvin in his Institutions seeks to defend himself, in his instruction against the so-called libertines, who, evidently induced by his own and Zwingle's writings, had denied the distinction between good and evil, and placed redemption in the knowledge, obtained through Christ, that no distinction exists between the two, he still labours to show the great difference existing between the act of God, and the act of the impious, in one and the same deed. So he says, God works to exercise justice, while the wicked man is actuated by avarice, covetousness, &c.† God, for instance, instigates a man to murder, but from no other motive than to punish a crime committed. We leave it to the judgment of every one, whether the employment of such means be compatible with the very notion of the Deity, and how extremely pernicious it would be, and subversive of all human morality, were men herein to imitate the Deity so represented? But it is evident that the enquiry must here be carried back as far as the fall of man, and the question arises, what share is to be allotted to God in that event. Calvin never thinks of deducing the fall of Adam from the abuse of human freedom; but, on the contrary, in perfect accordance with his own fundamental principles, he admits that God had ordained the fall, and by an eternal decree brought it about.*

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* Calvin. institut. lib. iii. c. 23, § 9. "Nos vero inde negamus, rite excusari (homines), quandoquidem Dei ordinationi, quâ se exitio destinatos queruntur, sua constet equitas, nobis quidem incognita, sed illi certissima."

† Calvin instructio advers. libertinos, c. 14 (in Joan. Calvini opuscula omnia in unum vol. collecta. Genev. 1552, p. 528.) "Altera

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exceptio, cujus infelices isti nullam habent rationem, hæc est,—magnam esse differentiam inter opus Dei, et opus impii, cum eo Deus vice instrumenti utitur. Impius enim suâ avaritiâ aut ambitione, aut invidiâ aut crudelitate incitatur ad facinus suum, nec alium finem spectat. Ideo ex radice illâ, id est, ex animi affectione, et fine, quem spectat, opus qualitatem sumit, et merito malum judicatur. Sed Deus respectum omnino contrarium habet: nempe ut justitiam exerceat ad conservandos bonos," etc.

Cf. de æternâ prædest (Opusc. lib. l. p. 946.) "Turpi quidem et illiberali calumniâ nos gravant, qui Deum peccati auctorem fieri obtendunt, si omnium, quæ aguntur, causa est ejus voluntas. Nam quod homo injuste perpetrat, vel ambitione," etc. . . .

Beza (in his Quæst. et Respons. lib. i. p. 113) distinguishes between *in* aliquo agere, and *per* aliquem agere, and accordingly adds "adjiciendum est, Deum agere quidem in bonis et per bonos: per malos vero agere, et non in malis." Zwingle makes use of the expression *in aliquo agere,* when speaking of that act of God, whereby He produces evil. De Provid. c. v. p. 364.

* Calvin. Institut. lib. iii. c. 23, § 4. "Nonne ad eam, quæ pro damnationis causa obtenditur, corruptionem, Dei ordinatione prædestinati ante fuerant? Cum ergo in sua corruptione pereant, nihil aliud quam pœnas luunt ejus calamitatis, in quam *ejus prædestinatione* lapsus est Adam, ac posteros præcipites secum traxit. § 7. Disertis verbis

In Beza, we find these monstrous errors pushed to a still further length. The principal points of his reasoning are as follows: God wished on one hand to show mercy, and on the other to reveal His justice. Adam was created morally just and holy; for from God's hand nothing unclean can come forth. But how could God unfold His mercies, since the sinner only can be the subject of these? How could He manifest His justice, if no one committed wrong, and thereby incurred punishment? Hence, for the unfolding of these attributes, the Deity must prepare a channel which was found in ordaining the fall of the first man. These divine objects being perfectly just and holy, their quality is transmitted to the means also selected for their execution.* Here Beza does not speak of a mere

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hoc exstare negant (sophistæ sc. papistici), decretum fuisse a Deo, ut sua defectione periret Adam, quasi vero etc. § 8. Cadit igitur homo, Dei providentia sic ordinante."

Beza (Quæst. et Respons. p. 117) deduces the sin of Adam from a spontaneo motu voluntatis, that is to say, from a natural impulse, the meaning whereof is, that God so formed human nature, that evil could not fail to arise, which He then makes use of for His own ends.

* Beza Absters. calum. Heshus. adv. Calvin. (with the κρεωφαγία sive Cyclops; in one volume, Genev. 1561, p. 231). "Superest, ut ostendamus, ita decretum esse a Deo Adami lapsum, ut tamen tota culpa penes Satanam et Adamum resideat. Hoc autem liquido apparebit, si, quemadmodum paulo ante Calvinus nos monuit, diversa atque adeo penitus contraria Dei, Satanæ, et hominis consilia, ac deinde etiam diversos agendi modos consideramus. Quid enim Deo propositum fuit, quum lapsum hominis ordinaret? Nempe patefaciendæ suæ misericordiæ in electis gratuito servandis, itemque justo suo judicio in reproborum damnanda malitia viam sibi aperire. Nam nisi sibi et posteris suis lapsus esset Adam, nec ulla extaret in hominibus miseria, cujus misereretur Deus in filio suo, nec ulla malitia, quam condemnaret; ac proinde neque appareret ejus misericordia, neque etiam judicium. Hoc igitur quum molitur et exequitur Dominus, quis eum ullius injustitiæ coarguerit? Quid autem moliebatur Satan,

cooperation of the Deity in the performance of the mere outward part in an evil action ; for God, whether to punish or to exercise mercy, has regard to the inward evil sentiment, since, without this, sin is not possible. It was thus the part of the Deity to call forth somehow an evil sentiment, in order to attain His ends; that is to say, he must annihilate His sanctity, in order on its ruins to attain to compassion and justice. Hence, Beza does not deny, that the first man, when he sinned, succumbed under an invincible destiny; that it was thus not left to his freedom to abstain from sin. But, like Luther and Calvin, distinguishing between necessity and compulsion, he says the latter does not occur in

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quamvis imprudens Dei consilio subserviret ? Nempe quia Deum odit, et totus invidiâ exæstuat, inimicitias serere voluit inter Deum et hominem. Quid autem cogitant Adamus et Heva, simul atque se dociles Satanæ discipulos præbuerunt ? Nempe Deum ut invidum et mendacem coarguere, et eo invito sese in illius solio collocare."

The outlines of Beza's reasoning may be seen in Zwingle (De Provid. cap. vi. p. 364). How little, moreover, the sound common sense of the Christian, who, on one hand, upholds the idea of God's holiness and justice, and, on the other hand, clings to the doctrine of rewards and punishments according to man's works, could be led astray by such dialectic arts, the anonymous writer already cited very well points out, when he says : " Equidem favi ego aliquando doctrinæ tuæ, Calvine, eamque, quamvis non satis mihi perspicuam, defendi, quod tantum tribuebam auctoritati tuæ, ut vel contra cogitare putarem nefas ; sed nunc auditis adversariorum argumentis, non habeo quod respondeam.......*Nam tuæ rationes sunt obscuræ, et fere ejusmodi, ut statim, deposito de manu libro, excidant ex memoria, neque adversarios convincant. At adversariorum argumenta sunt aperta, acria, et quæ facile memoriæ mandentur, et ab illiteratis, quales fere erant qui Christum sectabantur, percipiantur.* Hinc fit, ut tui discipuli fere magis authoritate tua nitantur, quam ratione. *Et quum adversarios vincere non possunt, habent eos pro hæreticis et pertinacibus, et ab eorum consortio abstinent, et omnes ubique monent, ut abstineant.*" And such doctrines were to be held as formal articles of faith !

sin; that on the contrary, Adam sinned willingly, with an inward pleasure (*spontaneo motu*, in opposition to *libero* and *voluntario motû*), and although he was not able to avoid sinning, he did not wish to avoid it; and it was this very thing which constituted his criminality.*

It is by these principles, that passages in the Reformed confessions are to be estimated. They all assert, that God is not the author of sin, that is to say, in the sense, wherein Zwingle, Calvin, and Beza, attempt to exculpate the Deity, after having denied man's free-will.†

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* Beza Absters. lib. i. "Quærenda est vitii origo in instrumentorum spontaneo motu, quo fit ut Deus juste decreverit, quod illi injuste fecerant," etc. A distinction very familiar to Beza! Compare his "Quæst. et Respons." lib. i. p. 120.

† Confess. Helv. cap. ix. (ed. August. p. 19). "Ergo quoad malum sive peccatum, homo non *coactus* vel a Deo, vel a diabolo, sed *sua sponte* malum fecit, et hac parte liberrimi est arbitrii, cap. viii. p. 18. Damnamus præterea Florinum et Blastum, contra quos et Irenæus scripsit, ut omnes, qui Deum faciunt auctorem peccati. Confess. Gallic. cap. viii. lib. c. p. 113. Negamus tamen illum (Deum) esse autorem mali, aut eorum, quæ perperam fiunt, ullam culpam in ipsum transferri posse, quum ipsius voluntas sit summa et certissima omnis justitiæ norma. Habet autem ipse admirabiles potius quam explicabiles rationes, ex quibus sic utitur diabolis omnibus et peccantibus hominibus, tanquam instrumentis, ut quicquid illi male agunt, id ipse sicut juste ordinavit, sic etiam in bonum convertat." The Belgic Confession (cap. xiii. lib. c. p. 177) speaks in the same way.

CHAPTER II.

ON ORIGINAL SIN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

§ v.—The Catholic doctrine of original sin.

It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of the religious controversies of the last three centuries, that the Reformers, according to whose principles Adam in his fall only succumbed under a sentence of irresistible necessity pronounced upon him, should have represented the Deity as kindling into so fearful a wrath, and inflicting so frightful a chastisement for this *act* of the first man, which, according to their own views, should be called rather his pure misfortune. It is no easy task to explain how ideas so unconnected should have been associated in one and the same head. When we just now used the comprehensive word "Reformers," we did so advisedly; for even Luther and Melancthon had both completely framed their theory of original sin, when they were entangled in those opinions described in the preceding section,—opinions which Zwingle and Calvin only took up, and further developed. How could Adam be the subject of such fearful wrath, if he did only what he was obliged to do; if he perpetrated only what he could not avoid?* Hence arises a conception of original sin on the part of Protestants, which is in almost every respect (we trust we may be pardoned the expression) devoid of sense and reason. By the most exaggerated description of the effects of Adam's fall, they seem anxious to resuscitate the feeling of sin, and the consciousness of guilt, which, by their view of God's relation to evil, they were on the point of utterly destroying. And yet they only aggravate the matter, as will appear in the course of the present chapter, which must, however, in the first instance, be devoted to an examination of the principles laid down by the council of Trent.

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* Calvin (Instit. lib. iii. cap. i. sec. 4, fol. 77) very well enlarges on the magnitude of Adam's sin; but his whole description makes no impression, so soon as we remember the author's assertion, that Adam

The doctrine of the Catholic Church on original sin is extremely simple, and may be reduced to the following propositions. Adam, by sin, lost his original justice and holiness, drew down on himself by his disobedience the displeasure and the judgments of the Almighty, incurred the penalty of death, and thus, in all his parts, in his body as well as soul, became strangely deteriorated.* This his sinful condition is transmitted to all his posterity, as descending from him, entailing the consequence that man is of himself incapable, even with the aid of the most perfect ethical law offered to him from without (not excepting even the one revealed in the Old Covenant), to act in a manner agreeable to God,

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must needs sin. He shows acutely enough the unbelief, ingratitude, and pride of Adam; but it is only a pity that our first parent *was obliged* to lose faith, gratitude, and humility.

* Concil. Trid. sess. v. decret. de peccat. orig. "Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, incurrisseque per offensam prævaricationis hujusmodi iram et indignationem Dei, atque ideo mortem ...... totumque Adam ...... secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse, anathema sit."

or in any other way to be justified before Him, save only by the merits of Jesus Christ, the sole mediator betwixt God and man.* If to this we add, that the fathers of Trent attribute to fallen man free-will, representing it, however, as very much weakened,† and in consequence teach, that not every religious and moral action of man is necessarily sinful, although it be never, in itself and by itself, acceptable to God, nor anywise perfect,‡ we then have stated all, which is to be held as strictly the doctrine of the Church. That, moreover, fallen man still bears the image of God (section 1), necessarily follows from what has been advanced.§

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* Loc. cit. "Si quis hoc Adæ peccatum, quod origine unum est, et propagatione, non imitatione, transfusum omnibus, inest unicuique proprium, vel per humanæ naturæ vires, vel per aliud remedium asserit tolli, quàm per meritum unius mediatoris Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui nos Deo reconciliavit sanguine suo, factus nobis justitia, sanctificatio, et redemptio, anathema sit."

† Concil. Trid. sess. vi. cap. v. "Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium post Adæ peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, aut rem esse de solo titulo, imo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana invectum in ecclesiam, anathema sit." Cap. i.: "Primum declarat sancta synodus, ad justificationis doctrinam probe et sincere intelligendam, oportere, ut unusquisque agnoscat, et fateatur, quod cum omnes homines in prævaricatione Adæ innocentiam perdidissent, facti immundi, et, ut Apostolus inquit, naturâ filii iræ, ... usque adeo servi erant peccati, et sub potestate diaboli ac mortis, ut non modo gentes per vim naturæ, sed ne Judæi quidem per ipsam etiam literam legis Moysis, inde liberari, aut surgere possent, tametsi in eis liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esset, viribus scilicet attenuatum et inclinatum."

‡ Loc. cit. vii. "Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quæ ante justificationem fiunt, quacumque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata, vel odium Dei mereri, anathema sit."

§ Bellarmin de gratia primi hominis cap. ii. "Imago ad naturam, similitudo ad virtutes pertinet; proinde Adam peccando non imaginem Dei, sed similitudinem perdidit."

If, in reading these decrees of the council of Trent, we call to mind all those questions, which, since the rise of the Pelagian heresy, and even much earlier, were, on the matter at issue, proposed to scientific investigation, we shall not fail to observe, that the assembled fathers found it expedient in their decision not to touch upon a considerable number of these questions, and to express themselves in regard to them with a certain generality. We say, in regard to these questions; for, on the matter itself, considered according to Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, the council has pronounced very definite and full declarations. But, as in this doctrine the Lutherans were driven to the most pernicious exaggerations; and as, in the first years of the Reformation, some Catholic theologians,—for example, Albertus Righius, (as is often the case in the refutation of extreme opinions) approximated to the opposite extreme;* the decrees of Trent were received with feelings of very great prejudice by the Protestants, who, in their rash vehemence, charged them with Pelagianism.

As regards the deliberations of Trent, Payva ab Andrada, a Portuguese theologian who assisted at them, informs us, in the third book of his defence of the council, that it purposely abstained from any minuter definitions. And Pallavicini says, that the council has expressed itself more negatively, yet with such distinctness, that the errors on this matter then current were, as such, clearly and distinctly rejected. If the Church, he continues, be unable to give any accurate definition of original sin, it is sufficient for her to denote what original sin is not; and this she can do with as much propriety as one, who, having no clear notion of heaven, could still assert with confidence, that it was not composed of linen adorned with gold-paper! The same celebrated historian also relates, that the papal legates reminded the assembled fathers not to decide on the nature of original sin itself, because Scripture and tradition are silent upon this matter; and he adds, the holy synod was not convoked to pronounce upon opinions, but to condemn errors. We shall soon be enabled to see the great propriety of this judgment of Pallavicini's.*

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* To this Chemnitius (Exam. Concil. Trid. ed. Francof. 1599, Pt. i. p. 168) refers, when he exclaims: "Ad perpetuam igitur rei memoriam notum sit toti orbi Christiano," etc. See also his "Loci Theol." P. i. p. 227. Gerhard loci theolog. tom. iv. p. 518, (loc. ix. sec. 58).

In order to point out more nearly the points whereon the various schools were united, and the points about which they were at variance, we shall lay before our readers a summary statement of the scholastic views respecting original sin, in so far at least as their relation to the Protestant errors may require. By showing their agreement, it will appear, that it was only the most envenomed prejudice which could venture to charge the schoolmen with a superficial Pelagianism; that is to say, with the denial of original sin, or at least with the misapprehension of its magnitude. But while we mark the point at which the schoolmen diverge in opposite directions, we encounter the limit which a higher hand hath set to the investigations of human science. If their efforts to extend this boundary have been somewhat unsuccessful,—if they explain nothing, or much less than they ought,—it would still be unjust to regard what has been explained as the sole criterion of that which it was their task to have explained.

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* Loc. cit. p. 248, lib. vii. cap. x. p. 247: "Hic vero admonuerunt (Legati) ne quid certi statuerent de natura ipsa originalis culpæ, de qua scholastici discordant: nec enim synodus collecta fuerat ad decidendas opiniones, sed ad errores recidendos." Further on, it is said: "Quoties damnantur hæretici, optimum consilium est, magis generalia, quippe magis indubitata complecti, quod a synodo peractum est. Quoties in eosdem scriptis agitur, prudentis est, nullam ipsis ansam præferre transferendæ disputationis a re ipsa, quæ certa est, ad modum, qui est incertus."

"All who descend from the seed of Adam," says St. Bonaventura, "have a nature marred not only by punishment, but by guilt. This is manifest in the want of God's intuition, in the ignominy which weighs upon reason, and in the preponderance of evil desire (*concupiscentia*). The want of the divine intuition evidently presupposes guilt; because no one can be deprived of eternal good, for the enjoyment whereof he has been created, unless there be in him something which renders him unworthy of standing in the presence of his God. In respect to the second, no one need be ashamed of anything which is the property of his nature; but is not reason ashamed of certain motions of the flesh? This, too, betokens an inherited guilt. The preponderance of evil lust is a matter of certainty also, because then only is the soul of man *well ordered*, when the spirit is in subjection to God, and the flesh and animal faculties are in subjection to the spirit.*

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* From this it is clear, in what estimation we should hold the objection made to the divines before the Reformation, that they merely admitted the soul to have fallen into *disorder*, in consequence of original sin. Such was the reply made to the following passage cited by me from Duns Scotus. "Deordinat autem peccatum originale totam animam; ergo si est aliqua una culpa, in illa potentia est, ad cujus deordinationem tota anima deordinatur. Illa sola est voluntas: quia ipsa ordinata ordinat alias, ita deordinata deordinat." (Lib. ii. Sent. Dist. xxx. q. 2.) To form a right judgment on this matter, men

But ill-ordered, and therefore perverted, is the soul of man, when its relation to God and the senses has been inverted. This is now the case; and not only doth faith teach so, but philosophy herein concurs. The violence of wicked lust, and the law of the members, which each one hath from his birth, holds the spirit captive, and overmasters it. It is thus undeniable that the soul of each one is from his birth perverted (*perversa*); but if the right state of the soul be justice, its perverted state is guilt; and as we are perverted from our birth, we bear about with us from our birth the stain of guilt. Of this no one doubts, except he who is ignorant of the power of evil desire, and doth not know in what way the rational spirit should be obedient unto God. For it is acknowledged, that, unless our spirit love God above all things, and for His own sake, it is not perfectly obedient unto Him. It is also acknowledged, that without the gift of grace, no one in the state of corrupt nature loveth God above all things, and for His own sake; nay, he is necessarily overcome by the force of wicked lust, so as to be more enamoured of himself and of some apparent good. Thus is every soul from its birth a sinner, because perverted and disordered. And hence the apostle, speaking in the person of fallen humanity, saith: "I see another law in my members, which striveth against the law of the spirit, and holdeth me captive under the law of sin." Then he exclaims: "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" And he replies: "The grace of God through Jesus Christ." Whoever pays attention to this law in the members, and to our false relation to God, will cer-

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must understand the usus loquendi of the schoolmen; but for this knowledge a study of their writings is requisite.

tainly not deny that man from his birth is sinful; nay, he will clearly see that it is impossible to doubt the existence of original, any more than of actual, sin. If philosophers and some heretics have not acknowledged this, it is because they had no notion of the rectitude of the soul, of justice, nor how much the soul should turn to God. Thus all human nature is given up to corruption; and not only because it has incurred a penalty, but because it is in fact sinful."* "Original sin," adds this great teacher of the Church, "may be described as the want of original justice, whereby the perversity of nature and evil concupiscence hath arisen."

Let us hear now St. Thomas Aquinas, the head of another great school in the middle age. He thus enlarges on the subject of original sin. "As between things opposite, there is an opposite relation, so from original justice its opposite, original sin, may be explained. But the whole order of original justice consisted therein, that the will of man was obedient to God,—an obedience which in an eminent degree was practised by the will; for it is the province of the will to direct all other parts of the soul, in conformity to this its highest destination. Hence, when the will fell away from God, disorder in all other faculties of the soul ensued. Thus, in original sin the deprivation of original justice is the *formal part*, that is to say, the causal, determining, and essential part; but every other disorder in the faculties of the soul is the *material* part of original sin, that is to say, the thing determined,—the consequence,—the manifestation of the essence. The disorder of the other

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[*] J. Bonavent. ad lib. ii. Sent. dist. xxx. q. 11, art. 1, Op. Lugd. 1668, t. vi. P. xi. p. 373.

powers of the soul shows itself in the perverted affection to transitory good,—a disorder which may be denoted by the well-known expression, wicked desire, *concupiscentia*. Thus in its essence *(forma)*, original sin is the want of original justice; in its manifestation *(materia)* it is evil desire."*

In another place he says; "All the faculties of the soul have been, to a certain degree, displaced from their proper direction and destination,—a displacement which is called the wound of nature. But there are four powers of the soul, which can become the conduits of virtue — namely, reason, wherein is recognition; the will, wherein is justice; the faculty of exertion, wherein is courage; the faculty of desire, wherein is temperance. In so far as reason has been diverted from its bearing towards truth, has arisen the wound of ignorance; inasmuch as the will has been diverted from its bearing towards good, has arisen the wound of wickedness; inasmuch as the faculty of exertion has been diverted from its bearing towards the arduous, has arisen the wound of frailty; lastly, inasmuch as the faculty of desire has been diverted from its course, as directed by reason, towards the term of pleasure, has arisen concupiscence."†

As original sin was represented by Bonaventura in the more practical tone of eloquent complaint, and by Thomas, with more scientific accuracy, and subtlety of distinction; so we find the same generally expounded in the ecclesiastical schools prior to the period of the apostacy from the Church: so that any one who judges the matter with sobriety, and with competent knowledge, will be utterly unable to discover in them any, even the slightest, traces of Pelagianism.

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* Thom. Aquin. I.P. ii. q. 82, art. iv. The words "forma" and "materia" cannot always be rendered into our language in the same way.

† Thom. Aquin. lib. i. q. 85, art. iii.

If we turn now to the differences of opinion which divide the schoolmen, the most important will be found to consist in the representation of the mode wherein the sin of Adam was transmitted to his descendants. It must be especially observed, that, for very weighty reasons, the schoolmen rejected as erroneous the opinion, that souls were transmitted through generation by the parents to their children *(traducianismus)*; and on the other hand, held as alone true and orthodox, the doctrine that souls are ever created by God *(creatianismus)*. If according to the first view, the transmission of original sin (from the principle, that like comes of its like, and so that a sinner will beget a sinner) is apparently easy to explain; so, on the other hand, the doctrine of the successive creation of souls offers at the first view great difficulties, in the scientific treatment of the article of belief, which now engages our attention. For what happens to the soul created by God, and created in all soundness, purity, and integrity, that, at the moment of its union with the body, it should be deprived not only of all supernatural gifts, but so deeply wounded in all its natural faculties, and placed in so fearfully incongruous a relation to the Deity?

The teachers of science have at all times found it a matter of difficulty to acknowledge their ignorance. The expectation of scholars, to be able to comprehend every thing, is met by the presumptuous confidence of teachers to make all things comprehensible. The proposition is indeed defended, that in the true religion there must be mysteries,—there must be things incomprehensible. But instead thereof, it should be broadly maintained, that for us, in our present condition, the true religion is itself a mystery,—that it is *the* mystery, and that, in consequence, all its particular parts must offer mysteries. Here is the whole mysterious—therefore its parts: not this or that only is mysterious, but all is so.

Yet there is within us an irrepressible longing after comprehension: it is the same which in its excess leads to the denial of every thing above comprehension. This very longing to comprehend, like the fact, that we are surrounded by incomprehensible mysteries, points to the distraction which has convulsed our nature, to the wound inflicted on our reason,—to a lost intuition, and, in so far, to an unhappy past. Yet it betokens, too, a happy futurity—an intuition for which we are destined, which beams upon us from afar, and for which, even in this life, we seek some sort of compensation. This desire to comprehend, is a meagre vital sign of a yet extant, but deeply concealed, germ of future intuition, and a warranty, that that intuition will be one day imparted to us. So a well-regulated development ought not to be refused to this inborn desire. But full satisfaction here below, we may rest assured, it neither finds nor communicates. Shall then this very effort after comprehension, which is so closely connected with the original convulsion of our nature—with the night which has since spread over our spirit, be crowned with success in the attempt to dispel this darkness? We may be permitted to entertain a doubt. Who comprehends evil in itself? Whose eye has ever penetrated into the deep connexion between moral and physical evil? Who has ever explored the mysterious ties which unite the soul and the body? Who knows the sexual relations, and comprehends what is life, and the generation of life?

Some schoolmen taught, that, by the fall of Adam, a destructive and infectious quality was introduced into the human body; and that this quality, propagated by generation, contaminated the soul at the moment of its union with the body, debased it, and communicated to it the disorder of the body. But even overlooking the fact, that the rise of a positive *bad* quality is itself an enigma, nay, is utterly inconceivable; still this theory takes a very material view of evil. And although it may appear to offer some satisfactory explanations as to bodily diseases, and as to death; yet in the spiritual region it is utterly unavailing. How could the infusion of such a corporeal poison convey to the soul the germs of all which, in the most comprehensive sense, constitutes self-seeking—to wit, revolt against God,—arrogance and envy towards our fellow men,—vanity and complacency in regard to ourselves? If so disordered a spiritual condition, if so distempered a moral state could be engendered by the connexion of the soul with the body, it would be then certainly very difficult to uphold the notion of moral evil.

This theory was in consequence rejected by most of the schoolmen; and, instead of this, another was adopted, namely, that, with the exception of his heritage of guilt, fallen man is born exactly like Adam, when considered without his supernatural graces,—that is to say, with all the natural faculties, powers, and properties of the paradisaic man, as well as without any quality, evil in itself. The conflict between reason and sensuality is caused by the two very heterogeneous essences, whereof man is composed; and therefore, without the divine principle imparted to him, which held the inferior in subjection to the superior part, Adam would have gradually felt this combat within him (*vide* section 1), and indeed without incurring thereby the guilt of sin; for it is the nature of sensuality to be irrational. The conflict we speak of, would have been a natural event. The evil of that corrupt condition, wherein man is now born, consists in the fact, that, in Adam, he has deserved to be deprived of the justice conferred by supernatural grace; that is to say, to feel the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. What nature, without supernatural grace, would have been, is now, in consequence of the self-incurred loss of that divine gift, the penalty of all born of Adam.*

But as this theory doth not explain, and is unable to explain, the perversity of the will, wherewith we are born, it also is insufficient. It speaks only of a conflict between the sensual and the rational principle, which without the Divine aid would have arisen as a natural occurrence. But the question before every other is, to account for the wounds of the spirit, especially for the perversity of the will. Would the spirit of man, because it is an essence distinct from God, when considered in itself,—that is to say, as void of the gift of supernatural grace, and as a bare finite being, be found in that attitude of opposition to God, and all things holy, wherein man is now born? Then man, as a finite being, would be of himself disposed to sin, and would not be so merely through abuse of his freedom. The supernatural, divine principle, can certainly not be destined merely to remove that inclination to opposition against his Creator existing in man as a creature, or rather only to prevent its outbreakings. It is not by the absence of this supernatural grace, without which all are now born, that man is perverted in his will; he may become so, and doubtless easily, but he is not yet so at the moment of his creation.

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* Bellarmin de gr. primi hom. cap. v. "Nos vero *existimamus* rectitudinem illam etiam partis inferioris fuisse donum supernaturale, et quidem per se, non per accidens, ita ut neque in naturæ principiis fluxerit, neque potuerit fluere. Et quia donum illud supernaturale erat, ut statim probaturi sumus, eo remoto natura humana, sibi relicta, pugnam illam experiri cœpit partis inferioris cum superiori, quæ naturalis futura erat, id est, ex conditione materiæ secutura, nisi Deus justitiæ donum homini addidisset. Quare non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Adæ a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantiâ et infirmitate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturæ non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus malæ qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adæ peccatum amissione profluxit."

The inadequacy of this theory, to an explanation of the subject, has given rise to many objections against the Catholic doctrine of original sin. Men went on the supposition suggested by excited passions, that Catholic theologians would admit as notions of original sin, only what was really explained by the above-stated theory. Instead of accusing the weakness of speculation, they impeached the principle itself.*

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* Even Bellarmine, who defends, with great acuteness and subtlety, the last-stated opinion, says of original sin :

"Omnibus imputatur (peccatum Adæ) qui ex Adamo nascuntur, quia omnes in lumbis Adami existentes, in eo, et per eum, peccavimus, cum ipse peccavit ...... Præterea dicimus, quemadmodum in Adamo, præter actum illius peccati, fuit etiam perversio voluntatis et obliquitas ex actione relicta, per quam peccator proprie et formaliter dicebatur et erat ...... ita quoque in nobis omnibus, cum primum homines esse

§ VI.—Doctrine of the Lutherans respecting original sin.

The Augsburg confession expresses itself in the following manner respecting original sin. "They (the Protestants) teach, that, after Adam's fall, all men, who are engendered according to nature, are born in sin,—that is to say, without fear of God, without confidence in Him, and with concupiscence."* This article describes original sin as something at once privative and positive; as the deprivation of good, and the establishment of evil. It is our duty, in the first instance, to determine more accurately the nature of the good withdrawn. The Catholic theologians at the Diet of Augsburg, Eck, Wimpina, and Cochlæus, who had prepared a refutation of the Lutheran confession there read, remarked in their essay, that the description of original sin, "men *were born* without fear of God, and without confidence in Him," was very unfitting and inadmissible; because the fear of God and confidence in Him, consisted in a succession of intellectual acts, which not any one would think of demanding of the unconscious child. Hence, they said, the absence of such acts is by no means to be considered as constituting a sin in the new-born; the non-existence of those virtues would establish guilt perpetrated with self-consciousness and with freedom, and would not, in consequence, denote the essence of

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incipimus, præter imputationem inobedientiæ Adami, esse etiam similem perversionem et obliquitatem unicuique inhærentem, per quam peccatores proprie et formaliter dicimur."

* Confess. August. art. ii. p. 12. "Docent, quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia."

original sin, because man is born therewith, and this sin exists in him prior to all self-consciousness.*

The author of the apology saw himself hereby forced to express himself on this subject with the scientific accuracy to be desired. The obscure meaning of the passage he elucidated with the remark, that, by it, nothing more was signified, than that man, engendered in the course of nature, wanted the *capacity or the gifts* for producing the fear of God, and confidence in Him.† Hereby, in fact, the tenet of the Protestants was stated with the utmost precision; yet in a manner to be intelligible only to one, who knew its connexion with other doctrines. The reader will remember, that, according to the views of Luther and his followers, man was originally endowed with only natural powers;—an opinion which in the present matter exerts a very important influence. For as fallen man, as such, is evidently unable to exercise those virtues, which were possible to him in his state of original purity; and as he is unable to do so, because the powers fail him; the Reformers saw themselves in a situation to put forth the doctrine, that certain *natural powers* man no longer possessed.‡

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* Resp. theolog. Cath. ad art. ii. "Declaratio articuli est omnino rejicienda, cum sit cuilibet Christiano manifestum, esse sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, potius esse culpam actualem, quam noxam infantis recens nati, qui usu rationis adhuc non pollet."

† Apol. ii. sect. 2, p. 54. "Hic locus testatur, nos non solum actus, sed et potentiam, seu dona efficiendi timorem et fiduciam erga Deum adimere propagatis secundum carnalem naturam."

‡ Luther (in c. iii. Genes.) says, after the above-cited passage, wherein he rejects the doctrine of Catholic theologians respecting the supernatural powers of Adam: "Hæc probant, justitiam esse de natura hominis, *eâ autem per peccatum amissâ, non mansisse integra naturalia, ut delirant scholastici.*"

But most insight into these lost natural powers is afforded us by the Formulary of Concord. In the synergistic controversies, which agitated the Lutheran Church, Victorinus Strigel,* (a leader of the heterodox party, an acute, well-informed thinker, who was very familiar with the Catholic points of defence,† and convinced of the incontrovertible character of the dogma of free-will), asserted, that even fallen man possesses at least the faculty, the capacity, the aptitude, to know God, and to will what is holy; although this faculty is completely paralized, and, as it were, benumbed, and is not susceptible of any spontaneous exertion. The formulas, which he made use of, are these: fallen man possesses still the "*modum agendi, capacitatem, aptitudinem*;" that is to say, he still at least enjoys, in reference to spiritual things, the empty form of knowledge and of will, void, though that form be, of all real and essential purport.‡ Although Victorinus considered the consequences of the sin of Adam, in respect to his whole posterity, as of a far more destructive character, than Catholics, by the decisions of Trent at least, are immediately bound to regard them; still his view did not satisfy the orthodox party in his own Church. They called him a Pelagian, and asserted that even that bare faculty of knowledge and will,—that mere empty form in the soul of man, had been utterly destroyed; and here they doubtless spoke quite in the sense of Luther. The formulary of concord likewise rejected the view of the Synergist, and declared that fallen man no longer possessed even the mere natural faculty to understand God and his holy will, and, in conformity to that knowledge, to direct his own will.* In one word, the faculty of knowledge and will, inasmuch as it has reference to divine things, or (if we prefer the expression) the rational aptitude, is denied to the mere natural man,—the man as born of Adam. The truth of this mode of conceiving the Lutheran doctrine, on original sin, is not done away with, nay, is confirmed, by the declaration of the Formulary of Concord, that it was

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* See Plank's "History of the Rise, Changes, and Formation of our Protestant System of Doctrine," (in German) vol. iv. p. 584.

† He was a learned scholar in the old Christian Greek literature, and we are, as is well known, indebted to him for some translations from that literature into the Latin language. But the Greek Church shows *only* advocates of the doctrine of free-will.

‡ Calvin (Instit. lib. ii. sect. 14, fol. 87) gives us the wished-for explanation of the notion, which, in the sixteenth century, was attached to the word "aptitudo." We may compare with great utility this passsge with one in St. Thomas Aquinas. (See Summa tot. theolog. p. i. q. xciii. art. iv. ed. Cass. Lugd. 1580, vol. i. p. 417). St. Thomas here inquires, wherefore the spirituality of man constitutes his similitude to God; and he then says, the divine image within us may be considered in a threefold point of view. "Uno quidem modo secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum. Et hæc aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quæ est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat," etc. *Aptitudo* accord-

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ingly signifies, in opposition to *actus*, the natural disposition,—the faculty,—and here, the moral and religious faculty. See more copious proofs of this in my work,—"New Inquiry," &c. in reply to Dr. Baur, p. 35, second edition.

* Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arb. sect. 44, p. 644: "Eam ob causam etiam non recte dicitur, hominem in rebus spiritualibus habere modum agendi aliquid, quod sit bonum et salutare. Cum enim homo ante conversionem in peccatis mortuus sit, non potest in ipso aliqua vis ad bene agendum in rebus spiritualibus inesse; itaque non habet modum agendi seu operandi in rebus divinis." I. sect. 21, pp. 616, 617: "Repudiantur, qui docent, hominem ex prima sua origine adhuc aliquid boni, quantulumcunque etiam et quam exiguum atque tenue id sit, reliquum habere; capacitatem videlicet et aptitudinem et vires aliquas in rebus spiritualibus," etc.

not thereby intended to hold fallen man for an irrational creature.* For to that faculty of the human mind, which *it* terms reason, it assigns merely the finite world as the sphere of activity:† and thereby clearly shows, that, in its opinion, Adam, rejected of God, and all his descendants, considered merely as such, have no longer preserved any spiritual aptitude for God and His kingdom.

We arrive at the same result by various ways. The first, presenting itself to our view, is the following. The Lutheran confessions, as was proved above, (see section II.), describe the image of God, as the natural capacity in man to know God, to fear Him, and to confide in Him. But it is precisely this capacity, which we especially revere as rationality,—the rational disposition in man. Yet of this very divine image the Lutherans repeatedly assert, that it has been utterly effaced by original sin, and thereby plucked from the posterity of Adam.* The second course which leads to the above-mentioned result, consists in the views entertained by the Lutherans respecting man's free-will subsequently to his fall. They hold that he possesses only a certain external freedom, but none at all in spiritual things; and that, in respect to the latter, he is no more than a stone or a stock (these are comparisons they frequently use).† In like manner, the Formulary of Concord observes, that fallen man can neither *think, believe, nor will,* any thing having reference to divine and spiritual concerns; that he is utterly dead to all good, and no longer possesses any, *even the least, spark of spiritual powers.*‡ The expression "spiritual powers" is here constantly employed as synonimous with "the powers of free-will." Yet we need no further investigation, for even Plank admits, "Luther gave to the assertion, that man no longer possesses any will for good, so extensive a sense, that it would thence follow, that man, corrupted by original sin, no longer possesses *the power of will*, that is, the faculty of will."* Had Plank only added, "and no longer possesses *the faculty of knowledge* for the superabundance" (for both are included *in liberum arbitrium)*, he would then have stated with perfect accuracy the Lutheran doctrine.† Thus, according to Lutheran orthodoxy, did man lose, through Adam's fall (to express ourselves once more with comprehensive brevity), the most exalted and most subtle portion of this spiritual essence,—the part of his substance kindred to divinity,—the implanted organ for God, and for divine things inherent in his nature; so that, after its loss, he sank down into a mere earthly power, having henceforth organs only for the

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* Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arbitr. sect. xvi. p. 633. "Non tamen in eam sententiam sic loquuntur, quasi homo post lapsum non amplius sit creatura rationalis."

† Solid. declar. i. de peccat. orig. sect. x. p. 614. "In aliis enim externis et hujus mundi rebus, *quæ rationi subjectæ sunt*, relictum est homini adhuc aliquid intellectûs, virium, et facultatum, etsi hæ etiam miseræ reliquiæ debiles, et quidem hæc ipsa quantulacunque per morbum illum hæreditarium infecta sunt atque contaminata, ut Deus abominetur ea. (Sect. xl. p. 644.) Et verum quidem est, quod homo etiam ante conversionem sit creatura rationalis, quæ intellectum et voluntatem habeat: *intellectum autem non in rebus divinis; et voluntatem, non ut aliquid boni et sani velit.*" Victorinus Strigel, in his commentary on the Psalms, which appeared in the year 1563, had adduced the following passage from St. Augustine: "Non omnino deletum est in corde hominis per peccatum, quod ibi per imaginem Dei, cum crearetur, impressum fuerat, *neque adeo imago Dei detrita est illa labe, ut nulla in anima veluti lineamenta extrema remanserint, remansit enim quod homo non nisi rationalis esse possit.*" These words the theologians of Würtemberg note as reprehensible. See Plank's "History of the rise and changes of the Protestant system of doctrine (in German) vol. iv. p. 682. We see that Victorinus Strigel attached a different meaning to the word *reason*, from that which was attached to it by the Formulary of Concord. He considered it as the faculty for the apprehension of the super-sensual, as the principle of the Divine similitude in man; for as man appeared to him a being necessarily rational, he asserted, that remains of that faculty had survived his fall. This view, now, his adversaries rejected, and consequently regarded fallen man as really irrational, that is to say, as devoid of every faculty for the apprehension of the super-mundane.

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* Solid. declar. i. de pecc. or. § 9, p. 614. "Docetur, quod peccatum originis sit horribilis *defectus* concreatæ in paradiso justitiæ originalis, et *amissio* seu *privatio* imaginis Dei."

† Confess. Aug. Art. XVIII. "De libero arbitrio docent, quod humana voluntas habeat *aliquam* libertatem ad efficiendam *civilem* justitiam, et diligendas res rationi subjectas." Here is reason the highest faculty in man, that has survived his fall, confined purely to the finite. Let the reader compare the *Solida Declaratio,* ii. de lib. arb. § 21, p. 635, ibidem: "Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur ......ex sese et propriis naturalibus suis viribus, in rebus spiritualibus nihil inchoare, operari, aut cooperari potest: non plus, quam lapis, truncus aut limus."

‡ Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arb. § 7, p. 629. "Credimus igitur, quod

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hominis non renati intellectus, cor, et voluntas in rebus spiritualibus et divinis prorsus nihil intelligere, credere, amplecti, cogitare, velle, inchoare, perficere, etc., possint. Et affirmamus, hominem ad bonum (vel cogitandum vel faciendum) prorsus corruptum et mortuum esse: ita quidem, ut in hominis naturâ, post lapsum et ante regenerationem, *ne scintillula quidem spiritualium virium reliqua sit.*"

We must remember that here the question is only respecting the *natural* powers of man, since, according to the Protestant theory, he had no *supernatural* powers to lose.

* Plank's History of Protestantism (in German), vol. vi. p. 715. But when the revered author adds, that every genuine follower of the theology of St. Augustine is of this opinion, he certainly advances an assertion without proof, nay, very easy of refutation.

† Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arb. § 2, p. 628. "Hic est verus et unicus controversiæ status, quid hominis nondum renati *intellectus* et *voluntas*......ex propriis suis, et post lapsum reliquis, viribus præstare possit."

finite world, its laws, its ordinances, and its relations.

It is indeed absolutely inconceivable, how out of the organism of the human mind a link could be plucked and destroyed; how any faculty of a simple essence, uncompounded of parts, whose faculties science only separates and distinguishes (for they in themselves are one in all, and all in one), should be loosed from the others, and be annihilated: but we have not yet done with the impenetrable obscurity of the Lutheran theory of original sin.* Of the positive part which supplied the place of the one withdrawn, it is as difficult to arrive at any sort of clear conception. In his commentary on the third chapter of Genesis, Luther institutes a comparison between original sin and original justice, and, from the essential character of original sin, draws conclusions as to the essential character of original justice.† If, accordingly, with Luther, original justice be the faculty to love and discern God, original sin must in his opinion be THE FACULTY not to love God and not to discern Him, or rather to hate Him, and to be in a state of darkness as to all things appertaining to Him. This is about the same, as if a man were to say, every one possesses *the faculty* not only to have no property, but moreover to have debts! To Luther it was not only perfectly clear, that, through Adam's fall the whole human race had lost an integral portion of its spiritual existence; but also, that in man an opposite essence had been substituted in its room. And the latter occurrence he conceived to be so placed beyond the reach of doubt, that without the least hesitation he inferred from it, as a matter perfectly indisputable, and, as it were, self-evident, ulterior consequences! If it is inconceivable how the image of God can be utterly eradicated from the human spirit, it is still more inconceivable how a new essence could be inserted into the soul! And then evil was converted into something substantial! Such-like opinions, after indescribable efforts on the part of the Church, had, together with those of the Gnostics and the Manicheans, almost entirely disappeared; and now they again emerged, full of vigour and lofty pretension!

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* Beza (Quæst. et resp. p. 45) reproaches the Lutheran doctrine with leading to Epicurianism, since, if it were consistently followed out, the immortality of the soul must be denied.

"Quæstio. Ais igitur in summâ, corruptas esse animæ qualitates, non essentiam? Resp. Aio, et contrarium dogma dico esse certum et apertum ad Epicuræismum iter, id est, ad mortalitatem animæ adstruendam, quoniam positâ essentiæ ipsius vel levissimâ corruptione, necesse sit, rem ipsam interitûs obnoxiam confiteri," etc.

† Luth. in Genes. c. iii. "Vide, quid sequatur, ex illâ sententiâ, si statuamus justitiam originalem non fuisse naturæ, sed donum quoddam superfluum (!), superadditum. Annon sicut ponis, justitiam non fuisse de essentia hominis, ita etiam sequitur, peccatum, quod successit, non esse de essentia hominis?" We know the reasons by which it may be alleged, that Luther's words are not to be so strictly construed. But if he meant to assert nothing more than what was long customary, why did he not make use of the customary form of speech? The new language evidently betokens new conceptions. And how shall we account for the subsequent doctrines of Flacius, if Luther had given

The substance which Luther found in original sin, was, moreover, according to him, implanted alike in the soul and body of man. The following passages, which are found in different books composed by him, may serve as proofs of what has been stated, as well as set beyond doubt the nature of his opinions on this

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no occasion thereto? It is also said, *essentia* is very different from *substantia;* but let any consider the preceding note, and determine by it the *usus loquendi.*

subject. His expressions are as follows: "It is the nature of man to sin; sin constitutes the essence of man; the nature of man, since his fall, is become quite changed; original sin is that very thing which is born of father and mother." Of like import are these forms of expression: "The clay, out of which we are formed, is damnable; the fœtus in the maternal womb is sin." He says likewise: "man, as he is born of his father and mother, together with his whole nature and essence, is not only a sinner, but sin itself."* Melancthon also calls original sin "an innate power," and indeed the context would lead us to suppose, that he ascribed to this power something substantial.*

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* Quenstedt (Theologia didactico-polemica, Wittenberg, 1669, par. ii. p. 134-135) has collected, and indeed excused, the above-cited formulas of doctrine. They run thus in the Latin language: "Naturam hominis esse puram, hominis essentiam esse peccatum, hominis naturam post lapsum esse mutatam, peccatum originis esse id ipsum quod nascitur ex patre et matre; hominem esse ipsum peccatum," etc. See also Bellarmine de statu peccati, lib. v. c. 1. The same Bellarmine said, it is inconceivable that the soul, which is created by God in the act of generation, should receive from its Creator any bad ingredients, in the same way that a bad *material* power should pass into the soul, which is a *spiritual* essence. To this Gerhard replied: "Contra nos, qui animæ corruptæ ex animâ corruptâ propagationem propugnamus, argumentum hoc non pugnat!" Loci theol. tom. iv. p. 331, loc. x. § 88. Hence the doctrine of Creationism, as well as the opinion of the schoolmen, that unbaptized children go not to hell, but are admitted into a third place, Gerhard declares to be Pelagianism (*oblique pelagianizare*). Bellarmine, moreover, blames the expression of the Lutheran divines, that original sin is a positive quality. Gerhard is very much offended with him at this: then he says, the expression is not to be taken in its metaphysical strictness; next he adds, no quality is really thereby meant. "Quando pravam concupiscentiam dicimus esse qualitatem positivam, non intelligimus hoc secundum ἀκρίβείαν metaphysicam......non quasi aliqua vis agendi sit peccatum, sed quia illa vis agendi in homine est tantum ad peccatum prona atque prompta." This may be listened to, but is by no means Luther's meaning, as Gerhard thinks, but an improvement on it. In the same way speaks Chemnitius. Exam. Concil. Trid. par. I. p. 162.

At last, Matthias Flacius arose, and broadly asserted, that original sin was the very substance of fallen man! Error having now reached its highest pitch of extravagance, a retrogressive movement necessarily took place. The mere negative and privative character of evil was anew understood, and men again more approximated towards the Catholic view of the subject, without however rejecting the notion that a "positive" evil power, accompanied with the inmost and deepest corruption of all human nature, particularly of the yet surviving higher energies of the soul, was transmitted by parents to their children.†

The positive evil now,—the true image of the devil, which after the loss of the divine image is to be propagated by generation through the whole human race, constitutes the Lutheran notion of concupiscence, which the Reformers wished to enforce on the Christian world, as the sole scriptural, the sole just, accurate, and comprehensive view of original sin.* They understand by concupiscence a complete rise and setting of all the impulses, inclinations, and efforts, of fallen and unregenerated man in evil, and indeed in virtue of a wicked energy transmitted to him from Adam.

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* Melancthon loci theol. p. 19. "Sicut in igne est genuina vis, quâ sursum fertur, sicut in magnete est genuina vis, quâ ad se ferrum trahit; ita est in homine nativa vis ad peccandum."

† Solid. declar. i. § 10, p. 614. "Præterea affirmatur, quod peccatum originale in humanâ naturâ non tantummodo sit talis, qualem diximus, horribilis defectus omnium bonarum virium in rebus spiritualibus ad Deum pertinentibus; sed quod etiam in locum imaginis Dei amissæ successerit intima, pessima, profundissima (instar cujusdam abyssi), inscrutabilis et ineffabilis corruptio totius naturæ et omnium virium, imprimis vero superiorum et principalium animæ facultatum, quæ infixa sit penitus intellectui, cordi et voluntati hominis. Itaque jam, post lapsum, homo hæreditario a parentibus accipit congenitam pravam vim, immunditiam cordis, pravas concupiscentias, et pravas inclinationes."

Luther, it cannot be denied, here touched on the borders of Manicheism, if he did not actually overstep the frontier; and we are bound gratefully to acknowledge the fact, that his followers resisted with so much energy the intrusion of such monstrous errors. Yet the expressions which they ever employed respecting original sin, such as *congenita prava vis, positiva qualitas*, betray the original stamp of their master's doctrine. The Protestant belief, too, that so long as man lives here below, original sin is not totally effaced from him even by regeneration, even by the power of God, presupposes that essential substance, which Luther discovered in the unborn evil:—a belief, which, as we shall have occasion later to show, constitutes an essential difference between Catholicism and Protestantism.

Moreover, when the first glimpses of his new theory respecting original sin flashed on his mind, Luther must have been in the most singular disposition of mind, and must have been agitated by the darkest, the gloomiest, and the most perplexed feelings. For if he then taught, with Melancthon, that God works evil in man, how could he ascribe to it any sort of essence, and speak of a sinful stuff, out of which we were formed? The establishment of such a relation between God and evil,—to wit, that God is the author of the latter, is not indeed in conformity to Manichean principles, but would conduct us (if we were to give the speculative notion of the Lutheran doctrine respecting original sin) to a quite special view, which, in the proper place, we shall lay before our readers, as soon as all the intermediate points, which may furnish a complete insight into the subject, shall have been stated.

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* Apolog. ii. § 3, seq. p. 54 seq.

Here we shall only point out some of the consequences, which the symbolical writings of the Lutherans deduce from the fundamental doctrines already set forth.

It is there taught, that in fallen man, not the slightest good, how paltry soever it may be conceived, has survived;* that corrupt nature, of itself, and by its own force, can do nought but sin before God;† that fallen man is all evil.‡ After this, we are nowise surprised at the opinion, that all so-called actual or personal sins, committed in the self-consciousness of freedom, are *only* the particular forms and manifestations of original sin,—the boughs, as it were, and branches, and blossoms, and fruits of the wicked stem and its root.§ The Catholics, on the other hand, believe that in fallen and unregenerated man, the transition from original to actual sin is determinated by free-will, which possesses the power to resist the carnal propensity in a manner not totally unsuccessful, and not merely exterior: although abandoned to itself, it is unable to accomplish perfect actions, in their inward spirit morally good, and consequently acceptable to God.

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* Solid. declar. i. de pecc. orig. § 21, p. 716, 717. Those are noted as heretics, who assert: —— "Adhuc aliquid boni, quantulumcunque etiam, et quam exiguum atque tenue id sit, reliquum habere."

† Solid. declar. l. c. § 22. "Insuper etiam asserunt, quod natura corrupta ex se viribus suis coram Deo nihil, nisi peccare, possit."

‡ Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arb. § 14, p. 632. "Docent, ut ex ingenio et naturâ suâ totus sit malus."

§ Melancthon loci p. 19. "Scriptura non vocat hoc originale, illud actuale, peccatum: est enim et originale peccatum plane actualis quædam prava cupiditas," etc. Luther, Works, Wittenberg, Part II. 1551. p. 335. "And original sin may be called the arch-sin or chief sin, because it is not a sin which is committed like any other, but it is the only sin, the one which commits and incites to other sins, from which all other sins are derived, and are nought else than *the mere* fruits of this hereditary* or arch-sin." This writing was from the pen of

* In the German original, sin is called *erb-sünde*, hereditary sin. The play of words in the original of the above passage cannot be rendered in English—*Trans.*

On this Lutheran doctrine of original sin, we shall now take the liberty of indulging in the following remarks. It is not to be denied that the feeling which called forth this article of belief, was in itself very laudable. It evidently sprang out of a deep sense of human misery, of the universal sinfulness of mankind, and their need of redemption; and it would fain keep that sentiment alive. If we acknowledge this with pleasure, it is yet equally certain, that the doctrine in question attains this object only where thought does not exercise much sway, and we yield to the pressure of dark, unconscious feelings. It is forgotten that when God makes man the mere mechanical instrument of his activity—when there occurs in man a violent obliteration (so revolting to all rational, and still more to all Christian minds) of a natural spiritual faculty, and indeed the moral and religious faculty,—(the prerogative which solely and truly distinguishes him from the brute)—

Justus Menius, but the preface was composed by Luther. In the work entitled "Fundamental Doctrines of Dogmatic Divinity," by Dr. Marheineke, the present professor of theology at Berlin, second edition, § 267, p. 158, we find quite the same principle laid down, at least quite the same form of speech. It is as great an error to identify the sin of nature with the sin of person, as to separate the latter from the former. There is here the same vice, as in the rude antagonism of Nominalism and Realism.

sin then, from Adam to Christ, must be a thing unknown, and all moral must be transformed into physical, evil. How should man sin, when he has not even the faintest knowledge of God, and of his own destination; when he has not the faculty to will what is holy; when he is even devoid of freedom? He may rave,—he may be furious,—he may destroy; but his mode of acting cannot be considered other than that of a savage beast.

The second consideration, which presses itself upon our attention, is this, that Luther's exaggeration, so soon as it was recognized as untenable by his disciples, necessarily led the way to another doctrinal excess. From the one extreme opinion, that through Adam's fall all germs of good were utterly, even to the last vestige, eradicated from the whole human race, men passed to the other extreme, that even now, man in every respect is as well conditioned, and the universe wears as good an aspect for him, as for the paradisaic man. As soon as the dam of vigorous, but unenlightened feelings was broken through, nothing could prevent the whole doctrine of the fall being swept away: for this in fact was the offspring of the most confused feelings, and in its construction no scope had been conceded to the influence of the higher intellectual faculties.

Thirdly. When, in the times of the primitive Church, the heathens so often put the question, Wherefore did God send the Redeemer only after thousands of years, which had elapsed since the fall, and deny him to so many generations? the holy fathers (as, for instance, the author of the epistle to Diognetus and Saint Irenæus) were wont, viewing the subject from the pedagogic point of view, to make the following reply: The Almighty, by a long and severe experience, wished to teach the human race what, when abandoned to itself, it was capable of. He designed to bring it thus to self-knowledge, to consciousness of its sinfulness and guilt, to a lively feeling of its disorders, and to a sense of humiliation before Him, in order to awaken within it a more intense desire after supernal aid, and to cause that aid to be received with a clearer insight as to its absolute necessity for redemption. The theologians of the Middle Ages, also, frequently gave the same reply.*

But what reply could the Lutheran divines make? That man, without the faculty of knowledge and of will for divine things, must remain far from God and his kingdom, is very conceivable; it is as evident as that a man, having no feet, cannot walk. But to what end is this act of violence, that obliterated from the soul of man all religious aptitude—the very image of the Creator? Who would, in such case, venture on a Theodicea? who, even in the slightest degree, would be bold enough to justify Providence in the drama of the world's history?

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* Bonav. Brevilog. p. iv. c. 4. Opp. ed. Lugd. 1668, p. 27. "Ratio autem ad intelligentiam horum hæc est: quia incarnatio est opus primi principii reparantis, juxta quod decet et convenit secundum libertatem arbitrii, secundum sublimitatem remedii, et secundum integritatem universi: nam sapientissimus artifex in agendo omnia hæc attendit. Quoniam ergo libertas arbitrii hoc requirit, ut ad nihil tradatur invita, sic debuit Deus genus humanum reparare, ut salutem inveniret, qui vellet quærere salvatorem; qui vero nollet quærere salvatorem, nec salutem per consequens inveniret. Nullus autem quærit medicum, nisi recognoscat morbum: nullus quærit adjutorem, nisi recognoscat se impotentem. Quia igitur homo in principio sui lapsûs adhuc superbiebat de scientia et virtute; ideo præmisit Deus tempus legis naturæ, in quo convinceretur de ignorantiâ. Et post cognitâ ignorantiâ, sed permanente superbi de virtute, quâ dicebant, non deest qui faciat, sed deest qui jubeat, addidit legem preceptis moralibus erudientem, ceremonialibus aggravantem: ut habitâ scientiâ et cognitâ impotentiâ, confugeret homo ad divinam misericordiam et gratiam postulandam, quæ data est nobis in adventu Christi: ideò post legem naturæ et scripturæ subsequi debuit incarnatio Verbi." We see how this whole theory, to which St. Paul in his epistle to the Galatians has furnished the first materials, is based on Freedom. Compare Alex. Halens. sum. theolog. p. 111. Q. L. V., art. ii. Ed. Ven. 1575, p. 231. b. Also Hugh St. Victor, and others.

The Formulary of Concord attempts, moreover, to extract from its theory some grain of solace. It observes, that, if the Christian can discover in himself only a little spark of desire after eternal life, he may, by this feeling, convince himself, that God has commenced His operations within him; and he may joyfully look forward to the moment, when He will consummate the work begun.*

From the opinion, that in fallen man all the higher spiritual faculties are utterly destroyed, it follows of course, that not the faintest or remotest longing after God could spring up in his bosom: but if such a desire exist in the Christian, then, in the opinion of the authors of the above-named symbolical writing, such a desire is the surest proof that the work of regeneration is begun. But from the belief, that in man, after his fall, there still survives the religious aptitude, and that therefore the possibility of higher aspirations yet remains, no such consolation, according to these authors, can possibly flow! A dangerous self-delusion! for that even in the breast of the heathens such a divine spark beyond a doubt still glowed, is evident, from a contemplation of their history, on which we shall now take the liberty of offering a few remarks.

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* Solid. declar. ii. § 11. p. 631. "Deus est, qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bonâ voluntate; quæ Scripturæ dulcissima sententia omnibus piis mentibus, quæ scintillulam aliquam et desiderium gratiæ divinæ et vitæ æternæ in cordibus suis sentiunt, eximiam consolationem offert. Certi enim sunt, quod Deus ipse initium illud veræ pietatis tanquam flammulam in cordibus ipsorum accenderit," etc.

§ VII.—Considerations on Heathenism, in reference to the doctrines controverted between the two Churches.

We said above, that a very different representation would be formed of the entire history of mankind, according as we contemplated it from the Catholic, or the orthodox Lutheran, point of view. We are now enabled to make good this assertion; but before entering on the proof, we wish to premise a few remarks, for which we beg to claim the indulgence of the reader, as he will meet with statements in part previously advanced.

Nothing more distressing for the Church could possibly occur, than to see herself called upon to set a limit to the idea of the magnitude of original sin. For it becometh the Christian to give himself up with all his soul to an infinite grief at that alienation from God, and at that misery, wherein fallen humanity is sunk; and it is irksome, amid feelings of sorrow, which are boundless in themselves, to be obliged to think of a limitation to an error, that rushes with violence from an extraneous source. It is, however, consoling for the Church that this limitation should be made, in order to uphold the notion of moral evil, and thereby to impart to the sense of pain and sorrow a true and a solid basis, which, as has been stated above, is wanting in the system of her adversaries. It is only so long as an irregular excitement of the feelings and the imagination endures, that it can furnish any nurture to this sense of pain. But so soon as this ebullition of sentiment subsides, and calm, sober reflection awakes, the utter groundlessness of such feelings is discovered, and then they totally vanish, along with their empty motives. What man can grieve, on perceiving that his existence is not consecrated to God, so soon as he seriously reflects on the import of those words, that God had deprived him of all power for so doing? To recognize the evil in its true and entire magnitude, it should not be represented in such exaggerated colours, as we find it in the public formularies of the Lutheran faith. Hence, if in the following pages we lay before our readers a sketch of the religious and ethical life of the heathen nations,—a sketch hitherto rarely or never completed from the Catholic point of view,—we trust no one will imagine we are insensible to the enormity of that hereditary evil which afflicts our race, and thereby to the fulness of the blessings conferred by the Redeemer. It is precisely in order to give a firm basis to our feelings of thankfulness to Him, that we bring out the brighter side of the heathen world; and we can only regret to be obliged to give no more than a very imperfect account of the subject.

The extensive researches of our age in the ancient world, and the remotest parts of the New Continent, have brilliantly corroborated the truth of the Catholic doctrine, respecting fallen man. No people has been found without a belief in God, and without sacrifices, whereby it rendered its homage to the Deity. Nowhere are the religious ideas found pure,—nay, everywhere they are polluted with great errors; yet in superstition faith lies concealed; and this is the good element in the former. Even in the grossest Fetish-worship, the aspiration of the human soul towards God is not to be denied;—it proves, that fallen man, to speak the language of the Lutheran formularies, is still in possession of *spiritual powers.*

Melancthon appears to have had a perception of the weight, which this fact throws into the Catholic scale, for he endeavours to restore the equipoise, by observing, that these remnants of faith are to be ascribed to primitive traditions.* Without these traditions, doubtless (and this was ever the Catholic view), faith would have been lost; but had they not likewise found in the breast of man a point of contact and a hold, they could not possibly have been preserved. As things merely extraneous to man, they must have soon been entirely forgotten, and have perished.

The union of men in social life, and the formation of states, were certainly not possible without religion; and this truth is evidenced by the fact, that nations had their divinities, to whose protection they committed their commonwealth, to whom they erected temples, and sent up their supplications. The nations manifested thereby a sense of their dependence on a higher power, which, although it received no worthy adoration, yet really guided and protected the suppliants. This indestructible propensity in man to unite and to associate with his fellows, is at bottom eminently religious, and is an indelible proof of surviving faculties of a higher kind. The man all evil *(totus malus)* would have felt no social inclinations, and he and his fellows must have annihilated each other in the savage conflict, had even, under such circumstances, a plurality of men by possibility come into existence. When Calvin imagined these societies,—these types of the future Church,—to have been formed without religion, and without faith, and to have sprung up solely out of the exercise of man's lower faculties, he proved himself utterly unacquainted with their nature.*

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* Melancth. loci. theol. p. 67. "Ita ut mihi pœne libeat vocare legem naturæ non aliquod congenitum judicium seu insitum et insculptum naturâ mentibus hominum, sed leges acceptas à patribus et quasi per manus traditas subinde posteritati. Ut de creatione rerum, de colendo Deo docuit posteros Adam: sic Cainum docuit, ne fratrem occideret." The *Solida Declaratio* asserts still more (§ ix. p. 630); but in perfect contradiction with itself. It says, that human reason retains a little spark of the knowledge that there is a God ("notitiæ illius scintillulam, quod sit Deus"); but how is this possible without a spark of spiritual powers ("scintillula spiritualium virium")?

This is especially exemplified in China,—that empire of the Medium,—which, according to the spirit of its primitive constitution, was destined to be a real theocracy. The emperor was to hearken to the voice of God, and be His organ in respect to the people, who formed the family of the prince. All evils and calamities, which afflict the citizens of this paternal empire, are, according to this principle, considered as divinely inflicted chastisements for disobedience to the invisible ruler; and *moral* improvement, and recurrence to pious ancestral simplicity, are looked upon as the condition for the renewal of the country's prosperity. Who could suppose the spiritual powers of man to be obliterated here, where the religious view of all existence is so consummate, and is interwoven with the inmost vitals of the constitution and administration of the state? Who has ever read any fragments of the writings of the Chinese sages, without admiring the earnest view of life, the excellent ethical precepts, and the often profound wisdom which they frequently exhibit? Doubtless, Melancthon would have passed on the virtues of

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* Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 2, § 13, p. 87.

Lao-tseu, Confucius, and Mang-tseu, the same sentence he pronounced on the fortitude of Socrates, the continence of Xenocrates, and the temperance of Zeno,—to wit, that *only* selfish motives were at the bottom of these qualities, and that hence they should be accounted vices.* We undoubtedly are not disposed to revere these Chinese or Greek sages, as pure patterns of virtue, who, as far as they rested on themselves, could stand before the judgment-seat of God, or to assert that all their endeavours flowed from a source acceptable to God. But the question is not, whether any one, who neither knows Christ, nor is penetrated by his light, nor strengthened by his divine grace, be in and by himself pure and just in the eyes of God; but the question is, whether fallen man be entirely corrupted, whether all which he does and thinks be sin,† and be damnnable,‡ whether he have lost all moral and religious qualities, whether those virtues ought to be considered as things merely extraneous, and in no more intimate relation to man, than wealth and corporeal beauty.§ This we deny, and deny at the risk (not indeed very great in our times), of this being imputed to us as a crime, and of our being held up as bad theologians, in the same way as Philip Melancthon reproached our noble ancestors for having introduced into the schools philosophic studies, and recommended the reading of Plato and Aristotle, the former full of presumption which he easily communicates to his admirers, and the latter, in fact, teaching only the art of contention.* That those venerable men were yet capable of better conceptions and higher moral exertions, the Catholic deems a proof of the surviving faculties for good in the human breast. That those conceptions were not pure, and those exertions not perfect, nay, very imperfect, and for the most part positively evil, he holds to be a necessary consequence of the fall.

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* Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 22. "Esto fuerit quædam in Socrate constantia, in Xenocrate castitas, in Zenone temperantia......non debent pro veris virtutibus, sed pro vitiis haberi."

† Melancth. l. c. "Negant tamen (Pelagiani) eam esse vim peccati originalis, ut *omnia* hominum opera, omnes hominum *conatus* sint peccata."

‡ Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 3, fol. 93. The title of the chapter runs even to the effect: "Ex corruptâ hominis naturâ nihil nisi *damnabile* prodire."

§ Melancth. l. c. "Effundit autem hujusmodi virtutum umbras Deus in gentes, in impios quosvis non aliter atque formam, opes, et similia dona largitur." Thus in a manner purely mechanical, so that no higher spiritual activity was to be found. Moreover, such a view is doubtless consistent, when man no longer possesses spiritual faculties for the exercise of virtue.

Let us now turn from the Chinese to the Hindoos. The feeling of estrangement from God, and of the deep degradation of humanity, was so intense among the latter, that they conceived the infantine (and when we take into consideration the intellectual modes of conception in the youthful world, which in order to preserve the pure, eternal idea of man in God, ever imparted to it a concrete reality in time), they conceived the no less infantine and amiable, than earnest, doctrine of the preexistence of spirits, who on account of their sins had been by God cast out on the earth. Hence, they looked on all human existence as a period graciously vouchsafed by God for purification and purgation, as this is so clearly and vividly expressed in the well-known fragment of Holwell, and is generally believed not only in Hindostan, but in Thibet, in the kingdom of the Birmese, by the Siamese, &c. This idea is also stamped on the civil life of the Hindoos, and is particularly perceptible in the mutual relations of the several castes.

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* "Pseudotheologi nostri falsi cæco naturæ judicio commendarunt nobis philosophica studia. Quantum in Platone tumoris est et fastûs? Neque facile fieri mihi posse videtur, quin ab illâ Platonicâ ambitione, contrahat aliquid vitii," etc.

Who can possibly, we ask, be so painfully alive to this alienation from God, without retaining in his bosom something kindred to divinity,—the image of the Godhead? Were the means, employed to attain to the reunion with the Deity, mistaken, they were so, only because no other name is given to us, whereby we can be just before God, save that of Christ Jesus alone. But in these oft convulsive, these most tragic efforts to be united again to God, lies the irrefragable evidence of the desire after eternal life never obliterated from the breast of man. Who can look at the temples of Elephanta and Salsette, and deny the Hindoos the capability of religious feeling? Who has ever reflected on their doctrine of the present period of humanity,—the Cali-yuga, in its relation to anterior ages, and can refuse to acknowledge the deep sense of the ever-growing degeneracy of mankind, which this people hereby evinces? Who has ever examined their doctrines on the divine incarnations, and can fail to recognize in them the remote desire at least for a divine deliverance from the fall?—a desire, indeed, which is to be found in all antiquity. If the earlier Indian theism often degenerated into pantheism, we must seek the cause of this in the finite reason of man, more and more debilitated by the progress of sinfulness. But that no atheism,—no consummate impiety—was openly avowed, we must ascribe to that indelible image of God stamped on the human soul.

What would a Luther and Melancthon, a Musæus and Wigand, a Flacius and Hesshuss, have replied to any one, who had pointed to them the doctrine of the Parsi, who were so deeply impressed with a sense of the monstrosity of evil, that they were at a loss how to explain its existence in the good creation, otherwise than by supposing some self-existent wicked principle, who eternally counteracted the good one? Doth not a tenderer religious feeling lie here concealed, than in the above-stated opinion of Melancthon, Calvin, and Beza, that the good, holy God Himself instigates to evil, and needs the same for the execution of His designs? If the Parsi confounded moral and physical evil,—if they did not at least duly separate them,—this by no means justifies an objection against the judgment we have pronounced; for we would have only invited the Reformers to reflect, whether their doctrine were better than that of the Parsi, who were so very differently circumstanced (for they were ignorant of the Christian doctrine), while the Reformers contended against the truth, which shone beside them in all its lustre.

In the whole ancient world we discern a seeking after truth. Let us but consider what that signifies! If none by their own faculties were enabled to discover it,—for to every creature must it be communicated,—still it was the object of desire. The man all evil,—the man who hath been despoiled of all spiritual powers,—in whom the likeness of God hath been utterly effaced,—strives not after truth, and cannot so strive. Undoubtedly, truth was but too frequently sought for in the world of creatures; and it was only rarely that man could persuade himself to raise a look of joy upwards to heaven. But if we discover one such example only, it can then be no longer a matter of doubt, that man could do so, when he wished,—and the freedom, even of the fallen creature, is then fully established.

History makes us acquainted with endless gradations of moral character, and religious forms. From the most hideous depravity, up to an affecting piety, we find living examples in countless grades; and in all these do we find no evidence of moral freedom, but merely of an outward and civil liberty. Why was one individual, in exactly the same relations, other than his fellow-man, in a moral and religious point of view? In truth, if everything be unconditionally referred to God,—everything considered as His deed, and evil, as well as good, ascribed to Him, as the primary cause,—then assuredly we shall find no evidence of the truth, that man, even in his fall, has retained his freedom, and is endowed with moral and religious faculties, the use whereof is left to himself: then we must cease to speak of good and of evil, and must class the opinion of an all-holy God, and of man's moral capabilities, among the dreams of fancy.

History, accordingly, confirms the Catholic doctrine of original sin, and incontrovertibly demonstrates, that, deep as his fall might have been, man lost not his freedom, nor was despoiled of the image of God; that not all which he thought and did, was necessarily sinful and damnable; and that he possessed something more than the "mere liberty to sin,"—as the Lutheran symbolical books assure us. Moreover, it is by no means astonishing, when we consider the extravagance of the view, as to the world before Christ, expressed in the Lutheran formularies, that in the course of time, it should have been opposed by another opinion equally extravagant,—an opinion which regards the profoundest doctrines of the Gospel as mere heir-looms of heathenism; or even, in the mildest view, holds Christianity to be a natural result of the progress of our species, and consequently reveres paganism, independently of man's fall, as a stage, *necessary in itself*, of human civilization.

§ VIII.—Doctrine of the Calvinists on original sin.

In their account of original sin, and its consequences, the Calvinists did not proceed to near such lengths as the Lutherans. It may certainly be asserted in more than one respect, that the Reformed system of doctrine, as invented or arranged by Calvin, derived on many points undeniable advantages from the mistakes and errors of the earlier Reformers. Hence the more learned and scientific Calvin shows himself here and there more equitable towards the Catholics, presents their doctrine at times in a form not quite so disfigured as his predecessors, and on the whole proceeds with far more calmness and circumspection than Luther. Thus it happened, that, in the same way as Zwingle's cold and inane theory on the sacrament of the altar was by Calvin brought much nearer to the true Christian standard, so, in the doctrine which now engages our attention, only a slight removal from the truth is perceptible. But this retrogade movement, when it occurred, —for it did not often take place,—was almost always brought about at the cost of clearness and distinctness of ideas; and if the mitigation of a too great severity afford pleasure, the uncertainty and fluctuation of notions that is substituted, is but the more perplexing.

Even Calvin expresses himself in various ways respecting original sin and its consequences. In some places he says, the image of God has been utterly effaced from the soul of man.* In other passages he expresses the same thing to the following effect. "Man," says he, "has been so banished from the kingdom of God, that all in him which bears reference to the blessed life of the soul, is extinct;"† and he asserts, that man has received again organs for the divine kingdom only, by the new creation in Christ Jesus.‡

These assertions are, however, opposed by other passages, in which it is asserted, that the divine image stamped on the human soul, has never been totally destroyed and obliterated, but only fearfully disfigured, mutilated, and deformed.§

The same indistinctness, the same vacillation is apparent, when Calvin investigates in detail the faculties yet belonging to the sinful and unregenerated man; or when he subjects to a most comprehensive examination the principle of freedom, which, according to the Catholic dogma, survives even in fallen man. He observes, that reason (*ratio, intellectus*), and the will

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* Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. c. 2, n. 12. "Denique sicut primi hominis defectione deleri potuit ex ejus mente et animâ imago Dei," etc.

† Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 2, § 12, p. 86. "Unde sequitur, ita exulare à regno Dei, ut quæcumque ad beatam animæ vitam spectant, in eo extincta sint."

‡ Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. c. 29, § 2, p. 355. "Ac ne glorietur, quod vocanti et ultro se offerenti saltem responderit, nullas ad audiendum esse aures, nullos ad videndum oculos affirmat Deus, nisi quos ipse fecerit."

§ Calvin. Instit. lib. i. c. 15, § 4, p. 57. "Etsi demus non prorsus exinanitam ac deletam in eo fuisse Dei imaginem, sic tamen corrupta fuit, ut, quidquid superest, horrenda sit deformitas. Ergo quum Dei imago sit integra naturæ humanæ præstantia, quæ refulsit in Adam ante defectionem, postea sic vitiata ac prope deleta est, ut nihil ex ruinâ, nisi confusum, mutilum, labeque infectum supersit," etc.

(*voluntas*), could not be eradicated from man, for these faculties formed the characteristic distinction between man and the brute.* In the circle of social institutions, of the liberal and mechanical arts, of logic, dialectics, and mathematics, he accords to reason (he had better said understanding) the most glorious scope, even among the heathens; and takes occasion to indulge in a bitter sally against that contempt of philosophy, so prevalent among the Protestants of his day.† But when he comes to describe the religious and moral faculties of man, then the most singular indistinctness appears. As regards the knowledge of God, he by no means calls in question, that some truths were found scattered even among the nations unfavoured with a special divine revelation; and he seems, on that account, not to approve the opinion of a total destruction of the spiritual powers.‡ But, then, he destroys the hope which this concession offers, by adding, that the Almighty had granted such glimpses in the depth of night, in order to be able to condemn, out of their own mouth, the men whom they had been imparted to, or rather forced on; for then they could not excuse themselves as having been unacquainted with the ways of the Lord.§

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* Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 2, § 22, p. 86.

† L. c. § 15, fol. 88. "Pudeat nos tantæ ingratitudinis, in quam non inciderunt ethnici poetæ, qui et philosophiam, et leges, et bonas omnes artes Deorum inventa esse confessi sunt."

‡ L. c. § 12, fol. 86. "Hoc sensu dicit Joannes, lucem adhuc tenebris lucere, sed a tenebris non comprehendi: quibus verbis utrumque clare exprimitur, in perversâ et degenere hominis naturâ micare adhuc scintillas, quæ ostendant, rationale esse animal et a brutis differre."

§ L. cit. § 18, fol. 89. "Præbuit quidem illis Deus exiguum divinitatis suæ gustum, ne ignorantiam impietati obtenderent: et eos inter-

Accordingly, he appears again indisposed to regard those traces of the true knowledge of God, as the result and property of higher human faculties cooperating with God. Nay, he seems to look upon them as the consequence of some strange and marvellous influence of the Deity upon certain men, for certain purposes; and this is the more remarkable, as he elsewhere deduces the anxiety for a good reputation from the feeling of shame, and this again from the innate sense of justice and virtue, wherein the germ of religion is already involved.* Thus we see throughout, a sound, excellent mind, struggling for the victory with disordered feelings, but, after a short vigorous onset for the mastery, compelled to succumb.

Nearly in the same way he treats the moral phenomena of the ancient world. The Catholics were wont at times to refer to men, like Camillus, and from their lives to demonstrate the moral freedom enjoyed even by the heathens, and the remnants of good to be found among them. They defended, moreover, the proposition, that God's special grace, communicated for the sake of Christ's merits, working retrospectively, and confirming the better surviving sentiments in the human breast, is undeniably to be traced in many phenomena.†

What course does Calvin now pursue to explain such

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dum ad dicenda nonnulla impulit, quorum confessione ipsi convincerentur."

* L. cit. lib. i. c. 15, n. 8.

† Constitut. Unigenitus (Harduin. Concil. tom. xi. fol. 1635). This bull rejects, in consequence, the following Calvinistico-Jansenistical propositions: "N. XXVI. Nullæ dantur gratiæ, nisi per fidem." "N. XXIX. Extra ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia." By *fides*, "faith in Christ" is to be understood.

phenomena? He observes, that it is very easy to let ourselves be deceived by the same, as to the true nature of corruption, and he does not precisely deny the finer traces of a moral spirit. But, he says, we should remember that the Divine grace here and there works as an impediment, not by its aid to strengthen and purify the interior of man, but mechanically to prevent the otherwise infallible outbreaks of evil.*

The conduct of the good Camillus he accordingly explains by the assumption, that it might have been purely exterior and hypocritical, or the result of the above-mentioned grace mechanically repressing evil in his breast, but in no wise rendering him better than his fellows.† By such more than mechanical attempts at explanation, Calvin shows beyond doubt, that when he speaks of reason and the will as undestroyed and indestructible faculties of the soul, distinguishing man from the brute, he is far from thinking that man has preserved out of his unhappy catastrophe any moral and religious *powers whatever*.

Extravagant, however, as the judgment might be which Calvin formed of unregenerated man,‡ he yet did not forget himself so far as the Lutherans. When he teaches that the will and the reason exist even after the fall, he means thereby the *faculty* of faith, and of the higher will. Those passages, wherein he seems to deny this faculty to fallen man—and of these there are very many—must be corrected by others, wherein he expressly asserts, that, when he speaks of a destruction of the will, he understands only the really good will, and not the mere faculty of will;* so that the opinion of Victorinus Strigel, which was rejected by the Lutherans, appears to be precisely that of Calvin.

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* Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 3, § 2, fol. 94. "Exempla igitur ista monere nos videntur, ne hominis naturam in totum vitiosam putemus ……Sed hic succurrere nobis debet, inter illam naturæ corruptionem esse nonnullum Dei gratiæ locum, non quæ illam purget, sed quæ intus cohibeat."

† L. cit. § 3, fol. 95. "Quid autem, si animus pravus fuerit et contortus, qui aliud potius quidvis quam rectitudinem sectatus est?… …Quamquam hæc certissima est et facillima hujus quæstionis solutio, non esse istas communes naturæ dotes, sed speciales Dei gratias, quas varie et in certum modum profanis alioqui hominibus dispensat."

‡ Calvin. Instit. lib. ii. c. 5, n. 19. In this passage he says, in reference to the man who had fallen among robbers, whom the good Samaritan took pity on: "Neque enim dimidiam homini vitam reliquit Dei

Of concupiscence, moreover, as is evident from the preceding account, Calvin entertains nearly the same notion as the Lutheran formularies profess,† only that he is unwilling to use this technical word: and hence

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verbum, sed penitus interiisse docet, quantum ad beatæ vitæ rationem." The Catholics appealed to this parable, to show that fallen man still retained some vital powers. Then Calvin proceeds: "Stet ergo nobis indubia ista veritas, quæ nullis machinamentis quatefieri potest; mentem hominis sic alienatam prorsus à Dei justitiâ, ut nihil non impium, contortum, fœdum, impurum, flagitiosum concipiat, concupiscat, moliatur: cor peccati veneno ita penitus delibutum, ut nihil quam corruptum fœtorem efflare queat."

* Instit. lib. ii. c. 3, n. 6. "Voluntatem dico aboleri, non quatenus est voluntas: quia in hominis conversione *integrum manet, quod primæ est naturæ: creari etiam novam dico, non ut voluntas esse incipiat, sed ut vertatur ex malâ in bonum.* Hæc in solidum a Deo fieri affirmo." Compare lib. i. c. 5, n. 16; where he allows, that the good which may happen through us, may be called our own, because the faculty of will is ours.

† L. c. lib. ii. c. 1, n. 8. "Neque enim natura nostra boni tantum inops et vacua est; sed malorum omnium adeo fertilis et ferax, ut otiosa esse non possit. Qui dixerunt esse concupiscentiam, non nimis alieno verbo usi sunt, si modo adderetur (quod minime conceditur à plerisque, namely, the Catholics) quidquid in homine est, peccatum est, ab intellectû ad voluntatem, ab animâ ad carnem usque, hâc concupiscentiâ inquinatum refertumque esse."

we can understand why in the confessions of the Calvinistic Churches it is but very rarely employed.*

As regards the Calvinistic formularies, they may be divided into several classes; since those which were framed under the immediate or remoter influence of Zwingle, are clearly distinguishable from those wherein the spirit of Calvin breathes. In the Tetrapolitana the doctrine of original sin is not specially treated, but is only incidentally touched on under the article of Justification: a fact, for the explanation whereof, we shall have occasion to notice later the doctrine of Zwingle on original sin.

The most ancient Helvetic Confessions (II. and III.) express themselves on this head with much caution and circumspection, and could we be only assured of their spirit,—that is to say, were we but certain that this their boasted peculiarity did not proceed from the same motive which induced the Tetrapolitana to take no special notice of original sin,—they might call forth from the Catholic expressions of perfect satisfaction.†

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* Except in Article IX. of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church, I do not remember to have read it anywhere.

† Confess. Helvet. ii. c. xiii. p. 95. "Atque hæc lues, quam originalem vocant, genus totum sic pervasit, ut nullâ ope iræ filius inimicusque Dei, nisi divinâ per Christum, curari potuerit. Nam si quid bonæ frugis superstes est, vitiis nostris assidue debilitatum in pejus vergit. Superest enim mali vis, et nec rationem persequi, nec mentis divinitatem excolere sinit." What means *mentis divinitas?*

Confess. Helvet. iii. c. 2, p. 103. "Confitemur, hominem ab initio, secundum Dei imaginem, et justitiam, et sanctitatem à Deo integre factum. Est autem suâ sponte lapsus in peccatum, per quem lapsum totum humanum genus corruptum et damnationi obnoxium factum est. Hinc natura nostra vitiata est, ac in tantam propensionem ad peccatum devenit, ut nisi eadem per Spiritum Sanctum redintegretur, homo per se nihil boni faciat, aut velit."

To the Helvetic Confessions we may add that of the Anglican Church, which on every point endeavours to avoid a tone of exaggeration.*

The first Helvetic Confession (which however is not the most ancient), the Gallic, Belgian, and Scotch Confessions on the other hand, unequivocally express Calvin's doctrine, that man is thoroughly and entirely corrupted.† However, in these, as in the writings of Calvin, we meet with many indeterminate and wavering expressions. It is worthy of observation, moreover, that the first Helvetic formulary pronounces the Lutheran opinion, that fallen man no longer possesses the faculty of will and knowledge for the kingdom of God, to be Manichean.‡

The following fact is worthy of our attention :—

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* Confess. Anglic. art. IX. p. 129. "Peccatum originale non est, ut fabulantur Pelagiani, in imitatione situm, sed est vitium et depravatio naturæ cujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati, quâ fit, ut ab originali justitiâ quam longissime distet, ad malum suâ naturâ propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in quoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur."

† Confess. Helvet. I. c. viii.-ix. p. 15 ; Gall. c. x.-xi. p. 114 ; Scot. Art. iii. p. 146 ; Belg. c. xiv. p. 178. The Hungarian Confession speaks not at all of original sin, yet from motives different from the *Tetrapolitana*. In respect to the discrepancies noticed in the text, we find several in the first Helvetic Confession, which we cannot now enter into, as it would lead us into too many details. The Belgian Confession, for example, says that by original sin man hath been entirely severed from God, and yet in another place it leaves him some *vestigia exiqua* of the earlier gifts of divine similitude.

‡ Confess. Helvet. i. c. ix. p. 19. "Non sublatus est quidem homini intellectus, non erepta ei voluntas, et prorsus in lapidem vel truncum est commutatus." P. 21 : "Manichæi spoliabant hominem omni actione, et veluti saxum et truncum faciebant :" words which, by the employment of the peculiar Lutheran expressions, can refer only to the Lutheran opinions.

Even the Confessions of the Reformed consider actual sins as *only* the manifestations of original sin—as the gradual revelation of the same in special determinate phenomena. According to them, also, Adam's sin is the *unique*, the *only* source, whence all sins flow, without ever exhausting it; the infinite source, ever active and stirring to find an outlet, and, when that outlet is found, impatient to find a new one.*

With reason, Catholics were able to reply, that, according to this view, all sins would be necessarily equal, since, according to the maxims of a false realism, the person is considered as absorbed in nature, the individual in universal being; and the fact, that not all the unconverted are in a like degree rogues and villains, not all fratricides and parricides, robbers and poisoners, the Calvinists can by no means explain by the different use of freedom, since, according to their doctrine, no one possesses it. Thus, observe the Catholics, the primitive evil, according to the maxims of Calvin, progresses with a blind necessity, and finds in every man a ready, though servile, instrument for the perpetration of its most horrible deeds. It can, therefore, be regarded only as an accident, when one appears as a frightful criminal, the other as a moral man: the latter at bottom is as bad as the former; the sinfulness, alike in each, and repressible by none, manifests itself sometimes here, sometimes there, in more violent explosions. The first Helvetic Confession guards itself against these and such like consequences, and condemns the Jovinians, the Pelagians, and the Stoics, who taught the equality of all sins.† But it can establish no other difference of sins, than that of external manifestation, according to which, truly, not one sin perhaps is like to the other. However, we honour in this cautiousness a sound feeling—a welcome perception of that deep, indescribable abyss of error, out of which the Reformation sprang.

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* Confess. Belg. c. xv. p. 179.

† Confess. Helv. I. c. viii. p. 17.

The doctrine of the Reformed Confessions respecting wicked lust (*concupiscentia*), we shall not set forth at length, since it does not materially differ from the view of the orthodox Lutherans. In respect to the bodily death, this is regarded, as in the Catholic Church, to be a consequence of original sin.*

§ IX.—Zwingle's view of original sin.

To explain some phenomena in the Formularies of the Reformed Churches, we annex the doctrine of Zwingle on original sin. This Reformer ventures on the attempt, not merely to determine according to Scriptural evidence the nature of man's hereditary evil, but to give a psychological explanation of the sin of Adam—an attempt for which he is utterly incompetent, and which is very inferior to preceding efforts for the illustration of this very obscure mystery, nay, in reality explains absolutely nothing, and presupposes original sin. In the first place, Zwingle troubles the serious reader with a very untimely jest, when he says, that it was a bad prognostic for the future married man, that Eve should have been formed out of a rib of the sleeping Adam; for, from observing that her husband, during this operation, was not awakened nor brought to consciousness, the thought naturally arose in her mind, that her mate might be easily deceived and circumvented!! Satan now observed Eve's growing spirit of enterprise, and, withal, her total inexperience in all intrigues. Aiding, therefore, her internal desire to play a trick, and her utter impotence to accomplish her purpose, he pointed out to her the way for deceiving her husband, and the result was the first sin. This man, sporting over sin, seriously observes, that from this whole process of Satanic seduction, and especially from the enticements offered, it is easy to conclude, that the self-love of Adam was the cause of his sin, and that consequently from self-love flows all human misery. But then, as, according to all the laws of the outward world, the like can only proceed from its like, so, since Adam's fall, all men were born with this self-love, the germ of all moral evil. Zwingle then proceeds to describe original sin, which in itself is not sin, but only a natural disposition to sin—a leaning and propensity to sin; and endeavours to illustrate his meaning by the following comparison: A young wolf has in all respects the natural qualities of a wolf, that is to say, it is one, that, in virtue of its innate ferocity, would attack and devour the sheep, though yet it has not actually done so; and huntsmen, on discovering it, will treat it in the same manner as the old ones, for they feel convinced, that, on its growing up, it will, like others of its species, fall upon the flocks, and commit ravages. The natural disposition is the hereditary sin, or the hereditary fault; the special robbery is the actual sin growing out of the former; the latter is sin in the strict sense of the word, while the former ought not to be considered either as a sin or as a debt.*

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* Confess. Belg. c. xiv. p. 178. "Quo morti corporeæ et spirituali obnoxium reddidit." Helvet. l. c. viii. p. 17. "Per mortem itaque intelligimus non tantum corpoream mortem," etc.

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* Zwingli de peccato origin. declarat. op. tom. ii. fol. 117. "Quam ergo tandem causam tam imprudentis facti aliam esse putemus, quam

This account, while it explains nothing, is withal of a genuine Protestant stamp. That it explains nothing is evident, from its representing self-love as the cause of Adam's sin, which accordingly before his fall lay concealed in him, and by the mediation of Satan was only introduced into the outward world. This self-love is represented as the effect of Adam's sin extending to all his posterity—as the natural disposition of all his sons; so that original sin appears as a corruption already innate in Adam; and it must be considered, not so much as inherited of Adam, but as implanted by God himself. But this explanation also is a genuine Protestant one, since it frankly and undisguisedly holds up God as the author of sin, and looks upon all particular actual sins as the necessary results,—the outward manifestations of a natural disposition; a disposition which is well illustrated by that of the young wolf, that, devoid of freedom, is totally unable to resist the impulse of instinct. Hence, also, Zwingle with reason regards original sin, not as sin, but *only* as an evil, clinging to human nature: he is however, chargeable with an inconsistency, in considering actual sins to be sins, for they are only the necessary growth of a natural disposition. It would have been also more in conformity with his above-mentioned principles, as to the cause of evil, to have considered no moral transgression as contracting a debt.

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amorem sui? etc. Habemus nunc prævaricationis fontem, φιλαυτίαν scilicet, hoc est sui ipsius amorem: ex hoc manavit quicquid uspiam est malorum inter mortales. Hoc mortuus jam homo filios degeneres procreavisse neutiquam cogitandus est: non magis, quam quod ovem lupus aut corvus cygnum pariat......Est ergo ista ad peccandum amore sui propensio peccatum originale: quæ quidem propensio non est proprie peccatum, sed fons quidem et ingenium. Exemplum dedimus de lupo adhuc catulo......Ingenium ergo est peccatum sive vitium originale: rapina vero peccatum, quod ex ingenio dimanat, id ipsum peccatum actû est, quod recentiores actuale vocant, quod et propriè peccatum est."

CHAPTER III.

OPPOSITE VIEWS ON THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

§ x.—General statement of the mode in which, according to the different Confessions, man becomes justified.

The different views, entertained respecting the fall of man, must, necessarily, exert the most decisive influence on the doctrine of his regeneration. The treatment of this doctrine is of so much the more importance for us, and claims so much the more our attention, as it was in the pretended improvement on the Catholic view of man's justification, according to the special observation of the Smalcald articles, that the Reformers placed their principal merit. They call this subject not only the first, and the most important, but that, without the maintenance whereof, the opponents of Protestantism would have been completely in the right, and have come victorious out of the struggle.*

In conformity with this, Luther says, very pithily, in his *Table-talk*, "If *the doctrine* fall, it is all over with us." We shall, in the first place, state generally the various accounts which the opposite Confessions give of the process of regeneration, and then enter, with the minutest accuracy, into details.

According to the Council of Trent, the course is as follows:—The sinner, alienated from God, is, without being able to show any merit of his own, without being able to put in any claim to grace, or to pardoning mercy, called back to the divine kingdom.*

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* Pars ii. § 3, cf. Sol. Declar. iii. p. 653.

This divine call, sent to the sinner for Christ's sake, is expressed not only in an outward invitation, through the preaching of the Gospel, but also in an internal action of the Holy Spirit, which rouses the slumbering energies of man, more or less sunk in the sleep of spiritual death, and urges him to unite himself with the power from above, in order to enter upon a new course of life, and in order to renew the communion with God (preventive grace). If the sinner hearkens to this call, then faith in God's Word is the first effect of divine and human activity, cooperating in the way described. The sinner perceives the existence of a higher order of things, and with entire, and till then unimagined, certainty, possesses the conviction of the same. The higher truths and promises which he hears, especially the tidings that God has so loved the world, as to give up his only-begotten Son for it, and offered to all forgiveness of sins, for the sake of Christ's merits, shake the sinner. While he compares what he is, with what, according to the revealed will of God, he ought to be; while he learns, that so grievous is sin, and the world's corruption, that it is only through the mediation of the Son of God, it can be extirpated, he attains to true self-knowledge, and is filled with the fear of God's judgments. He now turns to the divine compassion in Christ Jesus, and conceives the confiding hope, that, for the sake of his Redeemer's merits, God may graciously vouchsafe to him the forgiveness of his sins. From this contemplation of God's love for man, a spark of divine love is enkindled in the human breast,—hatred and detestation for sin arise, and man doth penance.*

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. VI. c. 5. "Declarat præterea, ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum Jesum præveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab ejus vocatione, qua, nullis eorum existentibus meritis, vocantur; ut, qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, eidem gratiæ libere assentiendo et cooperando disponatur: ita ut tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse omnino nihil agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abjicere potest, neque sine gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libere sua voluntate possit. Unde in sacris literis, cum dicitur,—convertimini ad me, et ego ad vos convertar, libertatis nostræ admonemur. Cum respondemus,—converte nos Domine ad te, et convertemur, Dei nos gratia præveniri confitemur."

Thus, by the mutual interworking of the Holy Spirit, and of the creature freely cooperating, justification really commences. If man remains faithful to the holy work thus begun, the Divine Spirit, at once sanctifying and forgiving sins, communicates all the fulness of His gifts,—pours into the heart of man the love of God, so that he becomes disentangled from the inmost roots of sin, and, inwardly renewed, leads a new and virtuous life,—that is to say, becometh really just in the sight of God,—performeth truly good works—the fruits of a renovation of spirit, and sanctification of feeling,—goeth from righteousness on to righteousness, and, in consequence of his present religious and moral qualities, acquired through the infinite merits of Christ, and his Holy Spirit, he is rewarded with celestial happiness.* However, without a special revelation, the just man possesses not the unerring certainty that he belongs to the number of the elect.

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* L. c. c. vi. "Disponuntur ad ipsam justitiam, dum excitati divinâ gratiâ et adjuti, fidem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse, quæ divinitus revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud imprimis, a Deo justificari impium per gratiam ejus, per redemptionem, quæ est in Christo Jesu, et dum peccatores, se intelligentes, a divinæ justitiæ timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se convertendo in spem eriguntur, fidentes Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, illumque, tanquam omnis justitiæ fontem, diligere incipiunt, ac propterea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod et detestationem," etc.

The Lutheran view, on the other hand, is as follows: When the sinner hath been intimidated by the preaching of the law, which he is conscious of not having fulfilled, and hath been brought to the brink of despair, the Gospel is announced to him, and with it the solace administered,—that Christ is the Lamb of God, that taketh upon him the sins of the world. With a heart stricken with fear and terror, he grasps at the Redeemer's merits, through faith, which alone justifieth. God, on account of Christ's merits, declares the believer just, without his being so in fact: though released from debt and punishment, he is not delivered from sin (original sin); the inborn sinfulness still cleaves to the just, though no longer in its ancient virulence. If it be reserved to faith alone, to justify us before God, yet faith is not alone: on the contrary, sactification is annexed to justification, and faith manifests itself in good works, which are its fruits. Justification before God, and sanctification, must not by any means, however, in despite of their close connexion, be considered as one and the same thing; because this would render impossible the certainty of the forgiveness of sins, and of salvation, which is an essential property of Christian faith. Lastly, the whole work of regeneration is God's doing, alone, and man acts a purely passive part therein. God's act doth not only precede the workings of man, as if this could, or ought to follow; as if the latter co-operated with the former, and so both together; but the Holy Spirit is exclusively active, in order that to God alone the glory may accrue, and all pretensions of human merit be rendered impossible.*

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* L. c. c. vii. "Hanc dispositionem, seu præparationem, justificatio ipsa consequitur, quæ non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum, unde homo ex injusto fit justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit hæres secundum spem vitæ æternæ......Ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito per Spiritum sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur," etc.

The Calvinists, though with some differences, agree in the main with the disciples of Luther. Calvin is dissatisfied with the Reformers of Wittemburg, for having ascribed to the law, alone, the property of exciting a sense of sin, and a consciousness of guilt. He thinks, on the contrary, that the first place is due to the Gospel, and that it is by the enlargement of the divine mercy, in Christ Jesus, that the sinner is made attentive to his reprobate state,—so that repentance follows on faith.*

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* Solid. declar. v. de lege et Evang. § 6, p. 678. "Peccatorum cognitio ex lege est. Ad salutarem vero conversionem illa pœnitentia, quæ tantum contritionem habet, non sufficit: sed necesse est, ut fides in Christum accedat, cujus meritum, per dulcissimam et consolationis plenam Evangelii doctrinam, omnibus resipiscentibus peccatoribus offertur, qui per legis doctrinam perterriti et prostrati sunt. Evangelion enim remissionem peccatorum non securis mentibus, sed perturbatis et vere pœnitentibus annuntiat. Et ne contritio et terrores legis in desperationem vertantur, opus est prædicatione Evangelii: ut sit pœnitentia ad salutem." Apolog. iv. § 45, p. 87: "Fides illa, de quâ loquimur, existit in pœnitentiâ, hoc est, concipitur in terroribus conscientiæ, quæ sentit iram Dei adversus nostra peccata et quærit remissionem peccatorum, et liberari a peccato." Apolog. iv. de justit. § 26, p. 76: "Igitur solâ fide justificamur, intelligendo justificationem, ex injusto justum effici seu regenerari." § 19, p. 72: "Nec possunt acquiescere perterrefacta corda, si sentire debent se propter opera propria, aut propriam dilectionem, aut legis impletionem placere, quia hæret in carne peccatum, quod semper accusat nos." § 25, p. 25: "Dilectio etiam et opera sequi fidem debent, quare non sic excluduntur, ne sequantur, sed fiducia meriti dilectionis aut operum in justificatione excluditur."

That the severe remark of Calvin at the passage, where he states the relation between faith and repentance, to wit, that those understood nothing of the essence of faith, who conceived this relation other than himself, is not entirely destitute of foundation, nor based on an empty spirit of controversy, we shall clearly prove later, when it will be shown, that, with Calvin, repentance bears a very different signification from the terror caused by sin, in the Lutheran system; and, that according to the former, justification and sanctification appear in a more vital connexion.

More important still is the departure of the Calvinists from the Lutheran formularies, by their assertion, that it is only in those elected from all eternity, that the Deity worketh to justification and to regeneration. On the other hand, the Lutherans, like the Catholics, reject the doctrine of absolute predestination. Finally, the Calvinists lay a still more violent stress on the certainty, which the believer must have of his future happiness.

It follows, accordingly, that we must treat in succession, first, the distinctive doctrines in respect to the operation of God and of man, in the affair of regeneration; secondly, the doctrine of predestination; thirdly, the differences in the notion of justification; fourthly, those respecting faith; fifthly, those touching works; and sixthly, those in respect to the certainty of salvation. When these points shall have been first gone through in detail, then comprehensive reflections on the nature and deeper signification of this opposition between the Confessions, in respect to the doctrine of justification, will follow in a more intelligible, as well as instructive form. Then he who, after a general view, would not have suspected any practical or theoretical differences, important enough to occasion an ecclesiastical schism, will clearly see, that the Catholic Church could not possibly exchange her primitive doctrine for the new opinion; nay, could not, even by any possibility, tolerate in her bosom the two opposite views. The minute investigation of particulars will bring out, in the clearest light, those divergences of opinion, which, in a general survey, may be easily overlooked; and in the considerations which we have announced, we will clearly establish the absolute incompatibility of the two doctrines in one and the same system; and will point out the momentous interests, which the Catholics defended in the maintenance of their dogma.

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* Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. c. 3, § 1, fol. 209. "Proximus autem a fide ad pœnitentiam erit transitus: quia hoc capite, bene cognito, melius patebit, quomodo solâ fide et merâ veniâ justificetur homo, ne tamen a justitiæ imputatione separetur realis (ut ita loquar) vitæ sanctitas: pœnitentiam vero non modo fidem continuo subsequi, sed ex ea nasci extra controversiam esse debet. Quibus autem videtur, fidem potius præcedere pœnitentiæ, quam ab ipsâ manari vel proferri, tanquam fructus ab arbore, nunquam ejus vis fuit cognita, et nimium levi argumento ad id sentiendum moventur."

§ XI.—Of the relation of the operation of God to that of man, in the work of regeneration, according to the Catholic and the Lutheran systems.

According to Catholic principles, in the holy work of regeneration we find two operations concur—the Divine and the human; and when this work succeeds, they mutually pervade each other, so that this regeneration constitutes one theandric work. God's holy power precedes, awakening, exciting, vivifying;—man, the while, being utterly unable to merit, call forth, or even desire, that divine grace; yet he must let himself be excited, and follow with freedom.* God offers his aid to raise the sinner after his fall; yet it is for the sinner to consent, and to receive that aid. By accepting it, he is accepted by the Divine Spirit; and through his faithful cooperation, he is exalted again gradually (though never completely in this life) to that height from which he was precipitated. The Divine Spirit worketh not by absolute necessity, though he is urgently active: His omnipotence suffers human freedom to set to it a bound, which it cannot break through, because an unconditional interference with that freedom would bring about the annihilation of the moral order of the world, which the Divine wisdom hath founded on liberty. With reason, therefore, and quite in conformity with her inmost essence, hath the Church rejected the Jansenistical proposition of Quesnel, that human freedom must yield to the omnipotence of God.†

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. VI. c. V. ......"ut, qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, eidem gratiæ libere assentiendo et cooperando, disponantur, ita ut, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse omnino nihil agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abjicere potest, neque tamen sine gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit. Unde in sacris literis cum dicitur,—convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, libertatis nostræ admonemur. Cum respondemus,—converte nos Domine ad te, et convertemur, Dei nos gratia præveniri confitemur." Can. iv. "Si quis dixerit, liberum arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam justificationis gratiam se disponat ac præparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere, anathema sit."

† The Constitution of Pope Innocent X. (Apud Hard. Concil. tom.

This proposition involves, as an immediate consequence, the doctrine of God's absolute predestination; and asserts of those who attain not unto regeneration, that they are not the cause of their own reprobation, but that they have been absolutely cast off by the Deity Himself; for a mere inspiration of the Divine Spirit would have moved their free-will to faith, and to holy obedience.

It is not difficult to see, that the above-stated doctrine of the Catholic Church, is determined by her view of original sin; for, had she asserted that an utter extirpation of all germs of good, a complete annihilation of freedom in man, had been the consequence of his fall, she then could not have spoken of any cooperation on his part, of any faculties in him that could be excited, revivified, and supported. Man, who in this case would have lost all affinity, all likeness unto God, would no longer have been capable of receiving the Divine influences towards the consummation of a second birth; for the operation of God would then have found in him as little response, as in the irrational brute.

On the other hand, it is evident, from the Lutheran representation of original sin, that the Lutherans could not admit the cooperation of man: and the reason

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xi. fol. 143), rejects the proposition, No. II. "Interiori gratiæ in statu naturæ lapsæ nunquam resistitur;" and the Constitution Unigenitus (Hard. l. c. fol. 1634), No. XIII. "Quando Deus vult animam salvam facere, et eam tangit interiori gratiæ suæ manû, nulla voluntas humana ei resistit." No. XVI. "Nullæ sunt illecebræ, quæ non cedant illecebris gratiæ: quia nihil resistit omnipotenti." No. XIX. "Dei gratia nihil aliud est, quam ejus omnipotens voluntas: hæc est idea, quam Deus ipse nobis tradit in omnibus suis Scripturis." No. XX. "Vera gratiæ idea est, quod Deus vult sibi a nobis obediri et obeditur, imperat et omnia fiunt, loquitur tanquam dominus, et omnia sibi submissa sunt."

wherefore they could not, is equally obvious; namely, because, according to them, the hereditary evil consists in an obliteration of the Divine image from the human breast; and this is precisely the faculty capable of co-operating with God. Accordingly, they teach, that man remains quite passive, and God is exclusively active. Even so early as the celebrated disputation at Leipsig, Luther defended this doctrine against Eck, and compared man to a saw, that passively let itself be moved in the hand of the workman. Afterwards he delighted in comparing fallen man to a pillar of salt, a block, a clod of earth, incapable of working with God.* It may be conceived, that not only was such a doctrine necessarily revolting to Catholics, but that even among Luther's disciples, who, in the first unreflecting excitement of feelings, had followed him, a sound Christian sense, rallying by degrees, must offer resistance to such errors. In Melancthon's school, more enlightened opinions spread; and his followers, after Luther's death, had even the courage openly to defend them. Pfeffinger,† and, after him, the above-named Victorinus Strigel‡ arose; but their power went no further than to occasion a struggle, wherein they succumbed. Luther's spirit gained so complete a victory, that his views, nay his very expressions, were adopted into the public formularies.§

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* Luther in Genes. c. xix. "In spiritualibus et divinis rebus quæ ad animæ salutem spectant, homo est instar statuæ salis, in quam uxor patriarchæ Loth est conversa, imo est similis trunco et lapidi, statuæ vitâ carenti, quæ neque oculorum, oris, aut ullorum sensuum cordisque usum habet."

† Pfeffinger propositiones de libero arbitrio. Lips. 1555, 4. Compare Plank, lib. cit. p. 567.

‡ Plank, lib. cit. p. 584.

§ Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arbitr. § 43, p. 644, ad conversionem

I shall take the liberty of citing a passage from Plank, which states the opinion of Arnsdorf, on the nature of God's operation in respect to man,—an opinion, which was put forth amid the synergistic controversies. Nicholas von Arnsdorf said: "By his will and speech, God worketh all things, with all creatures. When God wills, and speaks, stone and wood are carried, hewn, and laid, how, when, and where He will. Thus, if God wills, and speaks, man becomes converted, pious, and just. For, as stone and wood are in the hand and power of God, so, in like manner, are the understanding and the will of man in the hand and power of God; so that man can absolutely will and choose nothing, but what God wills and speaks, either in grace or in wrath."* Who will not here see the remarkable influence, which Luther's theory, touching the mutual relation between the divine and the human operations, considered in themselves, and even independently of the fall, has exerted on this article of belief? God's wrath, thought Nicholas von Arnsdorf, forces one person to evil, in the same way as His grace absolutely determines another to good. So much doth the human mind find itself constrained to reduce to general laws, that special relation between God and man, which was revealed by the redemption of Christ Jesus.

Remarkable is the subterfuge, which the Formulary

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suam prorsus nihil conferre potest." § 20, p. 635. "Præterea sacræ literæ hominis conversionem, fidem in Christum, regenerationem, renovationem......simpliciter *soli* divinæ operationi et Spiritui Sancto adscribunt." On the comparison of man with a stone, and so forth, see § 16, p. 633, § 43, p. 644.

* Plank, History of the rise, the changes, and the formation of the Protestant system of doctrine, vol. iv. p. 708.

of Concord saw itself forced to adopt, in order to prevail upon men to hear preaching,—a subterfuge which of itself should have convinced its authors, how erroneous was the doctrine which they inculcated. For as, according to their view, man on his part can contribute naught towards justification, as he possesses not even the faculty of receiving the Divine influences, and thus, in consequence of the loss of every trace of similitude to his Maker, is cut off from all possibility of union with God, what blame could be uttered, and what reproaches made, if any one remained obdurate, when it depended on God alone to remove that obduracy? What blame was yet possible, when any one was disinclined to read the Bible, or obstinately resisted hearing the evangelical sermon, which was laid down by the Reformers, as the condition for receiving the Divine Spirit? To be asked to listen to a sermon, must certainly seem to one, devoid of all spiritual qualities and susceptibilities, as the most singular demand,—not less singular than if he were asked to prepare for flying; nay, more singular, for in the latter case he could understand the purport of the demand, while, in default of every spiritual organ for understanding the sermon, he could not even comprehend what was the proposed design: he might conjecture, indeed, that it was intended to pass a joke on him! The Formulary of Concord can say naught else than, that man hath still the power to move from one place to another; he still possesses outward, though no inward, ears; his feet and his external ears he need only exert, *and the consequences he must attribute only to himself, if he fail to do so.* So must the feet supply the place of the will, which, according to the Catholic doctrine, has yet survived the fall; the ears discharge the functions of reason; and the body undertake the responsibility of the mind.*

In general, the Reformers were unable to succeed in finding, in their system, a tenable position for the idea of human responsibility,—an idea not to be effaced from the mind of man, and whereon Kant established what he deemed the only possible proof of the existence of God. They observe, indeed, as we have seen, that man can repel the Divine influence, though he cannot co-operate with it; whereby, they think, his guilt is sufficiently established. But this solution of the difficulty in question is unsatisfactory, because every man can *only* resist; since all are in a like degree devoid of freedom, and of every vestige of spiritual faculties. The explication of the fact, that some become just, and others remain obdurate, can be sought for, not in man, but in God only,—whom it pleases to remove in one case, and to let stand in another, the obstacle which is the same in all!

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* The Solida Declaratio II. (de lib. arbit. § 19, p. 636,) allows man still the "locomotivam potentiam" seu externa membra regere. § 33, p. 640. "Non ignoramus autem et enthusiastas et epicureos piâ hâc de impotentia et malitia naturalis liberi arbitrii doctrinâ, quâ conversio et regeneratio nostra soli Deo, nequaquam autem nostris viribus, tribuitur, impie, turpiter et maligne abuti. Et multi impii illorum sermonibus offensi atque depravati, dissoluti et feri fiunt, atque omnia pietatis exercitia, orationem, sacram lectionem, pias meditationes remisse tractant aut prorsus negligunt, ac dicunt,—Quandoquidem propriis suis naturalibus viribus ad Deum sese convertere nequeant, perrecturos se in illâ suâ adversus Deum contumaciâ, aut expectaturos, donec a Deo violenter, et contra suam ipsorum voluntatem convertantur," etc. § 39, p. 642. "Dei verbum homo etiam nondum ad Deum conversus, nec renatus, externis auribus audire aut legere potest. In ejusmodi enim externis rebus homo adhuc, etiam post lapsum, aliquo modo liberum arbitrium habet, ut in ipsius potestate sit ad cœtus publicos ecclesiasticos accedere, verbum Dei audire, vel non audire."

At least, we cannot at all see, how it would cost the Almighty a greater exertion of power, to supply among some, rather than among others, the spiritual faculties that are wanting: for, all are herein equally passive. In other words, the doctrine of the non-cooperation of man, which rests on the original theory of Luther and Melancthon, touching the absolute passiveness of the created spirit towards its Creator, finds only in this theory its metaphysical basis, and presupposes, accordingly, absolute predestination, which, in the course of the synergistic controversies, was embraced by the most consistent Lutheran theologians, Flacius, Hesshuss, and others,* while the Formulary of Concord sacrificed to a better feeling the harmony of its own system.†

Proceeding, now, to the task of more nearly determining what is the work of regeneration, which the exclusively active Spirit of God hath to achieve, we can discover naught else but that the religious and moral qualities,—the faculty of faith and of will, which had been lost through Adam's fall,—must be inserted anew in the defective spiritual organization; and, accordingly, the inward ears be replaced. While, therefore, according to the Catholic system, the first operation of God consists in the resuscitation, excitement, higher tuning, strengthening, and glorification of these faculties, it is, according to the Lutheran system, to exert itself in a new creation of the same. In this way, we can understand, in some degree, the remark in the Formulary of Concord, that, in the further progress of regeneration, man cooperates with God, not indeed, as to the integrity of his being, but only through his renovated parts,—through the new divine gift,—the remaining portion of his being,—the mere natural man, who had come down from that earlier state of alienation from God,—being never active for the kingdom of God.* Moreover, by this doctrine, the identity of consciousness is destroyed; and we cannot see how the man, new-born or newly created, can recognize himself to be the same,—at least, it is not easy for him to do so, unless he stands before the mirror, and perceives to his contentment, that he has ever the same nose, and consequently is the same person as heretofore. Nor can we conceive how repentance can be possible; for the new-created faculties will have difficulty to repent for what they have not perpetrated; and the old cannot repent, for the divine is not within their competence.

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* Plank, loc. cit. vol. iv. p. 704 707.

† Solid. declar. p. 644. "Etsi autem Dominus hominem non cogit, ut convertatur (qui enim semper Spiritui Sancto resistunt .... ii non convertuntur), attamen trahit Deus hominem, quem convertere decreverit."

Here we may remark, that, by the Lutheran doctrine here stated, the reproach which its professors so perpetually urge against the Catholic tenet, to wit, that it is Pelagian, receives its explanation.† In truth, we discover everywhere, we might almost say, an intentional misrepresentation of the Catholic doctrine: and Melancthon, in this, surpasses Luther himself. Want of solid historical information had an undoubted share in this charge; and this becomes more evident, when we see the Thomists called Pelagian; nay, the views of Luther, on the relation of Grace and Nature, represented as containing the true old Catholic doctrine in opposition to Pelagianism; for *never* was it taught, not even by St. Augustine, that, by original sin, man was bereft of the moral and religious faculties. But in all this there evidently existed an internal obstacle to the full comprehension of the Catholic doctrine,—an obstacle which we feel ourselves called upon to point out,—while it makes the Lutheran view appear more pardonable, since it shows that it sprang out of a true Christian zeal, which, in this, as in almost every instance, was foolishly directed. The Catholic dogma, that even, in fallen man, moral and religious faculties exist,—faculties which are not always sinful in themselves, and must be exercised even in the work of regeneration,—led some to believe, that such an exercise of the faculties in question was the natural transition to grace, so as to suppose that, according to Catholic principles, a very good use of them was the medium of grace, or, in other words, merited it. Such an opinion were undoubtedly

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* Solid. declar. ii. de lib. arbitr. § 45, p. 645. "Ex his consequitur, quam primum Spiritus Sanctus, per verbum et sacramenta, opus suum regenerationis et renovationis in nobis inchoaverit, quod revera tunc per virtutem Spiritus Sancti cooperari possimus, ac debeamus, quamvis multa adhuc infirmitas concurrat. Hoc vero ipsum, quod cooperamur, non ex nostris carnalibus et naturalibus viribus est, sed ex novis illis viribus et donis, quæ Spiritus Sanctus in conversione in nobis inchoavit." This decision, of necessity, presupposes the opinion, that the faculty lost through original sin, and recurring in regeneration, can be no mere quality of the human spirit. It is the higher faculty of will and of knowledge, if the passage cited is to bear any sort of sense.

† Calvin (Instit. lib. iii. c. 14, § 11, fol. 279) is far more just and equitable. "De principio justificationis nihil inter nos et saniores

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scholasticos pugnæ est, quin peccator gratuito a damnatione liberatus justitiam obtineat, idque per remissionem peccatorum, nisi quod illi sub justificationis vocabulo renovationem comprehendunt, qua per Spiritum Sanctum renovamur in vitæ novitatem. Justitiam vero hominis regenerati sic describunt, quod homo per Christi fidem Deo semel conciliatus, bonis operibus justus censeatur et eorum merito sit acceptus." In this there is something inaccurate, but how much more conscientious is Calvin here, than the *Solida Declaratio*, ii. 52, p. 648.

Pelagian; and in that case, not Christ, but man, would merit grace, or rather, grace would cease to be grace. To escape now the like errors, the Reformers supposed man was unable to achieve anything, and received only, in regeneration itself, those faculties which can be active in and for the kingdom of God. But the fine and delicate sense of the Catholic dogma, which very carefully distinguishes between nature and grace, totally escaped the perception of the Reformers. The finite, even when conceived as without sin, though it may stretch itself on every side, can never attain to the infinite, nor ever cling to it but with an illusive grasp.

Nature may honestly exert all her powers; she will never of herself, and by herself, reach a *supernatural* transfiguration: the human, by no strain of power, will become of itself the divine. There would remain an eternal gap betwixt the two, if it were not filled up by grace: the divinity must stoop to humanity, if humanity is to become divine. Hence did the Son of God become man, and not man become God, in order to reconcile humanity with the Godhead. The like must typically recur in every believer. Thus the Church may look on the non-regenerated as endowed with the fairest faculties of nature, and as turning them to the best account. Yet it is not by the use of such faculties that they acquire life in grace, either its beginning, its middle, or its end. On the contrary, Divine grace must ever compassionately stoop to our lowliness, and impart to our sin-polluted faculties the first heavenly consecration, in order to prepare them for the kingdom of heaven, and the receiving of Christ's image. Here, accordingly, we see how important is the difference, which divides the Confessions in their view of man's original state. As in the finite, though yet unstained, faculties of the paradisaic man, Catholics deem the aid of a high supernatural power to have been absolutely necessary to preserve him in a living intimate communion with God; so they must necessarily look on the restoration of the fallen Adam to that communion, by means of his mere unaided natural powers, as a thing utterly impossible, or, in other words, as solely the result of grace. But while the Protestants, on the other hand, conceived that primeval man accomplished this union with God through his finite faculties alone, they necessarily considered the existence of a Divine similitude in the natural powers of fallen man, and still more, the exercise and expansion of such powers in the work of regeneration, as quite incompatible with the notion of grace, and as very derogatory to, if not utterly subversive of, the merits of Christ. That man should retain the possession of all his natural powers and faculties, signifies, according to the Protestant system, that he is able of himself to attain to the perfect knowledge and love of God. Thus, if the Protestants wished to maintain the notion of grace, they were obliged to exhibit man as absolutely passive in the work of regeneration, and as devoid of all powers acted on by grace. It was far otherwise in the Catholic system, which they were unwilling to probe.

When we endeavour to trace the cause, which led the Reformers to the adoption of such a view, we must search for it in another quarter. They confounded, as it appears to us, what was objective, and subjective, in the matter of justification. In relation to the former, man is completely and entirely passive; but, not so in respect to the latter. Fallen man cannot be justified, unless he confess before God, and to himself, that he is utterly incapable of discovering within him any means capable of reconciling him, sinner as he is, with his God. He must, with the most heartfelt confession of his own nothingness, with perfect humility, give himself up to God,—resign himself to His all-gracious disposal, acknowledging that he can only receive, and thus, is merely passive.

In this way, only, doth man fall back into the natural relation of the creature to the Creator. But, should he wish to present to God anything,—be they works, or aught else,—in order thereby to exhibit the Almighty as his debtor, and to demand His grace, as his wages, and in this manner to display his activity,—he would then be raising himself to an equality with God, and, if I may so speak, be placing himself on the same footing with the Deity, and, by such arrogance, would throw himself out of the relative sphere of the creature to the Creator. But, when man rests on the merits of Christ alone, and knows nothing of his own merits, he is then passive, and inactive, letting God alone work. But, when man coincides with these operations of God, he then becomes himself active, and cooperates with God; and the free acknowledgment, that in the sense above-mentioned, he can be in the relation only of a passive recipient, forms the very highest activity, whereof he is capable. Now, the Reformers did not accurately distinguish between these two things, and, in the excess of a pious zeal, rejected all exertion, all agency, in every sense of the word, on the part of man. The Catholic recognizes the necessity of a completely passive demeanour, since he rejects all merits that could earn the redemption; but he insists on the necessity likewise of an active demeanour, since he is convinced, that it is only by his free and faithful cooperation, that he can receive and appropriate to himself the workings of God. When man possesses the first, he gives the glory to God; and, when he declares the second, he gives thanks to God for his ability to render glory to Him; and this, without freedom, he were unable to do.*

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* The Reformers, Luther, Melancthon, and others, and, after them, all modern Protestant theologians, reproach *the Church* with admitting the opinion of "meritum de congruo;" that is to say, an opinion that it is to be expected of God (*congruum esse*), that upon a heathen, who should make the best and most serious use of his natural faculties, He would bestow His grace, and admit him into His divine kingdom. This would be the admission of a quasi-merit, and consequently Pelagian. The Council of Trent knows nothing of such scholastic distinctions, that is to say, distinctions which were current in many schools, and therefore takes no notice of the above-mentioned *meritum de congruo.* Those schoolmen, who adopted this opinion, appealed particularly to the centurion Cornelius, in the Acts of the Apostles, c. x. 22-35; they might have also pointed to the fact, that so many Platonists became converts to Christianity, while no ancient document states the conversion of any Epicurean. We should be very desirous to hear an explanation of this phenomenon from an orthodox Lutheran. Such a man would undoubtedly pronounce as heretical one of the finest portions of Neander's *Church History,*—the one wherein he points out those elements favourable to Christianity, or preparatory to it, in the "Religious and philosophical systems of antiquity." See more particularly vol. i. part i. p. 31. According to the orthodox Protestantism, no philosophy of history is possible. In fine, this Protestantism should be made to observe, that it is one thing to assert that God will certainly have regard to the sincere seeking and desire of a heathen, and another thing to maintain that all should *believe* that Divine grace is due to him, on account of this his seeking and desire.

Moreover, the German Reformers reproached the theology of that day with teaching, that by his own powers man was enabled to love God above all things. But whoever has only the most superficial acquaintance with the theology of the Middle Age, must be astounded when he hears this; and that when the respected professor Hahn lately referred to this subject, in his *Dogmatic Theology*, he should not have expressed his astonishment, would afford no favourable idea of his historical acquirements, did we not know the object he had in

§ XII.—Doctrine of the Calvinists on the relation of grace to freedom, and human cooperation.—Predestination.

The doctrine of the Calvinists, respecting original sin, which, according to them, commits fearful ravages on the human mind, without, however, eradicating the faculties of faith and will, extends its influence to the matter in question. They necessarily teach, that grace first determines, and, consequently, goes before, all the truly pious endeavours of man; so that on this subject we meet with a gratifying general uniformity between all the Confessions. On account of their milder and sounder view of original sin, the Calvinists are enabled, moreover, to uphold the doctrine of the active cooperation of man with God;* and

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view. There were, doubtless, some obscure individuals, destitute of all consideration, who taught something of the like; and to these we may apply the following passage from the intellectual Pallavicini, though it is directed against a degenerate scholasticism in general:—"Si vitium aliquorum accusat, reminisci debuerat (Sarpi) in omnibus disciplinis, ac potissimum in nobilissimis, adeòque maxime arduis, tolerandos esse professorum plerosque vitiis laborantes: plurimis concedi, ut in illis ingenia exerceant, quo doctrinæ præstantia in paucis efflorescat......Nulli datum reipublicæ est, ut in suâ quisque arte præcellat: vel ipsa natura, quâcunque solertiâ humanâ major, vitiosos partus, abortus, monstra præpedire non valet. Unicum superest remedium, ut videlicet eos artifices adhibeas, quos communis existimatio comprobat. Id usu venit scholasticæ theologiæ. Disciplinarum omnium præstantissima simulque difficillima ea est: ejus possessionem sibi multi arrogant, pauci obtinent: hoc constanter admiratur hominum consensio: alii processû temporis, quà neglecti, quà ignoti jacent, quà etiam derisi."—Hist. Concil. Trid. lib. vii. c. 14, p. 253.

* Calvin Instit. lib. ii. c. 3, n. 6. "Sed erunt forte, qui concedent, a bono suopte ingenio aversam, sola Dei virtute converti (voluntatem): sit tamen ut præparata suas deinde in agendo partes habeat." (Calvin here combats Peter Lombard.)..."Ego autem...contendo, quod et pravam nostram voluntatem corrigat Dominus, vel potius aboleat, et a

herein they again coincide with the Catholics, but oppose the Lutherans. By this power of cooperation, however, the Calvinists mean not to affirm, that it is in the power of man to receive, or to reject, the action of God. Where Divine grace knocks, the door *must* be opened; *it works quite invincibly*, and those, who enter not into life, are never touched by it. Here we immediately come to the doctrine of Predestination.

By the side of many very shallow and sterile conceptions, there were ever agitated, in the bosom of the Catholic Church, the most manifold, profound, and speculative theories on divine predestination, and its relation to human freedom. To philosophical talent and acuteness, as well as to the imagination, a wide, and (according to the favourite term of speculation, in every age) a very enticing field is here opened, which constantly invites the hand of cultivation. The Church, however, has deemed it her duty to set certain limitations to this spirit. For God can be represented in such relations to man, as to make the latter entirely dis-

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seipso bonam submittat. Quatenus a gratiâ prævenitur, in eo ut pedissequam appelles, tibi permitto, sed quia reformata opus est domini." Hereby Calvin appears to establish the distinction between the Catholic view and his own, in this point, namely, that God alone in the first place heals the will, without any cooperation on the part of man (how this is to come about, let him understand who can); and that next, the will (which is the natural faculty), cooperates: whereas the Catholic teaches that the human will must labour with God at its own improvement. But the difference between Calvin and Luther is this: that according to the latter, nothing of the old man is any longer fit for an active cooperation.—Confess. Helvet. i. c. ix. p. 21: "Duo observanda esse docemus; primum, regeneratos in boni electione et operatione, non tantum agere passive, sed active. Aguntur enim a Deo, ut agant ipsi, quod agant. Recte enim Augustinus adducit illud, quod Deus dicitur noster adjutor. Nequit enim adjuvari, nisi is, qui aliquid agit."

appear; or man, again, may be conceived in such a position, *relatively* to God, as to subvert the notion of the Almighty, as the dispenser of grace. According to the first view, God appears acting with a cruel caprice, which cannot be conceived by man; according to the second, so ruled by the caprice of man, that He ceases to be He who is, and through whom all goodness *springs*. Accordingly, the Catholic Church alike rejects an overruling of God on the part of man, to impart sanctifying and saving grace; and an overruling of man on the part of God, to *compel the former to become this or that*. On the contrary, she teaches, in the former case, as is well known, that divine grace is unmerited; in the latter, that it is offered to all men, their condemnation depending on the free rejection of redeeming aid.*

The Lutheran formularies emancipated themselves, in this respect, from the authority of Luther; and, in accordance with the Catholics, taught, not, indeed, as we before observed (§ XI.), without detriment to the internal consistency of their system, that Christ died for all men, that he calleth all sinners to himself, and earnestly willeth that all men should come to him, and receive his proffered aid.†

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. 2. "Hunc proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius pro peccatis nostris, sed etiam pro totius mundi." C. iii: "Ille pro omnibus mortuus est." Can. xvii.: "Si quis justificationis gratiam non nisi prædestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit; reliquos vero omnes, qui vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divina potestate prædestinatos ad malum; anathema sit." Pope Innocent X, in his constitution against Jansenius, rejected the proposition. (n. v.): "Semipelagianum est dicere, Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse, aut sanguinem fudisse."—Hardin. Concil., tom. xi. fol. 143.

† Solid. declar. xi. de æterna Dei prædestinat. § 28, p. 765. "Si igitur æternam electionem ad salutem utiliter considerare voluerimus,

It is otherwise with Calvin. He assures us, indeed, that he will move cautiously between two shoals, one consisting in the temerity of the believer, to scrutinize the unfathomable mysteries of God,—the second, consisting in the studious avoidance of the subject of predestination,—speaking of it as a dangerous sandbank.* He finds, for his own part, a great practical interest in this doctrine. The sweet fruits (*suavissimus fructus*), which he discovered in the dogma of absolute predestination, and which tended to confirm him in his opinion, are thus noted by him. In the first place, men can have no firm and deep conviction of the truth, that it is only God's mercy which hath insured human salvation, unless the believer be assured, that not all are destined for happiness; nay, that God grants to one, what He refuseth to another. In the second place, ignorance in this respect, obscures the glory of God,—plucks humility up by the roots (*ipsam humilitatis radicem evellit*),—renders a sense of internal gratitude towards God impossible, and disturbs the quiet of conscience in the pious; for the consciousness that, in respect to sins, no difference exists between him and the reprobate, and that faith alone establishes the

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firmissime et constanter illud retinendum est, quod non tantum prædicatio pœnitentiæ, verum etiam promissio Evangelii revera sit universalis, hoc est, quod ad omnes homines pertineat." Here follow many Scripture texts. § 29, p. 766: "Et hanc vocationem Dei, quæ per verbum Evangelii nobis offertur, non existimemus simulatam et fucatam: sed certo statuamus, Deum nobis per eam vocationem voluntatem suam revelare: quod videlicet in iis, quos ad eum modum vocat, per verbum efficax esse velit, ut illuminentur, convertantur, et salventur." § 38, p. 769: "Quod autem verbum Dei contemnitur, non est in causa Dei vel præscientia vel prædestinatio, sed perversa hominis voluntas."

* Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 21, fol. 336.

difference, comprises a source of the purest consolation.*

Calvin has left a warning example to those, who, from any subjective practical motives, think they are obliged to adopt any new or strange doctrine; an example that shows it to be the exclusive duty of the theologian to seek out with humility what the doctrine of the Church prescribes, for the promotion and excitement of religious and moral feelings; since the truth and objectivity of the Church doctrine imparts, likewise, to all the practical precepts it sanctions, the character of truth and objectivity. For the reasons above-stated,—that is to say, in order to call forth a deep Christian piety, Calvin lays down the following notion of predestination:—"We call predestination that eternal decree of God, whereby He hath determined what the fate of every man should be. For not to the same destiny are all created: for, to some is allotted eternal life; to others, eternal damnation. According as a man is made for one end or for the other, we call him predestined to life, or to death."† The same idea the Reformer again expresses in the following way: "We assert that, by an eternal and unchangeable decree, God hath determined whom He shall one day permit to have a share in eternal felicity, and whom He shall doom to destruction. In respect to the elect, this decree is founded in His unmerited mercy, without any regard to human worthiness; but those, whom He delivers up to damnation, are, by a just and irreprehensible judgment, excluded from all access to eternal life.*

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* L. c. c. 21, § 2, fol. 336; c. 24, § 17, fol. 390: "Nempe tutius piorum conscientiæ acquiescent, dum intelligunt, nullam esse peccatorum differentiam, modo adsit fides." Calvin (de æternâ Dei prædest. opusc. p. 883), goes still further: "Inprimis rogatos velim lectores... non esse, ut quibusdam falso videtur, argutam hanc vel spinosam speculationem, quæ absque fructu ingenia fatiget: sed disputationem solidam et ad pietatis usum maxime accommodatam: nempe, quæ et fidem probe ædificet, et nos ad humilitatem erudiat, et in admirationem extollat immensæ erga nos Dei bonitatis, et ad hanc celebrandam excitet," etc.

† Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. c. 21, n. 5, p. 337. "Prædestinationem vocamus æternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes: sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna præordinatur. Itaque prout in alterutrum finem quisque conditus est, ita vel ad vitam, vel ad mortem prædestinatum dicimus."

It is scarcely credible to what truly blasphemous evasions Calvin resorts, in order to impart to his doctrine an air of solidity, and to secure it against objections. As faith was considered by Calvin a gift of the Divine mercy, and yet, as he was unable to deny, that many are represented in the Gospel to be believers, in whom Christ found no earnestness, and no perseverance, and whom consequently he did not recognize to be the elect, Calvin asserts, that God intentionally produced within them an apparent faith; that He insinuated himself into the souls of the reprobate, in order to render them more inexcusable.† Instead of acknowledging, in the above-stated facts, the readiness of the Almighty to confer His grace on all, who only wish it, he explains them by the supposition of intentional deceit, which he lays to the charge of the Almighty! Equally strange is the reason assigned for the doctrine of predestination,—that God wishes to manifest His mercy towards the elect, and His justice towards the condemned; as if the two divine qualities were severed one from the other, and were mutually ignorant of each other's existence! God will be at once just and merciful to all without exception,—not just merely towards these, and merciful only towards those, as the prejudiced judges of this world are wont to be! We must also bear in mind, that the notion of justice, considered in itself, cannot even be upheld, if no fault exists; and no fault can be charged on the reprobate, if, without possessing the use of freedom, they are condemned; nay, have been condemned from all eternity! Equally baseless would be the notion of mercy, as it has necessarily for its subject sinners, who, by the free determination of their own will, and not by extraneous compulsion, have transgressed the divine moral law, in order then again to receive pardon: for in this case, the whole process would be a mere absurd farce.

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* L. c. n. 7, p. 339. "Quos vero damnationi addicit, his justo quidem et irreprehensibili, sed incomprehensibili judicio vitæ aditum præcludi." And how did Calvin treat those who opposed such a doctrine? His work, *De æternâ Dei prædestinatione*, is directed against Albertus Pighius, a very intellectual and learned divine; as also his treatise, *De libero arbitrio*. In the latter work Pighius is treated with sufficient decency, but in the former we read as follows: "Albertus Pighius Campensis, homo phreneticâ plane audaciâ præditus......Paulo post librum editum, moritur Pighius. Ergo ne cani mortuo insultarem, ad alias lucubrationes me converti......In Pighio nunc et Georgio Siculo, belluarum par non male comparatum," etc.

† Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. c. 2, n. 11, p. 194. "Etsi in fidem non illuminantur, nec Evangelii efficaciam vere sentiunt, nisi qui præordi-

It was, moreover, only by the greatest efforts of

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nati sunt ad salutem; experientia tamen ostendit reprobos interdum simili fere sensu atque electos affici, ut ne suo quidem judicio quicquam ab electis differant. Quare nihil absurdi est, quod cœlestium donorum gustus ab Apostolo, et temporalis fides a Christo illis adscribitur; non quod vim spiritualis gratiæ solide percipiant, ac certum fidei lumen; sed quia Dominus, ut magis convictos et inexcusabiles reddat, se insinuat in eorum mentes, quatenus sine adoptionis spiritû gustari potest ejus bonitas," p. 195. "Commune cum illis (filiis Dei), fidei principium habere videntur, sub integumento hypocriseos."

Calvin and his disciples, particularly Beza, that this doctrine was enabled to pervert the sound understanding of Christians. Bern especially resisted for a long time, till the *consensus Tigurinorum* was brought about. The Gallic Confession immediately adopted this doctrine,* and the Belgic likewise.† That the Synod of Dort should sanction Calvin's doctrine of predestination, was to be expected.‡ However, other Reformed communities had, from their very origin, much softened the doctrines of Calvin. Among these we may notice the Articles of the Anglican Church,§ while the Catechism of the Palatinate maintains silence upon the subject, and the Confession of the Marches positively declares against the decree of absolute predestination.‖

§ XIII.—Of the Catholic notion of justification.

The want of a deeper acquaintance with the usages of antiquity, particularly of a vivid insight into the spirit of its language, gave the outward occasion at least to a confusion in the notion attached to justification in Christ Jesus, and served strongly to confirm the obstacle which existed in the interior of minds, and prevented the entire appreciation, and comprehensive understanding, of this practical and fundamental doctrine of Christianity.

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* Confess. Gallic. c. xii. p. 115.

† Confess. Belg. c. xvi. p. 189. "Credimus, posteaquam tota Adam progenies sic in perditionem et exitium, primi hominis culpâ, præcipitata fuit, Deum se talem demonstrasse, qualis est; nimirum misericordem et justum;—misericordem quidem, eos ab hac perditione liberando et servando, quos æterno et immutabili suo consilio, pro gratuitâ suâ bonitate in Jesu Christo Domino nostro elegit et selegit, absque ullo operum eorum respectu: justum vero, reliquos in lapsû et perditione, in quam sese præcipitaverant, relinquendo."

‡ Synod. Dordrac. c. i. art. VI. seq. p. 303, seq.

§ Confess. Anglic. art. XVII. p. 132.

‖ The Scotch Confession (Art. VIII. p. 141) speaks a language extremely mild, such as a Catholic might employ. The Declaration of Thorn (Art. XVIII. p. 423), is doubtful. Confess. March. Art. XV. p. 383. The Hungarian Confession slurs very well over the matter, p. 252.

The ancients are wont to put the form, in which the inward essence outwardly manifests and reveals itself, for the inward spirit itself, because the latter, concealed in its form, is thus brought out. Hence, when in the Old Testament the justification of a man through and before God is represented in the form of a human and judicial act, and consequently of a mere outward acquittal and release, it is the grossest error, and a proof of entire ignorance of the ways of thinking, and modes of speech, among ancient nations, not to connect such expressions with the idea of an inward deliverance and discharge from evil. How much in the Protestant Church the style of the ancient world was misunderstood, we may perhaps most clearly discern from a passage in Gerhard, where he says, the whole act of justification is described only by expressions borrowed from judicial usage. For example: "judgment," Psalm cxliii.; "judge," John v. 27; "tribunal," Rom. xiv. 10; "accused," Rom. iii. 19; "accuser," John v. 45; "witness," Rom. ii. 15; "handwriting," Col. ii. 14; "advocate," 1 John ii. 1; "acquittal," Psalm xxxii. 1; etc.* Even the multitude of these, and similar expressions, should have inspired a certain caution, and have encouraged the idea, that they must have in part at least a figurative signification. Rarely, even in the Catholic Church, was the right view unfolded with perfect scientific exactness, and brought back by means of an accurate philology to its first principles.*

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* Gerhard, loci. theolog. Ed. Cotta, tom. iii. p. 6.

But though the true sense of the ancients might not be explained with the clearest scientific evidence, yet it was adhered to in life. The Church being connected by her origin with the close of the ancient world, the knowledge of the old modes of speech passed to her by a living and immediate contact, although this knowledge did not rise through the medium of reflection to abstract science. If St. Augustine says with reason, that the Old is but the New Testament still veiled, and the New the Old Testament unveiled, the true sense of the latter must evidently be better known to the Church than to the synagogue itself. The former imparted to the sense of the Old Testament, in the matter before us, a more appropriate form,—and this is the case with all the religious ideas, which the Church and the synagogue have in common,—in order that the unshackled spirit may show itself purer, and more transparent, and that the form may correspond to the matter. It is worthy of remark, that the Protestants conceive justification to be a thing chiefly external, and the Church to be a thing chiefly internal; so that, in either respect, they are unable to bring about a *permeation* of the inward and the outward. The one, however, determines the other; for, as they consider not justification to be internal, the Church, according to their system, could not become external. When justification is not the inmost property of man, it is then too weak to possess the power to produce a complete effect, and to throw out the invisible into the visible, and consequently to make the inward Church simultaneously and indubitably an outward one. Hence that painful oscillation between the invisible and the visible Church, because justification was not conceived to be an internal thing.

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* Bossuet (Exposition de la doctrine de l'Eglise Cathol. c. vi.) expresses himself thus briefly, according to the usual interpretation: "Comme l'Ecriture nous explique la remission de péchés, tantôt en disant que Dieu les couvre, et tantôt en disant, qu'il les ôte et qu'il les efface par la grâce du Saint Esprit, qui nous fait nouvelles créatures; nous croyons qu'il faut joindre ensemble ces expressions, pour former l'idée parfaite de la justification du pécheur." From the want of a deeper knowledge of the Oriental languages, spring so many strange and half explanations of scriptural passages, which were adduced by the Protestants against the Catholics, and vice versâ. One example may serve for many. Calvin, in his Instit. iii. 11, appealed to Rom. iv. 8, where from Psalm xxxi. the following passages are taken: "Blessed is he, whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered." "Blessed is the man, unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity." Now Calvin observes: "A complete definition of justification is either here given, or it is not: if it be complete, then justification consists merely in the forgiveness of sins, which is sufficiently explained by the words, cover and not impute.' To *justify*, means accordingly, to declare any one free from punishment, in despite of yet existing sin. But if by the mere covering and remission of guilt and sin, the notion of justification is not completed, how can it be said that he is blessed, whose sins are covered? Bellarmine now answers (De Justificatione, l. 11, c. 9), it is said: "Beati immaculati in viâ, qui ambulant in lege Domini;" and in Matthew, c. v. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, the clean of heart," &c.; and he asks, "If the description of the just man be complete, why is no mention made of the covering, and of mere forgiveness? If it be but an incomplete description, how are those called *Blessed*, who are only imperfectly just?" Then he adds: "Potest igitur ad omnes ejusmodi quæstiones responderi, non poni in his locis integram definitionem justificationis, aut beatitudinis; sed explicari solum aliquid, quod pertinet ad justificationem aut beatitudinem acquirendam:"—an excellent refutation of Calvin, without, however, being quite satisfactory in a scientific point of view.

The Council of Trent describes justification to be an exaltation from the state of sinfulness to that of grace, and of adoption of the children of God; that is to say, an annihilation of the union of the will with the sinful

Adam (a removal of original sin, and of every other sin committed before justification), and the contraction of fellowship with Christ, the Holy and the Just One,—a state which is, in a negative sense, that of remission of sin, and in a positive sense, that of sanctification.* The Council further represents justification as a renewal of the inward man, by means whereof we become really just,† as inherent (*inhærens*) in the believer, and as a restoration of the primeval state of humanity. On this account, the same synod observes, that, by the act of justification, Faith, Hope, and Charity, are infused into the heart of man; and that it is only in this way he is truly united with Christ, and becometh a living member of his body.‡ In other words, justification is considered to be sanctification and forgiveness of sins, as the latter is involved in the former, and the former in the latter: it is considered an infusion of the love of God into our hearts, through the Holy Spirit; and the interior state of the justified man is regarded as holy feeling,—as a sanctified inclination of the will, —as habitual pleasure and joy in the Divine law,—as a decided and active disposition to fulfil the same in all the occurrences of life,—in short, as a way of feeling, which is in itself acceptable and well-pleasing to God. When God declares man to be just and well-pleasing to Him, he really is so.*

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* Concil. Trid. Sess. vi. c. 5. "Quibus verbis justificationis impii descriptio insinuatur, ut sit translatio ab eo statû, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adæ, in statum gratiæ et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam Jesum Christum, salvatorem nostrum."

† L. c. c. vii. "Quæ (justificatio) non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum; unde homo ex injusto fit justus," etc.

‡ L. c. c. vii. "Quamquam nemo possit esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur; id tamen in hâc impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito per Spiritum Sanctum charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret: unde in ipsâ justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accipit per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, per fidem, spem et charitatem. Nam fides, nisi ad eam spes accedat et charitas, neque unit perfecte cum Christo, neque corporis ejus vivum membrum efficit."

The Scriptural word *Grace* hath several significations; but not rarely corresponding to it is the German expression, "*gnädige, wohlwollende, huldvolle Gesinnung*,"—a gracious, benevolent, condescending feeling, towards any one: this signification is the basis of all the others; nay, it is, if we will, the only one. But if the question be as to the application of Divine grace towards men, especially sinners, then this feeling is by no means a mere quiescent one, but the condescending will becomes at once an act; is life, and engenders life; so that the grace of God, extended spiritually to the dead, calleth them back to life: the grace of God is sanctifying.

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* It may be useful to lay before the reader some descriptions of justification, to enable him, amid the variety of expression, to recognize the unity of idea. Thom. Aq. Prima Sec. q. cxiii. art. I. et art. VI.: "Justificatio importat transmutationem de statu injustitiæ ad statum justitiæ prædictæ." But justice he had described as "rectitudinem quandam ordinis in ipsa interiori dispositione hominis, prout supremum hominis subditur Deo, et inferiores vires animæ subduntur supremæ, sc. rationi." Bellarm. de justificatione, lib. ii. c. vi. "Justificatio sine dubio motus quidam est de peccato ad justitiam, et nomen accipit a termino, ad quem ducit, ut omnes alii similes motus, illuminatio, calefactio, et cæteri: non igitur potest intelligi vera justificatio, nisi aliqua præter remissionem peccati justitia acquiratur. Quemadmodum nec vera erit illuminatio, nec vera calefactio, si tenebris fugatis vel frigore depulso, nulla lux, nullusque calor in subjecto corpore subsequatur." St. Augustine says (de Spiritû et lit. c. 17): "Ibi [among the Jews] lex extrinsecus posita est quâ injusti terrerentur, hic [in Christianity] intrinsecus data est, quâ justificarentur." On this observes Bellarmine: "Quo loco dicit (Augustinus), hominem justificari per legem scriptam in cordibus, quæ, ut ipse ibidem explicat, nihil est aliud, nisi charitas Dei diffusa in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis." lib. ii. c. vii. Bellarmine continues: "Itaque per justitiam, quâ justificamur, intelligitur fides et charitas, quæ est ipsa facultas bene operandi." Pallavicini says (lib. viii. c. 4, p. 259), "Consenserunt omnes [at Trent] de nominis significatione, justificationem, scilicet, esse transitum à statû inimici ad statum amici, filiique Dei adoptivi."

As little can it be disputed, that the words, "justify," "rechtfertigen," "δικαιοῦν," "justificare," signify also to acquit. This signification is used when we speak of just or innocent men, who have been acquitted by their judges, of the charges brought against them; who, after enquiry instituted, have been pronounced to be what they are—guiltless. This sense, in the matter under consideration, is inadmissible, because the question is not about just and innocent men, who have been wickedly brought before the judicial tribunal, but about men really and truly guilty, and unrighteous. Here we see the real signification of the Greek word above-adduced, and of the corresponding Hebrew and Latin words, namely, "to make just." The absolving and acquitting word—the word which forgives sin—is a power truly emancipating, dissolving the bonds of evil, and extirpating sin; so that, in the room of darkness, light is admitted: death gives way before life, and despair yields to hope. Hence the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake, is undoubtedly a remission of the guilt and the punishment, which he hath taken and borne upon himself; but it is *likewise* the transfusion of his spirit to us, so that we enter into a *full* vital communion with the second Adam, in like manner as we had with the first.

There can be no doubt, that the transition from the life of the flesh to the life of the spirit, as above described, cannot ordinarily be sudden; that, on the contrary, the substitution of the latter for the former must be represented as the final term of many preliminary stages in the history of the internal man.* The act of justification, indeed, fills up only one portion of time; for the communication of a vital principle cannot be considered other than as consummated in a single moment.† However, the development of the same may be subjected to a succession of periods. Susceptibility for the act of Divine justification is dependent on a series of preliminary, mutually qualifying emotions, in the interior man. From the period wherein our faculties of discernment have clung with undoubting firmness to revealed truths, the struggling soul moves on through fear and hope, through grief and intuitive love, through struggle and victory, up to that happy moment, where all its better energies, hitherto dissipated, unite under the impulse of a higher power, for obtaining a decisive conquest; where, by the full infusion of the Holy Spirit, the union with Christ is consummated, and we belong wholly to him, and he again joyfully recognizes himself in us. In other words; in order that man may be completely adopted by God in the place of a child, or be justified, He requires on the part of man, a gradually preparatory susceptibility. Hence we may clearly see how singular is the objection urged by Protestants, that the acts preparatory to the great act of justification, indicate a Pelagian tendency in the whole Catholic system.* Because, according to our doctrine, so much must be endured and wrought, so much must be consummated in the spirit, ere the one great divine act can ensue, they think we must needs believe, that, by that preliminary spiritual action and suffering, the fulness of God's grace is merited. It is, however, far otherwise. The history of regeneration forms one great whole, most intimately united in all its parts, so that the third and fourth grade cannot be made, till the first and the second have been passed.

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* Bellarmin. de justif. lib. i. c. 13. "Quos enim diligit (Deus), *primum* vocat ad fidem, *tunc* spem et timorem et dilectionem inchoatam inspirat, postremo justificat, et perfectam charitatem infundit."

† Dun Scotus (l. iv. Sent. dist. i. p. 8) says, justication is momentary: "Quia non est successio in inductione alicujus formæ, nisi penes partes mobiles, vel penes partes ipsius formæ." Compare my work, *New Investigations* (in German), second edition, p. 206.

As divine grace can alone impart the power for the execution of the first step,—and it is so with all the others, as, accordingly, all parts of the great whole are determined by higher aid, and consequently are a work of Divine favour,—it follows, that what holds good of the parts, must hold good of the whole. Without human exertion, indeed, the first motion of our spirit cannot be made, precisely because it must move itself. It is so with the second and third motion. In other words, without human agency, God can produce in man no faith, no fear, no germ of love, no hope, no repentance, and, therefore, not the real justification determined by them. But does it follow, that, because the Catholic believes this, he must also believe, that God communicates, *on this account*, his further manifestations of grace, because man had not refused his cooperation to the earlier ones? The notion of a necessary preliminary condition to a thing, is here confounded with the cause of that thing itself.

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* Chemnit. Exam. Concil. Trid. part I. p. 281; Gerhard loc. tom. vii. p. 221. (loc. xvii. c. 3, sect. v.) That to him, who has been prepared by faith and fear, by hope and contrition, God doth (through baptism) impart the sanctifying grace, the best schoolmen term, not without reason, a *meritum de congruo*, but not a *meritum de condigno*.

In order, however, to complete the Catholic theory of justification, we must, according to the Council of Trent, subjoin two observations. In the first place, the Catholic Church does not dispute, that even in the justified man, notwithstanding that original sin, together with all actual sin, has been forgiven him, and has been obliterated from his soul, there still subsists a perverse sensuality (*concupiscentia*). Yet it is taught that this *in itself* is no sin, and that, if it occurs in Holy Writ under this denomination, it is only because it appears as a consequence of sin, and leads again to real sin, when the will hearkens to its suggestions. The Council saith: "God hateth nought in the regenerated, because nothing is damnable in those who have been truly buried with Christ in baptism, who walk not according to the flesh, but, putting off the old man, put on the new, created after God, and are become innocent, immaculate, pure, and pleasing unto God, heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs with Christ, so that nothing hindereth their entrance into heaven. That, however, concupiscence, or the stimulus to sin, remains in the baptized, the holy Council avows and acknowledges; but as this stimulus is left for our trial, it is unable to injure those who will not consent, but who resist victoriously by the grace of Christ: for he is not crowned except he strive lawfully."*

As the Catholic Church deduces original sin, and with it all evil in the world, in the last degree, from the abuse of free-will, it cannot find any further traces of sin in man, so soon as his spirit has been averted from the creature, and hath turned to God; so soon as his will hath been again healed, and his inmost feelings been sanctified. By the inborn evil, and by that habit of sin which hath grown out of it, and hath become more or less inveterate, more or less confirmed, a mechanical readiness to incline towards sin hath been engendered in the body and the inferior faculties of the soul. The new bent of the will, therefore, cannot immediately draw into its orbit the movements of the soul and the body. But since, to those regenerated in spirit, such emotions are alien, and even an abomination; since the spirit and the flesh are completely severed one from the other; since they are involved in a decisive, and, for the former, a victorious struggle; so most certainly a carnal emotion in conflict with the will, yet mastered by it, cannot contaminate it, and therefore not convict it of sin. If the will give not in to the desires of the flesh, or the desires of the flesh reach not the will; if, accordingly, there be no consent, then there is no sin.* Thus evil, and (in the strict sense of the word) the sinfulness in concupiscence, is removed, as it is driven back from the inward to the outward man, in whom it survives as the consequence and the chastisement of sin, and withal as a temptation, which may conduce either to the more exalted glorification of the soul, or to its relapse into the deepest fall. In the former case, it summons us to struggle and to victory, and to the confirmation and expansion of virtue; in the latter, it can easily surprise the inattentive, and draw him into its toils, or penetrate into his inmost soul.

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* L. c. Sess. v. decret. de peccato originali.

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* Bellarmin. de amiss. grat. et statû peccati, lib. v. c. 5, tom. iv. p. 278. "Tota controversia est, utrum corruptio naturæ ac præsertim concupiscentia per se et ex naturâ suâ, qualis etiam in baptizatis ac justificatis est, sit proprie peccatum originis. Id enim adversarii contendunt, catholici autem negant; quippe qui sanatâ voluntate per gratiam justificantem docent reliquos morbos non solum non constituere homines reos, sed neque posse constituere, cum non habeant veram peccati rationem. Addit Thomas Aquinas in solâ aversione mentis à Deo consistere proprie et formaliter peccatum originis, in rebellione autem partis inferioris, qui fuit effectus rebellionis mentis à Deo, non consistere peccatum, nisi materialiter."

But that gap which, in consequence of regeneration, is established between the interior, now sanctified, man, and the outward man, is by no means a fixed, immutable separation. On the contrary, in the believer, faithfully cooperating with sanctifying grace, it is in a state of constant decrease, and gradual declension; for the continued exercise of virtue, and the ever more and more powerful development of the divine principle of life thereby occasioned, restore the harmony of all the parts of man in his new course, with a constant, though not always perceptible, increase (although, without the extraordinary interposition of a higher power, that harmony in this life is never perfect);* so that man's inferior faculties learn to move in progressive unison with the sanctified spirit, and have a share in its glorification, as they had before moved in accord with the unholy spirit, and participated in its dissonance. However, the regenerated man looks anxiously for deliverance from the body, not in order to be then only freed from any sinful inclination of the will, but to be delivered from trial, and the fear of trial.

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* The Council of Vienna (in the lib. v. Clement. tit. de hæret.) has pronounced against the Beguards what Pope Innocent XI. repeated against Michael Molinos. He condemned, in his bull, the following propositions: "No. 55. Per hanc viam internam pervenitur ad purgandas et distinguendas omnes animæ passiones, ita quod nihil amplius sentitur, nihil, nihil. No. 56. Duæ leges et duæ cupiditates, anima una, et amoris proprii altera, tamdiu perdurant, quamdiu perdurat amor proprius, unde quando purgatus est et mortuus, ut fit per viam internam, non adsunt amplius duæ illæ leges, nec aliquid sentitur amplius." A doctrine of this kind is ever connected with the other, that at this grade of the spiritual life a fall is no longer possible. Hence the following propositions of the Quietists are rejected:—"No. 61. Anima, quum ad mortem mysticam pervenit, *non potest* amplius velle aliud, quam quod Deus vult, quia non habet amplius voluntatem, et Deus eam illi abstulit." No. 63. "Per viam internam

The second observation which we have to make, is, that, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, the just man can never hold himself quite free from the so-called venial sins, and transgresses in divers ways, and therefore it is not without reason that he daily, in the Lord's prayer, prays for forgiveness of sins. As the will of the regenerated, however, is not thereby alienated from God, and His holy law which he loves; and as such transgressions proceed more from the infirmity of the new man, than from any remnant of perverseness in the will, sins of this nature occasion no interruption in the newly established relations with God; and internal justification, therefore, according to Bossuet's expression, appears not untrue, though it be not perfect. But this infirmity requires us in every instance to observe constant self-watchfulness, and to practice uninterrupted prayer for obtaining Divine grace, and increase of sanctification.*

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pervenitur ad statum continuum, immobilem in pace imperturbabili." Compare my work, *New Investigations* (in German), second edition, p. 211.

* Concil. Trid. Sess. VI. can. 11. "Si quis hominem semel justificatum dixerit amplius peccare non posse, neque gratiam amittere, atque ideo eum, qui labitur et peccat, nunquam vere fuisse justificatum, *aut contra*, posse in totam vitam peccata omnia, etiam venialia vitare nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio......anathema sit."

§ XIV.—Doctrine of the Protestants on justification and sanctification.

The notions which the Protestants form of justification, is thus briefly defined in the Formulary of Concord: "The word 'justification' signifies, the declaring any one just, the acquitting him of sins, and the eternal chastisements of sin, on account of the justice of Christ, which is by God imputed to faith;"* and it expressly says, our justice is *not of us*.† With these declarations Calvin perfectly coincides.‡ Justification, in the Protestant sense, is a judicial act of God, whereby the believing sinner is delivered from the punishments of sin, but not from sin itself: while Catholics teach that, on one hand, the remission of sin, the debt as well as the penalty, and on the other hand, positive sanctification, follows in a like way, through the divine act of justification. The great difference between the Confessions consists, accordingly, in this,—that, according to the Catholic doctrine, the justice of Christ, in the act of justification, is immediately appropriated by the believer, becoming part of his inward self, and changing his whole moral existence; while, according to the Protestant system, justice remains in Christ, passes not into the inward life of the believer, and remains in a purely outward relation to him; covering his injustice, not only past, but still outstanding, since by justification the will is not healed. We therefore may say,—according to Catholic principles, Christ, by justification, stamps inwardly and outwardly his living impress on the believer; so that the latter, though a feeble and imperfect, becometh yet a real, copy of the type. On the other hand, according to the Protestant doctrine, Christ casts on the believer his shadow only, under which his continued sinfulness is merely not observed by God. Hence the explicit remark of the Formulary of Concord, that the faithful, on account of the obedience of Christ, are looked upon as just, although by virtue of corrupt nature they be truly sinners, and remain such even unto death.*

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* Solid. declar. iii. de fid. justif. § 11. p. 655. "Vocabulum justificationis in hoc negotio significat, justum pronuntiare, a peccatis et æternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere propter justitiam Christi, quæ a Deo fidei imputatur."

† L. c. § 48, p. 664. "Cum igitur in ecclesiis nostris apud theologos Augustanæ Confessionis extra controversiam positum sit, totam justitiam nostram extra nos esse......quærendam, eamque in solo Domino nostro Jesu Christo consistere," etc.

‡ Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 11, § 2, fol. 260. "Ita nos justificationem simpliciter interpretamur acceptionem, quâ nos Deus in receptos pro justis habet. Eam in peccatorum remissione ac justitiæ Christi imputatione positam esse dicimus." § 3: "Ut pro justis in Christo censeamur, qui in nobis non sumus."

These avowals prove of themselves, that the Protestants have adopted those notions of grace and justification, which we pointed out above (§ XIII.), as one-sided and erroneous. But the opposition between the Confessions, in this matter, derives a stronger illustration from considering the following points, which show the wide practical consequences of this opposition. Concupiscence, which, as Catholics avow, still remains after justification, the mere incitement to sin, is represented by Protestants as sin in itself, and indeed as the yet subsisting original sin; while the distinction between the mere feeling of that incitement to sin and the consent to the same, is rejected by them as unessential, nay, as untrue. It is precisely on this gound that they rest the assertion, that justification consists in the mere declaration of the remission of sin, not in the purification from sin itself, because original sin still subsists, and adheres even to the will. In like manner it is asserted, that between venial and mortal sin there is no internal and essential difference; for (so the Protestants teach), all sins, in themselves, whatever be their nature, accuse man in a like degree before the tribunal of God: all merit (eternal) death. Faith in the merits of Christ, according to them, constitutes the only decisive distinction between sinners in the eyes of God. When man believes, and so long as he believes, *all* his sins, so they teach, are mere venial sins; as on the other hand, without this faith none of his sins can be pardoned; for, in reality, unbelief is the only sin.

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* Solid. declar. iii. de fid. justif. § 15, p. 657. "Per fidem propter obedientiam Christi justi pronunciantur et reputantur, etiamsi ratione corruptæ naturæ suæ adhuc sint, maneantque peccatores, dum mortale hoc corpus circumferunt."

These most astounding maxims involve in themselves the following consequences. If the justified man, *considered in himself*, be as much a sinner and as damnable as the unjust man, then no internal and essential difference, *as to moral being*, is recognized between the converted and the unconverted; the scriptural antitheses of the old and the new man, of the old and the new life, of the new creation, of the first birth, and of regeneration, lose not only their point, but in a great degree, their *moral signification* (§ 29); the notion of penance, whereby the transition from the one state to the other is brought about, must be conceived in a one-sided, nay, totally mistaken sense (§ 33); and the impressive language of Holy Writ, respecting the deliverance from sin wrought through Christ, and the mortification (eradication) of sin in believers (Rom. vi. viii. 1-4) is then nothing more than unmeaning bombast, nay, the occasion of the most deplorable and ridiculous self-delusion. But the ulterior consequences of the doctrine, that, in those who believe in the merits of Christ, all distinction between venial and mortal sins is effaced, will in a subsequent part of this work (§ XVI.) be made fully manifest. Here we shall cite some passages that will show, to what subversion of morality a system leads, that will make no essential distinction between the feeling of the incitement to sin, and the wilful consent to the same. As the former, as long as we live, is unavoidable, so the latter is represented to be simultaneous with it ; and from this point of view of moral worthiness, the deed is made to be not more punishable than the most involuntary sensual enticement to the same. Thus Melancthon appeals to the testimony of every Christian conscience, which saith to each one, that even the Christian has nothing less in his power, than his own heart, whose *entire* emotions are unclean.* Hence, the same Melancthon proposes to Catholics the question : Do not the saints seek their own interest ? and he is really of opinion, that the saint, the man truly justified before God, remains *necessarily* enslaved to vain glory, to avarice, and the like.† Luther speaks of wicked lust, avarice, anger, immodesty, adding a significant et cetera, which are all to be found in the just man.* Calvin, too, makes us acquainted with saints of this sort.† A singular saint, forsooth, who seeks his own interest, and not Christ's glory! Equally strange is the combination of ideas, when we are required to conceive an immodest or avaricious saint; for, according to the laws of logic, the predicate destroys the subject. Yet, what is the meaning of the words, when men speak of the covetousness, the avarice, the choler, and immodesty, of saints? Do they mean thereby a stimulus inserted in the flesh, which incites them indeed to works of the flesh, but at last wearies itself out in unsuccessful efforts? Then we cannot understand how such idle, unsuccessful temptations can be denominated covetousness, avarice, choler, and immodesty. But if we imagine this stimulus to be victorious over the will, or its impulse to be consummated into an outward act, how can the conquered be called saints and just ones? Rom. viii. 1-9, 13. Such a confusion of language hath its ground in the confusion of essentially different ideas; and we must marvel much, when the identifying of what is most distinct, nay, most opposite in notion and in language, fails to produce in life also a corresponding identification.

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* Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 18. "Christianus agnoscet, nihil minus in potestate suâ esse, quam cor suum," etc. Melancthon uses the word "cor" instead of "voluntas," because, according to him, man has really no will, but merely impulses and desires.

† L. c. p. 138. "Annon sua etiam quærunt sancti? Annon in sanctis amor est vitæ, gloriæ, securitatis, tranquillitatis, rerum?" Let the reader observe the singular identification of "amor gloriæ" and "securitatis, tranquillitatis," as if the latter were in itself as much as the former, which, a few lines lower, is further explained by the word κενοδοξία. But when Melancthon says, the Parisienses (the doctors of Sorbonne, as representatives of Catholic theology) did not look to the *affectus internos*, but directed their view to mere outward observances, so for this assertion he may answer at the tribunal of God.

Having spoken thus far of the Protestant system of justification, it remains for us to notice their view of sanctification; for it would be in the highest degree unjust, if we did not show, that, according to the Lutheran system, the renovation of sinful man, the moral change,—in a word, sanctification,—must attach to the confiding reception of the declaration of the forgiveness of sin. Man, conscious of so gracious, so unmerited a remission of sin, must, in thankful return for so great a benefit, earnestly strive to improve, and to observe, with ever greater fidelity, the commandments of God. In the justified man, according to the same system, original sin by the communication of the Holy Spirit is weakened, though not extirpated; and, in proportion as it is weakened, sanctification increases. Calvin, approximating to the Catholic view, goes even so far as to confess, that, as Christ cannot be divided, man in communion with Him must partake at once of justification and sanctification. Thus, whosoever is received by God into His grace, possesses thereby the spirit of the Sonship, through whose power the transformation into the likeness of God ensues.* Pleasing as it is to witness this improvement in doctrine, and closely as it is connected with Calvin's representation of original sin, and his description of the process of regeneration; yet an essential difference will ever be found between the two systems, Catholic and Protestant, including, under the latter, the Calvinistic view. For since a mere weakening, not an extirpation, of original sin is admitted, no essential *moral* difference, but a mere *gradual* one, can then be maintained between the old and the new man: but this is as much opposed to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as it is to the dignity of Christianity, to the notion of a new principal of life communicated by it, which in consequence supersedes the old one, and to the most explicit declarations of Scripture. If the influence of Christ over man were merely confined to this, that the latter was a somewhat morally better, not quite a morally different, man from the heathen, then, in a strict sense, it were impossible to speak of sanctification; for both the Heathen and the Christian would, in their inward life, be like, and differ only in their degree of discipline. The Catholic Church, above all things, insists on a radical internal change. Moreover the difference consists in this, that with the Protestant the external relation to Christ is by far the most important thing; so that at this point of his spiritual life he can calmly sit down, and, without advancing a step further, be assured of eternal felicity; since, by what the Reformers call justification, his sins have been once forgiven, and, at the same time, the gates of heaven opened to him;* while the Catholic can obtain the forgiveness of his sins only when he abandons them, and in his view the justified man,—the man acceptable to God,—is identical in every respect with the sanctified. Even with Calvin, forgiveness of sins is *quite abstractedly* the only ground for hope of salvation; and if he at length has penetration to perceive, that justification and sanctification cannot be separated in the interior life, he yet divides them in his theory, and deduces from one and the same thing different effects; since he says, that it is only by the declaration of God remitting sins, that righteousness is acquired, and not by any sanctifying power, which, together with the consciousness of such a remission, has been imparted. Hence it follows, that even a minimum of real improvement,—without which, according to Calvin, the certainty of being favoured with grace cannot take place,—would entirely suffice for salvation.

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* Interpretation of the Epistle to the Galatians. Wittenberg, 1556. Part I. p. 202, b.

† Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 3, § 10, fol. 213. Yet his language is much milder.

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* Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 11, § 6. Compare Calvin. Antidot. in Concil. Trid. opusc. p. 702. "Neque tamen interea negandum est quâ ratione (juxta quorumdam opinionem), per solam quidem fidem coram Deo justificatur; sed tamen ita, ut absque operibus salutem æternam consequi impossibile sit." Thus, with justification without works, salvation without works is promised.

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* Calvin (Instit. lib. iii. c. 11, § 15) first attacks Peter Lombard, whose doctrine he thus states: "Primum, inquit, mors Christi nos justificat, dum per eam excitetur charitas in cordibus nostris, quâ justi efficimur: deinde quod per eamdem extinctum est peccatum."…… ….He then turns against Augustine: "Ac ne Augustini quidem sententia recipienda est. Tametsi enim egregie hominem omni justitiæ laude spoliat,……gratiam tamen ad justificationem refert, quâ in vitæ novitatem per spiritum regeneramur." Hereupon he says: "Scriptura autem, cum de fidei justitiâ loquitur, longe alio nos ducit." At last he concludes (§ 21): "Ut talis justitia uno verbo appellari queat peccatorum remissio."

To this statement of doctrines it will be well to subjoin some remarks, directed towards a deeper scientific appreciation of the Lutheran system. The point to which we would here particularly direct attention, is the fact how well the doctrine of original sin couples with that of justification; how well the one prepares the way for the other! The former was so deeply engraven in the essence of man, that the latter cannot extend beyond his surface. If original sin had been represented as so destructive to man, in order thereby to exalt the power of Christianity, so that it could be said, "Behold, though original sin had sunk so deep into the inmost core of human existence, yet Christianity sinks still more deeply; it penetrates into the lowest depths of the soul, and works healingly, and creates anew; if the power of the evil principle be great, that of the good principle is still greater;" then this mistaken view of original sin ought to have been entirely excused as a theoretical error. But now it is taught, its ravages are so frightful, that they remain in the will, even of the regenerated: the disease under which we labour is so malignant, that we cannot be radically cured of it; and, as we cannot, so we need not be. Hence Christ, our righteousness, is out of us: the unrighteousness in the old Adam is within us; the righteousness in the new Adam out of us.

Moreover, the essence of original sin, according to Luther's expression, recurs very evidently here. If Catholics teach, that it is only in the case where the solicitation to sin, proceeding from the flesh, is with full consciousness entertained, and consented to by the will, that the real character of sin appears, so the Lutherans and Calvinists, with unexampled obstinacy, assert, that that solicitation, even when repelled with decided resistance, is in itself sinful. Let us weigh this doctrine well, and enquire, whether evil be not then considered as something existing apart, independent of the will, and extraneous to it, and be not regarded as an essence? What else can be meant, when it is said, something evil in itself remains in man, and is yet evil, even when the will resists and overcomes it? Here the sinfulness, certainly, lies no longer in a perverted bent of the will, because the will, in this instance, cannot be perverted; and yet sin, that is to say, original sin, is still in man. This is strikingly corroborated by the assertion, that we can be then only liberated from sin, when we have put off our dear "*corpusculum*."* This assuredly is to conceive sin as something very substantial!

And yet it is uncommonly difficult to conceive, how Luther should have regarded sin as really something, which, in the strict sense of the word, was an evil essence. Perhaps the following considerations may enable us to understand Luther better than he understood himself. Two facts above all are very remarkable. In the first place, it is asserted of God, that He conceals from His eye the sins of believers, or regards these as just, though they be not so. Now, it is very difficult to imagine, how God can view anything other than as it is in itself; or how a really unjust man can be accepted as just by an omniscient Deity. If we would do justice to Divine omniscience, no alternative remains but to suppose, that what is looked upon by man as sin, is really none in the eyes of God, and is a mere consequence of human finiteness; and in this way we can comprehend the security, which is felt in the faith in a mere outward justification. That something of this sort lies concealed in the back-ground of the minds of those who adopt this view of justification, is strongly confirmed by the second fact, to which we must now draw attention. The act of justification, and the whole work of regeneration, are represented as the doing of God alone.* Now, it must afford ample matter for astonishment, that God, who is here the exclusive agent, should not entirely pervade His own work, and extirpate the very roots of sin, and exert His unshackled might in all its splendour. Man, whose conduct is entirely passive during this process of justification, could yet be entirely transformed. Wherefore does not this change occur? We are compelled to recur to the same thought which we expressed above, though in a somewhat altered form; to wit,—that sin is an essential condition in the original constitution of man, and, being thus necessary, is therefore not imputed to us by God. For the observation of Calvin,—who seems to have felt the revolting nature of the theory, that God is the exclusive agent in regeneration, without being withal the thorough agent,—the observation of Calvin, that this defective influence was grounded in the motive of God, to be able to summon before His tribunal men at every moment of their lives, cannot seriously satisfy any one.* Calvin should have called to his aid his absolute necessity of all occurrences, as an explanation ready at hand. This necessity of sinning, in the present stage of human existence, is, then, the true ground of this theory, and of the possibility of that profound tranquillity in a state of continued sinfulness,—though such never entered into the minds of the Reformers. At least, no other speculative notion of the Protestant account of original sin, considered in connexion with the doctrine of justification, can be established.

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* Solid. Declar. de fid. justif. § 7, p. 686. "Dum hoc mortale corpusculum circumferunt, vetus Adam in ipsâ naturâ omnibus illius interioribus et exterioribus viribus inhæret."

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* Solid. Declar. ii. de lib. arbit. § 44, p. 645. "Tantum boni, et tamdiu bonum operatur, quantum et quamdiu a Spiritû Dei impellitur." Far other is the belief of the Catholic, who knows that the Divine Spirit ever urges man on, but that man will often not let himself be so urged, and, by his own fault, will not correspond to the divine impulse.

Luther, accordingly, did not express himself well, when he said, *original sin is a part of man's essence;*—he should have said, *sin cleaves necessarily to the essence of man.* Thus did the dogmatic decisions of Luther and Calvin against human freedom meet the vengeance due to them: and though they had so much enlarged on the magnitude of sin, yet, in consequence of the relation to man, wherein they placed the

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* Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. ii. § 11, fol. 169. "Nam hoc secundum (Reformationem in vitæ novitatem) sic inchoat Deus in electis suis, totoque vitæ curriculo paullatim, et interdum lente in eo progreditur, ut semper obnoxii sint ad ejus tribunal mortis judicio." Here progress in good is made to depend on God alone, and the cause of retrogression in the path of virtue deliberately referred to the Deity.

Deity, they were at last compelled, in despite of themselves, to deny the very existence of sin. What they taught as to the origin of evil, manifests itself again in this matter; and, even in the Lutheran system, the consequences of that doctrine remained, though the doctrine itself the Lutherans rejected. It is far otherwise, as we have above said, in the Catholic Church. Because she clings so firmly, and with such a bleeding heart, to the truth, that it is only in freedom that the ultimate cause of sin is to be sought for;—for this very reason, she can, she must, likewise maintain a real redemption from sin.

ON JUSTIFYING FAITH.

§ xv.—Catholic view of this subject.

The doctrine of justifying faith experienced the same fate as all the other fundamental doctrines of Christianity. For fifteen hundred years, Christians had lived in and by that faith, had formed many intellectual conceptions upon it, and had laid down the same in numerous writings, but had withal felt much deeper things than could be comprehended in notions, or defined by words. Yet, in default of an erroneous view of that faith decisively put forth, and asserted by many, men were as far from arriving at a truly sifting point, and at the highest degree of evidence upon the matter, as, before Arius, upon the doctrine of Christ's divinity, and before Pelagius, upon that of Grace. Hence it happened, that, in the same way as in the above-named articles of faith, much that was obscure, much that was self-contradictory, was found among Christian writers before the Nicene Council and the African and the Gallic Synods, so it proved in the various expositions of justifying faith, prior to the general Council of Trent; and it became the great and earnest, as well as astonishing task of its assembled Fathers, to define the pure truth, and separate it from the dross of error.* As Arius and Pelagius, men widely different in character from Luther, and far his inferiors, did not draw their opinions from their own fancy, but only embraced with warmth, and developed to the fullest extent, obscure conceptions here and there current; so Luther merely adhered to some opinions that had previously been started, as we learn from that celebrated Confession delivered by him before the breaking out of the Reformation. In opposition to his teaching, the Church exalted now to the highest degree of certainty, what, from her origin, had been taught perpetually and universally, established this in the form of a dogma, and separated it from mere individual opinions.

Some of the theologians assembled at Trent applied themselves, especially, to determine the nature of the opposition which St. Paul establishes between non-justifying works and justifying faith. The bishops of Agatha and Lanciano, showed, at great length, that Paul merely disputes the justifying power of those works, which precede faith, and, accordingly, spring not out of it.† In conformity with this opinion, the bishop Cornelius Mussus observed, that the apostle denies merely the value of the exterior part of the works; for instance, Abraham was not acceptable to God, merely because he offered up his son in sacrifice, or performed other like actions, but he became so by the inward exercise of faith and other virtues, connected with a sanctified course of will proceeding from faith, and manifesting itself actively in good works.* Very rightly was it said, that Paul had not in view the works of a man sanctified in Christ, and excluded these from consideration, when he denied to works, in opposition to faith, the power of rendering us acceptable to God. In other words,—they observed, that Paul opposed to the old, unsatisfactory, legal order of things, the new way of salvation pointed out by God, and attributed only to the living adherence to the same (πίστις), the power of making us pleasing unto the Deity.

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* Pallavic. Hist. Conc. Trid. lib. viii. c. 4, n. 18, p. 262. "Ingens omnes incesserat cura explicandi effatum apostoli, hominem justificari per fidem."

† Pallavic. l. c. n. 13, p. 261.

These definitions were, however, of a more negative kind; the following are more positive in their nature. That faith in Christ justifies, observes another theologian, signifies as much, as that faith is the necessary root, from which all spiritual actions, agreeable to God, spring forth; so that consummate righteousness is not conferred by faith, immediately and in itself, but only in its ulterior development. And Claudius Jajus added, with as much brevity as truth,—through faith is the grace given to us, not to be absolutely acceptable to God, but to enable us to become so; and this observation Bertonus illustrated, by remarking that Paul did not say, that man is justified *by* faith, but *through* faith; for our righteousness is not faith itself, but in the latter is the power given to us to acquire the same. (John i. 12.)† An expression of Bernard Diaz is also worthy of mention. This theologian observed, that the justifying power is on this account ascribed to faith,—because it raises us from our native lowliness

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* Pallavic. l. c. n. 14, p. 261.

† Ibid. n. 3, p. 260.

(our earthward views), and consists in certain movements, which transport us to a grade of spiritual life, exalted above natural existence; so that we may be considered by God as having entered on the way to acquire His approval (by attachment to Christ).*

All these definitions express, only in various ways, one and the same thing, which the Council of Trent approves, when it says: "Faith is the beginning of all salvation,—the basis and the root of all justification; for, without it, it is impossible to please God, and to attain to His adoption."† Thus is faith *the beginning* of salvation; but yet not a beginning which, during this period of life, can be again abandoned, after important progress hath been made; for it is likewise the permanent *ground-work,* whereon the whole structure of salvation is erected: yet is it not a mere substratum, standing in no immediate organic connexion with the superincumbent parts; for it is the *root* of justification. To its power and activity is attributed the justifying grace, the new vital principle, transforming man from an enemy, into a friend of God; divine love, in a word; (*fides impetrat justificationem,* say the schoolmen), although faith does not merit even this grace. A real definition of faith, however, the Council of Trent has not given: such a one is found in the Roman catechism, when it says: "The word 'faith' signifies not so much the act of thinking, or opining, but it has the sense of a firm obligation (contracted in virtue of a free act of submission), whereby the mind decisively and permanently assents to the mysteries revealed by God."* Catholics consider faith as the reunion with God in Christ, especially by means of the faculties of knowledge, illuminated and confirmed by grace, with which the excitement of various feelings is more or less connected. It is, in their estimation, a divine light, whereby man discerns, as well as recognizes, the decrees of God, and comprehends not only what God is to man, but also what man should be to God.

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* L. c. n. 16, p. 262. "Ideo dici hominem per fidem justificari, quod hæc ex humilitate nativa nos attollit, motusque quosdam super conditionem naturæ nobis imprimit, efficitque ut a Deo respiciamur ceu iter justitiæ jam ingressi."

† Concil. Trid. Sess. VI. c. viii. "*Quomodo intelligitur, impium per fidem, et gratis justificari.* Cum vero apostolus dicit, justificari hominem per fidem, et gratis; ea verba in eo sensu intelligenda sunt, quem perpetuus ecclesiæ Catholicæ consensus tenuit, et expressit; ut scilicet per fidem ideo justificari dicamur, quia fides est humanæ salutis initium, fundamentum et radix omnis justificationis: sine quâ impossibile est placere Deo, et ad filiorum ejus consortium pervenire: gratis autem justificari ideo dicamur, quia nihil eorum, quæ justificationem præcedunt, sive fides, sive opera, ipsam justificationis gratiam promeretur. Si enim gratia est, jam non ex operibus: alioquin, ut idem apostolus inquit, gratia non est gratia."

As justification now, in the Catholic sense, consists in a total change of the whole inward man, we can understand why the Catholic Church should so urgently insist, that faith alone doth not justify before God; that it is rather only the first subjective, indispensable condition to be justified; the root from which God's approval must spring; the first title, whereon we can establish our claim of divine filiation. But if faith passes from the understanding, and the feelings, excited through the understanding, to the will; if it pervades, vivifies, and fructifies the will, through the new vital principle imparted to the latter, and engenders, in this way, the new man created after God; or (to make use of the expression of Seripandus at the Council of Trent),* if love is enkindled out of faith, as fire out of brimstone, then, only after faith and love doth regeneration or justification ensue.

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* Catechism. Conc. Trid. p. 17. "Igitur credendi vox hoc loco putare, existimare, opinari, non significat, sed ut docent sacræ literæ, certissimæ assensionis vim habet, quâ mens Deo sua mysteria aperienti firme constanterque assentitur....... Deus enim, qui dixit, de tenebris lumen splendescere, ipse illuxit in cordibus nostris, ut non sit nobis opertum Evangelium, sicut iis, qui pereunt."

Hence, the schools of the middle age recognized, likewise, a faith, whereof they said, that it alone justified; it is known by the designation of the *fides formata*, under which the schoolmen understood a faith, that had love in itself as its soul, its vivifying, its plastic principle *(forma)*; and on this account it was called *fides charitate formata, animata, fides viva, vivida.* This is that higher faith, which brings man into a real, vital communion with Christ, fills him with an infinite devotion to God, with the strongest confidence in Him, with the deepest humility and inmost love towards Him; liberates him from sin, and causes all creatures to be viewed and loved in God.

We shall take the liberty of quoting some passages, extolling this faith, from writings composed prior, as well as subsequent, to the Reformation. Thomas Aquinas, in answer to the question, whether we were delivered from sin through the sufferings of Christ, says: "Through faith we appropriate to ourselves the sufferings of Christ, so that we become partakers of the fruits of the same. (Romans, iii. 25.) But the faith, through which we are cleansed from sin, is not the unliving faith *(fides informis)*, which can co-exist with sin, but the faith living through love *(fides formata)*; so that the sufferings of Christ, not only by means of the understanding, but by means of feeling, become appropriated by us. In this way are sins forgiven us through the power of Christ's passion."*

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* Pallav. hist. Concil. Trid. lib. viii. c. 9, n. 6, p. 270. "Quemadmodum a sulphure ignis emicat, ita per eam (*fidem*), in nobis charitatem extemplo succendi. Quæ præceptorum observationem et salutem secum trahit."

Cardinal Nicholas, of Cusa, in one of his most intellectual writings,—that on religious peace, wherein he lays down principles for the union of all religions in one, observes: "Faith alone justifies;" but then he adds, "it must be full-formed faith *(fides formata)*, for without works it is dead."† More fully he explains his meaning, in one of his exhortations, to the following effect:‡ "It is love, the vivifying principle *(amor, qui*

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* Thom. Aquin. Summa. tot. theol. p. iii. quæst. xliv. art. i. edit. Thomæ a Vio. Lugd. 1580, vol. iii. p. 233. "Fides autem, per quam a peccato mundatur, non est fides informis, quæ potest esse etiam cum peccato, sed est fides formata per charitatem, ut sic passio Christi nobis applicetur, non solum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad affectum. Et per hunc etiam modum peccata dimittuntur ex virtute passionis Christi." Cf. q. cxiii. art. iv. "Motus fidei non est perfectus, nisi sit charitate informatus, unde simul in justificatione impii cum motû fidei est etiam motus charitatis; movetur autem liberum arbitrium in Deum ad hoc, quod ei se subjiciat, unde et concurrit actus timoris filialis et actus humilitatis," etc.

† Nicol. Cusan. de pace fidei Dial. op. edit. Basil. p. 876. "Vis igitur, Deum in Christo nobis benedictionem repromisisse vitæ æternæ?—Sic volo. Quapropter oportet credere Deo prout Abraham credidit, ut sic credens justificetur cum fideli Abraham, ad assequendam repromissionem in uno semine Abrahæ Christo Jesu, quæ repromissio est divina benedictio, omne bonum in se complicans.—Vis igitur, quod sola fides illa justificet ad perceptionem æternæ vitæ?... Oportet autem, quod fides sit formata, nam sine operibus est mortua."

‡ Nicol. Cusan. Excitat. lib. iv. opp. edit. Bas. 1565, p. 461. Confer. Pet. Lombard, lib. iii. dist. 23, c. 1, edit. 1516, p. 136. "Credere Deum est credendo amare, credendo in eum ire, credendo ei adhærere, et ejus membris incorporari; per hanc fidem justificatur impius, ut

est forma), which consummates faith and confidence; which seizes, upholds, and transforms the soul. From Christ redemption was desired, and he answered. Faith and confidence secure what is loved and wished for. For nothing is anxiously desired, save what we love; if thus the Redeemer be loved, he then redeems: love consequently redeems, for it is the love of the Redeemer. In love, accordingly, is the beloved object; hence, too, the beloved Redeemer is in love. For God is love; and he who abideth in love, abideth in God, and God in him. It is the consummate faith, or the consummate confidence, which we call the faith vivified by love *(fides charitate formata)*, whereof the Saviour saith, that it maketh us well-pleasing unto God. Thus he who knoweth Christ, and doth not approach him; or he who goeth towards him, but doth not enter into fellowship with him; or he who goeth towards him, and entereth into some fellowship with him, but doth not embrace him, and knit the ties of the closest fellowship with him, hath no part in redemption."

To the words of this theologian, we shall subjoin a passage from Bellarmine, who flourished nearly about the same length of time after the rise of Luther, as Nicholas of Cusa did before him. On that passage of Galatians v. 6: "For in Jesus Christ, neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by charity," he observes, in order that there may be no occasion for errors, the same apostle (St. Paul) declares what sort of faith he calls the justifying one, when he says: in Jesus Christ, neither circum-

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deinde ipsa fides incipiat per dilectionem operari; fides ergo, quam dæmones et falsi Christiani habent, qualitas mentis est, sed informis; quia sine charitate est."

cision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, that is to say, neither the law given to the Jews, nor the works of the Heathens, can render men acceptable before God, but only faith; yet not every faith, but solely that "which worketh by charity," to wit, the faith which is moved, shaped *(formatur)*, and vivified by charity. If love accordingly be the vivifying principle *(forma)* of faith; then, say the Catholics with reason, faith without love is dead *(informis)*; with love it is living *(formata)*.*

To this, we may add the explanations which a celebrated Catholic exegetist, at the commencement of the seventeenth century, has given on the 22nd verse of the third chapter of Romans. After the apostle has said, that, by the works of the law, no one is justified before God, he adds, a new path of salvation without the law has been now opened by God; to wit, through faith in Christ; so that all believers may become just. On the word "believers" Cornelius à Lapide now observes: "Those are meant, who are not contented with a mere naked, empty faith, such as the demons possess; but those, who, like friends, have a faith matured by love *(fides charitate formata)*, who believe in Christ in such a way, as to fulfil his commandments, who possess an humble, living and obedient faith; in short, who believe not merely theoretically, but practically, *(qui credunt non speculativè, sed practicè Christo)*."† This view presents itself so naturally to the unprejudiced enquirer, that Heinroth, for example, probably without having ever read a Catholic theologian, observed in his *Pisteodicea :* "Faith is the basis, but love is the principle, of a righteous life."*

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* Bellarm. de justif. lib. ii. c. 4, opp. tom. iv. p. 709.

† Cornelii a Lap. Comm. in omnes divi Pauli ep. Edit. Antverp. 1705, p. 57.

§ XVI.—Lutheran and Calvinistic view of faith.

As we now proceed to unfold the Protestant view of faith, it will be desirable in the first place, in order to throw the clearest light on this obscure point, to make our readers acquainted with the position wherein Luther and his followers placed themselves in relation to the Catholic doctrine we have just been stating. Above all, we must observe, that they combated the distinction between the two species of faith, of which we spoke in the preceding section, not to maintain one of the two as alone true, and alone worthy of the name, but to reject both. Had they only represented as inadequate that faith which Catholics denote as insufficient for justification, to wit, the dead faith, their conduct would have been at once intelligible and laudable: but they disputed its very existence, clearly and frequently, as it is attested by Holy Writ.† The cause of this fact must be sought for in the opinion, that faith is the result of the exclusive working of the Divinity in man,—an opinion which appeared incompatible with the other, that it could show itself dead and ineffectual; whereas the Catholic doctrine explains the want of a progressive movement of faith, not pervading and transforming the whole man by the resistance, which human freedom, everywhere cooperating, or refusing its cooperation, offers. To what surprising interpretations of Scripture the Protestant view leads, in so far as it disputes the distinction between the two aforesaid species of faith, we have already shown in the Twelfth Section, when we had occasion to speak of the Calvinistic theory of predestination.

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* Heinroth Pisteodicea, Leipzig, 1826, p. 459. We have much pleasure in making mention, on this occasion, of a layman, who has given a very intellectual commentary on the epistle to the Romans (William Beneke, Brief an die Romer, Heidelburg, 1831). Let the reader compare pp. 64, 74, 145, 241. We are at a loss, however, to understand how he could find in the epistle to the Romans, the doctrine of the preexistence of souls.

† Luther, Commentary (in German) on the Epistle to Galatians, loc. cit. p. 70. "Therefore, faith is not such an *otiosa qualitas*, that is to say, such an useless, lazy, dead thing, that it can lie concealed in the heart, even of a mortal sinner, just like useless chaff, or as a dead fly, during winter-time, sticks in some chink, till the dear sun comes and rouses it, and warms it into life."

But even the notion "of the faith, which worketh by charity," described by Catholics as the one alone justifying, is rejected by Protestants. When, in the year 1541, deputies of Catholics and Lutherans assembled at Ratisbon, in order to bring about, if possible, a reconciliation of parties, they agreed on the following exposition of the article on Faith: "It is a settled and sound doctrine, that sinful man is justified by living and active faith; for by it are we rendered agreeable and well pleasing unto God for Christ's sake.* Luther pronounced condemnation on this article in these words: "it is a wretched, botched note."†

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* "Firma igitur est et sana doctrina per fidem vivam et efficacem justificari hominem peccatorem; nam per illam Deo grati et accepti sumus."

† How Plank endeavours to excuse this dissatisfaction on the part of Luther, the reader may see in his *History of the Protestant System of Doctrine*, vol. iii. part ii. p. 91. That very many modern Protestant theologians, even such as are by no means Rationalists,—as, for example, the sagacious Menken, should reject Luther's theory, is by

We will now take the liberty of bringing before our readers the following passages from Luther's Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. "Our papists, and sophists," says he, "have taught the like, to wit, that we should believe in Christ, and that faith was the groundwork of salvation; but, nevertheless, that this faith could not justify a man, unless it were the *fides formata;* that is to say, unless it first received its right form from charity. Now this is not the truth, but an idle, fictitious illusion, and a false, deceitful, misrepresentation of the Gospel. On this account, what the senseless sophists have taught respecting the *fides formata*, that is to say, the faith, which should receive its true form and shape from charity, is mere idle talk. For that faith alone justifies, which apprehends Christ by the word of Scripture, and which adorns or decorates itself with Him, and not the faith, which embraces in itself charity. For if faith is to be certain and constant, it should apprehend nought else, cling to nought else, save the one Christ. For, in the anguish of the conscience, it hath no other stay, but this precious pearl. Therefore, should the law affright a man, and the weight of sin oppress him, as much as they are able, he can,

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no means astonishing. But it is worthy of notice, that the untenable nature of this theory is manifest to many Lutheran divines, in proportion as they unconsciously ascribe to Luther and his followers the Catholic doctrine. Thus, Dr. Augustus Hahn, professor in Leipzic, in a letter to Bretschneider, entitled *State of Christianity in our time*, writes as follows: "Thus Melancthon, in his *Apology* (art. 3), rectifies the Catholic notion of justification through good works, as he shows the Gospel has perfected the Old Testament doctrine respecting the free grace of God in Christ towards all, who with sincere contrition manifest a living faith, working by charity," etc. (p. 64.) In fact, the true notion of Lutheran orthodoxy often totally escapes those who, above all things, wish to be orthodox.

nevertheless, when he hath apprehended Christ by faith, ever boast that he is yet just and pious. But how cometh this to pass? And by what is he rendered so just? By that noble treasure and pearl, which is called Jesus Christ, whom by faith he hath made his own."*

In the same work of the Reformer, we read on the same subject as follows: "But if a man hears, that he is to believe in Christ, and yet that such faith is of no avail, and profiteth him nothing, unless charity be added thereto, which giveth force to faith, and renders it capable of justifying a man, then it must needs come to pass, that a man will immediately fall away from the faith, despair, and think, if this be so, that faith without charity doth not justify; then it is undoubtedly useless, and nothing worth, and charity alone can justify: for if faith hath not charity by its side, which imparteth to it the right form, which constitutes it in such a manner, that it can justify, then is it nought; but if it be nought, how can it then justify?

"The adversaries, in support of this their pernicious and poisonous doctrine, adduce the text from the thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians: 'If I spake with the tongues of men and of angels, and if I should prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge; and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.' This text the papists regard as their wall of iron. But the dull, stupid asses can neither understand nor perceive anything in the writings of St. Paul, and therefore, with this their false interpretation, they have not only done violence to the words of St. Paul, but they have moreover denied Christ, and set all his blessings aside. Therefore we must beware of this doctrine, and regard it as a very diabolical and hellish poison; and conclude with St. Paul, that we be justified by faith only, and not "per fidem formatam charitate."*

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* Luther's Works, part I. p. 47, c. 6, ed. Wittenberg.

What, now, is justifying faith in the Protestant sense? Man believes, when he trusts that he has been received by God into grace, and that, for Christ's sake, who, by his death, has offered up atonement for our sins, he receives forgiveness of the same.† Melancthon expresses himself still more clearly, when he says, "Faith is the unconditional acquiescence in the Divine mercy, without regard to our good or evil works."‡ By these definitions is the essence of that faith, which the Reformers require, by no means made clear: we must more accurately point out the manner wherein faith exhibits the property of justification. Negatively this is explained by the express observation, that it is not the love connected with faith, or faith, in as far as it manifests its activity in works, which possesses the power of justifying.* Positively this is explained by the declaration, that it is the instrument and the mean, which lays hold of the grace (the compassion) of God, and the promised merits of Christ.†

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* L. c. p. 70. The Reformers often recur to this *fides formata* in a tone of great indignation. Thus, Luther in a disputation says (Opp. Jen. tom. i. fol. 538, Thes. iv.): "Docent (sophistæ) neque infusam Spiritu Sancto fidem justificare nisi charitate sit formata." Melancthon, loci theol. p. 85: "Fingunt (vulgus sophistarum) aliam fidem formatam, id est, charitate conjunctam; aliam informem, id est, quæ sit etiam in impiis carentibus charitate." Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 4, n. 8, p. 195: "Primò refutanda est, quæ in scholis volitat nugatoria fidei formatæ et informis distinctio," etc.

† Confess. Aug. art. IV. fol. 13. "Item docent, quod homines non possint justificari coram Deo propriis viribus, meritis, aut operibus, sed gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, cum credunt se in gratiam recipi, et peccata remitti propter Christum, qui suâ morte pro nostris peccatis satisfecit."

‡ Melancthon loc. theol. p. 93. "Habes, in quam partem fidei nomen usurpet scriptura, nempe pro eo, quod est fidere gratuitâ Dei misericordiâ, sine ullo operum nostrorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, respectu: quia de Christi plenitudine omnes accipimus." Most complete is the definition which Calvin gives: Instit. lib. iii. c. 2, § 7, fol. 195. "Justa fidei definitio nobis constabit, si dicamus esse divinæ erga nos benevolentiæ firmam certamque cognitionem, quæ, gratuitæ in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum Sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris, et cordibus obsignatur."

If this more accurate explanation should not yet place in the fullest light the nature of the Protestant idea of faith, this will be most certainly effected, by considering the comparison, which Calvin, on a certain occasion, employed for this object. Osiander, a preacher in Nuremberg, and afterwards in Königsberg, one of the most celebrated of Luther's followers at the commencement of the Reformation, had taken the liberty to put forth a peculiar theory of justification, which, if we duly elucidate his obscure phraseology, and the want of precision in his ideas, was quite Catholic,—a circumstance which was often urged as a matter of reproach against him. He taught, among other things, that the justifying power lies not in faith considered in itself, but only inasmuch as it essentially embraces

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[*] Apol. iv. de justif. § 26, p. 76. "Solâ fide in Christum, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem."

[†] Solid. Declar. iii. de fide just. § 36, p. 662. "Fides enim tantum eam ob causam justificat, et inde vim illam habet, quod gratiam Dei et meritum Christi in promissione evangelii tanquam medium et instrumentum apprehendit et amplectitur." § 23, p. 659: "Et quidem neque contritio, neque dilectio, neque ulla alia virtus, sola fides est illud instrumentum, quo gratiam Dei, meritum Christi, et remissionem peccatorum apprehendere et accipere possumus."

Christ; that is to say, according to Catholic language, inasmuch as, by the real communication of Christ's righteousness, it places man in a real communion with him. To this Calvin replies: "Doubtless he is of opinion, that faith by no means justifies through its intrinsic energy; for, as it is always weak and imperfect, it could produce only a defective justification. Faith is only the mean (organ) through which Christ is offered up to God. Thus it blesses man in the same way as an earthen vessel, in which a treasure is found, makes a man happy, although it possess in itself no worth."* Thus is justifying faith regarded, not as a morally renovating and vital principle, flowing from the spirit of Christ; but as standing in the same relation to Christ, as the earthen vessel to the treasure. In the same way as the two become not one,—the vessel remains earthen, the treasure golden,—so the believer is not *inwardly* united with Christ by justifying faith: they stand merely in an outward relation one to the other. Christ is pure; man, on the other hand, although he believes in a way agreeable to God, is inwardly impure. Christ is offered up by man to God through faith, the sacrificial vessel, without man himself being a victim acceptable to God through Christ; and as such being just, and, in consequence thereof, obtaining eternal felicity. The belief in an extraneous righteousness, described in the Fourteenth Section, required this notion of faith *(justitia extra nos)*. A peculiar conception, likewise, of the *appropriation* of the merits and obedience of Christ, must accordingly be formed. Now, this was precisely called appropriation of obedience, whereby it is *not appropriated* by us, not *made our own* in an inward living manner, so that we may become obedient like unto the Redeemer. It is the same with this new mode of appropriation, as if any one were to purchase a very learned book, and instead of stamping its contents deeply on his mind, and in this way appropriating it, so that he might become a living book, should hold himself very learned, the learned book was his (outward) property!

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* Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 11, § 7, fol. 262. "Quod objicit, vim justificandi non inesse fidei ex se ipsâ, sed quatenus Christum recipit, libenter admitto, nam si per se, vel intrinsecâ, ut loquuntur, virtute justificaret fides, ut est semper debilis et imperfecta, non efficeret hoc, nisi ex parte: sic manca esset justitia, quæ frustulum salutis nobis conferret......Neque tamen interea tortuosas hujus sophistæ figuras admitto, quum dicit fidem esse Christum: quasi vero olla fictilis sit thesaurus, quod in ea reconditum sit aurum. Neque enim diversa ratio est, quia fides etiamsi nullius per se dignitatis sit vel pretii, nos justificat, Christum afferendo, sicut olla pecuniis referta hominem locupletat......Jam expeditus est quoque nodus, quomodo intelligi debeat vocabulum fidei, ubi de justificatione agitur." Cfr. Apolog. iv. de justif. § 18, p. 71. "Et rursus quoties nos de fide loquimur, intelligi volumus objectum, scilicet misericordiam promissam. Nam fides non ideo justificat aut salvat, quia ipsa sit opus per se dignum, sed tantum quia accipit misericordiam promissam." Cf. Chemnit. Exam. Conc. Trid. part I. p. 294.

Now, the rejection of the above-stated second Catholic view of faith, becomes perfectly intelligible. Moreover, Calvin, as it appears, borrowed the simile in question from Luther's writings, in which it frequently occurs, though not so fully carried out.*

After these explanations, we can understand the purport of passages, like the following, from Luther's writings: "Now thou seest how rich is the Christian or the baptized man; for, though he will, he cannot lose his salvation, *however great his sins may be*, unless he refuse to believe. No sin can damn him, but unbelief alone. When faith in the Divine promise given in baptism returns, or is not effaced, then all else will be made to vanish in a moment through faith, or rather the veracity of God; for He cannot belie Himself, if thou confess Him, and acquiesce faithfully in His promises. But contrition, and confession of sins, and even satisfaction, and all those efforts invented by man, will quickly leave thee, and make thee unhappier, if thou forgetest this Divine veracity, and busiest thyself about those things. Vanity of vanities, and vexation of spirit, is all which we strive for, beyond faith in God's fidelity."* In this passage it is asserted, that, by the

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* Luther's Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, part I. p. 70, ed. Wittenberg (in German). "The reason wherefore faith justifies, is, that it apprehends and brings to itself the costly noble pearl, to wit, Jesus Christ."

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* Luther de captiv. Bab. tom. ii. fol. 264. "Ita vides, quam dives sit homo Christianus, *etiam volens non potest perdere salutem suam quantiscunque peccatis, nisi nolit credere.* Nulla enim peccata eum possunt damnare, nisi sola incredulitas......Cætera omnia, si redeat vel stet fides in promissionem divinam baptizato factam, in momento absorbentur per eandem fidem," etc. Here we may appropriately insert the following celebrated passage from a letter of Luther to Melancthon, although from the evident excitement of mind (so we would willingly believe) under which the author writes, peculiar stress ought not to be laid upon it; but it will still ever remain a characteristic monument in the history of religious opinions. "Sin lustily," writes Luther, "but be yet more lusty in faith, and rejoice in Christ, who is the conqueror of sin, of death, and of the world. Sin we must, so long as we remain here. It suffices, that, through the riches of the glory of God, we know the Lamb which taketh away the sins of the world: from Him no sin will sever us, though a million times in a day we should fornicate or commit murder." Epist. Dr. M. Lutheri a Joh. Aurifabro coll. tom. i. Jena, 1556, 4, p. 545, b. Luther says to his friend:—

"Si gratiæ prædicator es, gratiam non fictam sed veram prædica: si vera gratia est, verum non fictum peccatum ferto, Deus non facit salvos ficte peccatores.

"*Esto peccator et pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo,* side of faith, the greatest sins can still be committed; but this certainly is not the faith which St. Paul recommends to us, although Luther is ever appealing to the authority of this apostle. But it is that earthen vessel of Calvin, on whose surface, indeed, Christ as the Lamb of God is found, but without the spirit of the Redeemer livingly pervading the whole man, destroying sin, and truly engendering a new life within us. Who, that had ever reflected on the Pauline notion of faith, could have ever taken pleasure to defend the thesis, "that, if in faith an adultery could be committed, it were no sin."* Even in Melancthon, we find similar passages, of which we shall cite only one: "Whatever thou mayest do, whether thou eatest, drinkest, workest with the hand, teachest, I may add, shouldst thou even sin therewith, look not to thy works; weigh the promise of God; confide in it, and doubt not that thou hast no longer a Judge in heaven, but only a Father, who cherisheth thee in His heart, as a parent doth his child."† In other words,

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qui victor est peccati, mortis et mundi: peccandum est, quamdiu hic sumus. Vita hæc non est habitatio justitiæ; sed exspectamus, ait Petrus, cœlos novos et terram novam, in quibus justitia habitat.

"Sufficit quod agnovimus, per divitias gloriæ Dei, agnum qui tollit peccata mundi: ab hoc non avellet nos peccatum, *etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus.* Putas tam parvum esse pretium et redemptionem pro peccatis nostris factam in tanto ac tali agno?" The letter was written from the Wartburg, and bears the date of the year 1521.

* Luther disput. tom. i. p. 523. "*Si in fide fieri posset adulterium, peccatum non esset.*"

† Melancthon loc. p. 92. "Qualiacunque sint opera, comedere, bibere, laborare manû, docere, addo etiam, ut sint palam peccata," etc. I candidly avow, I could as soon imagine the co-existence of day and night, as conceive a man holding the Pauline πίστις (faith) with the sentiments and conduct described by Melancthon. And what should prevent us from representing to ourselves such a man as unchaste,

suppose thou shouldest be a drunkard, or a glutton, let not thy hair turn grey; only forget not that God is a kind elder, who learned to forgive much sooner than thou didst learn to sin.

However, we have pointed out only one side of the Lutheran principle of faith, namely, that whereby it works justification. There is another, whereby it becomes the source of love and of good works. Luther, in many places, describes this in nearly the same terms as the Catholics depict the divine love of the regenerated. In this class of the reformer's writings, are included those on Christian freedom and on good works; and who knows not the brilliant description of faith in his preface to St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans? "Faith," says he, "is a divine work within us, which changes us, makes us be born again out of God, destroys the old Adam, and transforms us, as it were, into other men, in heart, in feeling, and in every faculty, and communicates to us the Holy Spirit. This faith is something living and efficacious; so that it is impossible that it should not always work good. Faith doth not first ask, whether good works are to be done; but, before it enquires about the matter, it hath already wrought many good works, and is ever busied in working." Here, in the most amiable contradiction with the Lutheran theory of justification, a renovation and entire transformation of the whole inward man is taught. Faith appears as the blossom, springing out of the union of *all* the powers constituting the interior man, as an expression of their combined workings; while a strong testimony is rendered to the power of

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choleric, &c., if the qualities stated in the text be compatible with faith? In what respect is *gula* morally different from *libido?*

the Saviour over sin and death. In his commentary, likewise, on the epistle to the Galatians, Luther calls faith "the righteous heart, the thoroughly good will, and the new-created understanding, or reason." Here also Luther means to say, that faith is an effect of all the spiritual powers of man, when they are purified and glorified by the Divine Spirit.*

APPRECIATION OF THE THEORETIC AND PRACTICAL GROUNDS, WHICH THE PROTESTANTS ALLEGE FOR THEIR VIEW OF FAITH.

§ XVII.—Appreciation of the theoretic grounds.

But why, now, do the Reformers so much insist on the distinction of two principles in one and the same faith; to one whereof is reserved the power of working justification, to the other, that of evincing itself in charity and good works, and in unfolding the fulness of all virtues? Luther and his friends conceived they had very weighty theoretical and practical reasons for this separation. The theoretical reasons will first engage our attention. It is very usual with Luther and his friends to boast of faith, as the instrument embracing the mercy of God in Christ, as not only the first and original, but also the only pure ordinance of God in man, unmixed, and consequently untroubled, with any human alloy; whereas faith, when it manifests itself in love, and in the whole course of feelings to which it should give rise, on one hand, doth not appear itself, but rather, if we may so speak, as the fruit of itself, and on the other hand, penetrates and pervades the human and the sinful element, and consequently no longer exhibits its pristine purity.* Now it is the exclusive act of God, according to them, which maketh men agreeable to Him; it is consequently the instrumental faith only, not the faith working by charity, that justifieth before God, and therefore the distinction in question must be regarded as well-founded, nay, as absolutely necessary.

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* Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, part I. p. 143; German edition of Wittenberg. Passages similar to those cited in the text often occur.

The *naïve* simplicity of these theoretic errors, which are entirely based on the doctrine of God's exclusive operation in the work of salvation, is too evident to need any special comment. Luther in one word wished to say: in us God believes—in us God confides in himself—and as everywhere He can rejoice only in *His own works*, so He rejoiceth solely in *this* His exclusive act. Evident as this is, yet, on account of the importance of the matter, and for the sake of elucidating the notions respecting it, it behoves us not to pass it over with too much haste. The Lutherans describe the *entire* spiritual life of regenerated man as the act of God. Is it not therefore extremely singular and, according to their theoretical doctrines, utterly inconceivable, that they should not likewise say, God in Christ Jesus *loveth* in us, and should not attribute to the Creator as lively a joy in this His work, as that whereby he *believeth* in us? If the one, as well as the other, be His work, if both have been obtained for us through the merits of Christ, what imaginable cause is there, why God should look down graciously upon us, inasmuch as He excites within us faith in the Redeemer; but cannot love us, inasmuch as he produces within us love for Christ? The doubt that in love something human, and therefore, as they say, something meagre and insufficient, exists, the peculiar theory of Protestants cannot allege; for what is weak and sinful in love, that is to say, what is not love itself, they will not denominate God's work, but only love itself. The exotic and impure elements in this love God could always separate, and, as to that which should be proved to be his own work, graciously accept, and even as graciously as anything else, which He hath ordained. A very peculiar reason must have induced the Lutherans to adopt this view; for although, as they conceive, faith is the exclusive work of God, yet it still frequently trembles, becomes now and then, even according to the symbolical books (for example, the *Apology*), extremely weak, is scarcely able at times to cling to the staff of Divine Providence, and forgets itself even so far, as to doubt the existence of God. And as regards Luther himself, he was often unable to put off the doubt, whether he had conceived justifying faith in a very believing spirit, and dispelled awakening scruples, not by the power of faith, but after a very human fashion, to wit, by resolving in such moments to inveigh instantaneously and energetically against the papacy, and in this way to set aside disgust by pleasure.* Now this dismay, and this doubting in divine truths and divine promises, are most assuredly no gracious work of God; but in both we recognize the human alloy, and (in the sense of the Reformers), we must say: "In us God believes; it is man, on the contrary, who trembles, and who doubts. In despite of this perturbation of the divine element within us, God doth not yet cease to look down graciously upon the seed He hath sown in man." Why should the Deity, then, on account of the human alloy intermingled with charity, be induced to cast no friendly eye upon it, and not graciously to recognize that portion of it, which is His own work?

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* Luther de captiv. Babyl. opp. tom. ii. p. 284. "Opus est enim omnium operum excellentissimum et arduissimum, quo solo, etiamsi cæteris omnibus carere cogeris, servaberis. Est enim opus Dei, non hominis, sicut Paulus docet; cætera nobiscum et per nos operatur, hoc unicum in nobis et sine nobis operatur."

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* Some passages of this kind we must here lay before the reader. Luther, in his *Table-talk* (p. 166, ed. Jena, 1603), says: "I once believed all that the Pope and the monks told me. But now what

Love, then, is an effect of faith, and consequently not the first of the divine workings within us; for as it is only faith which with God's aid brings forth charity,

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Christ saith, who cannot lie, this I cannot put too strong a faith in. But this is a wearisome subject; we must defer it to another day." P. 167: "The spirit is indeed willing, but the flesh is weak, saith Christ, when he speaks of himself. St. Paul also saith: The spirit will give itself up to God, and trust in Him and obey; but reason, flesh, and blood resist, and will not and cannot upward rise. Therefore must our Lord God bear with us; the glimmering wick he will not put out; the faithful have only the first-fruits of the spirit, not the full perfection, and the ten commandments. One person asked, wherefore doth not God impart to us full knowledge? Dr. Martin replied: If any one could indeed believe, then for very joy he would be able neither to eat, nor drink, nor do aught else. As at Dr. Martin's table the text from the prophet Hosea, *Hæc dicit Dominus*, was sung, he said to Dr. Jonas, "As little as you believe that this singing is good, so little do I firmly believe that theology is true. I love my wife, I love her more dearly than myself—that is most sure—I mean to say, I would rather die than that she or the little ones should die. I love Christ very dearly, who with His blood hath redeemed me from the power and tyranny of the devil: but my faith ought in justice to be greater and more ardent than it is; ah! Lord! enter not into judgment with thy servant," &c.

and certainly not any unbelief ingrafted on faith, love must in consequence be as divine as faith; because it is the pure, though (as the Lutherans assert) the later, production of a divine principle. For whatever would be defective in charity, would be, as we remarked above, not charity itself, but only the effect of a deficiency in faith; or, to express ourselves more accurately (for a deficiency, that is to say, the absence of being, can do nothing), a smaller degree of charity presupposes a small degree of faith; though the former, be it even subsequent in its origin, is as divine as the latter. A flame is not less fire than a spark, though the spark precedes the flame; it is the same with a little flame, though it were only the effect of a little spark, and both in the same way would be comprised in the notion of a little fire.

Whithersoever we turn our inquiring glance, we can discover nothing which should have brought charity into such discredit, that it were only by faith, and not by love, we can be acceptable to God. Holy Writ is not in the slightest degree chargeable with the evil repute into which love is fallen. Let us compare only John xiv. 21, 23, and 1 Cor. viii. 3. If the Saviour saith in the former place, "He who loveth me, shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him;" so we may be allowed to put the question, what distinction can exist "between receiving any one into his grace," "assuring any one of his good-will" (declaring him just), and "loving any one?" It is also useful attentively to consider, who it is, according to this passage, whom the Father and the Son love;—him, it saith, "who loveth Christ." Thus, it would be Faith, in so far as it loves, and is active in love, wherein consists the righteousness that availeth before God, and whereby we become well-pleasing unto Him.

To speak out plainly our own opinion, it appears to us, that, in the Protestant mode of distinguishing between the instrumental faith, and the faith working by charity, there has been always wanting a clearness of conception. This will be proved most evidently, if we take the pains of inquiring, what is this faith considered *in itself*, and what, on the other hand, it ought to be, *according to Protestants;* this faith, as we should premise, being always understood, in the Protestant sense, of confidence in the Saviour, as the Forgiver of sins. The discussion, which we have just concluded, leads us to a certain result. Let us once more place ourselves in the Protestant point of view, which looks on charity as an effect, or a fruit of faith. If charity stands really in this relation to faith, it is necessarily comprised in it, for, otherwise, it could not proceed from it; it would be, therefore, most certainly only another form of Faith's existence, or faith in another shape, and would determine its essence in such a degree, that it could not be conceived without it, and could only be, through it, what it is. It would, therefore, be no error to assert, that love were the essence of faith, and so in a higher, more developed, and more distinct manner; it would be the essence of the latter, because it is the latter which is manifested in it, as the cause in its effect, the reason in its consequence, the root in the tree. Love would be faith, even in a more consummate form, because faith only, after a gradual growth, hath become love. Faith, in so far as it embraces Christ, and the forgiveness of sins in him, is, consequently, love itself, although (as, until more accurate definitions be given, we are willing, for argument's sake, to concede) it be at first only love in its infancy. Love is thus, without doubt, the organ, which rests with confidence in Christ, and the efficacious faith is the instrumental one, only, as we said, in a more mature and a more confirmed shape.

The truth of what has been stated, and, consequently, the due relation in which faith stands to charity, may, in various ways, be made evident. The first is as follows:—To the abstract idea of God, as a Being infinitely just, corresponds the sentiment of fear. If, on the other hand, God be conceived as the all-loving, merciful, and forgiving Father, this is most assuredly possible only by a kindred sentiment in our souls, corresponding to the Divine love, that is to say, by a love germinating within us. It is awakening *love* only that can embrace the loving, pardoning, compassionate God, and surrender itself up entirely to Him, as even the Redeemer saith, "He who loveth me, shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will *manifest myself to Him.*" Thus it would not be faith (confidence) which would be first in the order of time, and love in the next place, but faith would be an effect of love, which, after she had engendered faith as confidence, supported by this her own self-begotten help-mate, would come forward more vigorously and efficaciously. This, at least, Holy Writ teaches very clearly. Compare Romans v. 5, with viii. 15, 16.—The second mode, wherein what we have said may be made evident, is as follows: Confidence in the Redeemer (for this, we repeat it again, the Reformers denominate faith), necessarily presupposes a secret, hidden desire,—a longing after Him. For our whole being, having received the impulse from God, forces and urges us to apply to ourselves what is offered through the mediation of Christ; and our deepest necessities, whereof we have attained the consciousness through His Spirit, are satisfied only in Him. But what is now this longing, this desire, other than love? Assuredly, this aspiring of our whole being towards Christ, this effort to repose in Him, to be united with Him, to find in Him only our salvation, is nought else than love. It follows, then, that love, even according to this view of things, constitutes the foundation and internal condition of confidence—nay, its very essence; for, in every internal consequence, the essence is again manifested.*

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* Cardinal Sadolet (ad Principes Germ. orátio. Opp. ed. Ver. MDCCXXXVIII. tom. ii. p. 359-60) observes with great truth: "Illud præterea docto homine indignum, quod, cum istam ipsam fidem, in qua una hæretis, a Spiritû Sancto nobis conceditis dari, non videtis eam in amore et charitate esse datam. Quid enim aliud Spiritus Sanctus est, quam amor? Quod etiam ut prætereatur, cum fidem esse fiduciam affirmatis, qua certo confidimus nostra nobis peccata a Deo per Christum fuisse ignota, spem, quamvis imprudentes, in hâc fiduciâ inseritis: non enim sine spe potest esse fiducia. Quod si spem, profecto etiam amorem; sic enim confidimus nostra peccata nobis condonari, ut non modo id speremus, sed etiam amando optandoque expectemus, ut ita sit: quoniam omnis ratio spei et fiduciæ, quacunque versetur in re, amore rei illius innixa est, quam nos esse adeptos aut adepturos confidimus. Ita in fide verâ spes et charitas sic implicita est, ut nullum eorum ab aliis possit divelli." S. Ambrose admirably observes (Exposit. Evang. Luc. viii.): "Ex fide charitas, ex charitate spes et rursus in se sancto quodam circuitu refunduntur." *Fiducia* is the *corroborata spes*, as defined by the schoolmen. Bellarmin. de justif. lib. i. c. 13: "Quarta dispositio (ad justificationem) dilectio est. Statim enim ac incipit aliquis sperare ab alio beneficium, incipit etiam eundem diligere ut benefactorem, atque auctorem omnis boni, quod sperat......Porro dilectionem aliquam priorem esse remissione peccatorum, vel tempore, si sit dilectio imperfecta, vel certe naturâ, si sit perfecta et ex toto corde, atque ad eam disponere," etc.

It was only a very singular confusion of the manner wherein the Gospel is announced to us, with the interior, living acceptance of the same in our own souls, that could ever have given rise to a different opinion. The Redeemer, doubtless, announces himself to us from without (*Justitia nostra extra nos*), as Him, for the sake of whose merits, the forgiveness of sins is offered to us, with the view of restoring us to communion with God. But when we have once clearly apprehended and recognized this righteousness, which is without, then first awakes within us the feeling kindred to divinity ; we find ourselves to be beings designed and created for God ; we feel ourselves attracted towards Him (this is the first germ of love) ; we find, even in our sins, no further obstacle ; we pass them by, and move consoled onwards toward God in Christ (this is confidence in the latter) ; and, by the progressive development of such feelings, we at last disengage ourselves from the world, and live entirely in God (*Justitia intra nos*, *inhærens*, *infusa*.) Thus the recognition of the truths revealed in Christ, and especially of the forgiveness of sins in him, (this is faith, in the ordinary Catholic sense), is, undoubtedly, the primary thing preceding all others—the ground-work and the root of justification (*radix et fundamentum justificationis*) ; so that, *from this sort of faith*, love emanates. But, if faith be taken in the sense of *confidence* (*fiducia*), then it is far from the truth to assert, that it is only followed by love, and, still more, that, separated from love, or conceived without it, it is capable of justifying. This confidence is itself only one phase in the history of love. Accordingly, our sins are not, in the first place, forgiven us, so that, in consequence of this consciousness, we love, but because we confidingly love, and lovingly confide, they are forgiven. *In our interior life*, forgiveness of sins and sanctification are simultaneous; or, as St. Thomas Aquinas excellently expresses it,* "the infusion of grace, and the remission of sin, like the illumination of any space, and the dispersion of darkness, are one and the same thing." But, according to the Apology, and the Formulary of Concord, it is *Faith exclusively alone*, wherein the appropriation of the merits of Christ and justification consist; and, consequently, neither charity nor any other virtue,† that is to say, no holy feelings on the part of men, have any share in this work. Accordingly, faith or confidence in Christ, in so far as it justifies, is something quite distinct from every holy sentiment, especially charity, which is the one expressly named. Whether this doctrine can be in any way justified—whether it offer any sense whatever—the discussion in which we have just been engaged may suffice to show.

§ XVIII.—Appreciation of the practical grounds.

Let us now endeavour to comprehend the meaning of those practical reasons, which the Protestants allege in their cause. These reasons are the following:—

1. The first is, that in this way only "troubled consciences" can receive a powerful and adequate solace. For, so say the Protestants, if instrumental faith, which clings to Christ alone, who hath offered up satisfaction

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* Prim. sec. 9, q. cxiii. art. vi. "Idem est gratiæ infusio et culpæ remissio, sicut idem est illuminatio et tenebrarum expulsio."

† Solid. declar. iii. de fide justif. § 23, p. 659. "Neque contritio, *neque dilectio, neque ulla alia* virtus est illud instrumentum, quo gratiam Dei, meritum Christi, et remissionem peccatorum apprehendere et accipere possumus."

for us, possess the power of justifying, hearts, sorely grieved on account of their sins, will then enjoy a steady interior peace. But this they never can attain to, if only the faith, which is manifested in love,—faith evidenced in holiness of sentiment,—be considered as the test of the children of God; for who is conscious of possessing the true love of God, and holiness of feeling?

2. In the second place, the Protestants contend, that, if the instrumental faith be regarded as the one conferring justification, every thing is then referred to the divine mercy in Christ, and all glory rendered to the Redeemer. But so soon as faith, inasmuch as it comprises a circle of holy feelings, is to earn for us the approbation of heaven, then the glory, due to the Saviour alone, is divided between him and us, or rather withdrawn from him. In a word, by this way only can the merits of Christ, in their entire magnitude, be gratefully acknowledged.*

3. The reason, first assigned, offers us, in fact, a very beautiful, and very pleasing motive, and we see at once the sentiment which it is intended to cherish in the breast of men. This sentiment is *humility*, which, with an honest self-denial, refers all good to God, as its pri-

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* Apolog. iv. de dilect. et implet. leg. § 48, p. 90. "De magnâ re disputamus, de honore Christi, et unde petant bonæ mentes certam et firmam consolationem." Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 1, § 13, p. 273: "Atque omnino quidem duo hic spectanda sunt, nempe ut Domino illibata constet et veluti sarta tecta sua gloria, conscientiis vero nostris coram ipsius judicio placida quies ac serena tranquillitas." De necessitate reformandæ ecclesiæ opusc. p. 429: "Neque inter opera et Christum dimidiat, sed in solidum Christo adscribit (Paulus), quod coram Deo justi censemur. Duo hic in quæstionem veniunt: utrum inter nos et Deum dividenda sit salutis nostræ gloria," etc. Compare Chemnit. Exam. Concil. Trid. part I. p. 296, and in other passages.

mary source, and ascribes nothing good to man, as such: and humility, therefore, must be regarded in fact as the motive of the third ground for this distinction between the two kinds of faith.*

Let us now examine the intrinsic worth of the first reason. It is certainly a great task for the true Church to administer solid consolation to consciences sorely troubled and deeply agitated on account of their sins. But the solace so extended should be no false one; and that such an epithet must attach to the Protestant consolation, we have already, on account of the distinction between the instrumental and the efficacious faith, full and just cause to apprehend. And why so? Let us hear the following dialogue betwixt Luther and a heart seeking consolation:—"Thou sayest, I have done no good work; I am for this too weak and frail. Such a treasure thou wilt not acquire by thy works; but thou shouldst hear the joyous message, which the Holy Ghost proclaims to thee, through the mouth of the prophet, for he saith to thee,—Be joyous, thou barren, that barest not; that is to say, that art not active in charity. As if he would say, why art thou anxious and art so troubled? for thou hast no cause to be anxious and to be troubled.—But I am barren, and lonely, and bear no children.—Although thou buildest not on the righteousness of the law, nor bearest children, like Hagar, it matters not; thy righteousness is far higher and better, to wit, Christ, who is able to defend thee against the terrors and the curses of the law; for he became an anathema for thee, that he might redeem thee from the anathema of the law."*

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* Luther adv. Erasmum. Roterod. Opp. tom. iii. p. 176, b. "Duæ res exigunt talia prædicari. Prima est humiliatio nostræ superbiæ et cognitio gratiæ Dei, altera ipsa fides Christiana. Primum, Deus certo promisit humiliatis, id est deploratis et desperatis, gratiam suam. Humiliari vero penitus non potest homo, donec sciat, prorsus extra suas vires, consilia, studia, voluntatem, opera, omnino ex alterius arbitrio, consilio, voluntate, opere suam pendere salutem, nempe Dei solius. Siquidem, quamdiu persuasus fuerit, sese vel tantulum posse, pro salute suâ, manet in fiduciâ sui, nec de se penitus desperat, ideo non humiliatur coram Deo, sed locum, tempus, opus aliquod sibi præsumit, vel sperat, vel optat saltem, quo tandem perveniat ad salutem. Qui vero nihil dubitat, totum in voluntate Dei pendere, is prorsus de se desperat, nihil eligit, sed exspectat operantem Deum, is proximus est gratiæ, ut salvus fiat. Itaque propter electos ista vulgantur, ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti, salvi fiant: cæteri resistunt humiliationi huic, imo damnant doceri hanc desperationem sui; aliquid vel modiculum sibi relinqui volunt, quod possint: hi occulte manent superbi et gratiæ Dei adversarii. Hæc est, inquam, una ratio, ut pii promissionem gratiæ humilitati cognoscant, invocent, et accipiant." Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 12, § 6, p. 272: "Hactenus perniciosam hypocrisin docuerunt, qui hæc duo simul junxere, humiliter sentiendum, et justitiam nostram aliquo loco habendam."

What an utterly false and dangerous application of the twenty-seventh verse of Galatians, chapter iv.! Is not this replacing one part of faith by the other? And distinguishing the efficacious from the instrumental faith, in order that not merely in the defective condition, but in the utter absence, of the former, the latter might be made to represent it? Here we find no solace, but the encouragement of a false security;

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* Luther's Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, p. 258. It is self-evident that the soul in question is not one which is in a state of anxiety, because, on account of the relations wherein it is placed, it cannot perform the works it would desire, nor confer happiness on its fellow-creatures. In this case the solace administered would have been of a very different kind, and could not have been brought in connexion with the passage relative to Hagar. It should then only have been said, the charity, wherewith this soul is animated, sufficeth; for love is the fulfilment of the law. But this it was precisely, which Luther did not wish to assert.

and the doctrine, that it is only the faith working by charity which justifies, is reproached with being unable to rise above the low level of a mere legal justice! And what contradictions, too, we find here! Above, as we have seen, Luther termed faith the thoroughly good-will, and here we find faith destitute of all will. Above, faith was described as an eternal, active principle, and here it appears before us as indolence itself! Above, it was a fresh living power, which doth not first ask, whether and what it should do; but, before the question is put, is already prepared: here it appears a thing that can only sigh and lament, and can never make progress, and which still, however, remains the true faith! Should the distinction accordingly between the active and the instrumental faith be meant undoubtedly to express the idea, that faith justifies, yet not in so much as it is active, still it would convey the sense, that it justifies, even when it is not active! Let us attentively consider once more some passages previously cited from Luther's writings (see § XVI);—passages, which only now perhaps will be completely understood. Let us especially weigh the words; "But if a man heareth, that he should believe in Christ, and yet that this belief availeth him nothing, nor is of use, *unless love be added thereto*, which imparts vigour to faith, and renders it capable of justifying man; then without doubt he will fall away from faith, despair, and think that, if it be really so, that *faith without love* doth not justify, then is it undoubtedly profitless and nothing worth." Luther's already cited description of the riches, which flow to us from baptism, is well worthy of our repeated attention. All these passages furnish so many evidences of the opinion which we have advanced, respecting the real practical importance of the here alleged distinction between the two forms of one and the same faith. It is not to be denied, that, according to Luther, the form of faith efficacious to holiness cannot appear, without the other, which consists in the solacing apprehension of Christ's merits. But the latter can exist without the former, and indeed, in such a way, that, according to Luther's opinion, the faith in the forgiveness of sins through Christ would lose all value and all importance, if such were not the case.

This now is not the doctrine of St. Paul, who consoles us in a very different manner. Compare Romans v. 1-6, viii. 1-16; Galatians, v. 6-22. In the Holy Spirit let us cry out, "Abba, dear Father! But the fruits of the Spirit are charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, longanimity, mildness, faith, modesty, continency, chastity." Peace and joy in the Holy Spirit are accordingly not to be gained without love and all other holy sentiments. And this the soul, whose scruples are silenced by Luther, clearly proves. Because it possessed no loving, gentle, and meek faith, therefore joy and peace were not its portion, and never would it obtain these *alone*, unless it were seduced into a culpable levity, or sought its satisfaction in carnal pleasures. The nature of that consolation, which the Catholic Church administers, we shall later have occasion more accurately to define.

2. Let us now proceed to the appreciation of the second of the practical grounds, which, in the opinion of the Reformers, so strongly enforce their view of faith, as to render it not only laudable, but even commanded by the spirit of Christianity to such an extent, that they characterize the opposite opinion as absolutely wicked. It would have been, in truth, a noble struggle

between the different confessions, if they had striven in an *enlightened manner* to surpass each other in the glorification of Him, whom they mutually revere as the source of all salvation. But the sovereign rule, according to which judgment should be given in this strife, is this; when we praise the holiest, let there be nothing unholy! Let us first endeavour clearly to apprehend the meaning of the Reformers' assertion! They think the doctrine of Catholics, that only the sanctified is the justified man, only the lover of God is the beloved of God, has nothing above the level of vulgar and every-day maxims; for to love him, who loves us, is not rare even among men. Thus if we would be agreeable to God, only in so far as the power of Christ really transforms us, puts aside sin, and makes us in fact worthy of becoming children of God, this is not a sufficient honour for the Redeemer; the conception of Christ and the value of his sufferings before God are not estimated sufficiently high. But if the merit of the sufferings of the Son of God be so exalted, that its power can introduce us into heaven, without its costing him, or ourselves, any effort for our preparatory purification, then what he hath achieved for us, and what he is able to achieve with his Father, appears in all its lustre.* The Reformers conceived that the case was nearly the same, as if a gentleman were to testify his favour to a friend, by letting him introduce guests in their soiled travelling clothes, without giving them on that account a less gracious welcome. But here the question is not about forms of decorum and ceremonial frivolity;—it is about that inward adornment, that nuptial garment, which, under pain of removal from the banquet, according to the sentence of the Lord of grace, who is also the Holy One, ought not to be wanting. Even the gentleman, in the case referred to, would suppose that *the guests* introduced to him in the manner described, would entertain the same kindly feelings towards himself, *as the friend* under whose auspices they were admitted. Having thus formed clear notions of the mode, which the confessions deem most fitting for showing forth the glory of the Redeemer, it can no longer be a matter of doubt, which of them renders the tribute most worthy of that Redeemer. And now let us enquire into the misunderstandings, that have led to a condemnation of the Catholic doctrine.

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* Chemnit. Exam. Conc. Trid. part I. p. 265. "Videt enim pius lector, remissionem peccatorum, adoptionem, ipsam denique salutem et vitam æternam adimi et detrahi satisfactioni et obedientiæ Christi, et transferri in nostras virtutes, Christo vero mediatori *hoc tantum* relinquitur, quod propter ipsius meritum accipiamus charitatem......Exinanita est fides, et abolita promissio, si hæreditas ex lege, cujus summa est charitas."

It is scarcely possible, perhaps, to conceive any objection less cogent against the peculiar doctrines of the Catholic Church, than the assertion that it considers the reconciliation of man with God, *partly* as the work of Christ, *partly* as the work of man, or what is the same, that it divides between the Saviour and the believer the glory of bringing the latter back to God; and this forsooth, because Catholics represent the faith animated by love as agreeable to God! If the doctrine of Catholics were this, that the holy sentiments required of the Christian were obtained independently of Christ, and, in this independence, were acceptable to God; or even that Christ supplied only those virtues, wherein we were deficient; then the above objection would doubtless be well founded. But as the Church expressly teaches, that the entire spiritual life of the faithful, in so far as it is agreeable to God, flows absolutely from the source which is called Christ, how can there be here any question of a division of glory, or a thankless conduct towards the Redeemer, and of a want of pious feeling! Undoubtedly, the Church urgently demands of every one, to appropriate in a complete and vivid manner the power proffered in the Redeemer; undoubtedly, she teaches, that it is only by this living appropriation, by stamping Christ on our souls, we can become pleasing unto God; namely, when all our feelings, all our thoughts, and will, are filled with His vital breath. But to call this a dividing of glory with Christ, is tantamount to asserting, that a man, exposed to danger of death from hunger, divides the honour of his deliverance with him, who benevolently offers him food and drink; because the unhappy man makes use of the strengthening nurture, and by that participation appropriates it to his own substance, and does not merely content himself with turning up a look of hope and confidence towards his benefactor. With this case, in fact, may be aptly compared the theory of Protestants in respect to the relation of the believer to Christ. But whoever is entangled in this error, will perish in his sins, like the starving man whom he would take for his model, while he fancies he is rendering glory to the Saviour alone. He will be comprised in the number of those, who exclaim, "Lord, Lord," (be thou alone praised!), but who "do not the will of the heavenly Father."

But this whole error is here based on a confusion of the objective consummation of the atonement with its subjective appropriation (see § XI.);* and the love which must first germinate from faith in the grace and the love of God in Christ, though in a living faith it

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* The Council of Trent distinguishes five causes of justification,

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the sense whereof Sarpi should have fathomed before he presumed to express a censure. "Hujus justificationis causæ sunt *finalis* quidem gloria Dei et Christi, ac vita æterna: *efficiens* vero misericors Deus, qui gratuito abluit: *meritoria* autem dilectissimus unigenitus suus, Dominus noster Jesus Christus, qui, cum essemus inimici, propter nimiam caritatem, quâ dilexit nos, suâ sanctissimâ passione in ligno crucis nobis justificationem meruit et pro nobis Deo patri satisfecit: *instrumentalis* item, sacramentum baptismi:......demum unica *formalis* causa est justitia Dei; non quâ ipse justus est, sed quâ nos justos facit: quâ videlicet ab eo donati, renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ, et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes."...... Sess. VI. c. viii. It is the *justificationis causa formalis,* which gives so much offence to the Protestants. The *causa formalis* is, in the technical language of the mediæval schools, the *dans esse in aliquo, dans actualitatem;* and accordingly, here it is that whereby the righteousness, which God desireth of us, becomes real within us, forming (*forma*) the vivifying principle within us. The Council says, the righteousness becomes living and is formed within us, through the impression of God's holy will (*justitia Dei*) upon our souls. This doctrine the Protestants take quite abstractedly, just as if it signified: "the sanctified will is what is acceptable to God in us," without attending to what immediately before was said respecting the *causa finalis, efficiens,* and *meritoria,* to wit, that it is only the mercy of God and the merits of Christ which are the source, whence flow the release of the human will from sin and its sanctification, and on this account it is said, God stamps his will upon us, *nos justos facit Deus.* Luther says, the *causa formalis justificationis* is the instrumental faith (Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, loc. cit. p. 70); and in his system he is right, for, according to it, man is already completely righteous and regenerated, so soon as he possesses that faith—so soon as he apprehends Christ—the extraneous righteousness. But the Catholic denies that by this theory the scriptural, or even scientific, notion of a living appropriation is realized; and he is equally far from conceding, that by upholding this notion the Catholic Church withholds the glory due to Christ, the Lord, or, in other words, fails to recognize in its full extent the power of the atonement.

Calvin (in Antidot. in Concil. Trid. opusc. p. 704) expresses himself has already ripened into blossom and fruit, is so understood, as if God remitted us our sins on account of our

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with great naïveté: "Porro quam frivola sit et nugatoria causarum partitio......supersedeo dicere." He is also perfectly right in avoiding all clear scientific definitions on this matter: for the very existence and maintenance of the whole Protestant system of doctrine is connected with this point.

Chemnit. Exam. Concil. part I. p. 266. "Sed Andradius hanc Christi mediatoris justitiam fide nobis imputatam blasphemat esse commentitiam, adumbratam et fictitiam. Nullum autem habent aliud argumentum, nisi (!) quod opponunt absurditatem ex physicâ et ethicâ: absurdum scilicet esse (sicut Osius inquit) dicere alicujus rei formam esse, quæ ipsi rei non insit, ut si dicam, parietem esse album albedine, quæ vesti meæ inhæreat, non parieti: vel Ciceronem esse fortem fortitudine, quæ non ipsi, sed Achillis animo inhæreat. Quid vero hæc argumenta aliud ostendunt quam Pontificios in doctrina justificationis, relictâ evangelii luce, quærere sententiam, quæ conformis et consentanea sit philosophicis opinionibus, aut certe legalibus sententiis de justitiâ? Evangelium vero pronuntiat esse sapientiam in mysterio absconditam, quam nemo principum hujus sæculi cognovit. Ideo cum habeamus sententiæ nostræ in scripturâ certa et firma fundamenta (?), non est curandum, *etiamsi incurrat in absurditatem philosophicam.*"

Here it is openly avowed, that the Protestant theory of appropriation of the merits of Christ, cannot stand the test of scientific investigation. And such is the fact; for, as was said above, we are to appropriate to ourselves the obedience of Christ without his becoming our own true and inmost property; He is to become subjective, without becoming so; and this is, in truth, a philosophic absurdity. In the same way, no philosophic notion of Protestant faith can be formed, because it is to be an organ of appropriation *without appropriating!* To the same confusion of ideas we may ascribe charges like the following: "Sed hoc dicunt esse totum meritum Christi, quod propter illud misericordia Dei infundat nobis novam qualitatem justitiæ inhærentis, quæ est caritas, ut illâ justificemur: hoc est, ut non propter Christi obedientiam, sed propter nostram charitatem, absolvamur coram judicio Dei, adoptemur in filios,"...Chemnit. lib. i. p. 263. Here again we find the divine and the human, the objective atonement and the subjective appropriation confounded with each other. When Chemnitius, in a tone of lament, proceeds to observe, "Ut ita misericordia Dei love, whereas it is His voluntary gift. A misunderstanding of Scripture has had great share in producing this

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tantum sit causa efficiens, et obedientia Christi *tantum* sit meritoria causa," we can only express our astonishment; for what more can they be *in themselves?* Chemnitius desires the obedience of Christ should be also the *causa formalis*, that is to say, should become our own, without ourselves being obliged to be obedient: it is to become subjective without becoming subjective!! In a word, the theory of Chemnitius is what we have already commented on in the text; to wit, that the merits of Christ stand forth in a far more glorious light, when we not merely believe they work out our forgiveness, in so far as they work out at the same time our improvement, but when we also assume, that for the sake of these merits sin is forgiven us, even when we reform not our conduct, but merely believe. Chemnitius (p. 263-4) censures Catholics for denying forgiveness of sins on account of Christ's satisfaction, because they make the same tantamount to a real extirpation of sin, and the implanting of charity in the room of the old debt of sin. But Catholics teach that through faith in the divine mercy in Jesus Christ, and all connected therewith, love for God is awakened in our souls, and thereby the affection for sin effaced. But is this to deny the objective forgiveness of sins, or is it not rather to appropriate the same to ourselves? Is it not to protest against a notion of appropriation, which is none at all? Calvin, especially, entertained the singular opinion, that Catholics believed justification to consist, *partly* in the forgiveness of sins, *partly* in the spiritual regeneration. Antidot. in Conc. Trid. opusc. p. 704: "Sed quid facis istis bestiis (the Catholics)......Nam justitiæ partem operibus hinc constare colligunt, quod nemo absque spiritû regenerationis per Christum Deo concilietur," and so on: "Ac si *partim* remissione, *partim* spirituali regeneratione justi essemus." Calvin having already taught, that by instrumental faith, and apart from all newness of life, man becomes righteous, must needs further teach, that by forgiveness of sins alone is man justified. But although under righteousness Catholics include newness of life, it by no means follows that they hold justification to consist, *partly* in this newness of life, and *partly* in the forgiveness of sins, for out of faith is unfolded the entire new life, and the latter is ever determined by the former. Thus, in the righteous man, faith and the inner newborn life form an inseparable unity (*fides formata*), as in God do forgiveness of sins and sanctification.

error. In the Bible, God is represented as loving men *before* they love Him (see 1 John iv. 10); that is to say, as loving them *without* their love; whereas the Catholic Church teaches that he only, who loves God, is beloved of God. Hereby the free, unmerited, grace of God in Christ seems totally rejected, as if only through our love, the love of God deserved to be acquired. What is to be said in reply to this? In answering this question, we connect with the first epistle of John iv. 10, numerous other passages which appear to contradict it;—passages wherein it is expressly said, that God loves only those who love Him. In the verse referred to, the love of God embracing the human race (τον κοσμον) in the Redeemer, is announced, and at the same time the eternal mystery is unveiled, that God, through his Son, proffers forgiveness to all. But this universal, eternal love of God is *realized in the individual*, only at the moment wherein he cooperates with the love of God revealed in the Redeemer, and, full of faith, stamps it on his heart and his will; so that, as this specific individual, he is, in effect, beloved of God at the moment only when the love hath become mutual. (John xiv. 21-23.) Hence both forms of speech in Holy Writ are equally true; hence the truth of the Catholic doctrine, which, in the article of justification, *wherein this personal appropriation of God's unmerited grace is the question at issue*, necessarily adheres to the words of the Scriptural text last referred to.

3. Let us now turn to the relation which the distinction in question bears to humility. The principal virtue of the Pauline faith is, doubtless, humility,—the unconditional resignation to God in Christ, self-renunciation on the part of man, and his deep conviction of possessing no sentiment agreeable to God, without

Christ;—and it is not be denied, that a perception of this truth mainly influenced the Reformers in their definition of faith. But as they asserted that it was not the intrinsic worth of faith,—that is to say, it was not a circle of closely connected virtues involved in faith, such as humility, love, self-denial, and the rest, which stamped on it the character of justification, a method was found of dispensing with humility even in humility itself, and, in order to evince a true humility, it was taught, that it was not humility in faith which rendered us acceptable to God! It is indeed a sign of true humility, to be ignorant of itself, and to conceal itself from its own view; but never hath a truly humble man taught, that humility doth not render us agreeable to the Deity. Were there any other means of awakening in our souls a heart-felt, vivid, persevering sense of the virtue of humility, than faith in the merits of the Redeemer, by the acknowledgment of which alone man is compelled to go out of himself, to renounce, without reserve, his own self-produced virtue, in order to live entirely in and by God; we should not then even stand in need of the merits of the Redeemer. So much is humility the cardinal point, on which everything hinges, which must be called forth before everything else, because in this negative, all positive is comprised. And this is not to make us acceptable to God, because, forsooth, no virtue can make us so! And it is precisely in the avowal, that it is not humility, but faith only which possesses this property, that true humility is to consist! Here the Reformers were evidently misled by the most vague, the most confused, yet withal honourable, feelings. Of the truly positive principle in the negative character of humility, they had no clear conception. Still less did they pause to reflect, that it is one thing to lay down the doctrine, that a man can be thoroughly good, and another to hold oneself as personally good. The latter would be the destruction of all religious life, while the former is its essential condition.

The inextricable contradiction, in which this doctrine involved the Protestants, is well worthy of notice. According to their teaching, humility, like every other virtue, can be *rightly* found, only where it is most urgently inculcated, that the believer needs it not to render himself acceptable to God. And yet it is taught at the same time, that *on that account* the Christian needs it not, as a holy sentiment, to obtain the favour of the Deity, because, like every other virtue, it appears *always impure* in man, that is to say, always marred by self-complacency and arrogance. Hence, if it were exacted as necessary to justification, man would never become just in the eyes of God. Thus, forsooth, true humility is to be engendered by a system of faith which establishes, that there is no true humility even in the new-born ; and true humility can acquire a solid foundation only by the doctrine of its impossibility, or at least its non-existence in this system. Either the doctrine, that there is no true humility, is right,—and then such a doctrine can never produce true humility, because otherwise the doctrine itself would be false ;—or, there is such a thing as true humility, and then the doctrine is false.

Akin to this contradiction, or, rather, identical with it, though only in another form, is the following. In studying the writings of the Reformers, the thought has often involuntarily occurred to us, that they entertained the opinion that it was something extremely dangerous to be really good; nay, that the principle of sanctity, so soon as it was on the point of acquiring complete dominion over a man, contained the germ of its own destruction, as such a man must needs become arrogant, fall into vain-glory, liken himself to the Eternal, and contend with him for divine sovereignty. Hence the security of believers seemed to require, that they should ever keep within themselves a good germ of evil, because in this state we are better off! Accordingly the matter was so handled, as if real goodness were incompatible with humility, and as if it were in evil only, that this virtue flourished; whereas it was not considered, that wickedness was in itself the contrary of true humility, and utterly excluded it. In the following passage, replete with wonderful *naïveté*, the impression which, as we just said, the reading of the Reformers' writings has produced on our mind, has been recorded in felicitous language by Luther himself. "Doctor Jonas said to Dr. Martin Luther at supper-time: he had that day in his lecture been commenting on that sentence of Paul in 2 Timothy iv. 'Reposita est mihi corona justitiæ'; 'there is laid up for me a crown of justice;' 'Oh! how gloriously doth St. Paul speak of his death! I cannot believe it!' Whereupon Dr. Martin replied, 'I do not believe St. Paul was able to have so strong a faith on this matter as he asserts. In truth, I cannot, alas! believe so firmly as I preach, talk, and write, and as other people think I believe. AND IT WOULD NOT BE QUITE GOOD FOR US TO DO ALL THAT GOD COMMANDS, FOR HE WOULD THEREBY BE DEPRIVED OF HIS DIVINITY, AND WOULD BECOME A LIAR, AND COULD NOT REMAIN TRUE. The authority of St. Paul, too, would be overturned, for he says in Romans: 'God hath concluded all things under sin, in order that He might have mercy on all men.' "*

§ XIX.—Survey of the differences in the doctrine of faith.

We will now endeavour, briefly, to state the points of agreement and of divergence in the article of faith. They are as follows:—

1. If "Faith" be taken in an objective sense, that is to say, as an establishment instituted by God, in Jesus Christ, in opposition to Mosaism, or any human and arbitrary system of religion, and the modes of thinking, feeling, and acting, which such prescribe, then the Catholic can without restriction assert: it is by faith alone, man is able to acquire God's favour: there is no other name given to men whereby they may be saved, save Christ Jesus alone. And it is *only* through the mercy of God, we say this name is given; consequently without any merit on the part of mankind in general, or of individual man in particular.

2. The divergence commences only when the objective must become subjective,—when the question regards the conditions under which that institution of salvation is to conduce towards our personal salvation. But here, also, each confession teaches, that man should adhere to Christ, and enter into a spiritual connexion with him, in order to partake of the blessings proffered through and in him. But the Catholic says, if this adherence be a mere connexion of ideas—an empty union of feeling or phantasy with Christ—a mere theoretic faith in him—a mere recognition of

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* See Luther's Table-talk, p. 166 (in German): Jena, 1603.

Christian truths, in opposition to *works wrought in the vital communion of the will* with Christ, as well as to the love engendered by faith, and to all other virtues; then this faith is in itself by no means sufficient to render men acceptable to God, or to justify. But if faith, on the other hand, be understood as a new divine sentiment, regulating the whole man—as the new living spirit (*fides formata*); then to this *alone*, even according to the Catholic system, is the power given to make us the children of God, and heirs of eternal happiness; for, in this sense, faith alone embraces every thing.* But let it be observed, that, by the Catholic Church, sacred charity is regarded as the substantial form of faith, which alone justifies, not as a consequence, as a fruit *in expectancy*, but which, perhaps, may never come forth. *Love must already vivify faith*, before the Catholic Church will say, that through it man is really pleasing unto God. Faith in love, and love in faith, justify; they form *here* an inseparable unity.† This justifying faith is not merely negative, but positive, withal; not merely a confidence, that, for Christ's sake, the forgiveness of sins will be obtained, but a sanctified feeling, in itself agreeable to God. Charity is, undoubtedly, according to Catholic doctrine, a fruit of faith. But faith justifies, *only when it has already brought forth this fruit.* Faith is also, in our view, a vivifying principle; but it obtains for us the favour of God, *only when it has already unfolded its vivifying power.**

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* We should here observe, that, at the commencement of the Reformation, the proposition, "that faith alone justifies," often bore the sense, "that even the sacraments are unnecessary." On which account, at several religious conferences, the Catholics, under the article of faith, insisted on the necessity of the sacraments as means of justification. Of these external means of grace we are not here speaking, where we have to treat merely of the internal acts agreeable to God, the spiritual state of the soul, and its outward manifestations in moral conduct.

† A very comprehensive view of this subject has been taken by Cardinal Sadoletus, bishop of Carpentras, in his letter to the Genevans. (Epp. c. xvii. n. 25, Opp. ed. Veron. 1738, tom. ii. p. 176.) "Assequimur bonum hoc nostræ perpetuæ universæque salutis, fide in Deum sola et in Jesum Christum. Cum dico fide solâ, non ita intelligo, quemadmodum isti novarum rerum repertores intelligunt, *ut seclusâ*

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charitate et cæteris Christianæ mentis officiis, solam in Deum credulitatem et fiduciam illam, qua persuasus sum in Christi cruce et sanguine mea mihi delicta omnia esse ignota: est hoc quidem etiam nobis necessarium, primus hic nobis patet ad Deum introitus: sed is tamen non est satis. Mentem enim præterea afferamus oportet pietatis plenam erga summum Deum, cupidamque efficiendi quæcunque illi grata sint: in quo præcipue virtus Spiritûs Sancti inest. Quæ mens etiamsi interdum ad exteriora opera non progreditur, ipsa tamen ex sese ad bene operandum jam intus parata est, promptumque gerit studium, ut Deo in cunctis rebus obsequatur: qui verus divinæ justitiæ in nobis est habitus." After citing several scriptural texts, Sadoletus continues: "Certe fides, quæ in Deum nostra per Jesum Christum est, non solum ut confidamus in Christo, sed bene in illo operantes, operarive instituentes, ut confidamus, imperat nobis ac præscribit. Est enim amplum ac plenum vocabulum fides, nec solum in se credulitatem et fiduciam continet: sed spem etiam et studium obediendi Deo, et illam, quæ in Christo maxime perspicua nobis facta est, principem et dominam Christianarum omnium virtutum, charitatem."

* Sadoleti Epp. lib. xiii. n. 2; Gaspari Contareno Card. opp. ed. Veron. tom. ii. p. 45. "De justificatione et justitiâ placet mihi vehementer tuarum rationum contextus et distinctio ex Aristotele sumpta. Sequitur enim certe charitas cursum illum antecedentem, quo ad justitiam pervenitur: non tamen sequitur eadem charitas (meo quidem animo opinioneque) justitiam, *sed eam ipsa constituit:* vel potius charitas ipsa est justitia. Habet enim formæ vim charitas: forma autem est id, quod ipsa res. Cum ergo acceditur, præeunte illa præparatione ad justitiam, acceditur una et ad charitatem: ad quam cum est perventum, tum justitia per ipsam charitatem constituitur. Justitiam voco, non vulgari, neque Aristotelico nomine, sed Christiano more

3. The justifying subjective faith, in the Protestant sense, is described, not merely as a recognition of the New Testament Revelation,* but as an assurance of the Divine Grace in Christ Jesus, as confidence in the merits of the Redeemer, by the power whereof sins are forgiven. And this confidence is held up as being able, abstractedly and entirely of itself, to win for its possessor the favour and friendship of the Almighty. This consciousness of the Divine favour must see charity and good works in its train; but as by their presence the latter contribute nought towards justifica-

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ac modo, eam quæ omnes virtutes complexa continet: neque id humanis viribus, sed instinctû influxûque divino," etc.

* On this matter, as in other articles, we find in Luther little permanent uniformity; and this may be accounted for by the obscurity and confusion in the notion which he *commonly* attached to justifying faith. Very often with him, "faith" is belief in the truth of anything. Thus, in his commentary on the epistle to the Galatians (loc. cit. p. 70), he calls faith "a hidden, lofty, secret, incomprehensible *knowledge*; but immediately thereupon, "a true confidence and assurance of the heart." Elsewhere, in the same work, he compares faith to dialectics, and hope to rhetoric; that is to say, faith floated before his mind as something theoretical, and not as anything practical. In his work, *De servo arbitrio* (lib. i. p. 177, b), faith is again described, in a long passage, as a firm persuasion; and so also in the numerous passages where he opposes it to the future intuition. In his book, *De captivitate Babylonicâ* (opp. tom. ii. p. 279, b), he says: "Verbum Dei omnium primum est quod sequitur fides, fidem charitas, charitas deinde facit omne bonum opus." Here one act on the part of men is overlooked: the preaching of the truth is followed, first, by *knowledge and recognition of the truth*, next, by confidence, and so on; but which of these acts is here denoted by *fides?* Probably it includes at once knowledge and confidence. Such indefiniteness in language is attended with very pernicious consequences, and, in later times, was productive of an utter indifference to *the truth*, just as if the having confidence were alone sufficient, or as if "confidence" were intelligible without the firm conviction of the truth.

tion, so by their absence they take nothing from the state of the justified. Here, accordingly, charity is not regarded as the substantial form of the alone-justifying faith: man is already justified, so soon as he confides in Christ; the seed is sown for heaven, and brings us thither, even when, under unfavourable circumstances, as, for instance, the sluggishness of the will, and the like, it bears absolutely no fruit. Thus the Protestant doctrine excludes works wrought before, as well as after, conversion to Christ, and, moreover, all holy sentiments, when it attributes to faith alone the power of saving,—a doctrine which we may say, in passing, has not even the *very slightest* foundation in Scripture. Of *such* an opposition between faith, charity, and works, *Paul did not even once think,* and James is absolutely opposed to it. (See section XXII.)*

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* After this investigation we shall be enabled to appreciate Gerhard's *Loci Theologici* (tom. vii. p. 206, loc. xvii. c. iii. sect. v.) where he endeavours to base on tradition the Protestant doctrine of faith. It is a compilation totally unworthy of a man like Gerhard. Every passage wherein any doctor of the Church asserts that faith in Christ alone conducts to salvation, he alleges in favour of the Protestant theory, without at all inquiring what sense the author attached to these words. He was even so foolish as to make use of those passages wherein fathers of the Church (for example, St. Irenæus), assert of the Catholic faith, in opposition to heretical systems of doctrine, that it can alone insure salvation!! The perception that a father of the Church, like Chrysostom, who held anything but the Protestant doctrine respecting original sin, free-will, and its relation to grace, could not possibly have entertained the Lutheran view of faith, it would be perhaps too much to expect from Gerhard; for any desire to investigate the internal connexion between different doctrines he did not even feel.

§ xx.—On the assurance of justification and eternal felicity.

The opinion, that the believer must be perfectly convinced of his justification before God, and of his future felicity, is so closely connected with the doctrine of faith, in the Protestant system,* that Melancthon says of the schoolmen, who deny it, "We see clearly, from this alone, how utterly devoid of intellect this species of men are."† The close connexion of this position with the whole Protestant system is undeniably clear. We have before observed, that, from the doctrine of the total extirpation of all seeds of good out of the human breast, one advantage in regard to Christian life might be gained,—that man, so soon as he perceived any little sparks of a higher life within him, might be well assured that God had begun His work of redemption, which would be as certainly consummated. (Chap. XI. § VI.) Secondly, that theory of faith, according to which men are to direct their view towards God's mercy, and to turn it away from their own moral state,* necessarily involves the opinion we have advanced. Moreover, this assurance of salvation presupposes absolute predestination, and the doctrine, that God's grace works only in the elect; for if a man can at any time repel the grace once felt, then, by the very idea of this possibility, the sense of certitude is at once shaken. Hence, it is only by the Calvinists that this doctrine hath been carried out to its full extent; while on the part of the Lutherans, it betrays that original adherence to the principles of predestination, which in other matters also have left traces of their influence, and the later rejection whereof, has so materially impaired the internal harmony of their system.

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* Apolog. iv. § 40, p. 83. "Non diligimus, nisi *certo* statuant corda, quod donata sit nobis remissio peccatorum." XII. De pœnitent. § 20, p. 157: "Hanc certitudinem fidei nos docemus requiri in evangelio." Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 2, § 16, fol. 197: "In summâ, vere fidelis non est, nisi qui solidâ persuasione Deum sibi propitium benevolumque patrem esse persuasus, deque ejus benignitate omnia sibi pollicetur: nisi qui divinæ erga se benevolentiæ promissionibus fretus, indubitatam salutis expectationem præsumit."

† Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 116. "Ut vel hoc solo loco satis appareat, nihil fuisse spiritûs in toto genere."

‡ Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 92, says, in this respect: "Debebant enim non opera sua, sed promissionem misericordiæ Dei contemplari. *Quid est enim iniquius, quam æstimare voluntatem Dei ex operibus nostris, quam ille suo verbo nobis declaravit?*" True, if man hath no freedom; and hence it is by no means surprising, that Melancthon

Catholics, from opposite reasons, believe not that a quite unerring certitude of salvation can be acquired.*

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requires us to be certain of our salvation (for the certitude of the forgiveness of sins is, with the Reformers, tantamount to the certitude of salvation), although the believer be not assured of his perseverance in good. "Certissima sententia est, oportere nos certissimos semper esse de remissione peccati, de benevolentiâ Dei erga nos, qui justificati sumus. Et norunt quidem fide sancti, certissime se esse in gratia, sibi condonata esse peccata. Non enim fallit Deus, qui pollicitus est, se condonaturum peccata credentibus, *tametsi incerti sint, an perseveraturi sint.*"

* Concil. Trident. Sess. VI. cap. ix. "Sicut nemo pius de Dei misericordia, de Christi merito, de sacramentorum virtute et efficaciâ dubitare debet, sic quilibet, dum se ipsum suamque propriam infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratiâ formidare et timere potest, *cum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei*, cui non potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum." Cap. xii. "Nemo quoque, quamdiu in hac mortalitate vivitur, de arcano divinæ prædestinationis mysterio usque adeo præsumere debet, ut certo statuat se omnino esse in numero prædestinatorum: quasi verum esset, quod justificatus amplius peccare non possit, aut, si peccaverit, certam sibi resipiscentiam promittere debeat. Nam, nisi ex speciali revelatione, sciri non potest, quos Deus sibi elegerit." C. xiii. "Similiter de perseverantiæ munere, de quo scriptum est,—Qui perseveravit usque in finem, hic salvus erit: quod

As they consider not fallen man to be devoid of all moral and religious qualities and signs of life, they are unable to discover a criterion, absolutely beyond the reach of illusion, whereby they can distinguish between the operations of grace, and the effects of those feelings in man akin to the Deity, and uneradicated by his fall.*

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quidem aliunde haberi non potest, nisi ab eo, qui potens est eum, qui stat, statuere, ut perseveranter stet, et eum, qui cadit, restituere. Nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliceatur: tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare, et reponere omnes debent. Deus enim, nisi ipsi illius gratiæ defuerint, sicut cœpit opus bonum, ita perficiet, operans velle et perficere. Verumtamen qui se existimant stare, videant, ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur. (Phil. ii. 12)......Formidare enim debent, scientes quod in spem gloriæ, et nondum in gloriam renati sunt, de pugna quæ superest cum carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo: in quâ victores esse non possunt, nisi cum Dei gratiâ apostolo obtemperent, dicenti: Debitores sumus, non carni, ut secundum carnem vivamus; si enim secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini: si autem spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis."

* Melancthon (loc. theol. p. 121) says, "The fruits of the Holy Spirit testify that he worketh in our breast (*quod in pectore nostro versetur*); every one, to wit, knoweth from his own experience whether he hateth sin from the bottom of his heart." This criterion sounds the more strange from the lips of Melancthon, because he at the same time teaches, that even in the will of the regenerated sin remains; that is to say, it is not detested from the heart. Hereby, accordingly, confidence would be placed in our own worthiness, whereas the Protestant doctrine of the solace of faith is to be zealously upheld, precisely because, if man look to himself, despair must take possession of his soul. The principles, which Melancthon here lays down for discerning the state of grace, are those of the Catholic theologians of the Middle Age, and suit only the Catholic point of view.

So speaks St. Thomas Aquinas, loc. cit. quæst. cxii. art. v. "Hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest, se habere gratiam, in quantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas, et in quantum homo non est conscius peccati mortalis. Secundum quem modum potest intelligi, quod habetur Apoc. 1: 'Vincenti dabo manna absconditum, quod nemo novit, nisi qui accipit,' quia sc. ille, qui accipit,

But even if they were fortunate enough to possess such a criterion, the confidence built thereon would be again damped, by the remembrance of the doctrine of human and divine cooperation in the second birth and its consummation, and be reduced to a more modest tone. For, together with the deepest confidence in God's mercy, Catholics are taught, by reason of those humiliating experiences, which we all make in the course of our lives, to entertain a great distrust of human fidelity; and an absolute predestination, that would bid them overlook such scruples, is rejected by their Church. Thus the Catholic Christian, without a false security, yet full of consolation, calm, and entirely resigned to the divine mercy, awaits the day on which God shall pronounce his final award.

The avowals of Calvin in this matter are very remarkable, as well as the strenuous exertions he must have recourse to, in order to awaken in the souls of his disciples the desired assurance. He observes, that no temptation of Satan is more dangerous, than when he seduces believers to doubt of the certainty of their salvation, *and tempts them to seek the same in evil ways.* To this he subjoins the remark, that such temptations are the more dangerous, *because to none are the generality of men more inclined, than to these.* Rarely do we find a man, whose soul is not at times disturbed by the thought,—"Nowhere is the source of thy salvation to be found, but in the Divine election; but in what manner hath this election been revealed to thee?"

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per quandam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit. Ista tamen cognitio imperfecta est. Unde apostolus dicit. I. ad Cor. iv.: 'Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum,'" etc.

This train of thought Calvin concludes with a proposition drawn from his own experience: "When once such doubts have become habitual in any one, then the unhappy man is either constantly tortured with dreadful anxiety, or entirely deprived of all consciousness."*

By this rash endeavour to obtain the assurance of our future salvation, various kinds of superstition, as well as a distracting uncertainty, were occasioned: so that the very contrary to Calvin's wishes occurred; and it soon became manifest, that the effects of an unnatural desire were ever pernicious. With sin, and the combat against sin, came the restlessness of the spirit; the latter never capable of being stilled, till the former had ceased to exist.† Undoubtedly, according to the sentence of the apostle, the spirit testifies to the spirit, that we are the children of God;‡ but this testimony is of so delicate a nature, and must be handled with such tender care, that the Christian, in the feeling of his unworthiness and frailty, approaches the subject only with timidity, and scarcely ventures to take cognizance of it. It is a holy joy, which would fain conceal itself from its own view, and remain a mystery to itself; and the more exalted the Christian stands, the more humble is he, and the less is he disposed, without an extraordinary revelation, to vaunt of a certainty, which so little accords with the uncertainty and mutability of all earthly things. The higher the duties which the Catholic Church imposes on man, the more obvious the reason wherefore she will acknowledge no absolute certainty of salvation. And herein precisely we must look for the motive of her teaching, that the believer can and must become worthy of salvation, while yet she denies the certainty thereof; whereas the Protestants, who assert that man can in no wise become worthy of heaven, exert their utmost endeavours to call forth such a sense of security.

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* Lib. iii. c. 24, § 3, fol. 353......"Eoque exitialior est hæc tentatio, quod ad nullam aliam propensiores simus fere omnes......Quæ si apud quempiam semel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuo excruciat, aut reddit penitus attonitum."

† Calvin. loc. cit. c. 2, § 17, fol. 198. "Nos certe dum fidem docemus esse certam ac securam, non certitudinem aliquam imaginamur, quæ nullâ tangatur dubitatione, nec securitatem, quæ nullâ sollicitudine impetatur; quin potius dicimus, perpetuum esse fidelibus certamen cum suâ ipsorum diffidentiâ." But by this sentence the whole doctrine of assurance is given up. These striking contradictions are inherent in the very effort to force artificially on the human consciousness something in contradiction to that consciousness itself.

‡ Sarpi histoire du concile de Trente, traduite par Amelot de la Houssaie, Amst. 1699, p. 198. "Au commencement du IX. chapitre, où l'on disait, *que les péchés ne sont pas remis par la certitude qu'on a de la remission*, le legat changea le mot de *certitude* en ceux de jactance et de confiance présomptueuse en vertu de cette certitude de la grâce. Et à la fin du même chapitre, au lieu de dire, *parceque personne ne peut savoir certainement, qu'il ait reçu la grâce de Dieu*, le mot *certainement* fut changé en ceux-ci, de certitude de foi." This is further

Moreover, in many other cases of spiritual life, it is the same as with the point in question. The innocence that would become conscious of itself, is usually lost by that very act; and the reflexion, whether the act we are about to perform be really pure, makes it not unfrequently impure. Hence the Saviour saith, "let not thy right hand know what thy left doeth." Joyful, yet full of sorrow, calm, and without precipitancy, the true saints

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below explained, that faith is eternally true and unchangeable itself, however believing man may change; whereas, he who by an inward feeling is convinced of his state of grace, cannot yet be sure whether through sin he may not fall from that state: and therefore man in general cannot be assured of his salvation, *cum certitudine fidei*, although he may with confiding hope look forward to it.

pursue their way—they boast not on that account of being in the number of the elect, but resign their fate to God. According to the Protestant theory, every one should be asked what he thought of himself, and he must in his own life be regarded as a saint. The doubt of others as to the truth of his own declaration would invalidate the doctrine of the symbolical books. As if in irony of their own doctrine, the Protestants would recognize no saints! I think that, in the neighbourhood of any man, who would declare himself under all circumstances assured of his salvation, I should feel very uncomfortable, and should probably have some difficulty to put away the thought, that something like diabolical influence was here at play.

But the truth, which even this Protestant doctrine darkly divined, must not be overlooked. It consists in the individualizing of evangelical truths—in pointing to the necessity of the personal application of them, and of the relation of the Divine promises to ourselves, so that we should not regard them as undefined, and as merely relative to others.

OF GOOD WORKS.

§ XXI.—Doctrine of Catholics respecting good works.

By good works the Catholic Church understands the whole moral actions and sufferings of the man justified in Christ, or the fruits of holy feeling and believing love. Of the observance of certain ecclesiastical ceremonies, external rites, and the like, we have not *here* occasion to speak, as the following exposition will very clearly show. As in the man truly born again from the Spirit, the Catholic Church recognizes a real liberation from sin, a direction of the spirit and the will truly sanctified and acceptable to God, it necessarily follows that she asserts the possibility and reality of truly good works, and their consequent meritoriousness. It is evident, too, that, in consequence of this doctrine, she can and must exact the fulfilment of the moral law, as laid down by the Apostle Paul, in Rom. viii. 3-4.

Thus, we must especially observe, that it is only on works consummated in a real vital communion with Christ, the Church bestows the predicate "good;" and, of a fulfilment of the law, she speaks only in so far as the power to this effect hath been given in fellowship with Christ. The Fathers of Trent express themselves in the following manner:—" As a constant power flows from Christ, the Head, on the justified, who are his members, as from the vine to its branches, a power, which precedes their good works, accompanies the same, and follows them,—a power, without which, they can be in nowise agreeable to God, and meritorious; so we are bound to believe, that the justified are enabled, through works performed in God, to satisfy the divine law, according to the condition of this present life, and to merit eternal life, when they depart in a state of grace.*

From this we may, at the same time, clearly see, how far works are called meritorious. When we presuppose, what must be here of course taken for granted, the fundamental doctrine of all true religion, to wit, that it was out of *pure love itself* that God conferred on us life, all our faculties, and the destination for eternal happiness; and that the agent expressly acknowledges these truths; then we may briefly describe those works as meritorious, which our freedom (and without freedom it were idle to talk of man's moral relations) hath wrought in *the power of Christ.* Hence the holy fathers of Trent observe at the same time: "So great is the goodness of the Lord towards all men, that He considers his own gifts as their merits."* This is the idea which the ancient Church attached to merit, and which is founded on Holy Writ. Can heaven then be merited by believers? Undoubtedly; they must merit it, that is to say, become worthy of it, through Christ. Between them and heaven there must be a homogeneity—an internal relation; that relation, which, by God's eternal ordinance and His express promises, exists between sanctity and beatitude; terms which are not only inseparable, but which stand also in the same relation to one another, as cause and effect.† The Catholic Church, as she maintains that the genuine Christian possesses in Christ an inward righteousness proper to himself, and deeply rooted in his being, cannot do other than teach that salvation is to be derived from this source. A heavenly seed having been sown in the soul of the just, it must bear its fruits for heaven.*

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. 16.

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* Even Calvin allows this to be the doctrine of Catholics. He says as follows (Instit. lib. iii. c. 11, § 14, p. 266): "Subtile effugium se habere putant sophistæ, qui sibi ex scripturæ depravatione et inanibus cavillis ludos et delicias faciunt: nam opera (of these St. Paul saith that they do not justify) exponunt, quæ literaliter tantum et liberi arbitrii conatu extra Christi gratiam faciunt homines necdum regeniti, id vero ad opera spiritualia spectare negant. (This is right.) Ita, secundum eos, tam fide, quam operibus justificatur homo, modo ne sint propria ipsius opera, sed dona Christi et regenerationis fructus." However, the Catholic doth not say, man is justified *tam fide, quam operibus*, as if both existed independently of each other.

† St. Thomas Aquinas has expressed himself admirably on this matter. He says (loc. cit. quæst. cxiv. art. 1) that the notion of merit is founded on the notion of justice, in the Hellenic and Roman sense of the word. But absolute justice, strictly speaking, exists only between absolute equals. To give back *of our own* as much as we have received, or will receive, is to give according to merit, and to act justly, which absolutely presupposes the equality of both parties. In this sense there can be no question of merit before God; for we should be obliged

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to offer to God what is our own, not what we have received from him, whereupon he would repay us with as much of his own. Hence, when in Holy Writ so much is said of a reward, which the good receive in the next life; or when it is said there will be a remuneration, according to works, it is only a conditional merit and a conditional justice which is meant. He says: "Manifestum est autem, quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inæqualitas, in infinitum enim distant; totum, quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo, unde non potest hominis a Deo esse justitia secundum absolutam æqualitatem, sed secundum proportionem quandam, in quantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanæ virtutis homini est a Deo, et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest, nisi secundum præsuppositionem divinæ ordinationis: ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo, per suam operationem, quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit. Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatæ, differenter tamen, quia creatura rationalis se ipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium. Unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in aliis creaturis."

* St. Thomas, in answer to the questions, whether eternal life can be obtained without grace? and whether with grace we become *worthy* of the same? says as follows: (Q. cxiv. art. II.) "Non potest homo mereri absque gratia vitam æternam per *pura* naturalia, quia scilicet meritum hominis dependet ex præordinatione divinâ. Actus autem cujuscunque rei non ordinatur divinitus ad aliquid excedens proportionem virtutis, quæ est principium actus: hoc enim est ex institutione divinæ providentiæ, ut nihil agat ultra suam virtutem. Vita autem æterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturæ creatæ: quia etiam excedit cognitionem et desiderium ejus, secundum illud I. ad Cor. 2: nec oculus vidit etc. Et inde est, quod nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actûs meritorii vitæ æternæ, nisi superaddatur aliquid supernaturale donum, quod gratia dicitur. Si vero

If Catholics teach, that the divine grace which precedes the first beginnings of regeneration, cannot be merited, this is a far different case; and this remark should serve to place in the strongest light our doctrine respecting good works. In the former instance, nature, yea, fallen nature and grace stand opposed to one another;—humanity, thoroughly polluted with sin, on one side, and the Deity on the other: but in the latter instance, this is by no means the case. Although the greatest effort of nature cannot draw down to itself the supernatural power (for this must condescend), in the regenerated, however, exist qualities truly divine and supernatural,—a holy energy, which stamps its impress on the whole inward life of the believer, and contains, as in a germ, the beatitude which still, however, retains a supernatural and divine character. Thereby, however, the grace of beatitude doth not cease to be a grace; but it is already comprised in the grace of sanctification. If God gave the latter, then was the former, too, communicated. Hence also, the Council observes, this doctrine can give no occasion to self-confidence or to self-glory; but "he who glorieth, must glory only in the Lord."

It is, moreover, scarcely necessary to observe, that it is not to works considered abstractedly, but to works

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loquamur de homine sub peccato existente, additur cum hoc secunda ratio propter impedimentum peccati," etc. Art. III.: "Si loquamur de opere meritorio, secundum quod procedit ex gratiâ Spiritus Sancti, sic est meritorium vitæ æternæ ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti, moventis nos in vitam æternam, secundum illud Joann. iv., fiet in eo fons aquæ salientis in vitam æternam, etc.... Gratia Spiritus Sancti, quam in præsenti habemus, etsi non sit æqualis gloriæ in actû, est tamen æqualis in virtute: sicut et semen arbori, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem."

in connexion with the feelings in which they have their source, that salvation is awarded: it is promised to works only in so far as they are the expression and the blossom, the consummation and the proof, of feeling, or love in its outward and active manifestation. By a metonymy, the outward is put for the inward thing, which constitutes with the former an indivisible whole,—a one act, and this, too, *in consequence of a biblical usage of speech.* It is, also, self-evident, that sanctified feelings, which remain unmanifested in deeds, because they fail of an outward occasion, or even of the physical means, possess as much worth, as if they had been revealed in works.* Lastly, it is taught, that the performance of good works augments grace. Exercise in good, the faithful cooperation with grace, renders the soul ever more susceptible to its influence. The general maxim, that the exercise of any faculty serves to strengthen it, holds good in this case also; and that he who doth not bury the talent he hath received, but puts it out to interest, will receive still more, is the promise of our Lord.

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* Jacob Sadolet. card. ad princip. Germaniæ oratio, loc. cit. p. 360. "Quomodo igitur opera cum fide simul justificant, cum sæpe absque operibus faciat sola fides justitiam, uti in latrone fecit, ut in aliis multis, quos ex historiis ecclesiasticis possumus colligere? Nempe, quia habitus justitiæ, quo ad bene operandum propensi efficimur, fidei ipsi ab initio statim propter amorem et charitatem est annexus; ubi enim amor Dei inest, qui in vera illa fide protinus elucet, simul illa subito adest propensio animi et cogitatio, esse in actionibus rectis amori nostro in Deum, et Deo ipsi satisfaciendum, admonenti nos illi et docenti, si diligamus eum, et mandata ejus servemus. Hinc intestinus justitiæ habitus, non conflatus ex actionibus et operibus nostris, sed cum ipsa fide charitateque conjunctim divinitus nobis impressus, is ille ipse est, qui justos nos facit. Et sane convenientius est, ut a justitia justi, quam a fide nominemur. Tametsi (ut dixi) omnia hæc in unum connexa sunt et cohærent. Hunc habitum præclare exprimit Paulus divinis illis verbis, quibus ad Ephesios utitur, sic scribens: gratia servati estis per fidem, idque non ex vobis, Dei donum est; non ex operibus, ne quis glorietur, Dei enim ipsius sumus effectio, ædificati in Christo Jesu ad opera bona, quibus præparavit Deus in illis ut ambularemus. Ad Deum itaque per Christum accedenti, statim ad recte faciendum prompta facilitas quædam et voluntas bona agnoscitur. Porro iste ipse habitus justitiæ tunc absolute in nobis perfectus est, cum explicat sese, et exerit in sanctas actiones: exercitationemque continet justitiæ cum ipsa exercendi voluntate conjunctam. Ipso autem fidei

But doth not this doctrine promote mere outward holiness? Its object is precisely to encourage *holiness in deeds*. Doth it not produce self-righteousness? This should it do,—namely, cause that we *ourselves* become righteous. Yes, indeed, the Church requires works emanating from the sanctified soul, and knows well how to appreciate the mere exterior works. Nay, she urges us to become righteous *in our own persons*, distinguishing this very accurately from the conceit that we can become righteous *through ourselves;* but she calls on the Protestants to learn this distinction, not to hold the one as synonimous with the other, and, in consequence, to reject both alike.

§ XXII.—Doctrine of the Protestants respecting good works.

Let us now turn to the exposition of the Protestant doctrine on good works. Above all, we must describe what they are in themselves, according to the Lutheran and Calvinistic writings; next, what is their merit, and whether and how far they be deemed necessary. That this whole article of doctrine must, in every respect, be

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initio, aut si spatium non est recti faciendi, licet totam perfectionem justitiæ non teneat, idem tamen nobis potest ad salutem, quod absoluta plenaque justitia."

only a further development of the Protestant principles on justification and justifying faith, is evident of itself; for the view which the Protestants have formed of the latter, that it possesses no power of moral renovation, no power for the expiation of sin, pervades their whole conception of Christian works. In a word, the same relation which they, as we have before shown, establish betwixt justifying faith and charity, recurs here, applied to good works.

Luther, asserting the continuance and operation of original sin, even in the will of the justified, maintained, immediately after the commencement of his Reforming career, that no works could possibly be *pure and acceptable to the Deity;* and used the expression, that even the best work is a venial sin. This proposition was, as may be supposed, condemned in the papal censure of his opinions. But the Reformer went a step further, and laid down the doctrine, that every so-called good work,—that is to say, every act of a believer,—is, when considered in itself, a mortal sin, though, by reason of faith, it is remitted to him.* Melancthon not only expressed full concurrence in the doctrine of his master, but carried it out to an extreme, by asserting, that all our works, all our endeavours, are *nothing but* sin;† and Calvin, though in more measured language, corroborated the assertions of both.*

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* Luther. assert. omn. art. op. tom. ii. fol. 325, b. "Opus bonum optime factum est veniale peccatum. Hic (articulus) manifeste sequitur ex priori, nisi quod addendum sit, quod alibi copiosius dixi,—hoc veniale peccatum non natura sua, sed misericordia Dei, tale esse...... Omne opus justi damnabile est et peccatum mortale, si judicio Dei judicetur." Cfr. Antilatom. (confut. Luth. rat. latom.) l. c. fol. 406, b, 407, seq.

† Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 108. "Quæ vero opera justificationem consequuntur, ea, tametsi a spiritû Dei, qui occupavit corda justifica-

It may not be unworthy of our attention, and at any rate it will conduce to the elucidation of the subject before us, to examine, in a few words, the course of argument pursued by Luther. He says: in the saint two men are to be distinguished,—a slave of sin, and a servant of God; the former is holy according to the flesh, the latter according to the spirit. Accordingly, the person of the just man is in part holy, in part sinful; and the entire personality being thus divided between sin and holiness, every good work partakes of the character of both,—for a holy and an unholy sentiment co-exist in the breast of the believer.† Even Melancthon expressly affirms, that the believer, in despite of the spirit of Christ working within him, is unable to exalt himself above this dualism; that *two*

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torum, proficiscuntur, tamen quia fiunt in carne adhuc impurâ, sunt et ipsa immunda." P. 158: "Nos docuimus, justificari solâ fide,...... opera nostra, conatus nostros nihil nisi peccatum esse."

* Calvin. instit. lib. ii. c. 8, § 59, lib. iii. c. 4, § 28. He says the same also in his work, *De necessit. Reformandæ eccl. opuscul.* p. 430; yet his expressions are much milder than Luther's. He says here: "Nos ergo sic docemus; semper deesse bonis fidelium operibus *summam* puritatem, quæ conspectum Dei ferre possit, imo etiam *quodammodo* inquinata esse," etc. Quite falsely doth Zwingle state the Protestant doctrine. He says (in fidei Christianæ exposit. ad regem christianiss. Gall. opp. tom. ii. p. 558): "Fidem oportet esse fontem operis. Si fides adsit, jam opus gratum est Deo: si desit, perfidiosum est, quicquid fit, et subinde non tantum ingratum, sed et abominabile Deo......Et ex nostris quidem παραδόξως adseruerunt, (?) omnè opus nostrum esse abominationem. Quâ sententiâ nihil aliud voluerunt, quam quod jam diximus!" This Luther did not mean to say, for otherwise there would be no difference.

† Luther. Assert. omn. art. n. 31, opp. tom. ii. fol. 319.

natures ever survive in him, the spirit and the flesh.* If we only recollect that by the word "flesh" is understood, not the body merely, but the entire man, independent of the new powers imparted to him through the Holy Ghost, there can no longer remain, it appears to us, any obscurity in this article.†

The spirit of Christ is too powerless to be able, like a purifying fire, totally to cleanse the nature of man, and to produce in him pure charity and pure works. Hence the assertion so often and so energetically repeated by the leaders of the Reformation, at the outset of their career, that even the regenerated cannot fulfil the law.‡ On this subject Luther expresses himself with great *naïveté*. In reply to the observation of the Catholics,—that God commands not impossibilities, and that, if we have only the will, we have the power of loving Him with our whole hearts, and thereby of fulfilling the law, he observes: "Commanding and doing are two things. Commandment is soon given, but it is not so easily executed. It is, therefore, a wrong conclusion to say, God has commanded me to love him; therefore I can do so."§

The intrinsic inanity of this doctrine, its evident repugnance to Scripture,—which only the most forced interpretation could conceal,—and the very pernicious influence which it too evidently exercised over the morals of those professing it, as well as the cogent objections of Catholics, gradually brought about some ameliorations, which passed into the later writings of Melancthon, and even into the public formularies, but still fell very far short of that standard, which the Catholic Church deems herself authorized, both by the spirit and the letter of the Gospel, to propose to her children.*

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* Melancth. loc. theolog. "Ita fit, ut duplex sit sanctorum natura spiritus et caro."

† Loc. cit. p. 138.

‡ Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 127. "Maledixit lex eos, qui non universam legem semel absolverint. At universa lex nonne summum amorem erga Deum, vehementissimum metum Dei exigit? a quibus cum tota natura sit alienissima, utut maxime pulcherrimum pharisæismum præstes, maledictionis tamen rei sumus."

§ Luther, Commentary on Epistle to Galatians, loc. cit. p. 233.

If, now, the question be asked, what do good works, or rather the sentiments pervading them,—the inward kernel of the regenerated,—the fulfilment of the law through charity,—what do good works merit? it is clear, that this question must be answered in a sense very different from that of Catholics. Already the rejection of the cooperation of free-will necessarily involved the denial of every species of merit, and rendered the very notion of such a thing utterly unintelligible. As, moreover, no true sanctity was believed to exist in the justified, so no felicity could be derived from it. Accordingly, it was most zealously contended, that, when the question was about good works, and the observance of the moral precepts, the former should not be represented as having reference to the acquisition of eternal happiness, nor the latter as having any internal connexion with works and the fulfilment of the law; and both should be stated as utterly independent one of the other, in the same way as justification is something very different from sanctification.† To estimate the whole extent of that separation, which in this article of doctrine divides the Christian Confessions, we need only be reminded of George Major, a very esteemed Protestant, who ventured to teach, that good works are necessary to salvation. His motive in the introduction of this innovation was very laudable. He believed that a true Christian bearing and deportment was most painfully neglected among the members of his Church, and that the preaching of what was then called "the new obedience," was not adequately discharged; and, under this impression, he conceived, that, if the necessity of good works for ensuring salvation was generally recognized, a salutary change in this respect would take place. By this step he advanced scarcely a whit nearer to the Catholic doctrine than the other Lutherans; for, like them, he did not uphold an internal connexion between holiness and salvation. He only conceived that good works must be there (outwardly present), if eternal happiness was to be the reward of faith.* Nevertheless,

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* Apolog. iv. de dilect. et implet. legis. § 50, p. 91. "Hæc ipsa legis impletio, quæ sequitur renovationem, est *exigua* et *immunda*." § 46. p. 88: "In hâc vitâ *non possumus* legi satisfacere."

† Solid. Declar. iv. § 15, p. 672. "Interim tamen diligenter in hoc

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negotio cavendum est, ne bona opera articulo justificationis et salutis nostræ immisceantur. Propterea hæ propositiones rejiciuntur: 'Bona opera piorum necessaria esse ad salutem,'" etc. III. De fidei justitiâ. § 20, p. 658: "Similiter et renovatio seu sanctificatio, quamvis et ipsa sit beneficium mediatoris Christi et opus Spiritus Sancti, non tamen ea ad articulum aut negotium justificationis coram Deo pertinet: sed eam sequitur."

* Marheineke thinks, the distinction between the Catholic and the Protestant doctrine, respecting works, consists herein: that these are considered by Catholics as a *conditio sine quâ non* to salvation, but not so by Protestants. This is by no means the case. Such, indeed, was the opinion of Major; but it is not the Catholic doctrine. Melancthon in his *Erotemat. Dialectices*, p. 276, ed. Wittenberg, 1550), defines the notion of the *conditio sine quâ non*, to be, not the internal condition to, or primary cause of, an effect, but something by the absence whereof the effect doth not take place: as, for instance, if a king should

his doctrine excited general opposition; and Von Amsdorf, the old friend of Luther, composed, under these circumstances, a work, wherein he professed to show that good works were even hurtful to salvation.* The Formulary of Concord, which, among other things, undertook to adjust the controversies pending on this subject, disapproves, indeed, of Amsdorf's doctrine, yet expresses that disapprobation in very mild terms; while it rejects Major's view as incompatible with the exclusive particles,—"Faith *alone* saves, by faith alone we are justified *without* works."†

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offer his daughter in marriage to any one, who should with great elegance ride up and down a public place, the *conditio sine quâ non* would have no manner of internal relation to the effect, which is to follow. On the other hand, the doctrine of the Catholic Church may be represented under the image of a father promising the hand of his daughter to a youth who sincerely loved her, and was favoured with her affection. This mutual inclination of hearts is an internal condition to the solemnization of marriage—something required by the essence of the latter.

* The work is intitled, "The Proposition of Nicholas von Amsdorf, that good works are hurtful to salvation, shown to be a right, true, Christian proposition, preached by St. Paul and St. Luther." 1559. He defended the proposition in the same sense, as Luther might have defended the thesis of a disputation: "fides nisi sit sine ullis, etiam minimis operibus, non justificat, imo non est fides." Op. tom. i. p. 523. The sense of this thesis must be clear from the preceding statements in the text. Doubtless it was immediately followed by the other thesis, "*impossibile esse, fidem esse sine assiduis, multis et magnis operibus.* Both theses comprise *exaggerated opinions*, whose limitation must be drawn from the whole argument in our text. The editor of Luther's works, in the introduction prefixed to the general collection of that Reformer's public Disputations, which are found in great numbers at the end of the first volume, observes, that from these disputations we may learn, in the surest as well as the shortest way, Luther's true doctrine; and this observation we have found very true.

† Solid. Declar. iv. § 15, p. 672. "Simpliciter pugnant cum particulis exclusivis in articulo justificationis et salvationis." § 25, p. 676:

If good works, according to the doctrine of the Lutherans, be not necessary to salvation, are they in any respect necessary? This question was agitated among the Lutherans, and resolved in various senses. But the very possibility of such a question, in a doctrinal system, presupposes a strange obliquity of all ideas. The Augsburg Confession and the Apology frequently employed the expression, "they are necessary;" and the Formulary of Concord appeals to their authority.* But what notion, after all we have set forth, is to be connected with the word "necessary," it were no easy matter to discover. Perhaps it was meant to be said: "We may take it as certain, that faith will ever achieve something." Moreover, works go not entirely unrewarded. The Formulary of Concord assures to them *temporal* advantages, and, to those who perform the most, a greater recompense in heaven.† Accordingly, faith without works would absolutely merit heaven; but works would only contribute something thereto!

In how much more enlightened a way have the schoolmen explained the relation of faith to works, as conducive to Divine favour and eternal happiness!‡ What is the (living) faith, other than the good work, still silently shut up in the soul; and what is the good Christian work, other than faith brought to light? They are one and the same, only in a different form;

"Interim haudquaquam consequitur, quod simpliciter et nude asserere liceat, opera bona credentibus ad salutem esse perniciosa."

* Solid. Declar. iv. § 10, p. 670: "Negari non potest, quod in Augustanâ Confessione ejusdemque Apologiâ hæc verba sæpe usurpentur atque repetantur: 'bona opera esse necessaria,'" etc.

† L. c. iv. § 25, p. 676.

‡ See, for instance, H. Smid's *Mysticism of the Middle Age*, p. 245. Jena, 1824. (In German.)

and hence, Catholic theologians explain the fact, why in Scripture salvation is promised sometimes to works, sometimes to faith. From this conception of the relation between faith and good works, Luther in one place attempted to meet the objection against his doctrine, founded on the very numerous passages in Holy Writ, that promise to a virtuous conduct eternal felicity. He replies, namely, that faith and works are "one cake," and therefore, on account of their inseparable unity, exchange their predicates; so that to works is ascribed what really belongs to faith, in the same way as the Scripture refers to the Divine nature in Christ the attributes of his humanity, and *vice versâ*.* But Luther did not perceive, that by such a mode of explanation he placed himself on Catholic ground, and utterly annihilated his doctrine, that faith without works could justify. For if works together with faith constitute an unity,—that is to say, if works be absolutely implied by faith, in the same way as, when no outward, accidental hindrance occurs, the inference is implied in the reason, the effect in the cause, how can it be asserted, that faith without works justifies? Does is not, then, follow, that faith is of value, only in so far "as it worketh by charity"? and thereby alone, would not the whole Lutheran theory of justification be given up? Luther became entangled in his own distinctions, for he here ascribes to faith, *as the moral vivifying sentiment,* the power of justification; whereas, according to the whole tenour of his system, it is to faith as *the organ* which clings to the merits of Christ, that he must impute this power.† It was precisely from this point of view, that Luther might have discovered how utterly erroneous was his whole system; for never certainly would the Scripture have promised eternal life to works, nor that *communicatio idiomatum* have been possible, if faith could justify, merely as *the instrument* so often boasted of, and not as involving an abundance of moral and religious virtues. Thus, that in Holy Writ eternal felicity should be promised to works, in so far as they emanate from faith, unquestionably supposes that this faith is, absolutely and without restriction, the one which Catholic theologians are wont to designate as the *fides formata*. Hence, Luther elsewhere abandons this mode of enfeebling the objection adverted to; and, in all the plenitude of his power, he commands his followers, not once, but a thousand times, to observe silence on the subject of works, when justifying faith was spoken of, and, consequently, to consider both, not as one, but as two cakes of very

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* Luther Comment. on Ep. to Galat. loc. cit. p. 145.

† It was a very favourite saying of Luther's, that, as good works

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are the fruits of the spiritual birth and the new inward life, we cannot be justified through the same : on the contrary, works are then only good, when man is already righteous. "That good works," says he, "merit not grace, life, and salvation, is evident from the fact, that good works are not the spiritual birth, but only fruits of it : by works we become not Christians, righteous, holy, children and heirs of God ; but when we have become righteous through faith, from God's pure mercy, for Christ's sake, and when we have been created anew and born again, then only we perform good works. If we only insist upon regeneration and *substantialia*, on the essence of a Christian, we have at once overturned the merit of good works towards salvation, and reduced them to nothing." (Luther's *Table-talk*, p. 171 : Jena, 1603.) This view of works affects not the Catholic doctrine, for this likewise teaches, that it is not by works that grace and regeneration are merited, but that works are the fruits of the new spirit. But since Catholics represent the fruits as forming one with the tree, they cannot say that the new spirit without its fruits insures salvation.

different substances.* Hence, in defining the relation of faith to works as conducive to salvation, the Formulary of Concord very wisely shuns the allusion to a one cake, but proposes to works, temporal rewards and a sort of decoration in heaven. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing our astonishment, that men, like Reinhardt and Knapp, as we see from their *Manuals of Dogmatic Theology*, could believe that by such definitions as those respecting the recompenses in question, a faith active in good works could be promoted; and still more, that, in their capacity of exegetists, they could find such a doctrine reconcileable with Scripture, which, in the most unqualified manner, promises *salvation* to good works: see, for example, Matthew v. 1; xxv. 31; Romans viii. 17.†

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* Comment. on Ep. to Galat. p. 74. Solid. declar. iii. de fide justif. § 26, p. 660: "Etsi conversi et in Christum credentes habent inchoatam in se renovationem, sanctificationem, dilectionem, virtutes et bona opera: tamen hæc omnia nequaquam immiscenda sunt articulo justificationis coram Deo: ut Redemptori Christo honor illibatus maneat, et cum nostra nova obedientia imperfecta et impura sit, perturbatæ conscientiæ certâ et firmâ consolatione sese sustentare valeant."

† A most superficial view of the relation between good works and eternal felicity, as stated in Holy Writ, as well as a remarkable specimen of fanciful and shallow interpretation of Scripture, we find in Luther's *Table-talk* (p. 176, Jena, 1603), where the recompenses promised to holiness of conduct are represented only as a tutorial stimulus, without any reference to the inward life of the soul. It is as follows:

"In the year 1542 (accordingly in his ripest years, shortly before his death), Dr. Martin Luther said, touching the article of our justification before God, that it was in this case precisely the same as with a son, who is born, and not made by his own merit, heir to all the paternal estates; he succeeds, without any act or merit of his own, to all his father's properties. But nevertheless the father exhorts him to do this or that diligently; promises him a present, to engage him to perform his task with greater readiness, love, and pleasure. As if he

What especially confirmed the Reformers in their errors, was the explanation (derived, indeed, from their own system) of several passages of St. Paul,—for instance, of Romans iii. 28,—where it is said, that it is not through the works of the law, but through faith, that man is justified: a passage, in writing which the apostle did not dream of the opposition existing between Catholics and Protestants. St. Paul here contends against the Jews of his own time, who obstinately defended the eternal duration of the Mosaic law, and asserted, that, not needing a Redeemer from sin, they became righteous and acceptable before God by that law alone. In opposition to this opinion, St. Paul lays down the maxim, that it is not by the works of the law, that is to say, not by a life regulated merely by the Mosaic precepts, man is enabled to obtain the favour of Heaven, but only through faith in Christ, which has been imparted to us by God for wisdom, for sanctification, for righteousness, and for redemption. Unbelief

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should say to the son: if thou be pious, obedient to my commands, and diligent in thy studies, I will buy for thee a fine coat. So also: come to me and I will give thee a pretty apple. Thus he teaches his son to obey him, and although the inheritance will naturally fall to the son, yet by such promises the father will engage his son to do with cheerfulness what he bids him; and thus he trains up his son in wholesome discipline. Therefore we must consider all such promises and recompenses, as only a pedagogical discipline, wherewith God incites and stimulates us, and like a kind, pious father, makes us willing and joyous to do good, and to serve our neighbour, and not thereby to gain eternal life, for this he bestows on us entirely from his pure grace." From these so very different and opposite views of the same subject, it is again evident, that upon this important article of belief Luther had never formed clear and settled notions, and that this inward unsteadiness and obscurity made him ever vacillate from one extreme to another.

in the Redeemer, and confidence in the fulfilment of the law performed through natural power alone, on one hand, and faith in the Redeemer and the justice to be conferred by God, on the other (Romans i. 17, x. 3; Philipians iii. 9),—these, and not faith in the Redeemer and the good works emanating from its power, constitute the two points of opposition, here contemplated by the apostle. *The works of the law, ἔργα τοῦ νόμου,* St. Paul accurately distinguishes everywhere from *good works, ἔργα ἀγαϑὰ, καλά*; as indeed in their inmost essence they are to be distinguished from one another: for the former are wrought without faith in Christ, and without his grace; the latter with the grace and in the spirit of Christ. Hence St. Paul never says, that man is saved not through *good* works, but through faith in Christ! This marvellous opposition is a pure invention of the sixteenth century. Nay, the doctrine, that to good works eternal felicity will be allotted, has been positively announced by this apostle, Romans ii. 7-10.

§ XXIII.—The doctrine of Purgatory in its connexion with the Catholic doctrine of Justification.

The doctrine of the possibility of the fulfilment of the law, touched on in the last Section, must now be treated more fully and minutely. The conflicting doctrines are of such importance, as to deserve a more precise statement of the arguments on either side. Calvin says: "Never hath a man, not even one regenerated in the faith in Christ, wrought a morally good work,—a work which, if it were strictly judged, would not be damnable." Admitting even this impossibility to be possible, yet the author of such an action would still appear impure and polluted, by reason of his other sins. It is not the outward show of works, which perhaps in their external character may satisfy the moral law, but it is the purity of the will, which is regarded by God. Now, if we but raise our eyes to the judgment-seat of the Almighty, who will venture to stand before it? It is, therefore, evident, that the doctrine of an internal justification, involving the necessity of the fulfilment of the law, is reprehensible, because it must precipitate troubled consciences into despair.*

In reply to this, the Catholic observes: Either it is possible for man, strengthened and exalted by the Divine aid, to observe the moral law, in its spirit, its true inward essence, or it is impossible to do so. If the former be the case, then, undoubtedly, such observance cannot be too strongly urged; and every one may find a proof for its possibility in the fact, that, on every transgression of the law, he accuses himself as a sinner: for every accusation of such a kind involves the supposition, that its fulfilment is possible, and even, with assistance from above, not difficult. But if the latter be the case, then the cause must be sought for only in God, and in such a way, that either the Almighty hath not framed human nature for the attainment of that moral standard which He proposes to it, or He doth not impart those higher powers, which are necessary to the pure and not merely outward, but internal, compliance with His laws. In both cases, the cause of the non-fulfilment lies in the Divine will; that is to say, God is represented as not willing that His will should be complied with, which is self-contradictory. But in any case, there could be no conceivable guilt in respect to this non-obedience to the law, and, accordingly, there could be, notwithstanding the non-observance of the Divine precepts, no obstacle to the attainment of eternal felicity.*

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* Calvin Instit. lib. iii. c. 14, § 11, fol. 279. "Duobus his fortiter insistendum, nullum unquam extitisse pii hominis opus, quod, si severo Dei judicio examinaretur, non esset damnabile. Ad hæc, si tale aliquod detur, quod homini possibile non est, peccatis tamen, quibus laborare autorem ipsum certum est, vitiatum ac inquinatum, gratiam perdere; atque hic est præcipuus disputationis cardo." C. 14, § 1, fol. 270: "Huc, huc referenda mens est, si volumus de verâ justitiâ inquirere: quomodo cœlesti judici respondeamus, cum nos ad rationem vocaverit." § 4: "Illic nihil proderunt externæ bonorum operum pompæ......Sola postulabitur voluntatis sinceritas." Cf. Chemn. Exam. Conc. Trid. part I. p. 294.

If it be urged, that reference is had exclusively to man's fallen nature, which is in a state of incapacity for the fulfilment of the law, we may reply, that God in Christ Jesus hath raised us from this fall; and it was justly observed by the Council of Trent, that, in virtue of the power of Christ's spirit, no precept was impracticable to man. For to the heritage of corruption, a heritage of spiritual power in Christ hath been opposed, and the latter can in every way be victorious over the former. Or do we believe the moral law to have been framed merely for the nature of Adam, for his brief abode in Paradise, and not for the thousands of years that humanity was to endure?†

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* It many times really occurred to Luther, as if his doctrine led to the conclusion, that the eternal order of things prevented our observance of the law. So he says (*Table-talk*, p. 162, b. Jena, 1603), "God hath indeed known that we would not, *and could not*, do every thing; *therefore* hath he granted to us *remissionem peccatorum*." Indeed!!

† Concil. Trid. Sess. VI. c. xi. "*De observatione mandatorum, deque illius necessitate et possibilitate.* Nemo autem, quantumvis justificatus, liberum se esse ab observatione mandatorum putare debet: nemo temerariâ illâ et a patribus sub anathemate prohibitâ voce uti, Dei præcepta homini justificato ad observandum esse impossibilia. Nam Deus impossibilia non jubet, *sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere*

In modern times, some men have endeavoured to come to the aid of the old orthodox Lutheran doctrine, by assuring us that the moral law proposes to men an ideal standard, which, like everything ideal, necessarily remains unattained. If such really be the case with the moral law, then he who comes not up to it, can as little incur responsibility, as an epic poet for not equalling Homer's Iliad. More intellectual, at least, is the theory, that the higher a man stands on the scale of morality, the more exalted are the claims which the moral law exacts of him; so that they increase, as it were, to infinity with the internal growth of man, and leave him ever behind them. When we contemplate the lives of the saints, the contrary phenomenon will arise to view. The consciousness of being in the possession of an all-sufficing, infinite power, ever discloses the tenderer and nobler relations of man to God and to his fellow-creatures; so that the man sanctified in Christ, and filled with his Spirit, ever feels himself superior to the law. It is the nature of heaven-born love,—which stands so far, so infinitely far, above the claims of the mere law, never to be content with its own doings, and ever to be more ingenious in its devices; so that Christians of this stamp not unfrequently appear to men of a lower grade of perfection, as enthusiasts, men of heated

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quod non possis, et adjuvat, ut possis. Cujus mandata gravia non sunt, cujus jugum suave est et onus leve. Qui enim sunt filii Dei, Christum diligunt; qui autem diligunt eum, ut ipsemet testatur, servant sermones ejus. Quod utique cum divino auxilio præstare possunt," etc. Hence Innocent X, in his constitution against the five propositions of Jansenius, has rightly condemned the following proposition (Hard. Concil. tom. xi. p. 143, n. 1): "Aliqua Dei præcepta justis volentibus et conantibus, secundum præsentes quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia: deest quoque illis gratia, quâ possibilia fiant."

fancy and distempered mind. It is only in this way that remarkable doctrine can be satisfactorily explained, which certainly, like every other that hath for centuries existed in the world, and seriously engaged the human mind, is sure to rest on some deep foundation,—the doctrine, namely, that there can be works which are more than sufficient *(opera supererogationis)*,—a doctrine, the tenderness and delicacy whereof eluded, indeed, the perception of the Reformers; for they could not even once rise above the idea, that man could ever become free from immodesty, unjust wrath, avarice, &c. The doctrine in question, indeed, on which the Council of Trent does not enter into detail, in proportion as the principle, whereon it is based, is more exalted, is on that account the more open to gross misrepresentation; especially if, as the Reformers were imprudent enough to do, we look to mere outward, arbitrary actions. Quite untenable is the appeal to experience, that no one can boast of having himself fulfilled the law; or the assertion, that the question is not as to the possibility, but the reality, of such a fulfilment. In the first place, no argument can be deduced from reality, because we are not even capable of looking into it, and we must not, and cannot, judge of the hearts of men. We are not even capable of judging ourselves; and therefore St. Paul saith, "*he is conscious to himself of nothing*, but he leaveth judgment to the Lord."* Accordingly, the desire to determine the limits of our power in Christ by the reality of every-day life, would lead to the worst conceivable system of ethics. Once regulate the practicable by the measure of ordinary experience, and you will at once see the low reality sink down to a grade still lower. Lastly, this view alleges no deeper reason for what it calls reality, and we learn not why this hath been so, and not otherwise; so that we must either recur to the first or the second mode of defending the orthodox Protestant view, or seek out a new one.

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. "Quia in multis offendimus omnes, unusquisque sicut misericordiam et bonitatem, ita et severitatem et judicium ante oculos habere debet, neque se ipsum aliquis, etiamsi nihil sibi conscius fuerit, judicare: quoniam omnis hominum vita non humano judicio examinanda et judicanda est, sed Dei: qui illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, et manifestabit consilia cordium: et tunc laus erit unicuique a Deo, qui, ut scriptum est, reddet unicuique secundum opera."

Calvin commands us to raise our eyes to the judgment-seat of God. In truth, nothing is more fit to avert the sinner from himself, and to turn him to Christ, than calling to mind the general judgment,—not merely that which the history of the world pronounces, but that which the all-wise, holy, and righteous God doth hold.* Woe to him who hath not turned to Christ; but woe likewise to him whom the blood of Christ hath not really cleansed, whom the living communion with the God-man Himself hath not rendered godly. Can our adversaries even imagine, that the elect are still stained with sin before the judgment-seat of God, and that Christ covers them over, and under this covering conducts them into heaven? It is the most consummate contradiction to talk of entering into heaven, while stained with sin, be it covered or uncovered. Hence, the question recurs: how shall man be finally delivered from sin, and how shall holiness in him be restored to thorough life? Or, in case we leave this earthly world, still bearing about us some stains of sin, how shall we be purified from them? Shall it be by the mechanical deliverance from the body, whereof the Protestant Formularies speak so much? But it is not easy to discover how, when *the body* is laid aside, sin is therefore purged out from *the sinful spirit.* It is only one who rejects the principle of moral freedom in sin, or who hath been led astray by Gnostic or Manichean errors, that could look with favour upon a doctrine of this kind. Or are we to imagine it to be some potent word of the Divinity, or some violent mechanical process, whereby purification ensues? Some sudden, magical change the Protestant doctrine unconsciously presupposes; and this phenomenon is not astonishing, since it teaches, that by original sin the mind had been deprived of a certain portion, and that in regeneration man is completely passive. But the Catholic, who cannot regard man other than as a free, independent agent, must also recognize this free agency in his final purification, and repudiate such a sort of mechanical process, as incompatible with the whole moral government of the world. If God were to employ an economy of this nature, then Christ came in vain. Therefore is our Church forced to maintain such a doctrine of justification in Christ, and of a moral conduct in this life regulated by it, that Christ will, at the day of judgment, have fulfilled the claims of the law outwardly *for* us, but on that account inwardly *in* us. The solace, accordingly, is to be found in the power of Christ, which effaces as well as forgives sin,—yet in a two-fold way. Among some, it consummates purification in this life: among others, it perfects it only in the life to come. The latter are they, who by faith, love, and a sincere penitential feeling, have knit the bond of communion with Christ, but only in a partial degree, and at the moment they quitted the regions of the living, were not entirely pervaded by His spirit: to them will be communicated this saving power, that at the day of judgment they also may be found pure in Christ. Thus the doctrine of a place of purification is closely connected with the Catholic theory of justification, which, without the former, would doubtless be, to many, a disconsolate tenet. But this inward justification none can be dispensed from;—the fulfilment of the law, painful as it undoubtedly is, can be remitted to none. On each one must that holy law be inwardly and outwardly stamped. The Protestants, on the other hand, who, with their wonted arrogance, have rejected the dogma of purgatory, so well founded as it is in tradition, saw themselves thereby compelled, in order to afford solace to man, to speak of an impossibility of fulfilling the law—a thought which is confuted in every page of scripture, and involves the Almighty in contradiction with Himself. They saw themselves compelled to put forth a theory of justifying faith, which cannot even be clearly perceived. Lastly, they saw themselves compelled to adopt, tacitly at least, the idea of a mechanical course of operations practised on man after death — new authoritative decrees of the Deity; and left unexplained how a deep-rooted sinfulness, even when forgiven, could be at last totally eradicated from the spirit. Thus do both communions offer a solace to man, but in ways totally opposite: the one in harmony with Holy Writ, which everywhere presupposes the possibility of the observance of the law; the other in most striking contradiction to it: one in maintaining the whole rigour of the ethical code; the other by a grievous violation of it: one in accordance with the free and gradual development of the human mind, which only with a holy earnestness, and by great exertions, can bring forth and cultivate to maturity the divine seed once received; the other without regard to the eternal laws of the human spirit, and by a very guilty encouragement to moral levity.

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* Dr. Mohler here alludes to a celebrated saying of the German poet, "that the history of the world is the judgment of the world."—*Trans.*

§ XXIV.—Opposition between the communions in their general conception of Christianity.

In many an attentive reader the statements we have made may have already awakened the thought, that the Catholic Church views the whole system of Christianity, and the immediate objects of the Saviour's advent, in a manner essentially different from the Protestant communities. That such a thought is not entirely unfounded, the following investigations will show, in proportion as they will at the same time shed the clearest light on all that has been hitherto advanced, dissipate many doubts, and confirm, with more accuracy and vividness, the views we have put forth as to the nature of the Protestant doctrines.

According to the old Christian view, the Gospel is to be regarded as an institution of an all-merciful God, whereby through His Son He raises fallen man to the highest degree of religious and moral knowledge which he is capable of attaining in this life, proffers to each one forgiveness of sins, and withal an internal sanatory and sanctifying power. But, how now does Luther look upon the Gospel?

1. He asserts, that Christ hath only in an *accidental way* discharged the office of Teacher; and that his real and sole object was, to fulfil the law in our stead, to satisfy its demands, and to die for us. Hence he reproaches the Papists with teaching, that the Gospel is a law of love, and comprises a less easy, that is to say, a purer and more exalted morality than the

Mosaic dispensation. In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, he says, " On this account principally hath Christ come upon the earth, not to teach the law, but only to fulfil it. That he occasionally teaches, is merely accidental, and foreign to his office; in the same way, as, beside his real and proper duty, which was to save sinners, he accidentally restored the sick to health."* In another place he makes a similar remark: " Although this is as clear as the dear sun at noon-day, yet the Papists are so senseless and blind, that out of the Gospel they have fashioned a law of love, and out of Christ a law-giver, who hath imposed far more burthensome laws than Moses himself. But let the fools go on in their blindness, and learn ye from St. Paul, that the Gospel teacheth, Christ hath come not to give a new law, whereby we should walk, but to offer himself up as a victim for the sins of the whole world."

What a one-sided view did Luther here take of the mission of Christ! His teaching office he calls something accidental, and entirely forgets, that, in formal opposition to the Mosaic dispensation, Christ proclaimed a new, purer, more exalted, and therefore severer, law of morality (Matthew v. 31-48), and uttered himself those words: " A new commandment I give ye, that ye love one another." (John xiii. 34.) The misconception, moreover, whereon Luther's complaint is founded, that the Papists degrade Christ into a mere law-giver and ethical teacher, will shortly be more closely examined.

2. Yet Luther not only taught, that Christ had not come to impart to men a purer ethical code, but even maintained, that he had come to *abolish* the moral law,

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* Comment. on Ep. to Galat. loc. cit. p. 219.

to liberate true believers from its curse, both for the past and for the future, and in this way to make them free. The theory of evangelical liberty, which Luther propounded, announces, that even the decalogue shall not be brought into account against the believer, nor its violation be allowed to disturb the conscience of the Christian; for he is exalted above it and its contents. Luther called attention to a two-fold use of the moral law, the Mosaic as well as the Evangelical, to which somewhat later a third was added. The first consists herein, that it convinces the unconverted of their sinfulness, and, by menacing its transgressors with the divine judgments, throws them into a state of terror: the second, that it conducts those, sufficiently shaken and intimidated, unto Christ, in order to obtain through him forgiveness of sins. Moreover, the Saxon Reformer maintained, that the believer, *as such*, was to make no use of the moral law.* When the sinner hath come unto Christ, the law ceases for him, and the Gospel begins; he is free from the terrors which the *continued* transgressions of the former produce, and Christ unconditionally makes good all deficiencies. Hence, Luther so often insists on the necessity of separating most pointedly the law and the Gospel, of no longer molesting and tormenting the faithful with the former, but only of cheering and solacing them with the latter. He says, "It is of very great importance, that we should rightly know and understand, how the law hath been abolished. For such a knowledge, that the law is abolished, and its office totally set aside, that it can no longer be a ground of accusation and condemnation against the believers in Christ, confirms our doctrine on faith. From this our consciences may derive solace, especially in their moments of great fearful struggle and mental anguish. I have before earnestly and frequently said, and repeat it now again (for this is a matter which can never be too often and too strongly urged), that a Christian, who grasps and lays hold on Christ, is subject to no manner of law, but is free from the law, so that it can neither terrify nor condemn him. This Isaiah teacheth in the text cited by St. Paul: 'Give glory, thou barren one, that bearest not.'

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* The Formulary of Concord hath also a special article upon a third use of the law (*tertius usus legis*); its use, namely, a standard of Christian life.

"When Thomas of Aquino, and other schoolmen assert, that the law hath been abolished, they pretend that the Mosaic ordinances respecting judicial affairs and other secular matters (which they call *judicialia*), and in like manner the laws respecting ceremonies and the services of the Temple (kirchwerken), were after the death of Christ pernicious, and on that account were set aside and abolished. But when they say the Ten Commandments (which they call *moralia*) are not to be abrogated, they themselves understand not what they assert and lay down.

"But thou, when thou speakest of the abolition of the law, be mindful that thou speakest of the law, as it really is, and is rightly called, to wit, the spiritual law, and understand thereby the whole law, making no distinction between civil laws, ceremonies, and ten commandments. For when St. Paul saith, that through Christ we are redeemed from the anathema of the law, he speaketh certainly and properly of the whole law, and especially of the Ten Commandments; since these alone accuse the conscience before God and terrify it;

whereas the other two species of law, that treat, so to speak, of civil affairs and ceremonies, do not so. Therefore, we say, that even the ten commandments have no right to accuse, nor to alarm the conscience, wherein Christ reigns by his grace; since Christ hath abolished this right of the law, when he became an anathema for us."*

In the writings of Melancthon reigns, in a no less striking degree, the same one-sided view, which can neither satisfy human reason,—desirous in everything of unity of principle,—nor meet in all respects the practical wants of man. Melancthon, at times, defines very well the true notions of Christian freedom. For instance, when he says (what undoubtedly is acknowledged on all sides), that we are released from the obligation of observing the ritual law of Moses, and when he adds, that the believer, being inwardly and freely moved by the Divine Spirit, practises the moral law, and would fulfil it, when even it did not make any outward claims, the Reformer here excellently describes Christian freedom as a voluntary obedience to God, and consequently as a release from the fetters, wherein evil held men enchained. But immediately, again, he falls back into pure Lutheran definitions, by distinguishing, in the Christian liberty just described, two things. The first is, that, by reason of this freedom, the Decalogue condemns not believers, even though they be sinners; the second is, that they fulfil the moral law of themselves. Lastly, he expresses himself briefly and clearly to this effect—"The law is abrogated, not that it should not be fulfilled, but that it may be fulfilled, and may not condemn, even when it is not fulfilled."* Here a multitude of questions press themselves on our consideration. For instance, if *the essence* of freedom consists in the fact, that it can fulfil, and really doth fulfil, the law, how can those, who fulfil it not, be numbered among the free? How can one and the same freedom love inconstancy to such a degree, that here it proves itself obedient, there disobedient, and is only uniform in one thing, that in either case it doth not condemn. We may ask further, whether the strange freedom of those, who are free with respect to condemnation, but are not free from evil and disobedience, extends to every point of the Decalogue? Whether, in general, a limit can be traced, down to which freedom from condemnation can render innoxious the servitude to evil co-existing with it? We content ourselves with proposing these questions, and shall now proceed in our inquiry.

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* Luther, Comment. on Ep. to Galat. loc. cit. p. 257, b; 258, b. Compare his instruction how the books of Moses are to be read. Part v. ed. Wittenberg, p. 1, b. "The law signifies and demands of us, what we are to do, what we are not to do, and how we are to be in respect to God; it is exclusively directed to our conduct, and consists in demands; for God speaks through the law,—do this, do not this, this I will require of thee. But the gospel preacheth not what we are to do, and not do; requires nothing of us, but turns round, doth the reverse, and saith not, do this, do that, but bids us only hold out our laps, and saith, dear man, this hath God done for thee,—He hath sent his Son into the flesh for thee, he hath let him be slain for thy sake, and hath redeemed thee from sin, death, the devil, and hell: this believe and hold, and then thou art saved."

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* Melancthon (in his Loci Theolog. p. 127) says very well of Christian freedom: "Postremo libertas est Christianismus, quia qui spiritum Dei non habent, legem facere neutiquam possunt, suntque maledictionum legis rei. Qui spiritu Christi renovati sunt, ii jam sua sponte, etiam non præeunte lege, feruntur ad ea, quæ lex jubebat. Voluntas Dei lex est. Nec aliud Spiritus Sanctus est, nisi veri Dei voluntas et agitatio. Quare ubi Spiritu Dei, qui viva voluntas Dei est, regenerati sumus, jam id ipsum volumus sponte, quod exigebat lex." P. 130, we read as follows: "Habes quatenus a Decalogo liberi sumus, primum, *quod tametsi peccatores*, damnare non possit eos, qui in Christo sunt. Deinde, quod, qui sunt in Christo, spiritu trahuntur *ad legem faciendam*, et spiritu faciunt, amant, timent Deum," etc. P. 131. "Ergo abrogata lex est, non ut ne fiat, sed ut, et non facta, non damnet et fieri possit." Here one assertion evidently destroys the other. Hence, as stated above in the text, it is taught by Melancthon in his Apology, that we *cannot* fulfil the law.

Strobel announced to the learned world, as a great novelty, that already, in the year 1524 (thus seven years after the commencement of the great revolution in the Church), Melancthon *called the Gospel a preaching of penance*:[*] for, before that literary discovery, it was believed, that he had only much later risen to this idea! What astonishment do we feel, when we reflect on the notion which he attaches *to the new vivification* of the Christian by the gospel! He constantly takes *vivificatio* as the opposite to *mortificatio;* and as by the latter he understands only the mortal terrors, at the vengeance which the law announces to all its transgressors; so to his mind the former signifies merely the resuscitation, the recovery from these terrors, brought about by the tidings, that in Christ sins are remitted.[†]

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[*] Strobel, Literary History of Melancthon, loc. theol. p. 240.

[†] Luther also, De Captiv. Babyl. eccles. Opp. tom. ii. fol. 287, and in several other places, attaches the same idea to *novitas vitæ.* But Melancthon is clearer, in loc. theol. p. 147, "Qui rectissimi senserunt, ita judicarunt: Joannis Baptismum esse vivificationis, quod ei addita sit gratiæ promissio seu condonatio peccatorum." When Melancthon attempts to give any definition of the Gospel, he is usually as one-sided as Luther. "Novum Testamentum non aliud est, nisi bonorum omnium promissio citra legem, nullo justitiarum nostrarum respectu. Vetere Testamento promittebantur bona, sed simul exigebatur a populo legis impletio: novo promittuntur bona citra legis conditionem, cum nihil a nobis vicissim exigatur. Atque hic vides, quæ sit amplitudo gratiæ, quæ sit misericordiæ divinæ prodigalitas." Loc.

The *inward* resuscitation from the death of sin, the immediate communication of a new, higher, vital energy, which annihilates the earlier weakness, transforming it into a victorious, all-conquering power over flesh, Melancthon was unable to understand (as the Church had always done) by the word *vivificatio.* Even Calvin took scandal at this opinion of Melancthon's; at least, I am at a loss to know to whom his counter-statements can be applicable, except to his Wittenberg friend.* Even in the Apology composed by Melancthon for the Confession of Augsburg, the new resuscitation, nay, even the expression, "regeneration," are referred to this solace alone,† as is remarked by the Formulary of Concord.‡

No one can call to mind, that, in the symbolical books of the Lutherans, the believing sinner, when disquieted on account of his moral conduct, is ever consoled by the encouraging words: "thou canst do all in Him, who strengtheneth thee: not thou, but Christ with

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theolog. p. 126. Passages, such as at page 140, are true rarities, and do not agree with the rest.

* Calvin, instit. l. iii. c, 3, § 4, fol. 210. "Vivificationem interpretantur consolationem, quæ ex fide nascitur: ubi scilicet homo, peccati conscientiâ prostratus, ac Dei timore pulsus, postea in Dei bonitatem, in misericordiam, gratiam, salutem, quæ est per Christum, respiciens, sese erigit, respirat, animum colligit, et velut e morte in vitam redit......*non assentior, quum potius sancte pieque vivendi studium significet, quod oritur ex renascentiâ: quasi diceretur hominem sibi mori, ut Deo vivere incipiat.*"

† Apolog. iv. § 21, p. 73. "Corda rursus debent concipere consolationem. Id fit, si credent promissioni Christi, quod propter eum habeamus remissionem peccatorum. Hæc fides, in illis pavoribus erigens et consolans, accipit remissionem peccatorum, justificat et vivificat. Nam illa consolatio est nova et spiritualis." On regeneration, see § 26, p. 76.

‡ Solid. Declar. iii. de fidei justif. § 13, p. 656.

thee." Not to Christ, the strengthener and the sanctifier, do they refer him, but exclusively to Christ, the forgiver of sins. This solace they really impart in almost countless passages — on this they constantly insist. To make moral indolence attentive to itself, would have appeared to them a reprehensible transmutation of the gospel into the law.* It must be obvious to every man, that they could not urge to moral exertion, because such an act would have overthrown their leading doctrine, that, in the production of all good, man is utterly passive. Most striking in this respect is the decision, which the Formulary of Concord pronounced in the Antinomian controversies, which in themselves presuppose a most strange aberration of the human mind. It is there especially enjoined, *that the gospel should not be mixed up with the law ;* for otherwise the merits of Christ would be abridged, and troubled consciences be robbed of their sweetest solace.† Accordingly, it is there said, that in a wider sense, undoubtedly, the gospel is the preaching of penance, as well as of the forgiveness of sins ; but in its most proper sense it is *only* the latter—*only* the announcement of the pardoning mercy of God.* If to one, who recalls to mind the epistle to the Romans, i. 15-18, this opposition must appear singular enough, so the fact is still more remarkable, that, under the grace to be announced, absolution from sin is alone understood; and the truly sanctifying grace is passed over in utter silence. In one passage, indeed, the communication of the Holy Spirit is vaguely mentioned;† but should any one wish to refer this to the truly purifying, and effectually sanctifying Spirit, he would most certainly err; for the activity of the Spirit is, in this formulary, expressly confined to *consolation;* on which account, He is termed the Paraclete; and his office to convince the world of sin (*arguere de peccato*) is represented as one, not peculiar, but foreign to Him, under the new covenant.‡ If it be said, however, by way of excuse, that in other parts the sanctifying spirit of Christ is spoken of, let no one rest satisfied therewith: for the article, which undertakes to treat of the signification of the gospel, is certainly the place where such a subject must be handled in all its bearings.

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* On this ever-recurring consolation, see Apology iv. § 11, p. 68; § 13, p. 69; § 14, p. 70; § 19, p. 72 and 73; § 20, p. 73; § 21, p. 73; § 26, p. 76; § 27, p. 77; § 30, p. 78; § 38, p. 81; § 40, p. 83; § 45, p. 87; § 48, p. 90, and so on. In the Formulary of Concord there occurs as repeated mention of this solace, as in the Apology.

† Solid. Declar. v. de lege et Evang. § 1, p. 676. "Cavendum est ne hæc duo doctrinarum genera inter se commisceantur, aut Evangelion in legem transformetur. Ea quippe ratione meritum Christi obscuraretur, et conscientiis perturbatis dulcissima consolatio (quam in Evangelio Christi, sincere prædicato, habent, quâ etiam sese in gravissimis tentationibus adversus legis terrores sustentant) prorsus eriperetur."

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* L. c. § 4, p. 678. It is said of the Gospel in a wider sense: "Est concio de pœnitentia et remissione peccatorum." §. 5, p. 678. "Deinde vocabulum Evangelii in aliâ et quidem propriissimâ suâ significatione usurpatur: et tum non concionem de pœnitentia, sed tantum prædicationem de clementia Dei complectitur." Compare § 15, p. 681 and 682; § 16, p. 682. "Quidquid enim pavidas mentes consolatur, quidquid favorem et gratiam Dei transgressoribus legis offert, hoc proprie est, et recte dicitur Evangelion, hoc est lætissimum nuntium. Gratia (is only) remissio peccatorum." Apolog. iv. § 13, p.69. "Evangelium, quod est propriè promissio remissionis peccatorum."

† Solid. Declar. v. de lege et Evang. § 17, p. 682. "Lex ministerium est, quod per literam occidit et damnationem denuntiat: Evangelium autem est potentia Dei ad salutem omni credenti, et hoc ministerium justitiam nobis offert et Spiritum Sanctum donat."

‡ L. c. § 8, p. 679. "Manifestum est, Spiritus Sancti officium esse, non tantum consolari, verum etiam (ministerio legis) arguere mundum de peccato (Joh. xvi. 8:) et ita etiam in Novo Testamento facere *opus alienum*, quod est arguere: ut postea faciat opus proprium, quod est consolari et gratiam Dei prædicare. Hanc enim ob causam nobis Christus precibus suis et sanctissimo merito eundem nobis a Patre impetravit et misit; unde et Paracletus seu consolator dicitur."

What gross misconceptions, what profound errors, do we encounter here! A feeling of infinite pain seizes on the Christian observer, at witnessing such doctrines—at witnessing such fierce divisions in one and the same revelation! And most painful is the experience he makes, that not even one man felt the necessity of seeing those divisions composed! The controversies, indeed, which, upon this matter, were carried on in the Lutheran Church, indicate a sense of uneasiness, prevailing among many of its members—an obscure perception, that some prodigious mistakes had been committed; but to reconcile effectually those feuds, was a thing which occurred to no man. This inward disquiet it was which drove Agricola of Eisleben into thorough Antinomianism: a hidden impulse, unknown to himself, urged him to escape from this turmoil of contradictions, to pour out his insane blasphemies against Moses, to demand that *no further use* should be made of the law, to require that, for the future, grace only should be preached up in the Christian churches, and in this way to cut the Gordian note, and to rush into the wildest extremes. In this, as in other matters, the Formulary of Concord has restored no inward and essential harmony; and without entirely giving up the Lutheran point of view, it was out of its power so to do.

The life of the Saviour constitutes, in every relation, an organic unity; and everything in him, his sufferings, and his works, his doctrines, his conduct, his death on the cross, were in a like degree calculated for our redemption. It is the merits of the entire, undivided God-man, the Son of God, whereby we are won again to God. His three offices, the prophetic, the high-priestly, the royal, are alike necessary; take one away, and the remaining immediately appear as unintelligible, as devoid of consistency. Thus, by the advent of the Son of God into the world, there were proffered to men, not by accident, but by *necessity,* at once, the highest degree of religious and ethical knowledge; the ideal of a life agreeable to God; forgiveness of sins, and a sanctifying power: and, as in the one life of the Saviour we find all these united, so they must, in like manner, be adopted by us.

It is undeniable, and no arts can long conceal the fact, that Christ proposed, in the most emphatic manner, to his followers, the highest ethical ideal, corresponding to the new theoretical religious knowledge, and further developing the Old Testament precepts. It is likewise equally certain, that in his name are announced to all, who believe in him, grace and forgiveness of sins; that is to say, pardon for every moral transgression. These are two phenomena, which, as they stand in direct opposition one to the other, require, in consequence, some third principle which may mediate their union. This third conciliating principle, as it is to unite the two, must be kin alike to law and to grace, to the rigid exaction and to the merciful remission. This is the sanctifying power which emanates from the living union with Christ; the *gratuitous grace* of holy love, which, in justification, He pours out upon His followers. In this grace all law is abolished, because no outward claim is enforced; and, at the same time, the law is confirmed, because love is the fulfilment of the law: in love, law and grace are become one. This is the deep sense of the Catholic dogma of justification, according to which, forgiveness of sins and sanctification are one and the same ; according to which, justification consists in the reign of love in the soul. Hence the maxim which the ancient Church, after St. Paul (Rom. iii. 25), so frequently repeated, that, on entering into communion with Christ, the sins, committed *before* that event, were forgiven, but not future sins ; implying that now Christ would fulfil the law in us, and we in him. In the Catholic Church, therefore, controversies could never be prolonged as to the relation between law and grace, because, by its doctrine of justification, such an opposition was essentially and eternally precluded : while, on the other hand, the Reformers misapprehended the essence of love to such a degree, that, instead of recognizing in it whatever was most spiritual, most vital, most resuscitating, and thereby, in consequence, the fulfilment of the law, they looked on it as merely the law itself. Instead of raising themselves to the heights of Catholicism, and thence beholding how in love the entire undivided Christ becometh living within us, and the moral teacher and forgiver of sins is alike glorified, they urged it as matter of reproach against the Catholic Church, that *it buried Christ*, because, in their one-sided view, they regarded the Mediator only in his capacity of Pardoner.*

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* Apolog. IV. de justific. § 23, p. 75. "Itaque, qui negant fidem (solam) justificare, nihil nisi legem, abolito Evangelio et abolito Christo, docent." § 26, p. 77 : "Adversarii Christum ita intelligunt mediatorem et propitiatorem, quia meruerit habitum dilectionis.......Annon est hoc prorsus sepelire Christum, et totam fidei doctrinam tollere."

§ XXV.—The culminating point of inquiry.—Luther maintains an inward and essential opposition between religion and morality, and assigns to the former an eternal, to the latter a mere temporal, value.

This so decided and unreconciled opposition between gospel and law leads to a total degradation of the latter; so that all differences between Catholicism and Protestantism, in the article of justification, may shortly be reduced to this; namely, that the Catholic Church considers religion and morality as inwardly one and the same, and both equally eternal; while the Protestant Church represents the two as essentially distinct,—the former having an eternal, the latter a temporal, value. Luther, in numberless passages of his writings, insists on keeping both principles, the religious and the ethical, as far apart, nay, further apart, than heaven and earth; on separating them, like day and night, like sunshine and darkness. He teaches, that we are not to let the moral law by any means intrude on the conscience; that, in considering our relations to God, we are not to look to our personal bearing to that law, and that, in general, we are to attend to it only in the conduct of our every-day earthly existence. When the question recurred to him, wherefore, then, was the moral law given, he could make no other reply, than "that it was given for the sake of civil order;" or, that it had so pleased God to establish such an ordinance, the observance whereof, as might be said of any mere legal institution, afforded Him pleasure. The maintenance of the moral law, accordingly, he would leave to the jurisdiction of the state, and not by any means include among real religious concerns. It will be well, however, to hear Luther's own words, who, if anywhere, is in this matter his own best interpreter. He says, "we must thus carefully distinguish between both, placing the gospel in the kingdom of heaven above, and the law on the earth below, calling and holding the righteousness of the gospel a heavenly and godly righteousness, and that of the law a human and earthly one. And thou must separate and distinguish the righteousness of the gospel as peculiarly and carefully from the righteousness of the law, as our Lord God hath separated and divided the heavens from the earth, light from darkness, and day from night. So is the righteousness of the gospel light and day; the righteousness of the law darkness and night: and would to God we could divide them still further one from the other.

"Therefore, as often as we have to treat of, and to deal with, faith, with heavenly righteousness, with conscience, &c. &c , let us cut off the law, and let it be confined to this lower world. But if the question be about works, then let us enkindle the light which belongeth to works of legal justice, and to the night. Thus will the dear sun, and the clear light of the Gospel and of grace, shine and illumine by day, the light of the law shine and illumine by night. And so these two things must ever be separated one from the other, in our minds and our hearts, that the conscience, when it feels its sins and is terrified, may say to itself, now thou art on the earth; therefore let the lazy ass there work, and serve, and ever carry the burden imposed upon it. That is to say, let the body, with its members, be ever subjected to the law. But when thou mountest up to heaven, leave the ass with its burden upon the earth. For the conscience must have nothing to do with the law, works, and earthly righteousness. So the ass remains in the valley, but the conscience ascends with Isaac up the mountain, and knows nothing either of the law, or of works, but seeks and looks only for the forgiveness of sins, and the pure righteousness which is proffered and imparted to us in Christ.

"On the other hand, in civil government we must most rigidly exact, and observe, obedience to the law; and, in that department, we must know nothing, either of gospel, or conscience, or grace, of forgiveness of sins, of heavenly righteousness, or even of Christ himself; but we must know only how to speak of Moses, the law, and works. Thus both things, to wit, the law and the Gospel, are to be severed as far as possible one from the other, and each is to remain in the separate place to which it appertains. The law is to remain out of heaven, that is to say, out of the heart and the conscience. On the other hand, the freedom of the Gospel is to remain out of the world, that is to say, out of the body and its members. On this account, when law and sin shall come into heaven,—that is to say, into the conscience,—we must immediately drive them out; for the conscience must at no time know of law or sin, but of Christ only. And again, when grace and freedom come into the world,—that is to say, into the body,—we must say to them: 'hearken, it becometh not ye to walk and dwell in the hog-trough and horse-pond of this earthly life, but upwards to heaven ye should ascend.'"*

Luther cannot often enough recur to the idea of the internal and essential difference of the religious from the ethical principle, as in the case of such an excellent discovery was to be expected. Elsewhere he says, "Because it is so hazardous and dangerous to have anything to do with the law, and it may easily occur that herein we sustain a perilous and grievous fall, as if we were to be precipitated from heaven into the very abyss of hell; it is very necessary that every Christian should learn to separate the two things, most carefully, one from the other. Thus, he can let the law rule and govern his body and its members, but not his conscience. For the same bride and queen must remain unspotted and unpolluted by the law, and be preserved in all her integrity and purity for her only one and proper bridegroom—Christ. As St. Paul saith, in another place, I have entrusted ye to a man, that I may bring a pure virgin to Christ.

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* Comment. on Ep. to Galat. loc. cit. p. 62.

"Therefore must the conscience have its bridal bed, not in a deep valley, but on a high mountain, where Christ holds sway and jurisdiction; who neither terrifies nor tortures poor sinners, but, on the contrary, consoles them, forgives sins, and saves them."*

Luther's reply to the question, "what need is there then of the moral law?" is recorded in the following passage:—"Why do men keep the law, if it do not justify? They who are just observe it, not because they are thereby justified before God (for through faith only doth this occur), *but for the sake of civil order*, and because they know that such obedience is well-pleasing and agreeable to God, and a good example and pattern for improvement to others, in order that they may believe in the gospel." (Let the reader remember Zwingle's views on the same subject, c. I. § IV.)

Had Luther felt, in a higher degree than we can discover in him, the want of a more general completion and more consistent development of his views, he would most certainly have embraced the opinion of a merely righteous Demiurgos, as asserted by the Gnostics; laid claim to their heretical antinomianism in behalf of the Pneumatici; and, like Marcion, have separated the Old from the New Testament. Marcion, too, was unable to reconcile law and grace, the all-good, merciful God, with the God who imposes moral precepts and who chastises; and proceeded so far as to hold the legislative God of the old covenant to be essentially distinct from the God of the new. This opinion, absurd as it is in itself, possessed, however, a certain consistency, as did also the assertion of the Valentinians, that they were exempt from the law, but that Catholics, on the other hand, could be saved only by its observance; for they entertained the opinion that they were substantially different from the latter; that they were Pneumatici, and the Catholics Psychici,—beings belonging to an inferior grade of existence. But in Luther we discover no cohesion nor connexion of ideas; and his point of view is in itself utterly untenable. To the moral law he assigned the destination of terrifying the conscience; and yet the law and the conscience are to stand in no inward relation, one to the other; an association of ideas, which is utterly inconceivable! By holding up the moral law, the sinner is to be terrified into the conviction, that for having violated it he has deserved the *eternal* torments of hell; and yet it is to possess a mere *temporal* worth, and be destined for merely *transitory* relation! How then are we to understand the mission of Christ, and especially his atonement? Did not the latter take place, in order to deliver us from the *eternal* punishment that had been affixed to the transgression of the moral law? But how, we must repeat it, can the violation of a finite law, merely adapted for this period of earthly existence, entail an eternal chastisement? Was it for the fulfilment of so miserable an end that the

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* Loc. cit. p. 64. Compare p. 79, 168, 172.

Son of God was to become incarnate? It might, at least, have occurred to Luther's mind, that, if in the unconverted the consciousnesss of violating the law were accompanied with such deep sorrow, and produced such terrors of conscience, he ought not to expel it from the conscience of the converted. It might have been expected that he would, at least, be sensible that the law would lose all its efficacy on the unbelieving, if, in relation to the regenerated, he represented it as so paltry! The law, then, is to lead to Christ! Strange conceit! If the law stand in no essential, intimate relation to Christ, how can it conduct to him? How can that, which abideth not in him, and hath not root in him, smooth the way to him? For so Luther teaches, when the law hath brought the sinner to Christ, it must be again banished from the interior of man—his conscience and his heart—and be confined to his body! What doth not belong essentially and eternally to the spiritual part of man, can at no period of time, and in no state of existence, very strongly affect it. If thus the conscience of the *sinner* is to be moved by the law, and in order to rid himself of his own anguish he is to embrace the forgiver of sins, then, surely, in the man *justified* in Christ, the law is not to be limited to this earthly and transitory existence. Therefore hath Christ not abolished, but fulfilled, the law, which was to conduct to him! Rightly hath it been represented as Israel's distracting grief, that her God abode without her, far removed from her, and thundering forth terror and despair. *But, at the same time, and in most intimate connexion with this state of things*, the law of Israel was likewise only extraneous, and widely remote from her, and therefore menacing on stony tablets, and not inscribed on the living heart; for the law is God's declared will; and thus alienation from God involved also alienation from his law. By the coming of the Son of God into the world, and his reception into our souls, this disunion between God and man terminated:—in Christ both are reconciled, and are become one. Shall then the law, which had been extraneous, not penetrate also into the interior of man, and there become living, and, consequently, be fulfilled? Yea, by reconciliation with God we are reconciled, and become one with His law also. By the living reception of God into our hearts, through the means of faith, we likewise, and necessarily, receive His law; for the latter is God's eternal will, and one with Him; so that, where God is, there also is His law.

Religiousness and virtue! how intimately, how vitally, are they united! And in the same degree, therefore, religion and morality—faith and the law! Contemplate the immoral man—see how fading, how drooping, too, is all religious life within him, how utterly incapable it is of putting forth blossoms! How the clear, pure knowledge of divine things is obscured within him! Contemplate the history of nations, and ye will learn how every immorality and unbelief, or misbelief, have gone hand in hand! This truth the progress of heathenism has inscribed in frightful characters in the book of history. On the other hand, when the Saviour would lay the foundation for Christian piety—for faith in himself, he commands us to observe in life what he hath taught! And this was the experience of all the saints, that the more moral they became the more their piety increased; that, in proportion to the fidelity and purity wherewith the Divine law was realized within them, the deeper their religious knowledge became! Whence comes the fact, that a genuine piety evaporates, when a violation of the moral law occurs; and, again, that to the observance of the latter the former is so easily annexed? Doth not this point incontrovertibly to an essential unity of the two? Oh, believe me, whoso sees himself forced, in order to preserve in his heart and conscience a confiding faith, to banish thence the moral law, hath in his heart and conscience an erroneous faith; for the true living faith not merely agrees with the moral law—it is one with it. Again, too, whence the fact, that the religious and moral elements cannot really exist asunder; that the one perpetually seeks the other, nay, bears it in its own bosom? From the living sense and the clear acknowledgment of our dependence on the all-gracious and merciful God, humility and confidence first spring, next the fulness of love, which already includes obedience and resignation to the will of heaven, whereby we tread immediately on ethical ground. If the first virtues be more religious, the last are more ethical; but the distinction between them is absorbed in love—their living centre—the point wherein religiousness and morality unite.*

Now only have we obtained a complete solution to the Protestant doctrine, that faith, in its abstract sense, alone saves. Salvation the Catholic attaches only to the undivided interior life of the regenerated—to faith and love—to the fulfilment of the law, or to the concurrence of the religious and ethical principles: he places both in an equal relation to a future life, for both alike possess an eternal value. Luther, on the other hand, recognizes faith alone as the principle of eternal felicity, because he ascribes to morality only an earthly, perishable worth. The above alleged argument of the Protestants, that works, on account of the partly sinful faculty whence they emanate, have not a saving efficacy, is in itself inadequate; for from the same motive they should represent faith as weak and defective; and, consequently, deny it the power of insuring salvation. But from the point of view which we have now reached, we can survey the whole, and all becomes perfectly clear and luminous. Hence it was quite in the spirit of Luther, and even better than he understood himself, that Andrew Poach—a writer who took part in the controversies raised by Major—advanced the proposition, that even the perfect fulfilment of the law, that is to say, the purest morality, had no claim to eternal happiness.*

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* In modern times Schleiermacher, Twesten, and Sack, have shown themselves to be genuine Protestants, in severing, quite immoderately, the ethical and the religious principle one from the other; this, however, has been done more by the two former than by the latter.

Now have we at last succeeded in completely unfolding the speculative idea, which lies at the bottom of the Protestant doctrine of justification. We have before observed, that the relation towards evil, wherein the Reformers placed the Almighty, and their ulterior doctrine, that it cannot even by Divine power be rooted out from the regenerated, are based upon the idea that evil necessarily adheres to everything finite. The same thought may also be expressed in the following manner. The sense of sin cannot be effaced from all finite consciousness—from the consciousness of man—it constantly accompanies and tortures man, because evil is inseparable from him, as a limited being; to this he is predestined. But how doth he obtain quiet? By the lifting up of the mind to a higher point of view—to the inward essence of things—to the Infinite: in the consciousness of God, in faith, evil vanishes. Hence, moral freedom annihilated was converted into freedom from the moral law, which has relation merely to the temporal, limited, external world, but has no kind of reference to that which is eternal and exalted above space and time. But, however, we by no means intend to assert, that the Reformers were conscious of this fundamental principle of their system; on the contrary, had they understood themselves—had they conceived whither their doctrines led—they would have rejected them as unchristian. Yet we may also understand wherefore the Catholics, if they wished to uphold the idea of the holiness and justice of God; if they wished to maintain human freedom, insure the dignity of the moral law, confirm the true notion of sin, and the debt of sin, and not suffer the doctrine of redemption in Christ to be converted into a very folly, should, with all their energy, have opposed the Protestant theory of faith and justification.

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* "Propositio 'bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem' non potest consistere in doctrinâ legis, neque lex ullas habet de æternâ vitâ promissiones, etiam perfectissime impleta." Auctore Andreâ Poach, 1535. The orthodox Lutherans, indeed, would not admit this view.

§ XXVI.—Analysis of the elements of truth and of error in the Protestant doctrine of faith, as hitherto stated.

If we now take a retrospective view of all that has been advanced, and reduce all to a short summary, it will follow that in Protestantism the religious element formed the more luminous side, and the ethical the darker; and this, of course, was attended with the consequence, that ultimately the religious element was regarded only with a very oblique and distorted view.

The religious element no one will fail to notice in Protestantism, who only recalls to mind that notion of Divine Providence, which Luther and Melancthon put forth at the commencement of the Reformation, but which Calvin defended to the end of his days. The action of Providence the Reformers by no means made to consist merely in the guidance of all things little and great, in the wise and tender conduct of individuals, as of the whole human race. No; according to them, all the phenomena in the world of man are God's own work, and man is the mere instrument of God: everything in the world's history is God's invisible act, visibly realized by the agency of man. Who can here fail to recognize a religious contemplation of all things? All is referred to God—God is all in all.

The same pious view of the world, and the world's history, extends to the more special circle of Christian doctrines. The fundamental principles of Christian piety are, doubtless, rigidly maintained; but only a perverse application of them is made; for the same relation, wherein, as we have seen, the Deity is represented to be in respect to man, is established between Christ and the believer. The Redeemer is, in such a way, all in all, that he and his spirit are alone efficacious, and faith and regeneration are exclusively his act; so that, as, according to Luther's doctrine, man disappears before God, so the Christian likewise disappears before Christ. The following passage will furnish us with the clearest insight into Luther's feelings on this subject:—"I can well remember," he remarks, "that Dr. Staupitz, who was provincial vicar of the Augustinians, when the gospel first began to be preached, said to me, 'it affords me the greatest consolation, that this doctrine of the gospel, which is now coming to light, gives all honour and praise to God alone, and nothing to men. Now it is clear and evident that we can never ascribe too much honour, goodness, &c., to our Lord God.' So he then consoled me: and it is the truth, that the doctrine of the gospel takes from men all honour, wisdom, and justice, and ascribes them to the one just Creator, who creates all things out of nothing. Now it is much safer to ascribe too much to our Lord God; albeit, however, we can never too much ascribe to Him. Herein I do not err and sin, for I give to both—to wit, God and man,—what appertaineth to each."*

The feelings whereby Luther was guided, are, to judge from such appearances, sound to their inmost core; but as, in feeling, truth and error can lie enclosed, and only in a higher grade of intellectual life are separated one from the other, so this is here the case. In Luther we imagine ourselves to be transported to the primitive times of our race, when, before the mind of man, yet giddy from his fall, all forms pass in motley confusion; God and man are no longer kept distinct, and the acts of both are blended together.

The principle of freedom Luther did not apprehend; since in it he abhorred the destruction of all deeper religious feeling and true humility; viewing in it an encroachment on the rights of the Divine Majesty, nay, the self-deification of man. To be free and to be God was, in his opinion, synonymous.† But what was the consequence? While he desired to oppose the self-will, he annihilated the free will, of man; and, in combating his self-seeking, he assailed, withal, his self-existence and individuality. It is a circumstance worthy of special consideration, that Luther, so often as he will prove man to be no longer in possession of the higher freedom—that freedom which truth, piety, and virtue ensure, shows also involuntarily, that he no longer possesses the freedom of election, and confounds both species of freedom, which are yet so very distinct one from the other! The freedom of election is for man the necessary condition to a higher freedom, but not the same. Thus the Reformer worked himself up to an incapacity to discover in the Catholic notion of humility any humility at all; for humility, according to him, consists in the renunciation of an independent personality, and of personal dignity, and is of an essentially physical nature; whereas, according to the genuine and old Christian view, humility is of a moral essence, and must depend on a free homage, a free oblation of oneself. The Reformers said: "See, thou art not thyself free, and yet thou wouldst fain be free; in this consists all thy perverseness." The Catholic, on the other hand, said; "O, man, thou art created free; but if by thy freedom thou becomest a bond-slave to God, thou wilt receive thy freedom glorified back." Hereby it was possible for the Catholic to explain how a false freedom could be sought after; and his whole system became at once

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* Luther, Comment. on Ep. to Galat. loc. cit. p. 35.

† Luther de servo arbitrio ad Erasm. Roterod. l. l. fol. 117. b. "Sequitur nunc, liberum arbitrium esse plane divinum nomen, nec ulli posse competere, quam soli divinæ majestati; ea enim potestate facit omnia, quæ vult in cœlo et in terrâ. Quod si hominibus tribuitur,

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nihil rectius tribuitur, quam si Divinitas quoque ipsa eis tribueretur, quo sacrilegio nullum esse majus possit. Proinde theologorum erat, ab isto vocabulo abstinere, cum de humanâ virtute loqui vellent, et soli Deo relinquere; deinde ex hominum ore et sermone id ipsum tollere, tanquam sacrum ac venerabile nomen Deo suo asserere."

a Theodicea—a justification of God on account of evil in the world, which Protestantism must absolutely renounce, as it can never explain how man, whom it believes to be absolutely devoid of free will, could ever come to believe himself a free agent, and thereby become evil; unless, with the want of freedom, he be destined to this longing after freedom, and in this way he be doomed to an annihilating contradiction of his own nature with itself, and thereby all evil be referred to God.

In fact, this course of reasoning the Reformers fearlessly pursued; misapprehended, together with free will, the essence of the moral law and morality, which, without free will, is inconceivable; and yet ventured withal to accuse Catholics of want of humility — Catholics, according to whose doctrine that word can alone possess a rational sense; and who, when they say man that confesses himself a sinner before God (and this is the principle of all humility in fallen creatures), are alone consistent.

These grievous perplexities necessarily required a theory of justifying faith, such as the new Church gave. Reduced to a rational expression, this faith accordingly signifies the giving ourselves back full of confidence to God, as at our birth, and through the course of our lives, He hath constituted us;—a well-grounded expectation that He will grant us a favourable issue out of the enigmatic labyrinth of evil, which He hath himself prepared, and into which He hath conducted us. By such a method, undoubtedly, no glory accrues to man; but whether any glory be thereby rendered to God, the enlightened observer will be able to judge.*

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* Luther (de servo arbitrio ad Erasm. Roterod. l. l. fol. 236), expresses this thought in the following way: "Ego sane de me con-

§ XXVII.—Affinity of Protestantism with Gnosticism, and some Pantheistic systems of the Middle Age. More accurate determination of the difference between Zwingle's and Luther's principles.

There is no religious phenomenon, to which the system of the Reformers offers more resemblance, than Gnosticism, to which we have already had, now and then, occasion to advert. In the first place, the latter sprang out of a glowing desire after eternal life, and the deepest sense of human misery in general, and of the misery of sin in particular. So deep a horror for evil filled its disciples, that they deemed it absolutely incom-

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fiteor, si qua fieri possit, nollem mihi dari liberum arbitrium aut quippiam in manû meâ relinqui, quo ad salutem conari possem; non solum ideo, quod in tot adversitatibus et periculis, deinde tot impugnantibus dæmonibus, subsistere et retinere illud non valerem, cum unus dæmon potentior sit omnibus hominibus, neque ullus hominum salvaretur; sed quod etiam, si nulla pericula, nullæ adversitates, nulli dæmones essent, cogerer tamen perpetuo in incertum laborare et aerem pugnis verberare. Neque enim conscientia mea, si in æternum viverem et operarer, unquam certa et secura fieret, quantum facere deberet, quo satis Deo fieret. Quocumque enim opere perfecto reliquus esset scrupulus, an id Deo placeret, vel an aliquid ultra requireret, sicut probat experientia omnium justiciariorum, et ego meo magno malo tot annis satis didici.

"*At nunc cum Deus salutem meam, extra meum arbitrium tollens, in suum receperit, et non meo opere aut cursû, sed suâ gratiâ et misericordiâ promiserit me servare, securus et certus sum, quod ille fidelis sit, et mihi non mentietur, tam potens et magnus, ut nulli dæmones, nullæ adversitates eum, frangere, aut me illi rapere, poterunt. Nemo* (*inquit*) *rapiet eos de manû meâ, quia pater, qui dedit, major omnibus est. Ita fit, ut si non omnes, tamen aliqui et multi salventur, cum per vim liberi arbitrii nullus prorsus servaretur, sed in unum omnes perderemur. Tum etiam certi sumus et securi, nos Deo placere, non merito operis nostri, sed favore misericordiæ suæ nobis promissæ, atque si minus aut male egerimus, quod nobis non imputet, sed paterne ignoscat et emendet. Hæc est gloriatio omnium sanctorum in Deo suo.*

patible with the creation of the good God, and thence proceeded even to uphold a dualism of principles. From the present form of human existence, which arose out of the mysterious concurrence of these principles, evil, according to them, was quite inseparable; it could, though combated, never be overcome.

Down to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we find Gnosticism continuing in broken and detached systems. The Reformers in the sixteenth century embraced it under a milder form. It is not to be doubted, but that they were moved by the like feelings; that they were deeply impressed with the sinfulness of the world, and on that account represented human nature as so thoroughly corrupted, that the disease was in this life absolutely incurable.

Secondly, this sense of sin, pious, doubtless, but confused and distempered in itself, tended, among the Protestants as well as the Gnostics, towards its own destruction; and, as it did not comprehend, and thereby maintain itself, it became utterly extinct.

The higher the degree of objective sinfulness is considered, wherein the subject sees himself involved without personal guilt, the more the magnitude of subjective self-committed evil disappears; and human nature is then charged with the debt, which the individual had contracted. How much the Gnostics sought to excuse themselves, by means of their theory of evil, is well known. In like manner, the Protestants represent Adam, who is accounted the only sinner, as succeeded by Christ, who alone worketh good; and if, by the former, all personal guilt is made impossible, so, through the latter, all personal merit is rendered unnecessary. If the former hath bereaved man of all moral freedom, and, consequently, of all capacity for good, the latter is so constituted, that all liberty, all independent working of good on the part of man, becomes unnecessary; and the more unavoidable the necessity of sinning is represented to have been in the first Adam, the more easily obtainable is forgiveness through the second Adam described to be. The error here is precisely the same as if one were to believe, that a deep sense of guilt was possible, only under the condition of a prodigious magnitude of evil deeds committed by us; for, on the contrary, experience shows, that, when the amount of evil, objectively considered, is small, it is always *most deeply felt*, and most strongly detested. In fact, no blood-guiltiness, no perjury, no adultery is necessary, in order to make one weep out his whole life in penitential tears. In like manner, it is quite unnecessary that, through Adam, men should have been bereaved of all reason, and their every fibre infected, in order to inspire them with a deep sense of the misery under which they languish, and to make them hail a Redeemer with joy. In Adam we were wounded, but not killed: the wound causes a pain to be felt, and the physician to be welcomed, and admits of a perfect cure; but in death all pain is extinguished, and no life returns.

Thirdly, Gnosticism desired of its followers the consciousness, the knowledge (γνῶσις), that they were the sons of the good God; that they could not be lost; that they were quite certain of salvation; and with this claim was associated the doctrine, that some men are by birth οἱ Πνευματικοί (men of the spirit), others οἱ Ψῦχικοί (men of the soul), and others, again, οἱ χοϊκοί (men of clay). In Protestantism, we find, as parallels, *Faith*, which comprises the absolute assurance of eternal life, and the doctrine, that some are, from eternity, predestined to happiness, others to damnation; and this is merely another mode of expressing the Gnostic classification of men. Even the Gnostic doctrine of the Pneumatici contains a principle, that incited to the highest moral enthusiasm, to the most perseverant struggle against all evil; but it is well known how horribly this doctrine was abused in life. It is the same with the Protestant certitude of eternal life, and of absolute predestination. The conviction, that, through God's mercy, and without any moral obligation on my part, I shall infallibly have a share in eternal happiness, can inspire me with gratitude the warmest, and the most capable of producing the fairest fruits in life; and this it was which Luther expected to be the result of his doctrine. But the notion, that heaven will not be lost to the believer, or to him who firmly confides; and that no merit, that is to say, no personal worth, bears any inward relation to salvation, could as easily produce the opposite effects in practice; and that these did not fail to ensue, Luther himself often enough complains, and the course of our investigations will furnish us with numerous proofs. We do not contend, that such an assurance, in noble, tender, and sensitive souls, if such can vaunt of this assurance, is not capable of bearing the most abundant fruits; but how doth the view, which the Reformers entertain of human sinfulness, entitle them to reckon upon souls of such a stamp? If to this it be objected, that every doctrine can be abused, we admit the fact, but maintain, that truth of itself never gives occasion to abuse; that, on the contrary, abuse springs only from the false position, wherein any one sets himself in relation to the truth: whereas, with an erroneous doctrine, abuse is necessarily intertwined, and it is a mere matter of chance whether it conduce to any one's spiritual welfare. This is the case with the doctrine, that, without fulfilling any moral obligations, we become, by faith alone, partakers of Divine grace; this is the case with the Gnostic and Protestant feeling of assurance, and with the doctrine of predestination, which it presupposes.

Fourthly, Marcion was so impressed with the loftiness of the New Testament revelation, with the revelation of God, as a gracious, loving, and merciful Father, that, on that account, he held the divinity in Christ to be essentially different from the one that created the world filled with evils of every kind, gave in the old covenant such severe laws, and so strictly, according to them, meted out rewards and punishments. Into what contradictions Luther brought Nature and Grace, Law and Gospel, we have already seen, and not less so, how, in the Redeemer, he saw exclusively the merciful forgiver of sins.* Marcion, the most pious of Gnostics, but who evinced scarcely any trace of a scientific spirit, supposed, that the good God in Christ took compassion on men, without incurring any obligation to concern Himself as to their destiny; since they belonged to a creation to which He was a stranger: but he forgot, that it was inconceivable how men could even understand Him, and enter into communion with Him, because, as beings created by the Demiurgos (a spirit independent of God), they possessed nothing akin to God, no manner of likeness unto

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* Tertull. adv. Marc. l. i. c. 2. "Et ita in Christo quasi aliam inveniens dispositionem solius et puræ benignitatis et diversæ a Creatore, facile novam et hospitam argumentatus est divinitatem in Christo suo revelatam."

God. In his folly, he thought he more highly exalted the mercy of God, by representing Him as redeeming creatures, not only estranged from Him by sin, but, in their very essence, aliens to Him. In like manner Luther. Fallen man, according to him, was nothing but sin, entirely bereft of the Divine image; a doctrine by which he thought to exalt the glory of the Saviour; without considering, that he, who has no longer anything to be redeemed, cannot possibly be susceptible of redemption. Yet these parallels must now be closed, especially as we should be thrown into no small embarrassment, were we to compare Luther's ascetic exercises with those of Marcion. Such very opposite practical results flowed from theories which have the closest affinity with each other. But even Prodicus, the most libertine enemy to the law, and the Cainites professed theoretical maxims similar to those of Marcion!

Another doctrine, to which Protestantism bears undeniable relationship, is the ideal Pantheism, whose adherents, through the whole course of the middle age, were arrayed against the Church, in no less violent opposition than that which she encountered from the Gnostico-Manichean Dualists. To the former class belong Amalrich of Chatres, and his disciple, David of Dinant, with their followers, various classes of the Fraticelli, Lollards, and Beghards, the brothers and sisters of "the Free Spirit," together with several others. They held the doctrine of the One and All of things,—of the absolute necessity of everything which occurs,—and, consequently, of evil in the creation, of the want of free-will in man, and yet of the utmost latitude of freedom, which he can enforce against the dictates of the moral law,—of the certainty of salvation,—that is to say, the return to the Deity, or absorption in His bosom, which, indeed, forms a necessary part of Pantheism, and of every doctrine that ascribes a divine essence to man. To this class Wycliff belongs, who only further expanded the fatalistic doctrines more hesitatingly taught by Thomas Bradwardine; ascribed, in his Trialogus, evil to God; and, with the denial of freedom of election in man, admitted in his system an absolute predestination, and on this account was censured by an English synod.

Luther and Zwingle, to a certain extent, diverged into these opposite courses; and herein consists, if we judge rightly, the real difference between them. Luther approximates more to the Gnostico-Manichean view of the world;—Zwingle to the Pantheistic. In the first period of his opposition against the Church, Luther, in his peculiar humility, wished to refuse, *to fallen man only*, every species of freedom in what concerned holiness. But, in the course of his hostility, he thought to give a further support to his notion of humility, by representing man, *as in himself*, devoid of freedom,—a proof of his unscientific spirit,—for, by this second doctrine, he entirely took away all weight from the first. It is, however, evident, from numerous passages in his writings, that his principal object was to inspire men with humility and piety, by consideration of their deep guilt in Adam; and that, in the course of the struggle, he evinced a disposition to cling only to this groundwork of his system,—which we may call the would-be Christian,—and to give up the other, which we may characterize as the speculative one.* Zwingle, on the other hand, leant almost exclusively on the latter (for what he alleged respecting original sin, and evil in general, is scarce worthy of attention); he pretty openly declared for Pantheism, and thereby attached himself to the principles of that second party described above, which, in the middle age, unfurled the banner of opposition against the Church. The following statement will furnish the reader with more detailed explanations.

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* Luther de servo arbitr. adv. Erasm. loc. cit. p. 177, b. "Nonne agnoscis? Jam quæro et peto, si gratia Dei desit, aut separetur ab illâ vi modiculâ, quid ipsa faciet? Inefficax (inquis) est, et nihil facit

The leading principles in his writing on providence are as follows: All power is either created or uncreated. If it be uncreated, it is God himself; if it be created, it must needs be created by God. But, to be created by God, signifies nought else than to be an emanation of His power; for whatever is, is from Him, through Him, and in Him, *nay, is Himself*. Thus, created power is ever but a phenomenon of universal power, in a new subject, and a new individual.* The notion of a power,

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boni. Ergo non faciet, quod Deus aut gratia ejus volet; siquidem gratiam Dei separatam ab eâ jam posuimus, quod vero gratia Dei non facit, bonum non est. Quare sequitur, liberum arbitrium sine gratiâ Dei prorsus non liberum, sed immutabiliter captivum et servum esse mali, cum non possit vertere se solo ad bonum. *Hoc stante, dono tibi, ut vim liberi arbitrii non modo facias modiculam, fac eam angelicam, fac, si potes, plane divinam, si adjeceris tamen hanc illætabilem appendicem, et citra gratiam Dei inefficacem dicas;* mox ademeris illi omnem vim: quid est vis inefficax, nisi plane nulla vis?" But as might be expected from this conclusion, we find immediately a recurrence to the old doctrine: "Fixum ergo stet,...nos omnia necessitate, nihil libero arbitrio facere, dum vis liberi arbitrii nihil est, neque facit, neque potest bonum, absente gratiâ.

* Zwingli de providentia, tom. i. fol. 354, a. "Quæ tamen creata dicitur, cum omnis virtus numinis virtus sit, nec enim quidquam est, quod non ex illo, in illo, et per illud, imo illud sit, creata, inquam, virtus dicitur, eo quod in novo subjecto, et novâ specie, universalis aut generalis ista virtus exhibetur. Testes sunt Moses, Paulus, Plato, Seneca." (! !)

peculiar to a created being, is as incompatible with the notion of the Deity, as with the notion of a created being, since this would thereby be conceived as uncreated. To wish to be free, is accordingly identical with wishing to be one's own God; and the doctrine of freedom leads at once to self-deification, and to polytheism. The predicate "Freedom," and the subject "creature," are mutually incompatible; and the expression, "a free creature," involves a contradiction.

He continues: Freedom, as a self-power, being inconsistent with the omnipotence of God, the notion of a creature living according to its own design is evidently subversive of the wisdom of God For this is as much as to suppose, that God would alter his decree, which can only be eternal, and consequently immutable, according to human caprices and actions, the result of human prudence. The notion of Divine Providence is, therefore, according to Zwingle, in every respect, one and the same with that of the inevitable necessity of all occurrences; and quite consistently, therefore, he rejects, with the idea of free-will, all freedom of thinking also.*

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* L. c. "Jam si quicquam suâ virtute ferretur aut consilio, jam isthinc cessarent sapientia et virtus nostri numinis. Quod si fieret, non esset numinis sapientia summa, qui non comprehenderet ac caperet universa; non esset ejus virtus omnipotens, quia esset virtus libera ab ejus potentia, et idcirco alia. Ut jam esset vis, quæ non esset vis numinis, esset lux et intelligentia, quæ non esset numinis istius sapientia."

What conclusions for a Reformer! Above all, Zwingle should have been advised to reform his logic. More plausible, yet still devoid of all true solidity, is the following: "Immutabilem autem diximus administrationem ac dispositionem, hanc ob causam, ut et eorum sententiam, qui hominis arbitrium liberum esse adseverant, non undique firmam, et summi numinis sapientiam certiorem ostenderem, quam ut eam eventus ullus latere possit, qui deinde imprudentem cogeret aut retractare aut mutare consilium."

His thoughts on the essence of created energies Zwingle discloses further, when he says, the being of all things is the being of God, and God Himself; for, should we assert the contrary, then the notion of the infinite, which appertains to God, is destroyed; since any thing, which *is not Himself*, is placed *beside Him*, and *out of Him*.* To render his ideas more intelligible to the Landgrave of Hesse, he makes use of the following comparison. As plants and animals grow out of the earth, and, when their individual life is extinct, dissolve again into its bosom, so it is with the universe in respect to God:—and he adds, in passing, the consoling observation, that from thence the immortality of man is very apparent, since we see, that, nought which has ever been, can quite cease to be, as it only returns to the Universal Being. He even cannot refrain from a digression, to the effect that the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls is not quite groundless, and presents one very favourable side.†

From all this Zwingle infers, that there can be but one cause, and that the so-called secondary causes should not be regarded as causes, but only as means and instruments of the first, which is at once the only cause.‡ By this he utterly denies, that man can be the free principle of causation in a series of actions, and represents him as a completely passive instrument—a living machine, which never acts from itself, which is only set in motion, and is alike incapable either of good or of evil. So far Zwingle, who only reduces to its first principles Luther's doctrine of the servitude of the human will. We have often wondered at the so-called orthodox Protestant theologians of our days, when they opposed modern theological, and philosophical systems, which more consistently carried out the principles of the Reformers, so little did Protestant orthodoxy understand itself! With all his deviations on particular points, Schleiermacher is, in my opinion, the only genuine disciple of the Reformers.

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* L. c. fol. 355, b. "Cum autem infinitum, quod res est, ideo dicatur, quod essentia et existentia infinitum sit, jam constat extra infinitum hoc Esse nullum esse posse."...fol. 356: "Cum igitur unum ac solum infinitum sit, necesse est præter hoc nihil esse."

† L. c. "Sed hanc sententiam paulo *φιλοσοφικώτερον* tractatam... exemplo...confirmabimus," etc.

‡ L. c. fol. 358, b.

CHAPTER IV.

DIFFERENCES IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

§ XXVIII.—Doctrine of Catholics on the Sacraments in general.

The doctrine of the sacraments we shall now treat immediately after the exposition of the doctrine of justification; since, according to the expression of the Council of Trent, justification is, by means of the sacraments, either originally infused into us, or subsequently encreased, or, when lost, is again restored.* We shall begin with stating the Catholic doctrine. The nature of the sacraments in general will first be defined; next the object of their institution; then the manner in which they communicate grace will be explained; and, lastly, their number will be stated.

A sacrament is defined, by the catechism of the council of Trent, to be an outward sign, which, in virtue of the divine ordinance, not only typifies, but works, the supersensual; to wit, holiness and justice.† Here the same manual notices the distinction which, according to the definition we have cited, exists between a sacrament and an image, or the sign of the cross and the like.

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. VII. decret. de Sacram.

† "Quare ut explicatius, quid sacramentum sit, declaretur, docendum erit, rem esse sensibus subjectam, quæ ex Dei institutione sanctitatis et justitiæ tum significandæ, tum efficiendæ, vim habet."

On the object of their institution, the same catechism enlarges in the following manner. In the first place, man, as a being belonging to the world of sense, stands in need of a sensible type, to obtain and to preserve the consciousness of what passes in his supersensual part. It adds, if man were a pure spirit, then would the divine powers, which produce justice and holiness, require no sensible medium. In the second place, the catechism represents the sacraments as pledges of the Divine will in regard to man, as sureties of the truth of God's promises. It is only with difficulty, it continues, that men can be brought into belief; hence it was, that God, in the Old Testament, in corroboration of His word, made use of outward signs to strengthen the confidence of man in the Divine assurances. In like manner, such signs have been instituted by Christ, to serve to men as pledges of the forgiveness of sin, of heavenly grace, and of the communion of the Holy Spirit. Thirdly, the sacraments are represented as the channels (*quasi alvei*), whereby the power which flows from the sufferings of Christ, the grace which the Saviour hath merited for us, is individualized, and applied to each one; in order that by aid thereof, the health of the soul may be re-established, or confirmed. Fourthly, remarks the catechism, they are to be considered as outward marks and tokens of confession among the faithful. Lastly, the idea, with which this exposition of the cited manual concludes, is far more ingenious and more profound than it may at first sight appear,—the idea, namely, that the sacraments contribute the more to cherish Christian piety, as they are well calculated to humble arrogance by the reflection, that, as man had ignominiously delivered himself over to the dominion of the lower world, so he needs its mediation to enable him to rise above it. That false spiritualism, which, during a considerable part of the Middle Age, as well as at the period of the Reformation, everywhere burst forth, and sought to obtain ascendancy, might, by an earnest consideration alone of the great humiliating truth which this idea involves, have attained to a consciousness of its fearful aberrations.*

As regards the mode in which the sacraments confer on us sanctifying grace, the Catholic Church teaches, that they work in us, by means of their character, as an institution prepared by Christ for our salvation (*ex opere operato, scilicet a Christo*, in place of *quod operatus est Christus*),† that is to say, the sacraments convey a divine power, merited for us by Christ, which cannot be produced by any human disposition, by any spiritual effort or condition; but is absolutely, for Christ's sake, conferred by God through their means. Doubtless, man must *receive* this grace, and therefore be *susceptible* of it; and this susceptibility is evinced in repentance and sorrow for sin, in the desire after divine aid, and in a confiding faith. But he can *only* receive it, and therefore be *only* susceptible of it. By this doctrine, accordingly, the objectivity of Divine grace is upheld; and we are prevented from drawing down the effects of the sacrament into the region of the subjective; and, from entertaining the opinion, that these consisted in mere moral and dialectic results, in human feelings, considerations, and resolves, which, as at the view of a picture representing Christ crucified, are excited within us at the moment of receiving, or even may precede the reception. This human activity, except in the case of infants to be baptized, is indeed necessary; but it is not the divine grace promised in the sacrament, nor doth it even merit it. Nay, the religious energies of the human soul are set in new motion by the sacrament, since its divine matter impregnates the soul of man, vivifies it anew, establishes it in the most intimate communion with God, and continues to work within all men, who do not show themselves incapable of its graces, or, as the council expresses it, do not place an obstacle in the way.*

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* L. c. p. 167. The whole exposition of the catechism is taken from the manuals of the theologians of the Middle Age; for example, from Hugh St. Victor, Alexander Hales, Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas. See the last-named schoolman's Summ. tot. theolog. Par. 3. Q. lxi. Art. 1. p. 276.

† Concil. Trid. Sess. VII. can. viii. "Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit."

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* Concil. Trid. l. c. can. vi. "Si quis dixerit, Sacramenta novæ legis non continere gratiam, quam significant, aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, quasi signa tantum, etc. anathema sit." Bellarmine has treated this subject of the sacraments with the felicity which he always evinces in doctrinal investigations: "Igitur ut intelligamus," says he, "quid sit opus operatum, notandum est in justificatione quam recipit aliquis, dum percipit sacramenta, multa concurrere, nimirum, ex parte Dei, voluntatem utendi illâ re sensibili; ex parte Christi, passionem ejus; ex parte ministri, voluntatem, potestatem, probitatem; *ex parte suscipientis, voluntatem, fidem, et pœnitentiam;* denique ex parte sacramenti, ipsam actionem externam, quæ consurgit ex debitâ applicatione materiæ et formæ. Cæterum ex his omnibus id, quod activè et proximè et instrumentaliter efficit gratiam justificationis, est sola actio illa externa, quæ sacramentum dicitur, et hæc vocatur opus operatum, accipiendo passivè (operatum), ita ut idem sit sacramentum conferre gratiam ex opere operato, quod conferre gratiam ex vi ipsius actionis sacramentalis a Deo ad hoc institutæ, non ex merito agentis vel suscipientis." After proving all that has been here stated, and in reference to what has been said of the minister, after showing that his will only is *necessary*, Bellarmine continues: "Voluntas, fides, et pœnitentia in suscipiente adulto necessariò requiruntur, ut disposi-

The doctrine of justification,—according to which the divine activity precedes the human, and then both, in case the latter doth not obstinately resist, constitute one and the same divine and human work,—recurs in the theory of the sacraments. And from the universal relation which, according to Catholic doctrine, exists between grace and free-will, we might infer, that the *opus operatum* doth not establish a divine activity only, nor imply a mere inertness on the part of man.*

That Catholics reckon seven sacraments, needs no further evidence; but Catholics, we may notice in passing, assert of no sacrament, that its reception is entirely and absolutely necessary to salvation. So, for instance, the ardent desire of a catechumen for baptism, when invincible outward obstacles prevent its accomplishment, is sufficient. God, who freely chooses one mode of communicating to us His grace, can make use of another; but it is not for man to reject, according

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tiones ex parte subjecti, non ut causæ activæ; non enim fides et pœnitentia efficiunt gratiam sacramentalem, neque dant efficaciam sacramenti, sed solum tollunt obstacula, quæ impedirent, ne sacramenta suam efficaciam exercere possent, unde in pueris ubi non requiritur dispositio, sine his rebus fit justificatio. Exemplum esse potest in re naturali. Si ad ligna comburenda primum exsiccarentur ligna, deinde excuteretur ignis ex silice, tum applicaretur ignis ligno, et sic tandem fieret combustio, nemo diceret causam immediatam combustionis esse siccitatem, aut excussionem ignis ex silice, aut applicationem ignis ad ligna, sed solum ignem, ut causam primariam, et solis calorem, seu calefactionem, ut causam instrumentalem." Bellarm. de Sacram. l. ii. c. 1. t. iii. p. 108-9.

* Let the reader compare Sess. VI. c. vi. of the Council of Trent with what will be said below respecting penance. Many divines, moreover, along with Bellarmine in the passage just cited, bring, in connexion with the doctrine of the *opus operatum*, the fact, that the efficacy of the sacraments is not determined by the virtue and piety of those who dispense them.

to his caprice, the means of salvation offered to him by Christ, and to prefer another path of grace. This would argue a very gross presumption, and be a most culpable contempt of the divine ordinances. A spirituality of this kind is, with all its pretensions to refinement, nought else than a coarse, carnal arrogance.

§ XXIX.—Lutheran doctrine of the Sacraments in general. Consequences of this doctrine.

At the commencement of the Reformation, Luther and Melancthon evinced on this matter the most decided opposition to the Catholic Church; and the internal ground of this opposition lay entirely in their one-sided conception of the justification of man before God. Hereby especially the communication of *really sanctifying* graces, by means of the sacraments, was thrown into the back-ground, nay, even totally called in question; just as if the Reformers dreaded being sanctified. The highest point to which they could rise, was the one-sided view of the sacraments, considered as pledges of the truth of the Divine promises for the forgiveness of sins. The sacraments, accordingly, were to have no other destination, than to make the faithful receiver assured that his debt of sins was remitted, and to console and to quiet him.

The sacraments being now no longer considered as channels of grace, which *convey* an internal sanctifying power, and *proffer* it to man, their effects were necessarily confined to the subjective acts of the individual at the moment of reception; and it was asserted, that the participation of them was only in so far attended with fruit, *as faith in the forgiveness of sins existed.*

Hereby, therefore, in the first place, the *opus opera-*

tum—the objective character of these means of grace—was of necessity rejected; and everything drawn down into the sphere of the subjective. A second point of opposition was formed by the Lutheran notion of a sacrament, as above described; inasmuch as Catholics, with whom forgiveness of sins and sanctification are one and the same divine act, understand both, by the justification produced or augmented by the medium of the sacraments.

As it is by the right use of the sacraments that man is sanctified, so it is by the same means that his sins are forgiven him, or, when these are already forgiven, that sanctifying grace is increased. On the other hand, the Reformers, whose system everywhere lays too exclusive a stress on the pardon of sins, teach that even the sacraments serve only as instruments for confirming faith in this remission of sins. In the first edition of his "Loci Theologici,"* Melancthon betrays not even a perception of any deeper or more comprehensive notion of the sacraments, than the one here stated; and Luther, in his work on the Babylonish captivity of the Church, unfolds no other view.†

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* P. 46: "Apparet quam nihil sacramenta sint, nisi fidei exercendæ μνημόσυνα." P. 141, et seq: "Nostra imbecillitas signis erigitur, ne de misericordiâ Dei inter tot insultus peccati desperet. Non aliter atque pro signo favoris divini haberes, si ipse tecum coram colloqueretur, si peculiare aliquod pignus misericordiæ, qualecunque miraculum tibi exhiberet: decet de his te signis sentire, ut tam certo credas, tui misertum esse Deum, cum beneficium accipis, cum participas mensæ Domini, quam crediturus tibi videris, si ipse tecum colloqueretur Deus, aut aliud quidquam ederet miraculi, quod ad te peculiariter pertineret. Fidei excitandæ gratiâ signa sunt proposita.—Probabilis et illi voluntatis sunt, qui symbolis seu tesseris militaribus hæc signa comparaverunt, quod essent notæ *tantum*, quibus cognosceretur, ad quos pertinerent promissiones divinæ."

† Op. Jen. tom. iii. fol. 266, b. "Omnia sacramenta ad fidem

In regard to the distinction between the symbols of the Old Testament and the sacraments of the New, Catholic theologians were wont to teach, that the former imparted no justifying grace, that placed us in a real, vital communion with God, but that the latter did so. This distinction the Protestants evidently could not approve, since they held justification and sanctification as separate things, and asserted that the former was determined only by faith. What prevented them, however, from maintaining that our means of salvation were the channels of truly *sanctifying* graces, as cannot be asserted of the Jewish symbols? But Melancthon writes:—"Circumcision is nothing; so is baptism nothing; the communion of the Lord's Supper is nothing; they are rather testimonies and σφραγίδες (seals) of the Divine will toward thee; through them is thy conscience assured, if it ever doubted of the graciousness and the good-will of God in thy regard." Here baptism and the holy communion are ranked indiscriminately with circumcision; and, like it, are represented as mere signs of covenant. Melancthon, however, expresses himself still more distinctly on this point: he likens the sacraments of the New Law to the signs, which were given to Gideon, to assure him of the victory he would gain. Herein, however, we must beware not to alter the point of comparison, which Melancthon wishes to institute. He does not mean to say,

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alendam sunt instituta." 289, b: "Error enim est sacramenta novæ legis differre a sacramentis veteris legis penes efficaciam significationis." 287: "Ita nec verum esse potest, sacramentis inesse vim efficacem justificationis, seu esse signa efficacia gratiæ. Hæc enim omnia dicuntur in jacturam fidei, ex ignorantiâ promissionis divinæ. Nisi hoc modo efficacia dixeris, quod si adsit fides indubitata, certissime et efficacissime gratiam conferunt."

that in the same manner as the pledge, given to Gideon, afforded him the certainty that he would overcome the adversaries of God's people, so the sacraments are to us a sign of victory that we shall conquer our enemy, namely, evil. No, in the opinion of Melancthon, the resemblance consists only in the abstract assurance. In the one case, the assurance refers to the fact, that Israel would come victorious out of the impending contest; in the other, it implies only that we should derive consolation, even were we to succumb in the struggle. So mean a conception of the sacraments necessarily led to the view, that they operate only through faith in the Divine promise of the forgiveness of sins.

It was only in course of the disputes with the fanatics, as Luther called them, or with the Sacramentarians, that the Reformers of Wittemberg approximated again to the doctrine of the Church. Already the Confession of Augsburg expresses itself, though indefinitely enough, yet still in a manner to enable Catholics to declare themselves tolerably satisfied with it.

The "Apology" is still more explicit, for, in a few brief words, it says, that a sacrament is a ceremony, or a work instituted by God, wherein that is represented to us, which the grace annexed to the ceremony proffers.*

But, by degrees, the Lutherans again adopted the entire notion of the *opus operatum*, although they continue, even down to the present day, to protest against it — a protest which can be accounted for only by their apparent ignorance of the origin of the Lutheran opposition to the same, and by the arbitrary signification they have attached to the Catholic doctrine.* Thus, in course of time, no important difference inherent in the nature of things could be pointed out: but, as a dispute had once existed between Catholics and Protestants, and the later Protestants would not acknowledge the mistakes of the elder ones, they saw themselves forced to invent differences. Even Chemnitius gave Luther's original doctrine in a very disfigured form, and would not avow that he indulged in any such one-sided view of the sacraments, and even took the trouble to misrepresent the schoolmen, particularly Gabriel Biel, in order to conceal from the eye of uninformed readers Luther's own variations.†

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* Confess. August. Art. xiii. "De usû sacramentorum docent, quod sacramenta instituta sint, non modo ut sint notæ professionis inter homines, sed magis ut sint signa et testimonia voluntatis Dei erga nos, ad excitandam et confirmandam fidem in his, qui utuntur, proposita. Itaque utendum est sacramentis, ita ut fides accedat, quæ credat promissionibus, quæ per sacramenta exhibentur et ostenduntur." Apolog. p. 178: "Sacramenta vocamus ritus, qui habent mandatum Dei, et quibus addita est promissio gratiæ." P. 206: "Sacramentum est ceremonia vel opus, in quo Deus nobis exhibet hoc, quod offert annexa ceremoniæ gratia."

Meanwhile the original view of Luther on the sacraments (though, as the correction, which shortly after was made in it, showed, it had arisen out of a heedless spirit of opposition, and from want of serious reflection), produced very important consequences. As the aforesaid means of salvation, according to this theory, were, by their symbolical character, destined only to confirm and consolidate faith in the forgiveness of sins; so the number of the old ecclesiastical sacraments must of necessity be diminished. Every one at the first glance must perceive, that matrimony could no longer be numbered among these, for it was assuredly not instituted to serve as a pledge for the forgiveness of sins. Even the signification of holy orders could no more be appreciated, since this sacrament was as little destined to nourish and foster the faith of the person ordained, that his sins were remitted.* In short, the number of seven sacraments (in direct contradiction to Scripture, and the well-founded tradition of the Catholic, as well as of the orthodox Greek Church, nay, even of the Nestorians and Monophysites, who, fourteen hundred years ago, separated from the communion of these Churches) was reduced to two; and merely the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper retained; although the two so retained could not even be understood. Confirmation was only to be a renewal of baptism; and the Lord's supper, which was considered merely as a pledge of the forgiveness of sins, was to supply the place of extreme unction; for, in danger of death, man needed most the assurance of the pardoning mercy of God. Of penance we shall have to speak more in detail.†

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* Marheineke admits this at least, and says the difference between the two confessions consists simply in this, that Catholics teach, "sacramenta *continere* gratiam," Protestants, on the other hand, inculcate "sacramenta *conferre* gratiam." Catholics make use of both expressions, as may be seen from what has been already stated. But how far the *continere* is unsuited to the Protestant theory, the *in*, *sub*, et *cum* pane clearly point out.

† Chemnit. Exam. § 11, p. 39. His misrepresentations are well pointed out by Bellarmine in his work "De Sacramentis," l. ii. p. 110.

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* Melancth. loc. theolog. p. 157. "Matrimonium non esse institutum ad significandam gratiam" (*gratia* is here only the divine forgiveness of sins) "non est quod dubitemus. Quid autem in mentem venit iis, qui inter signa gratiæ ordinem numerarunt? Cum non aliud sit ordo, quam deligi ex *ecclesiâ* eos, qui docent," etc.

† Melancth. l. c. p. 156. "Signum gratiæ certum est participatio mensæ, hoc est, manducare corpus Christi et bibere sanguinem. Sic enim ait...quoties feceritis, facite in memoriam mei. Id est: cum facitis, admoneamini Evangelii, seu remissionis peccatorum....Est autem significatio hujus sacramenti, confirmare nos toties, quoties labescunt conscientiæ, quoties de voluntate Dei erga nos dubitamus."

On the other hand, it is evident that the Catholic, who does not conceive the believer under the one-sided view of a man that, for Christ's sake, has obtained merely the remission of his sins; but, under the living believer, understands a man redeemed from sin, and consecrated to God in mind and sense, needs a circle of sacraments, embracing all the important events of life, and reflecting the ever-recurring view of his earthly pilgrimage,—a circle of sacraments which symbolically express the high relation of each passage of his life to the atonement of Christ, and guarantee and really impart the divine energy, which is requisite to its beginning and its consummation.

The entanglement of man with the lower world, which, since Adam's disobedience, hath been subjected to a curse, is revealed in the most diverse ways. Even so diverse are the ways whereby we are raised up to a world of a higher order, in and by the fellowship with Christ.* If, by earthly generation and birth, we have

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(That is to say, as often as we doubt, whether God be earnest in forgiving us our sins.) "Id cum alias sape, tum maxime, cum moriendum est, accidit. Unctionem arbitror esse eam, de quâ Marci vi,"... (the fourteenth verse of the fifth chapter of James did not then occur to his mind!) "Sed ea signa esse tradita, ut certo significent gratiam, non video." (As if it were not expressly stated in James: *κἂν άμαρτίας ᾖ πεποιηκὼς, ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ.*

* Thom. Aquinas (Summ. p. iii. q. lxv. art. i. p. 296) objects: "Videtur, quod non debeant esse septem sacramenta. Sacramenta enim efficaciam habent ex virtute divina et ex virtute passionis Christi. Sed una est virtus divina et una Christi passio: una enim oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos." Among other things, he replies: "Dicendum quod sacramenta ecclesiæ ordinantur ad duo, scilicet ad perficiendum hominem in his, quæ pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum religionem Christianæ vitæ, et etiam in remedium contra defectum peccati. Utroque autem modo convenienter ponuntur septem sacramenta. Vita enim spiritualis conformitatem

been brought into a general connexion with this distracted world; so, in our maturer years, this connexion

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aliquam habet ad vitam corporalem, sicut et cætera corporalia conformitatem quandam spiritualium habent. In vita autem corporali dupliciter aliquis perficitur. Uno modo quantum ad personam propriam, alio modo per respectum ad totam communitatem societatis, in qua vivit: quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale. Respectu autem sui ipsius perficitur homo in vita corporali dupliciter. Uno modo per se, acquirendo scilicet aliquam vitæ perfectionem: alio modo per accidens, scilicet removendo impedimenta vitæ, puta ægritudines vel aliquid hujusmodi. Per se autem perficitur corporalis vita tripliciter. Primo quidem per generationem, per quam homo incipit esse et vivere. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est baptismus, qui est spiritualis regeneratio: secundum illud ad Titum iii. Secundo, per augmentum, quo aliquis perducitur ad perfectam quantitatem et virtutem. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est confirmatio, in qua datur sanctitas et robur. Unde dicitur discipulis, jam baptizatis, Luc. ult.: 'Sedete in civitate, quoadusque induamini virtute ex alto.' Tertio per nutritionem, qua conservatur in homine vita et virtus. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est Eucharistia, unde dicitur, Joann. vi., 'Nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis et biberitis ejus sanguinem, non habebitis vitam in vobis.' Et hoc quidem sufficeret homini, si haberet et corporaliter et spiritualiter impassibilem vitam. Sed quia homo incurrit interdum et corporalem infirmitatem et spiritualem, scilicet peccatum, ideo necessaria est homini curatio ab infirmitate. Quæ quidem est duplex, una quidem est sanatio, quæ sanitatem restituit. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est pœnitentia, secundum illud Psalmi: 'sana animam meam, quia peccavi tibi.' Alia autem est restitutio valetudinis pristinæ per convenientem diætem et exercitium. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est extrema unctio, quæ removet peccatorum reliquias, et hominem paratum reddit ad finalem gloriam, unde dicitur, Jac. v.... Perficitur autem homo in ordine ad totam communitatem dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc, quod accipit potestatem regendi multitudinem seu exercendi actus publicos. Et loco hujus in spirituali vita est sacramentum ordinis, secundum illud, Hebr. vii., 'quod sacerdotes hostias offerunt non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro populo.' Secundo, quantum ad naturalem propagationem: quod fit per matrimonium tam in corporali quam in spirituali vita, ex eo quod non solum est sacramentum, sed naturæ officium. Ex his etiam patet sacramentorum numerus,

ever meets us in more special relations, and in more definite forms: and what, by our birth, was deposited as a germ, is now expanded, and thereby realized and strengthened. But man feels himself ever more and more strongly straitened by the laws of this world,—they encompass him with ever growing force; and of his own free choice, as well as under a sort of mysterious necessity, he contracts, with a being of his own kind, the closest alliance in the bonds of earthly and sexual love, in order to provide for the perpetuity of his species, and thereby for the whole economy of this lower world. Hereby he becomes at once an active and efficient member of the state, which is itself a larger, but ever limited circle of families, who, usually having all sprung from one and the same progenitor, have, through their opposition to other associations of families, been drawn into peculiar destinies, and thereby received the impress of a special character; while, in a common order, and for mutual protection against such an opposition, they maintain themselves with all the individual interests determined by such a state of things. If, when once man hath come into the world, all the relations we have adverted to take place only at particular periods of his life, there are others again which pervade every stage of his existence. Self-preservation forms the centre point of all earthly exertion, which is concentrated in the care for one's livelihood. Much as thou mayest strive, O man! by a new recruiting of thy bodily strength, to renovate thy earthly existence, the

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secundum quod ordinantur contra defectum peccati. Nam baptismus ordinatur contra carentiam vitæ spiritualis: confirmatio contra infirmitatem animi, quæ in nuper natis invenitur: Eucharistia contra labilitatem animi ad peccandum: pœnitentia contra actuale peccatum, post baptismum commissum," etc.

seed of death was laid in the first moment of thy life,—it announces its being amid the fairest bloom of personal charms,—it waxes more and more in strength, and, at last, overmasters life itself. Thus, in various alternations of earthly action and suffering, of joy and of sorrow, doth the end of life unavoidably grow out of the beginning; it is betokened by sicknesses of various kinds, until the creature, that had sprung out of dust and ashes, again resolves into the same.

To this inferior order of things, the Church, in virtue of the commission given to her by Christ, opposes a higher order, not to annihilate the former, but to bestow on it the blessings of redemption, to explain its significancy, and to purify, by heavenly influences, all the stages of earthly and sinful existence; to raise humanity again up to God, as through Adam it had fallen, and to exalt time into eternity. Symbolical signs bring the higher world more immediately within the perception of sense, and withal convey from that world the capacity for its influence. To the earthly birth, stained with sin, the spiritual second birth for heaven is annexed. At the moment when the growing perils of the world threaten to encompass the individual, and lay fast hold upon him, cometh the *confirmation* of his spirit, by the Spirit from above, to enable him to encounter the arduous impending struggle. The earthly sexual intercourse, calculated as it is to draw down man to destruction, into the lowest depths of terrestrial existence, is transformed into a heavenly alliance; and sensuality, which is opposed to all permanent connexion, is subdued in Christ the Lord, and made instrumental to the indissoluble union of spirits. If by marriage man contracts a more intimate alliance with the earthly and limited existence of the state; so marriage is sanctified by a symbolical action, which, while it consecrates it to be the central organ for the union of all believers, makes them consider themselves members of an all-embracing divine kingdom on earth, which, totally distinct from circumscribed terrestrial kingdoms, is destined to permeate all these, and to vivify them with its spirit; in the same way as the individual's ecclesiastical life should pervade his civil existence. If matrimony be the vital condition, not only of states, but of all earthly existence, and of its regular progress, so Holy Orders are the condition to all ecclesiastical life, and all the other sacraments. In opposition to the earthly nurture, and the perishable food, the celestial Bread is offered us for our lasting spiritual sustenance through life; so that the Table of the Lord forms the centre-point of divine service and religious existence, as the table of the father of the family constitutes the centre of domestic service and civil life. If in the violent obstructions of bodily organism the foe of earthly life manifests himself, so Extreme Unction imparts strength and consolation,—warning us, that, in every case, the real man is redeemed by a higher power; and this, especially in the approaching dissolution of the bond between body and soul, never fails of its effect. The holy action devoted to the cure of the penitent sinner, who, after being incorporated into the Church, hath grievously fallen, cannot be conceived as a normal principle in the history of the spiritual life; for, otherwise, the fall after regeneration would come to be regarded as unavoidable and necessary,—that is to say, as no sin. But yet it hath been ordained by God's mercy as an extraordinary dispensation of grace; and so the septenary number of sacraments is now filled up.

Protestantism despaired of the possibility of the earthly being quite pervaded by the heavenly element, and of the former being viewed through the medium of the latter; and hence it was forced, not only to reject the doctrine of seven sacraments as the effect of human presumption, struggling against an unavoidable necessity; but, in the two sacraments it retained, it saw only the principle of the forgiveness of sins, rendered necessary in consequence of the indomitable carnal spirit of man.

§ xxx.—Further consequences of the original Lutheran view of the essence of a sacrament.

That infant baptism, according to the Protestant view of the sacraments, is an act utterly incomprehensible, cannot be doubted; for if it be through faith *only* that the sacrament takes effect, of what value can it be to the unconscious child? The Anabaptists, against whom Luther was so incensed, drew but the natural inferences from the premises which he had laid down, and could not be refuted by him without his proving unfaithful to his own principle.

In the same way, it was not difficult to come to the conclusion, that, with such views, there was not the slightest reason for adopting a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. For if the Lord's Supper, as Luther said, be only a pledge of the forgiveness of sins, no reason can be assigned why Christ should be present. The bare bread, and the bare wine, would achieve all which was expected of the sacrament. As little as God need be personally present in the rainbow, to make that natural phenomenon—selected as a token of promise to the infant world, that the inhabitants of the earth should never more be destroyed by a deluge—

attain its pacifying end; so little is the real presence of the Saviour necessary in the sacrament of the altar, if it be to serve only as a pledge of the remission of sins. This Andrew Carlstadt perceived; and, from the very principle laid down by Luther, as to the mode of viewing a sacrament, he drew conclusions against the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper; and, in our opinion, Plank should not have doubted whether Carlstadt had not really been conducted in this way to the denial of the Real Presence, as in one of his writings he himself stated it.* We recognize the internal consistency and necessity of Carlstadt's view, so soon as he had fallen into Luther's one-sided conception of the sacraments. Here, it appears to us, we have found the clue for explaining the fact, that, shortly after the breaking out of the dispute adverted to, Luther wrote, in the following manner, to Bucer and Capito, who had requested of him an elucidation of the difficulties which Carlstadt had raised against the real presence of Christ in the sacrament of the altar. He says, that five years previously he had come to the same opinion as Carlstadt had arrived at, and would willingly have enforced it, "in order to be able to give a blow to the Papacy," had he not been deterred by the clear words of Scripture.†

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* Plank, History of the rise &c. of the Protestant system of doctrine, 2d book, p. 215.

† E. Münch, in *Bilibald Pirkheimer's Schweizer-Krieg*, p. 54, communicates a letter of this scholar to Melancthon, wherein the same view appears to be stated. It is said: "So Œcolompadius, Zwingle, and others, are highly opposed to Luther; and if Luther had not investigated the matter so deeply, and had not engaged in so strenuous an opposition against Dr. Carlstadt, he would have been the leader in this cursed error." Pirkheimer means to say, that it was only out of opposition to Carlstadt, that Luther had been brought back to the doctrine of a real presence of Christ in the Lord's supper.

His whole theory of the sacraments led him to the adoption of Carlstadt's view; and what with repugnance he saw himself forced to revere as Scriptural, possessed in his system no internal consistency. With the same urgency should Luther's opinion, that the foundations of the Church had been shaken, since it had fallen into essential errors, have led him to dispute the true presence of the Lord in the sacrament. For it was, doubtless, inconsistent to admit, on the one hand, a real, and therefore *efficacious*, presence of Christ in the Church; and, on the other hand, to assert, that she had fallen away from Him, or rather, He had withdrawn from her, and, in matters of such vast moment, had suffered her to walk her own way.

If we be justified, perhaps, in assuming, that Luther's, and, more especially, Melancthon's, general exposition of the sacraments, had prepared the way for the original Helvetic view of the Lord's Supper (for the conclusions, which Luther himself was so disposed to draw, pressed not less urgently on the minds of others); so, on a nearer consideration, we may discover, in this exposition, the source whence emanated the rejection of all the sacraments, or, at least, that indifference for them, to which, in the first period of the Reformation, we discern so strong a propensity, as, for instance, in Carlstadt and Schwenkfeld. Luther, and especially Melancthon, had more than once asserted, that he, who held fast in faith to the Divine promise, did not even need the sacraments.* Hence, against the doctrine, that sacraments are the pledges of the forgiveness of sins, Carlstadt observes: "he who hath the right remembrance of Christ, is sure of his redemption, and hath peace in God through Christ,—not through the sacrament. If Christ be our peace and our assurance, then creatures without soul cannot tranquillize us and make us secure."* It was only when Luther heard his own thoughts uttered from the lips of others, that he found them dangerous and untrue. Hence, in his larger catechism, he suffers not a word to escape him, whereby the sacraments could be represented as anywise superfluous; nay, with all earnestness, and the greatest urgency, he exalts their power and efficacy.†

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* Melancthon loc. theol. p. 142. "Sine signo restitui Ezechias potuit, si nudæ promissioni credere voluisset: vel sine signo Gideon victurus erat, si credidisset. Ita sine signo justificari potes, modo credas." Luther de captivit. Babylon. l. c. fol. 280: "Neque enim Deus aliter cum hominibus egit aut agit, quam verbo promissionis.

§ XXXI.—Zwinglius and Calvin on the sacraments.

Zuinglius formed the worst and most miserable conception of the sacraments, that it is possible to imagine; yet, in doing so, as we have said, he merely followed out the hints given him by Luther and Melancthon.

He considers the sacraments only as ceremonies whereby a man professes himself a member of the Church, and a follower of Christ. He accordingly very much approves of the Lutherans throwing aside the belief that the sacraments contribute aught towards justification; but he laments the more that they should still regard them as pledges of the Divine mercy

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Rursus nec nos cum Deo unquam aliter agere possumus, quam fide in verbum promissionis ejus. Opera ille nihil curat, nec eis indiget, quibus potius erga homines et cum hominibus et nobis ipsis agimus." Fol. 286, b: "Qui eis credit, is implet ea, etiamsi nihil operetur."

* See the extracts from Carlstadt's writing, in the above-cited work of Plank, p. 218.

† Catech. maj. p. 510.

and favour; since he, whose faith needs such a confirmation, actually possesses none. In this respect, he says, the reception of the sacraments rather affords the Church an assurance that her followers believe, than that they themselves become thereby more sure and steadfast in their faith.*

If, contrary to the clearest teaching of Holy Writ, and the testimony of all Christian ages, Luther and Melancthon had degraded the sacraments into mere tokens of covenant between God and men; so Zuinglius advanced a step further, and represented them as signs of covenant between man and man. Who could now connect any sense with the words of Christ: "He who believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved"? And how powerless and unmeaning must the passage of Paul appear, wherein he calls baptism "the laver of regeneration, and of the newness of the Holy Spirit"? But the uncertainty of belief, which Zuinglius exhibits at the beginning of his treatise on the sacraments, is worthy of notice. He begs pardon, if he offends the opinions of others, and he declares that, with the exception of Eck and Emser, he is at peace with every one, and in return claims the indulgence of others for himself.* He speaks as if the question turned on mere human opinions—on things of a doubtful nature; just as if the Christian Church were such a wretched, mismanaged body, that she did not even know, and could not know, with certainty, what it was which she daily practised, and practised at the command of Christ, and must through all centuries continue to practise. When once the firm ground, and sure and eternal footing, is abandoned, then all must indeed vacillate, and all doctrines be abandoned to mere conjecture.

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* De verâ et falsâ religione Commentar. Op. tom. xi. fol. 197-9. He thus concludes: "Sunt ergo sacramenta signa vel ceremoniæ, pace tamen omnium dicam, sive neoticorum sive veterum, quibus se homo ecclesiæ probat aut candidatum aut militem esse Christi, redduntque ecclesiam totam potius certiorem de tuâ fide, quam te. Si enim fides tua non aliter fuerit absoluta, quam ut signo ceremoniali ad confirmationem egeat, fides non est." De peccato originali declarat. l. c. fol. 122: "Signa igitur nihil quam externæ res sunt, quibus nihil in conscientiâ efficitur. Fides autem sola est quâ beamur......Symbola igitur sunt externa ista rerum spiritualium, et ipsa minime sunt spiritualia, nec quidquam spirituale in nobis perficiunt: sed sunt eorum, qui spirituales sunt, quasi tesseræ." Elsewhere he expresses himself, however, in a somewhat milder strain; for instance, in his *Fidei Ecclesiasticæ Expositio*, l. c. p. 551: "Docemus ergo, sacramenta coli debere, velut res sacras, ut quæ res sacratissimas significent, tam eas, quæ gestæ sunt, tam eas quæ nos agere et exprimere debemus. Ut baptismus significat et Christum nos sanguine suo abluisse, et quod nos illum, ut Paulus docet, induere debemus, hoc est ad ejus formulam vivere; sic Eucharistia quoque significat cum omnia, quæ nobis divinâ liberalitate per Christum donata sunt, tum quod grati debemus eâ charitate fratris amplecti, quâ Christus nos suscepit, curavit, ac beatos reddidit." Here, accordingly, the sacrament signifies something for the receiver, not for the Church only. But this writing of Zwinglius was his swan-like song, as Bullinger in the preface to it asserts, p. 550: "Nescio quid cygneum vicinâ morte cantavit." A very high strain of song truly! Yet in his work, *De verâ et falsâ religione*, p. 108, he had already expressed himself in a similar way.

It was quite in the opposite sense that Calvin taught. His doctrine, with the exception of one point, differs not at all from that of the Lutheran formularies. Calvin carefully points out all the parts of what is understood by a sacrament, and recommends, with much urgency, its use.†

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* De verâ et falsâ relig. lib. i. p. 197.

† Calvin. Institut. lib. iv. § 3, fol. 471. "Ut exigua est et imbecillis nostra fides, nisi undique fulciatur, ac modis omnibus sustentetur, statim concutitur, fluctuatur, vacillat adeoque labescit. Atque ita quidem hic se captui nostro pro immensâ suâ indulgentiâ attemperat misericors Dominus, ut quando animales sumus, qui humi semper adrepentes et in carne hærentes nihil spirituale cogitamus, ac ne concipi-

The point in which he deviates from the Catholic and the Lutheran doctrine, consists especially herein, that he will have the sanctifying grace distinct and separate from the sacrament, as the sensible sign. The former, according to him, is not conjoined with the material element: and hence to every Christian is this element tendered, but not so the divine nourishment.* The necessity of this doctrine, in the system of Calvin, is evident; for as it is only to the elect that the Divine grace is imparted, and the rest are passed over by God, so grace must by no means be connected with the visible sign.† Nay,

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mus quidem, elementis etiam istis terrenis nos ad se deducere non gravetur, atque in carne proponere spiritualium bonorum speculum," etc. Helvet. 1, cap. xix. p. 65: "Prædicationi verbi sui adjunxit Deus mox ab initio in ecclesiâ suâ sacramenta vel signa sacramentalia. Sunt autem sacramenta symbola mystica, vel ritus sancti aut sacræ actiones, à Deo ipso institutæ, constantes verbo suo, signis, et rebus significatis, quibus in ecclesiâ summa sua beneficia homini exhibita retinet in memoriâ, et subinde renovat, quibus item promissiones suas obsignat, et quæ ipse nobis interius præstat, exterius representat, ac veluti oculis contemplanda subjicit, adeoque fidem nostram, spiritû Dei in cordibus nostris operante, roborat et auget, quibus denique nos ab omnibus aliis populis et religionibus separat, sibique soli consecrat et obligat, et quid a nobis requirat significat."

* Loc. cit. § 9, fol. 474. "Cæterum munere suo tunc ritè demum perfunguntur (sacramenta) ubi interior illi magister spiritus accesserit: cujus unius virtute et corda penetrantur, et affectus permoventur, et sacramentis in animas nostras aditus patet. Si desit ille, nihil sacramenta plus præstare mentibus nostris possunt, quam si vel solis splendor cœcis oculis affulgeat, vel surdis auribus vox insonet. Itaque sic inter spiritum sacramentaque partior, ut penes illum agendi virtus resideat, his ministerium duntaxat relinquatur; idque sine spiritûs actione manet frivolum, illo vero intus agente, vimque suam exercente, multæ energiæ refertum."

† Loc. cit. § 17, fol. 477. "Spiritus Sanctus (*quem non omnibus promiscue sacramenta advehunt, sed quem peculiariter suis confert*) is est, qui Dei gratias secum affert, qui dat sacramentis in nobis locum,

the Divine grace worketh irresistibly: it might, therefore, easily happen, that some, not among the chosen, should, without the Divine will, be classed among the elect, if the heavenly nurture and power united with the sensible sign itself were offered to every one! Hence in baptism the non-elect are only outwardly washed; and the same receive in the Lord's supper but mere bread and wine; a view which Gottschalk, a predestinarian of the ninth century, likewise entertained; at least such an opinion is imputed to him. Moreover, Calvin also admits but two sacraments.*

§ XXXII.—Baptism and Penance.

After having pointed out the divergences of opinion as to the nature of a sacrament in general, we must now proceed with details, and begin with baptism.† It is principally in describing the effects of this means of

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qui efficit, ut fructificent." Here lies the real point of difference. Now Calvin makes the matter appear, as if the Catholics separated the power working in the sacraments from their primary fountain, and looked upon them as working of themselves. "Tantum hic quæritur, propriâne et intrinsecâ (ut loquuntur) virtute operetur Deus, an externis symbolis suas resignat vices. Nos vero contendimus, quæcunque adhibeat organa primariæ ejus operationi nihil decedere." And now, "Interim illud tollitur figmentum, quo justificationis causa virtusque Spiritus Sancti elementis, ceu vasculis ac plaustris, includitur."

* Loc. cit. § 19, fol. 478. "Sacramenta duo instituta, quibus nunc Christiana ecclesia utitur, baptismus et cœna Domini." Quite in the same sense are the first Helvetic Confession, c. xix; the Augsburg, art. xxv.; the Gallic, art. xxxv. p. 123; the Belgic, art. xxxiv.-v. p. 192.

† In its sixth session, the Council of Trent supposes the case of an adult, who by baptism is received into the Christian Church; and, in fact, in this way the holy act can best be understood.

salvation, that the Christian Communities differ from one another; and indeed, the different notion which each entertains of justification, determines, as we may suppose, this diversity of opinion. If, according to Catholic doctrine, original sin in children, in adults original sin together with actual sins, is by the due reception of baptism removed, according to that process of regeneration above described;—so that the believer, having become a member of Christ, walketh no more according to the flesh, but interiorly quickened by the Divine Spirit, showeth himself a new man: so among the Protestants, their well known theory of the mere forgiveness of sins is here again predominant. Through the faith received before baptism, is the adult justified; but through baptism, in which all that Christ hath done for us is applied, and the Holy Ghost with all his gifts is imparted, this faith is sealed. This certainly is a far more elevated theory of baptism; one, unquestionably, more consonant to Holy Writ, than that adopted by Luther, at the commencement of the Reformation. However, according to the Lutherans, original sin still remains in the baptized—an opinion, which cannot in this place be matter of any further investigation. The Calvinistic formularies point out very beautifully the new life, commencing with baptism, and they do so still better than the Lutheran.*

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* Catechism. maj. part iv. § 9, p. 12. "Sola fides personam dignam facit, ut hanc salutarem et divinam aquam utiliter suscipiat." § 14, p. 54: "Quapropter quivis Christianus per omnem vitam suam abunde satis habet, ut baptismum recte perdiscat atque exerceat. Sat enim habet negotii, ut credat firmiter, quæcunque baptismo promittuntur et offeruntur, victoriam nempe mortis ac diaboli, remissionem peccatorum, gratiam Dei, Christum cum omnibus suis operibus [his sufferings and death and the like] et Spiritum Sanctum cum omnibus suis dotibus." (This is not true, see 1 Cor. xii.) The *Smalcald*

The Catholic Church, moreover, from the second century, hath invested the original simple act of baptism with a rich abundance of symbolical ceremonies, in order to stamp more deeply on the minds of her children the idea of this sacrament, and to symbolize, by various emblems, the exalted nature of the newness of life in Christ. Although, doubtless, the symbolization of this sacrament, unessential in itself, belongs not to this place, but only the doctrine itself; yet we may be permitted to draw, in a few words, the attention of the reader to this ceremonial, and thereby render him more familiar with the Catholic view of baptism, whereby it will become more evident what a decided influence this view hath on the conception of the other sacraments. As the Lord once, by a mixture of spittle and dust, cured the corporeal deafness of a man, so the same mixture, applied in baptism, denoteth the fact, that the spiritual organs are henceforth opened for the mysteries of God's kingdom. The burning candle signifieth that now truly the divine light from above hath fallen upon the mind, and the darkness of sin been changed into a celestial splendour. The salt denoteth the wise man, freed from the folly of this world: the anointing with oil, the new priest; for every Christian is, in the spiritual sense of the word, a priest who hath penetrated into

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Article, part iii. c. 5, § 1, in order to be able to say something against Catholics, confounds scholastic opinions with the doctrine of the Church. Helvetica 1, cap. xx. p. 71: "Nascimur enim omnes in peccatorum sordibus, et sumus filii iræ. Deus autem, qui dives est misericordiâ, purgat nos à peccatis gratuitè, per sanguinem filii sui, et in hoc adoptat nos in filios, adeoque fœdere sancto nos sibi connectit, et variis donis ditat, ut possimus novam vivere vitam. Obsignantur hæc omnia baptismo. Nam intus regeneramur, purificamur, et renovamur à Deo per Spiritum Sanctum," etc.

the inmost sanctuary, and hath renewed the most living communion with God in Christ Jesus; and the white garment imports that the believer, washed clean in the blood of the Lamb, must henceforth preserve, unto the second coming of the Lord, the innocence which he had lost in the first Adam, and won again in the second. Symbol is crowded upon symbol, in order to express, in the most manifest way, the one idea; that a total, permanent change is to occur in man, and a new, higher, and lasting existence is henceforward to commence; and hence, among other reasons, baptism is not repeated.

Hereby, on the part of the Church, the confident expectation,—on the part of the believer, the solemn vow, is declared, never more to fall into any grievous (mortal) sin; but rather to wax more and more in holiness of life. If such a sin be committed, then the darkness, the folly of the world, and the unpriestly life, take again possession of the soul; and thereby is communion with God broken off, and the baptismal grace forfeited. Hence, if the sinner wish to be converted from his evil ways, he needs a *new* reconciliation with God, and therefore another sacrament; and such a sacrament is penance conceived to be. Yet it ought not to be hence inferred, that penance, as a sacrament, is instituted *only* for such as return from a course of conduct, and a state of feeling, absolutely incompatible with the abode of Christ in their souls. It is for all believers an institution of fatherly instruction, exhortation, correction, quieting, and solace.

But it is quite otherwise in the Lutheran, and even in the Calvinistic creed. Since, according to this creed, the power of the Divine Spirit in regeneration is able to work no extirpation of sin; since, on the contrary, original sin as such, the carnal sin as such, though weakened, is still considered to endure in the man "born again of water and the spirit;" a totally different view of the relation of the baptized to Christ is necessarily entertained. And the sins,—even the more grievous sins,—of the former, appear not as anything which hath dissolved that state of grace obtained in baptism, and therefore not as anything whereby the fellowship with Christ would be again broken off. All sins, moreover, being but the particular forms of original sin, not extirpated, but *only forgiven in baptism*, and in all this God only working salvation, but man, on the other hand, not acting independently, baptism not only imparts the assurance, that all our sins committed before baptism are forgiven, but gives the pledge of the remission of all the sins to be afterwards committed.* Baptism is a letter of indulgence sealed by God for one's own life, and therefore, in every transgression, we need only recall and resuscitate in our minds the promises recorded in that letter; and this is what the Reformers call a *regressus ad baptismum*. Hence, baptism is characterized also as the sacrament of penance, that is to say, as the moral pledge given by God, that sins at every moment of his life are remitted to the believer, and that he is admitted to grace; or, in other words, penance is no peculiar sacrament.* Hence, Luther could not pardon St. Jerome for having called penance the second plank redeeming from shipwreck; since, as he says, the first, namely, baptism, could never be lost, provided only man, so often as he was seized with terror for his sins, renewed the promises made in baptism. He is even of opinion, that this view is borne out by the principle of the Church, forbidding the repetition of baptism. Accordingly, while Catholics conceive the effects of baptism to extend to our whole lives, in such a way, that, from the moment of baptism, to the close of our earthly career, life ought to flow on pure, stainless, and ever consecrated to God; Luther looks on these effects of baptism as administering consolation to man, even amid all his transgressions. Thus, had the Reformers considered the real internal renovation and sanctification of man to be possible through baptism, and regarded this renovation as one with justification, they would have seen clearly, that, by any grievous sin, the grace of baptism could be lost, and penance would then have been acknowledged as a second sacrament. But, since they look on justification as merely the forgiveness of sins, and the sacrament of baptism as its seal or letter, the operation of baptism, according to them, continues uninterrupted.*

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* See Luther's Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. "Therefore we say that man is a true Christian; not one who hath and feeleth no sin, but one to whom the sins which he hath and feeleth are not imputed by our Lord God, and on account of the faith which he has in Christ. And this doctrine ministers to the poor conscience a mighty and steady solace, when it would be like to quake before God's wrath and judgment. Wherefore is a Christian, when he is what he ought to be, perfectly and entirely free from all laws, and subject to no law whatever, whether internal or external."—p. 68. (Nothing conduces to his condemnation provided he only believe.)

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* Melancthon, however, occasionally makes an exception, the cause whereof we shall hereafter have occasion to show. Apolog. art. IV.: "In ecclesiis nostris plurimi sæpe in anno utuntur sacramentis, *absolutione* et cœnâ Domini." Art. V.: "Absolutio *proprie* dici potest sacramentum pœnitentiæ, ut etiam scholastici theologi eruditiores (?) loquuntur." Art. VII.: "Vere igitur sunt sacramenta, baptismus, cœna Domini, absolutio, quæ est sacramentum pœnitentiæ." In the third revisal of his *Loci*, after 1545, he says: "Cum autem vocabulum sacramenti de ceremoniis intelligitur institutis in prædicatione Christi, numerantur hæc sacramenta, baptismus, cœna Domini, absolutio." Compare Augusti's *Christian Archæology*, vol. ix. p. 28.

The particular parts of penance are accordingly very differently described by the two confessions. The Protestants regard contrition and faith, as the stages through which a particular penitential act takes its course. Contrition they explain by "terrors of conscience" (*conscientiæ terrores*), which consist in that dread of the Divine judgment, that attends the consciousness of the non-fulfilment of the Law. This fear is next banished by instrumental faith: and the conscience hereby obtaining the solace and the quiet which the Lutherans so exclusively look to, the whole penitential act is terminated. Hence, absolution is nothing more than a *declaration* that sin is forgiven.† Even the Calvinists have not refused their approbation to this decision; yet they have received it with the modification which their, in some degree profounder, doctrine of justification demanded.*

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* Melancthon loc. theol. p. 145. "Usus vero signi (baptismi) hic est, testari quod per mortem transeas ad vitam, testari quod mortificatio carnis tuæ salutaris est." [The notion of *mortificatio*, and of the *transitus ad vitam*, or of the *vivificatio*, has been explained above, and is evident from what follows.] "Terrent peccata, terret mors, terrent alia mundi mala; confide quia σφραγίδα accepisti misericordiæ erga te, futurum ut salveris, quomodocumque oppugneris a portis inferorum. Sic vides, et significatum baptismi et signi usum durare in sanctis per omnem vitam." P. 146: "Idem baptismi usus est in mortificatione. Monet conscientiam remissionis peccatorum, et certam reddit de gratia Dei, adeoque efficit ut ne desperemus in mortificatione. *Proinde quantisper durat mortificatio, tantisper signi usus est.* Non absolvitur autem mortificatio, dum vetus Adam prorsus extinctus fuerit." P. 149: "Est enim pœnitentia vetustatis nostræ mortificatio, et renovatio spiritus: sacramentum ejus, vel signum, non aliud, nisi baptismus est." P. 150: "Sicut evangelium non amisimus alicubi lapsi, ita nec evangelii σφραγίδα baptismum. Certum est autem, evangelium non semel tantum, sed iterum ac iterum remittere peccatum. Quare non minus ad *secundam* condonationem, quam ad primam, baptismus pertinet." All these passages are but extracts from Luther's work, *De captivitate Babylonicâ.* Op. tom. ii. fol. 287, b.

† Confessio Augustana, art. XII. "Constat autem pœnitentia pro-

§ XXXIII.—Continuation of the doctrine of Penance.

The Catholics raise the same objections to the Lutheran view of penance, as to Luther's doctrine of justification. They accuse it of poverty, and they charge it with holding down the believer to an extremely low grade of the spiritual life, allowing him scarcely a perception of the fulness of the riches of evangelical grace, while it is very far from expressing the biblical idea of μετάνοια. The doctrine of the Catholic Church is, that the sacramental penance should pass through three stages; whereof the first is contrition, with the firm purpose of change of life; the second, confession; the third, satisfaction: and hereby the sacerdotal absolution also receives a signification, wholly different from that which is attached to it by the Protestants. As regards, in the first place, contrition, it is of an essence far

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prie his duabus partibus; altera est contritio, seu terrores incussi conscientiæ, agnito peccato; altera est fides, quæ concipitur ex evangelio seu absolutione, et credit propter Christum remitti peccata, et consolatur conscientiam, et ex terroribus liberat."

* Calvin. instit. lib. iii. c. 34, § 8. The Lutheran denomination of the two parts here occurs under the name of *mortificatio* and *vivificatio*. But, as we remarked above, by the former expression, the putting off of the old man, and by the latter the putting on of the new man, are to be understood; so signifying something other than the Lutheran *contritio et fides*. When Augusti, in his *Archæology* (vol. ix. p. 25), says, the terminology of the Calvinists is either borrowed from Melancthon or made to harmonize with his, the first assertion is decidedly true, but the second is not at all so.

more exalted than what the Lutherans term *conscientiæ terrores,* above which only the rudest natures are incapable of rising; for these terrors involve no detestation of sin, as such, and contain no trace of the tenderer emotions: they are but the dread of sensible evil. It is contrary to all experience, that, within the circle of Christian life, sorrow for moral transgressions, and for the falling short of evangelical perfection, can or ought to be called forth only by the representation of hell torments: and he who would obstinately insist thereon, would merely deduce a general rule from the experience of his own individual feelings, and, in the same measure, furnish a remarkable example of his own narrow-mindedness, as well as of his ignorance of the plastic power of Christianity. It would be even contrary to the most clearly attested facts, to represent the dread of Divine chastisements as the only path which first leads men into the bosom of the Christian Church. Christ is the divine teacher of truth; and we need only peruse the Clementines, and the account which Justin hath given of his conversion to Christianity, at the commencement of his dialogue with the Jew Trypho, as well as the narrative which Tatian, in his apology for the Christian religion, and Hilarius of Poictiers, in his work on the Trinity, have furnished of their respective conversions,* to convince ourselves that the transition from heathenism to Christianity was especially brought about by the following means, to wit,—the recognition of reason, that Christ had communicated most credible revelations respecting divine things, and freed the frail heart of man from uncertainty and distracting doubt. We should not look on the teaching office of Christ as merely accidental, as Luther did, and thereby fell into such a narrow conception of things. He who, from a desire of truth, first embraces the Son of God manifested in the flesh, stands on much higher ground than one who has been induced to do so from the fear of hell; and other motives at least will concur to produce the sorrow for sin. How, then, within the pale of Christianity, should this sorrow consist only in that fear? But even where it exists, it is very far, according to Catholic principles, from completing the notion of repentance. The dread of the divine judgments is deemed by Catholics to be only an incitement to repentance,—a germ from which, after it hath been further expanded, something far nobler must grow out, if a true or perfect contrition is to be manifested. Out of faith and confidence, which, according to Catholics, *must precede, and not follow, repentance,* the hatred to sin, and the germs of Divine love are to be unfolded; so that these must concur to make up the penitential feeling. Contrition (*contritio charitate formata*) is with them a profound detestation of sin, springing out of the awakened love for God, with the conscious, deliberate determination *never more to sin,* but rather to fulfil the Divine law from and in a

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* Lactantius divin. Instit. lib. i. c. 1, is brief enough to permit our citing a passage in reference to this subject. After having described the assiduity with which the ancient philosophers sought for the truth, he says: "Sed neque adepti sunt id, quod volebant, et operam simul atque industriam perdiderunt: quia veritas, id est arcanum summi Dei, qui facit omnia, ingenio ac propriis non potest sensibus comprehendi: alioquin nihil inter Deum hominemque distaret, si consilia et dispositiones illius majestatis æternæ cogitatio assequeretur humana. Quod quia fieri non potuit, ut homini per seipsum ratio divina innotesceret, non est passus hominem Deus, lumen sapientiæ requirentem, diu-

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tius oberrare, ac sine ullo laboris effectu vagari per tenebras inextricabiles. Aperuit oculos ejus aliquando, et notionem veritatis munus suum fecit," &c.

love for Him. In every case, they hold no emotion of the soul worthy the name of repentance, unless with this emotion be connected at least a firm determination of the will to abstain from all sin, though even this resolution may not be determined by clearly defined motives of a higher kind.*

Moreover, it is scarcely necessary to call attention to the frequency with which the differences between the Christian communions in the doctrine of justification recur in the matter before us. The Protestants suppose the terrors of conscience to be the only condition necessary to render us susceptible of the blessings manifested to us in Christ Jesus. Instrumental faith delivers from these terrors, and man is justified by it alone. But, from faith, the resolution to begin a new life, and the germs of love, are *expected*, indeed, as the fruit, but of themselves contribute nought towards making us acceptable to God, and are, therefore, no sign of the Protestant notion of contrition, in so far as it is the condition of faith. With Catholics, on the other hand, sanctification and forgiveness of sins are one act: accordingly, should the latter ensue, the spirit of man must be moved by far other motives than mere fear.

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* Bellarm. de pœnitent. lib. 1, c. xix, tom. iii. p. 948 : "Cum partes pœnitentiæ quærimus, non quosvis motus, qui quocunque modo ad pœnitentiam pertinent, quærimus, sed eos duntaxat, qui ex ipsa virtute pœnitentiæ prodeunt. Porro terreri, cum intentantur minæ, non est ullius virtutis actus, sed naturalis affectus, quem etiam in pueris et in ipsis bestiis cernimus. Ad hæc sæpe terrores in iis inveniuntur, qui pœnitentiam nullam agunt, ac ne inchoant quidem, ut in dæmonibus, qui credunt et contremiscunt. Jac. 11." [There is, however, a distinction between believe and tremble, and tremble and believe, which Bellarmine has here overlooked.] Sæpe etiam nonnulli veram pœnitentiam agunt, nullo pœnæ terrore, sed solo Dei et justitiæ amore impulsi, qualem credibile est fuisse beatam illam fæminam, de qua Dominus ait Luc. vii : 'dimittuntur ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum.' Quod si terrores sine pœnitentia, et pœnitentia sine terroribus aliquando esse potest, certo non debent terrores illi inter partes pœnitentiæ numerari. Denique fides, ut mox probabimus, non est pars pœnitentiæ, sed eam præcedit." See the work "Hugo of St. Victor, and the theological tendencies of his age," by Albert Liebner, Leipzig, 1832, p. 465, where we may see how much more deeply the schoolmen have treated this subject than the reformers.

The Lutheran doctrine of contrition has exerted a determining influence on that of confession. Everything which is truly interior must, according to Catholic doctrine, be outwardly expressed: the love for Christ in our interior must manifest itself externally in works of charity to the brethren, and what we do unto these, we do to him also. It is the same with contrition and the confession of sins before God,—an act itself purely internal; if it be deep, strong, and energetic, it seeks an outward manifestation, and becomes the sacramental confession before the priest; and what we do to him, we do again unto Christ likewise, whose place he represents. Origen rightly compares sin to an indigestible food, which occasions sickness at the stomach, till it has been thrown off by a motion in the bowels. Even so is the sinner tormented with internal pain, and then only enjoys quiet and full health, when, by means of confession, he hath, as it were, eased himself of the noxious internal stuff. Two enemies, who wish for a sincere reconciliation, and, in their hearts, despise their hatred, will certainly feel themselves forced to avow to each other their mutual injustice; and it is only by means of this confession that their reconciliation becomes sincere, and peace is restored to their souls. For man is so constituted, that he doth not believe in his interior feelings, unless he see them in an outward manifestation; and, in fact, an internal sentiment is then only ripened to consummation, when it has acquired an outward shape. Moreover, a true confession to God cannot be indefinite; for, our sins are not merely abstract; we are guilty of specific, definite transgressions: and so a true confession of sins to God, is one necessarily entering into minute details; consequently, a confession to the priest is necessary.

But now the internal confession of sins—the interior pain, which is required by the Lutherans for penance—is merely a dread of the Divine judgments: it is no detestation of sin; no hearty, inward hatred of sin, which can only spring up by degrees *after* absolution —*after* the assurance of the forgiveness of sins hath been already obtained. Hence, an outward unbosoming of the conscience is absolutely impossible, because the sinner is really not yet in that spiritual disposition to induce him to confess. Sin is not internally rejected; how then should the rejection of it be outwardly manifested? Humility is still wanting: shame still confounds the sense of the sinner; because sin is too much his own, and is not yet estranged from his will. On the other hand, he, who truly and heartily hates sin, confesses it with an involuntary joyful pain; with pain, because it is *his own;* but with a joyful pain, because it now *ceases* to belong to him, and to be his own. Hence, too, we can understand, why Protestants look on Catholic confession as a *carnificina conscientiarum, a racking of the conscience.* However much, accordingly, the first Reformers did homage to the principle of ecclesiastical, and particularly of auricular, confession, this institution would not long endure.* The faithful were taught to do something, which, according to the general views of their teachers respecting penance, they could not do: they were to confess, and yet the sin surviving in their soul closed their lips; they were, by confession, to free their breast from sin, and yet they could never properly extricate themselves from its entanglements.

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* Luther de captiv. Babyl. Opp. t. ii. fol. 292. "Occulta autem

Private absolution, however, the Reformers, from a particular motive, wished, in every case, to retain; for, as the individual was to refer *to himself* the general forgiveness of sins, they deemed it right to give them a special absolution.*

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confessio, quæ modo celebratur, etsi probari ex scripturâ non possit, miro modo tamen placet, et utilis, imo necessaria est, nec vellem eam non esse, imo gaudeo eam esse in Ecclesiâ Christi." Art. Smalcald. P. iii. c. viii. p. 303. "Nequaquam in Ecclesia confessio et absolutio abolenda est: præsertim propter tenaras et pavidas conscientias, et propter juventutem indomitam et petulantem, ut audiatur, examinetur et instituatur in doctrinâ Christianâ." And we often find the same doctrine elsewhere laid down.

* The XXI. canon of the fourth council of Lateran (Hard. Conc. tom. vii. p. 35), says: "Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis, postquam ad annos discretionis pervenerit, omnia sua solus peccata confiteatur fideliter, saltem semel in anno, proprio sacerdoti, et injunctam sibi pœnitentiam studeat pro viribus adimplere, suscipiens reverenter ad minus in paschâ Eucharistiæ sacramentum."

This canon is to be ranked merely among disciplinary observances, for the determining of the time when any one should confess doth not belong to the essence of the sacrament. Even the present very laudable practice, of always going to confession before communion, doth not rest on any general law of the Church. He, who doth not feel himself guilty of any grievous transgression, can, without confessing to the priest, approach of his own accord to the table of the Lord; and so, doubtless, what was formerly the practice might again be renewed, and each one resort to confession, only when he found his conscience particularly burdened. But every well-thinking man, acquainted with the human heart and its wants, must deeply lament, if ever the present practice should be changed; and it is only the indolent priest, who

If in confession internal repentance is outwardly manifested, and the sinner thereby reveals his hidden

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reluctantly discharges his undoubtedly painful office, that could desire such a change. The intellectual Pascal, who, perhaps, of all theologians and philosophers of modern times, has, in his *Pensées*, cast the deepest glance into the misery of man, unfolds in one passage his arrogance and his inclination to deceive himself, and never to trace a faithful image of his own interior. He then, with reference to the differences between the Christian communions, proceeds to say: "En voici une preuve qui me fait horreur :

"La religion Catholique n'oblige pas à découvrir ses péchés indifférement à tout le monde : elle souffre qu'on demeure caché à tous les autres hommes, mais elle en excepte un seul, à qui elle commande à découvrir le fond de son cœur, et de se faire voir tel qu'on est. Il n'y a que ce seul homme au monde qu'elle nous ordonne de désabuser, et elle l'oblige à un secret inviolable, qui fait que cette connaissance est dans lui, comme si elle n'y était pas. Peut-on s'imaginer rien de plus charitable et de plus doux ? Et néanmoins la corruption de l'homme est telle, qu'il trouve encore de la dureté dans cette loi ; et c'est une des principales raisons qui a fait revolter contre l'Eglise une grande partie de l'Europe.

"Que le cœur de l'homme est injuste et déraisonnable, pour trouver mauvais qu'on l'oblige de faire, à l'égard d'un homme, ce qu'il serait juste en quelque sort, qu'il fit à l'égard de tous les hommes ! Car est-il juste que nous les trompions ?

"Il y a différens dégrés dans cette aversion pour la vérité : mais on peut dire qu'elle est dans tous en quelque dégré, parcequ'elle est inséparable de l'amour propre. C'est cette mauvaise délicatesse qui oblige ceux qui sont dans la nécessité de reprendre les autres, de choisir tant de détours et de tempéramens pour éviter de les choquer. Il faut qu'ils déminuent nos défauts, qu'ils fassent semblant de les excuser, qu'ils y mêlent des louanges et des temoignages d'affection et d'estime. Avec tout cela, cette médicine ne laisse pas d'etre amère à l'amour propre. Il en prends le moins qu'il peut, et toujours avec dégout, et souvent même avec un secret dépit contre ceux qui la lui présentent.

"Il arrive de là que, si on a quelque intéret d'etre aimé de nous, on s'éloigne de nous rendre un office qu'on sait nous étre désagréable : on nous traite comme nous voulons être traité : nous haissons la

spiritual condition to the priest of the Church, this Church, in her turn, acts on him again by the claim of satisfaction; so that, if contrition forms the essence of penitential feeling, and the confession of sins its form and its completion, its confirmation is secured by satisfaction. These three acts of the sinner,—for satisfaction, as far as regards his will, is already performed, though its execution be delayed,—are the conditions to the priestly absolution, wherewith the sacramental penance is concluded. We may easily perceive, that

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vérité, on nous la cache; nous voulons être flattés, on nous flatte; nous aimons à être trompés, on nous trompe.

"C'est qui fait, que chaque dégré de bonne fortune, qui nous élève dans le monde, nous éloigne davantage de la vérité, parcequ'on apprehende plus de blesser ceux dont l'affection est plus utile et l'aversion plus dangereuse.

"Un prince sera la fable de toute l'Europe, et lui seul n'en saura rien. Je ne m'étonne pas; dire la vérité est utile à celui à qui on la dit, mais désavantageux à ceux qui la disent, parcequ'ils se font haïr. Or ceux qui vivent avec les princes aiment mieux leur intérêts que celui du prince qu'ils servent, et ainsi ils n'ont garde de lui procurer un avantage, en se nuisant à eux-mêmes.

"Ce malheur est sans doute plus grand et plus ordinaire dans les plus grandes fortunes; mais les moindres n'en sont pas exemptes, parcequ'il y a toujours quelque intéret à se faire aimer des hommes. Ainsi, la vie humaine n'est qu'une illusion perpetuelle; on ne fait que s'entre-tromper et s'entre-flatter. Personne ne parle de nous en notre présence, comme il en parle en notre absence. L'union qui est entre les hommes n'est fondée que sur cette mutuelle tromperie; et peu d'amitiés subsisteraient, si chacun savait ce que son ami dit de lui, lorsqu'il n'y est pas, quoiqu'il parle alors sincèrement et sans passion.

"L'homme n'est donc que déguisement, que mensonge, et hypocrisie, et en soi-même et à l'egard des autres. Il ne veut pas qu'on lui dise la vérité, il évite de la dire aux autres; et toutes ces dispositions, si éloignées de la justice et de la raison, ont une racine naturelle en nous."—*Pensées de Pascal,* p. 1, art. v. n. 8, t. i. p. 194, etc. Paris, 1812.

absolution, according to Catholic principles, can by no means be a mere declaration that sins are forgiven, because the contrition required does not consist in mere terrors of conscience; and something, far other than a mere instrumental faith in the merits of Christ, is demanded of the penitent. The above-described succession of acts on the part of the sinner, united with the sacerdotal function (or, in other words, the full sacrament) is the organ of God's justifying grace, whereby man obtains the forgiveness of sins in sanctification, and sanctification in the forgiveness of sins.

Those theologians who pretend that the differences between the Christian communions, in the article of absolution, consist only herein,—that, according to Catholic principles, the priest acts merely from the fulness of his power, while the Protestant minister declares only the will of God, and announces the same to the sinner; those theologians, we say, understand not a single syllable of the doctrinal peculiarities of the two communions. For never did any man entertain the opinion, that he could of himself forgive sins; and the Protestant declaration, that sins are remitted, bears quite another sense, than scholars of this sort suppose.

Respecting satisfaction, which, before absolution, we considered consummated, at least as regards the will, it is now necessary to enter into a few details. It is of a two-fold kind; the one referring to the past, the other both to the future and the past. For example, if any one accuses himself of possessing unlawful goods, by theft, usury, robbery, cheating, or any other way, it is required, that the penitent should make restitution of the same, *if he wish to obtain the forgiveness of his sins*. But, as, in many cases, those robbed or defrauded cannot obtain possession of their lost property, so a corresponding renunciation of the unlawful goods, in some other appropriate way, is *enjoined;* for it is evidently in the very nature of things, that no one, while retaining the purloined goods, can truly repent of his theft. Hence the forgiveness of sins, which, according to Catholic doctrine, is identical with the internal extirpation of sin, appears determined by satisfaction; for the willing, joyous, restitution of property unrighteously acquired, is, in itself, satisfaction. According to the different transgressions, satisfaction, as is obvious, must take a different form. This is the first species of satisfaction, consisting in the performance of what true contrition absolutely requires. The cure that follows needs the most careful attention, and the still debilitated moral powers require the application of strengthening remedies. The priest, who has learned to know the spiritual state of the sinner, ordains, accordingly, the fitting remedies,—pious exercises, calculated to keep up his self-vigilance, and to impart to the will a safe, lively, and vigorous impulse, in the direction it most needs. The enjoining of such remedies belongs to the active superintendence of the Church; and he who knows the nature of man, his effeminate tenderness towards himself, his timorous unsteadiness in the choice of vigorous means conducive to his salvation, will easily understand why the Church should have come in aid of his weakness, and been directed by Christ to support and to determine, by the declaration of her own firm and manifest will, the will of her children. The declared will of the parent, is the stay to the will of the child; it comes in to its aid, doubling it, as it were, till it has attained sufficient strength.*

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* Catechismus ex decreto Concil. Trident. p. 343. "Satisfacere

Considered from one point of view, however, these penitential exercises, imposed by the Church, bear the character of real punishments, and, from the foundation of the Church, were ever regarded in this light: and this again drew down upon her the charge of Pelagianism. The matter accordingly stands thus: By the transgression of the eternal moral law, man contracted an infinite debt, which he was totally incapable of discharging. Christ took it upon himself: and to all, who will enter into a true, interior, living communion with Him, the Righteous one, that debt is remitted.

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est causas peccatorum excidere, et eorum suggestioni aditum non indulgere. In quam sententiam alii assenserunt, satisfactionem esse purgationem, qua eluitur quidquid sordium propter peccati maculam in animâ resedit, atque a pœnis tempore definitis, quibus tenebamur, absolvimur. Quæ cum ita sint, facile erit fidelibus persuadere, quam necessarium sit, ut pœnitentes in hoc satisfactionis studio se exerceant. Docendi enim sunt, duo esse quæ peccatum consequuntur, maculam et pœnam: ac quamvis semper, culpa dimissa, simul etiam mortis æternæ supplicium, apud inferos constitutum, condonetur, tamen non semper contingit, quamadmodum a Tridentina Synodo declaratum est, ut Dominus peccatorum reliquias et pœnam, certo tempore definitam, quæ peccatis debetur, remittat," etc. P. 347: "Divus etiam Bernardus duo affirmat in peccato reperiri, maculam animæ et plagam: ac turpitudinem quidem ipsam Dei misericordia tolli: verum sanandis peccatorum plagis valde necessarium esse eam curam, quæ in remedio pœnitentiæ adhibetur, quemadmodum enim, sanato vulnere, cicatrices quædam remanent, quæ et ipsæ curandæ sunt: ita, inanima culpa condonata, supersunt reliquiæ peccatorum purgandæ," etc. P. 352: "Sed illud imprimis a sacerdotibus observari oportet, ut, audita peccatorum confessione, antequam pœnitentem a peccatis absolvant, diligenter curent, ut, si quid ille forte de re aut de existimatione proximi detraxerit, cujus peccati merito damnandus esse videatur, cumulata satisfactione compenset: nemo enim absolvendus est, nisi prius, quæ cujuscunque fuerint, restituere polliceatur. At quoniam multi sunt, quibus etsi prolixe pollicentur, se officio satis esse facturos, tamen certum est ac deliberatum nunquam promissa exsolvere, omnino ii cogendi sunt, ut restituant," etc.

But, as in the fulness of His mercy the Almighty instituted this ordinance, it was not His will to release all who should return to Him, after personal guilt, from the temporal punishments which man is capable of enduring. And justice, which is not superseded by love, requires the imposition of such penalties, the more especially as those who believe in Christ, and by baptism are become members of His body, have received full strength to observe the Divine law ; for it is of such only there is question in the article of penance.

The contempt of God's commandments, on the part of these, and, still more, the grievous violation of them by a believer, is, even in case of amendment, deservedly punishable, and must be atoned for. Holy Writ abounds in examples of men who, after having obtained the remission of their sins, still received temporal chastisements at the hand of God ;—a fact utterly inexplicable, if a man, being once justified, could escape entirely without punishment. The reformers, indeed, explained these chastisements, as having a mere correctional tendency, yet in such glaring contradiction to many passages of the Bible, that, so interpreted, they offer no sense.* From this emasculated opinion the Reformers might well have turned away, had they but calmly interpreted the language of the uneducated man, on meeting with misfortunes : "I have *deserved* them," is his ordinary exclamation. They would then have perceived, that undebauched feeling regards sufferings as something far different from mere *means of correction ;* and humility would not have failed to suggest a view more consonant with its own spirit.

Moreover, if there be no temporal punishments for the righteous, there are then no eternal ones for the unrighteous. On the other hand, if there are eternal punishments for the latter, so there must be temporal punishments for the former, when after baptism they relapse into sin; for the question here is as to the notion and essence of punishments, and not as to any of their accidental qualities. If they be in their nature purely remedial, they cannot, in the one case, be destined solely for cure, and, in the other, only for chastisement, in the strict sense of the word; and *vice versâ*, if they be in their essence solely vindicative, they must everywhere retain this character. Both exclusive views, however, are erroneous. Nay, as in God goodness and justice are one, so each of those attributes concurs in determining the object of punishments; and it is only when man has wilfully repelled the pardoning and reconciling goodness of God, that he feels the arm of His justice alone. It was therefore an inconsistency, on the part of the Reformers, to leave intact the Scriptural doctrine of hell-torments, and yet to look on punishments *solely* as the means of amelioration.

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* See note A in appendix.

The Church, which, in the tribunal of Penance, recognizes a divine institution, must contemplate all the relations wherein the sinner stands to God, and foster in him the feeling that he is deserving of chastisement for his transgressions. She must attentively consider punishment in all its bearings, and impose satisfaction in the strict sense of the word, so as withal to prevent the relapse of the penitent, to confirm him in virtue, and to cherish the feeling of repentance. The primitive Church took precisely this view of penitential exercises; and it is contrary to history to assert that the satisfactions it required, were directed solely to the conciliation of the Church. The old visible Church did not separate itself from Christ, as in modern times has been done, out of the pale of Catholicism: and men therefore transferred to primitive Christianity their own modern conceptions, arising out of very opposite principles, when they endeavoured to enforce this unfounded theory touching the ancient satisfactions.

The Church, moreover, has repeatedly, in language as unequivocal as it was affecting, declared, that through the satisfactions she exacted, the merits of Christ could be, in no wise, impaired; that this species of satisfaction ought not to be confounded with that achieved by Christ; and lastly, that the works of satisfaction which she required, must emanate from the penitential spirit that Christ himself inspires, and from thence solely derive their value. Those works, on the other hand, she declared, which are not offered up by a sinner justified and regenerated, being perverse in themselves, must not be included in the above denomination.* Nevertheless, down to the present day, the Church has never been able to convince her adversaries, that, by these ordinances, the glory of Christ is not obscured, nor human self-righteousness promoted. But who does not perceive the necessity of such an opinion on the part of the Protestants, when he maturely weighs the Protestant doctrine of justification, which we have above described? If satisfaction in the form of restitution were made a condition to the forgiveness of sins, what was this but to declare works as necessary to *salvation?* If the Protestants exacted satisfactions as spiritual remedies, they would give countenance to the principle that man must cooperate with God, and that the forgiveness of sins depended on sanctification. If they declared satisfaction, in the proper sense of the word, to form an integral part of Penance; then this were tantamount to the opinion, that the just man could fulfil the law; for punishment is inflicted on the sinner baptized, in order precisely to impress him with the conviction that he wás enabled to observe the precepts of the law. Whichever way, accordingly, we look at satisfactions, the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism forbid their forming part of their penitential system.*

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* Concil. Trid. Sess. XIV. c. viii. "Neque vero ita nostra est satisfactio hæc, quam pro peccatis nostris exsolvimus, ut non sit per Christum Jesum. Nam qui ex nobis, tanquam ex nobis, nihil possumus, eo cooperante, qui nos confortat, omnia possumus. Ita non habet homo unde glorietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra in Christo est, in quo vivimus, in quo meremur, in quo satisfacimus, facientes fructus dignos pœnitentiæ: qui ex illo vim habent, ab illo offeruntur Patri, et per illum acceptantur à Patre."

With the ecclesiastical punishments we have described as remedies and satisfactions, the doctrine of Indulgences is connected, the abuse whereof, real and undeniable, led the Reformers into so many false steps, and would have been calculated to furnish them with some excuse, were it not expected of great men, for which they wished to pass, and, especially, of a Divine envoy (and such Luther was inclined to regard himself), that they should not take occasion, from the abuse of truths, to reject those truths themselves. From the earliest ages of Christianity, indulgences were understood to be, the shortening, under certain conditions, of the period of penance, imposed by the Church, and, withal, the remission of the temporal punishment.* The most important condition was fulfilled, when the sinner furnished such proofs of contrition, and of newness and holiness of heart, that he seemed no longer to need the special ecclesiastical remedies we have described, and appeared worthy to be released from the temporal punishment.†

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* Melancth. loc. theol. p. 65. "Quid enim videtur magis convenire, quam ut sint in ecclesiâ publicorum scelerum satisfactiones? At illæ obscurarunt gratiam." Calvin. instit. lib. iv. c. 4, § 25: "Talibus mendaciis oppono gratuitam peccatorum remissionem: quâ nihil in scripturis clarius prædicatur."

At a later period, many theologians gave greater extension to the doctrine of indulgences; but their opinions, though very well grounded, have not been declared articles of faith in any formulary of the Church, and, therefore, enter not into the plan of this work. The Council of Trent, with wise precaution, decreed no more, than that the Church has the right to grant indulgences, and that these, dispensed with wisdom, are useful.*

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* Concil. Ancyran. (an. 314) c. v.; Hard. Concil. tom. i. p. 273. "*τοὺς δὲ ἐπισκόπους ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς δοκιμάσαντας φιλανϑρωπεύεσϑαι, ἤ πλείονα προστιϑέναι χρόνον· πρὸ πάντων δὲ καὶ ὁ προάγων βίος, καὶ ὁ μετὰ ταῦτὰ ἐξεταζέσϑω· καὶ οὕτως ἡ φιλανϑρωπὶα ἐπιμετρείσϑω.*" Concil. Nicen. an. 325, c. xii. lib. i. p. 327: "*εφ' ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις προσήκει εξετάζειν τὴν προαίρεσιω, καὶ τὸ εἶκος τῆς μετανοίας. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ δάκρυσι καὶ ὑπομονῇ καὶ ἀγαϑοεργίαις τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ σχήματι επιδείκνυνται,*" etc. Compare Concil. Carth. iv. c. 75.

TRANSLATION.

Concil. Ancyr. (anno 314) c. v. Hard. Concil. tom. i. p. 273. "But bishops have the power, when they have examined into the character of the conversion, to exercise clemency, or to prolong the time: above all, let the anterior and the subsequent course of life be thoroughly sifted, and so let mercy be exercised." Concil. Nicæn. anno 325, c. xii. lib. i. p. 327: "But in all these things it is proper to investigate the object and the nature of the repentance. But such as, by dread, and tears, and patience, and good works, manifest their conversion in deed, and not in appearance," etc. Compare IV. Council of Carthage, c. 75.

† In the ancient Church, the absolution was given only after the satisfaction had been performed.

Of the relation which the doctrine of purgatory bears to these satisfactions, we shall elsewhere have occasion to speak.

§ xxxiv.—Doctrine of the Catholics on the most holy sacrament of the Altar, and on the Mass.

The mighty subject, which is now about to engage our attention, gave birth to the most important controversies between the Christian communions. All the other distinctive doctrines are here combined, though in a more eminent degree; for although, as has been clearly shown, in every point of difference the whole system of doctrine is mirrored forth, yet here this is more specially the case. On the view, too, which we take of this subject, depends the fact, whether the Church be destined to possess a true and vital worship, or ought to be devoid of one.

According to the clear declarations of Christ and his apostles, and the unanimous teaching of the Church, attested by the immediate followers of our Lord's disciples, Catholics firmly hold that in the sacrament of the altar Christ is truly present, and indeed in such a way, that Almighty God, who was pleased at Cana, in Galilee, to convert water into wine, changes the inward substance of the consecrated bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.*

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* Concil. Trident. Sess. xxv. decret. de indulg. At the same time the abuses in the dispensation of indulgences are openly and sharply rebuked and forbidden. "In his tamen concedendis moderationem, juxta veterem et probatam in ecclesiâ consuetudinem, adhiberi cupit: ne nimiâ facilitate ecclesiastica disciplina enervetur. Abusus vero, qui in his irrepserunt, et quorum occasione insigne hoc indulgentiarum nomen ab hæreticis blasphematur, emendatos et correctos cupiens, præsenti decreto generaliter statuit, pravos questus omnes pro his consequendis, unde plurima in Christiano populo abusuum causa fluxit, omnino abolendos esse. Cæteros vero, qui ex superstitione, ignorantiâ, irreverentiâ, aliunde quomodocunque provenerunt……mandat omnibus episcopis, ut diligenter quisque hujusmodi abusus ecclesiæ suæ colligat, eosque in primâ synodo provinciali referat," etc.

We therefore adore the Saviour mysteriously present in the sacrament;† rejoice in his exceeding condescending compassion; and express, in canticles of praise and thanksgiving, our pious emotions, as far as the divinely enraptured soul of man can express them.‡

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* Concil. Trid. Sess. XIII. c. iv. "Quoniam autem Christus, redemptor noster, corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis offerebat, vere esse dixit; ideo persuasum semper in ecclesiâ Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo sancta hæc synodus declarat, per consecrationem panis et vini, conversionem fieri totius substantiæ panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri, et totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus. Quæ conversio convenienter et proprie a sanctâ Catholicâ ecclesiâ transubstantiatio est appellata."

† L. c. c. v. "Nullus itaque dubitandi locus relinquitur, quin omnes Christi fideles, pro more in catholicâ ecclesiâ semper recepto, latriæ cultum, qui vero Deo debetur, huic sanctissimo sacramento in veneratione exhibeant. Neque enim ideo minus est adorandum, quod fuerit a Christo Domino, ut sumatur, institutum. Nam illum eundem Deum præsentem in eo adesse credimus, quem Pater æternus introducens in orbem terrarum dicit: 'et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei,' quem magi procidentes adoraverunt, quem denique in Galilæa ab apostolis adoratum fuisse, scriptura testatur."

‡ The well-known Christian hymn saith:—

"Lauda Sion salvatorem,
Lauda ducem et pastorem,
In hymnis et canticis.
Quantum potes, tantum aude,
Quia major omni laude;
Nec laudare sufficis.

Out of this faith sprung the mass, which, in its essential purport, is as old as the Church, and even in its more important forms can be *proved to have been already in existence* in the second and third centuries. But to unfold more clearly the Catholic doctrine on this point, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat of our reflections on the Church. The Church, considered in one point of view, is the living figure of Christ, manifesting himself and working through all ages, whose atoning and redeeming acts, it, in consequence, eternally repeats, and uninterruptedly continues. The Redeemer not merely lived eighteen hundred years ago, so that he hath since disappeared, and we retain but an historical remembrance of him, as of a deceased man: but he is, on the contrary, eternally living in his Church; and in the sacrament of the altar he hath manifested this in a sensible manner to creatures endowed with sense. He is, in the announcement of his word, the abiding teacher; in baptism he perpetually receives the children of men into his communion; in the tribunal of penance he pardons the contrite sinner; strengthens rising youth with the power of his spirit in confirmation; breathes into the bridegroom and the bride a higher conception of the nuptial relations; unites

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Laudis thema specialis
Panis vivus et vitalis
Hodie proponitur," etc.

In another we find the following:—

"Pange lingua gloriosi
Corporis mysterium,
Sanguinisque pretiosi,
Quem in mundi pretium,
Fructus ventris generosi
Rex effudit gentium," etc.

himself most intimately with all who sigh for eternal life, under the forms of bread and wine; consoles the dying in extreme unction; and in holy orders institutes the organs whereby he worketh all this with never-tiring activity. If Christ, concealed under an earthly veil, unfolds, to the end of time, his whole course of actions begun on earth, he, of necessity, eternally offers himself to the Father as a victim for men; and the real permanent exposition hereof can never fail in the Church, if the historical Christ is to celebrate in her his entire imperishable existence.*

The following may perhaps serve to explain the Catholic view on this subject, since it is a matter of so much difficulty to Protestants to form a clear conception of this dogma.†

Christ, on the cross, has offered the sacrifice for our sins. But the incarnate son of God, who hath suffered, died, and risen again from the dead for our sins, living, according to his own teaching, is present in the Eucharist, the Church from the beginning hath, at His command (Luke xxii, 20), substituted the Christ mysteriously present, and visible only to the spiritual eye of faith, for the historical Christ, now inaccessible to the corporeal senses. The former is taken for the latter, because the latter is likewise the former—both are considered as one and the same; and the eucharistic Saviour, therefore, as the victim also for the sins of the world. And the more so, as, when we wish to express ourselves accurately, the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is put only as a part for an organic whole. For his whole life on earth—his ministry and his sufferings, as well as his perpetual condescension to our infirmity in the Eucharist—constitute one great sacrificial act, one mighty action undertaken out of love for us, and expiatory of our sins, consisting, indeed, of various individual parts, yet so that none by itself is strictly speaking the sacrifice. In each particular part the whole recurs, yet without these parts the whole cannot be conceived. The will of Christ, to manifest His gracious condescension to us in the Eucharist, forms no less an integral part of his great work, than all besides, and in a way so necessary, indeed, that, whilst we here find the whole scheme of Redemption reflected, without it the other parts would not have sufficed for our complete atonement. Who, in fact, would venture the assertion that the descent of the Son of God in the Eucharist belongs not to His general merits, which are imputed to us? Hence the sacramental sacrifice is a true sacrifice—a sacrifice in the strict sense, yet so that it must in no wise be separated from the other things which Christ hath achieved for us, as the very consideration of the end of its institution will clearly show.*

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* Conc. Trid. Sess. XXII. c. 1. "Is igitur Deus et Dominus noster, etsi semel seipsum in arâ crucis, morte intercedente, Deo patri oblaturus erat, ut æternam illic redemptionem operaretur; quia tamen per mortem sacerdotium ejus extinguendum non erat, in cœna novissima, qua nocte tradebatur, ut dilectæ sponsæ suæ ecclesiæ visibile, sicut hominum natura exigit, relinqueret sacrificium, quo cruentum illud, semel in cruce peragendum, repræsentaretur, ejusque memoria in finem usque sæculi permaneret, atque illius salutaris virtus in remissionem eorum, quæ a nobis quotidie committuntur, peccatorum applicaretur," etc. C. ii: "Et quoniam in divino hoc sacrificio, quod in missâ peragitur, idem ille Christus continetur, et incruente immolatur, qui in arâ crucis semel se ipsum cruente obtulit, docet sancta synodus, sacrificium istud vere propitiatorium esse, per ipsumque fieri, si cum vero corde et rectâ fide, cum metû et reverentiâ, contriti ac pœnitentes ad Deum accedamus," etc.

† See note B in Appendix.

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* In Theophilus L. S. register. Annæ Comnenæ Supplementa

In this last portion (if we may so call it) of the great sacrifice for us, all the other parts are to be present, and applied to us: in this last part of the objective sacrifice, the latter becomes subjective and appropriated to us. Christ on the cross is still an object strange to us: Christ, in the Christian worship, is our property, our victim. There He is the universal victim—here He is the victim for us in particular, and for every individual amongst us; there he was only the victim;—here He is the victim acknowledged and revered: there the objective atonement was consummated;—

(Tub. 1832, c. iv. pp. 18-23) a fragment from the still unprinted panoply of Nicetas is communicated in reference to Soterichus Panteugonus the oldest document, to our knowledge, informing us of any doubt being entertained, whether the mass be really a sacrifice. Soterich lived in the twelfth century, under Manuel Comnenus, and maintained the opinion that it was only in an improper sense that Christ in the Eucharist was said to be offered up as a victim to God. But the Greek bishops assembled together rejected this view, and Soterich presented a recantation, which is not contained in the above-named writing, but which I printed in the *Theological Quarterly Review* of Tübingen. (See the *Tubinger Quartalshrift*, 1833, No. 1, p. 373.) The recantation runs thus: "*ὁμοφρονῶ τῇ ἁγιᾳ καὶ ἱερᾷ συνόδῳ ἐπὶ τῷ τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὴν νῦν προσαγομένην καὶ τὴν τότε προσαχθεῖσαν παρὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντος λόγου, καὶ τότε προσαχθεῖσαν* [it stands so written in the Paris codex, but it ought evidently to be *προσαχθῆναί*) *καὶ νῦν πάλιν προσάγεσθαι, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ μίαν, καὶ τῷ μὴ οὕτω φονοῦντι ἀνάθεμα. Κἄν τι πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν εὑρίσκηται γεγραμμένον, ἀναθεματί καθυποβάλλω. Ἡ ὑπογραφή Σωτηρίχος ὁ Παντεύγονος.*"

TRANSLATION.

"I agree with the holy synod herein, that the sacrifice now to be offered up, and once offered up by the only-begotten and incarnate Word, was once offered up, and is now offered up, because it is one and the same. To him who doth not so believe, anathema: and if any thing hath been found written in refutation hereof, I subject it to the anathema.

(Signed.) "SOTERICHUS PANTEUGONUS."

here the subjective atonement is partly fostered and promoted, partly expressed.

The Eucharistic sacrifice, in conformity to its declared ends, may be considered under a two-fold point of view. The Church, in general, and every particular Community within her, being founded by the sacrifice of the Son of God, and by faith in the same, and thus owing their existence to Him, the Eucharistic sacrifice must, in the first place, be regarded as one of praise and thanksgiving. In other words, the Church declares that she is incapable of offering up her thanks to God in any other way, than by giving Him back who became the victim for the world;—as if she were to say: "Thou didst, O Lord, for Christ's sake, look down, with graciousness and compassion, upon us as *Thy children*; so vouchsafe that we, with grateful hearts, may revere Thee as *our Father* in Christ, thy Son, here present. We possess nought else that we can offer Thee, save Christ; be graciously pleased to receive our sacrifice." While the Community, in the person of the priest, performeth this, it confesses perpetually what Christ became, and still continues to be, for its sake. It is not however the interior acts of thanksgiving, adoration, and gratitude, which it offers up to God, but it is Christ Himself present in the sacrament. These emotions of the soul are indeed excited, unfolded, kept up, and fostered by the presence and the self-sacrifice of the Saviour; but of themselves they are deemed unworthy to be presented to God. Christ, the victim in our worship, is the copious inexhaustible source of the deepest devotion; but, in order to be this, the presence of the Saviour, sacrificing Himself for the sins of the world, is necessarily required—a presence to which, as to an outward object, the interior soul of man must attach itself, and must unbosom all its feelings.

The community, however, continually professes itself as a sinner, needing forgiveness, and striving, ever more and more, to appropriate to itself the merits of Christ. Now the sacrifice appears propitiatory, and the Redeemer present enables us to be entirely His own children, or to become so in an ever-increasing degree. The present Saviour, in a voice audible to the spiritual-minded, incessantly addresses His Father above: "Be graciously pleased to behold in me the believing and repentant people:" and then He crieth to His brethren below: "come to Me, all you that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you: each one, who returneth to Me with all his heart, shall find mercy, forgiveness of sins, and every grace." Hence, in the liturgy of the Latin, as well as of the Greek, Church, it is rightly said, that it is Christ, who, in the holy action, offers Himself up to God as a sacrifice; He is at once the victim and the high-priest. But we, recognizing, in the Eucharistic Christ, that same Christ, who, out of love for us, delivered Himself unto death, even the death of the cross, exclaim, at the elevation of the Host, wherever the Catholic Church extends, with that lively faith in His manifest mercy, from which humility, confidence, love, and repentance spring—"O Jesus! for Thee I live; for Thee I die! O Jesus! Thine I am, living or dead."

It is now evident to all, that the belief in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, forms the basis of our whole conception of the mass. Without that presence, the solemnity of the Lord's Supper is a mere reminiscence of the sacrifice of Christ, exactly in the same way as the celebration by any society of the anniver sary of some esteemed individual, whose image it exhibits to view, or some other symbol, recalls to mind his beneficent actions. On the other hand, with faith in the real existence of Christ in the Eucharist, the past becomes the present,—all that Christ hath merited for us, and whereby he hath so merited it, is henceforth never separated from his person : He is present as that which He absolutely is, and in the whole extent of His actions, to wit, as the real victim. Hence the effects of this faith on the mind, the heart, and the will of man, are quite other than if, by the mere stretch of the human faculty of memory, Christ be called back from the distance of eighteen hundred years. He Himself manifests His love, His benevolence, His devotedness to us : He is ever in the midst of us, full of grace and truth.

Accordingly, the Catholic mass, considered as a sacrifice, is a solemnization of the blessings imparted to humanity by God in Christ Jesus, and is destined, by the offering up of Christ, partly to express in praise, thanksgiving, and adoration, the joyous feelings of redemption on the part of the faithful ; partly to make the merits of Christ the subject of their perpetual appropriation. It is also clear, why this sacrifice is of personal utility to the believer ; namely, because, thereby, pious sentiments, such as faith, hope, love, humility, contrition, obedience, and devotion to Christ, are excited, promoted, and cherished. The sacrifice presented to God, which, as we have often said, is not separated from the work of Christ, merits internal grace for the culture of these sentiments, which are psychologically excited from without, by faith in the present Saviour, whose entire actions and sufferings are brought before the mind. As, according to Catholic doctrine, forgiveness of sins cannot take place without sanctification, and a fitting state of the human soul is required for the reception of grace, as well as an active concurrence towards the fructification of grace, the reflecting observer may already infer, that it is not by a mere outward or bodily participation, on the part of the community, that the mass produces any vague indeterminate effects.

The sacrifice of the mass is likewise offered up for the living and the dead; that is to say, God is implored, for the sake of Christ's oblation, to grant to all those who are dear to us, whatever may conduce to their salvation. With the mass, accordingly, the faithful join the prayer, that the merits of Christ, which are considered as concentrated in the Eucharistic sacrifice, should be applied to all needing them and susceptible of them. To consider merely himself is a matter of impossibility to the Christian, how much less in so sacred a solemnity can he think only of himself and omit his supplication, that the merits of Christ, which outweigh the sins of the whole world, may likewise be appropriated by all? The communion with the happy and perfect spirits in Christ is also renewed; for they are one with Christ, and His work cannot be contemplated without its effects. Lastly, all the concerns of inward and outward life,—sad and joyful events, good and ill fortune,—are brought in connexion with this sacrifice; and at this commemoration in Christ, to whom we are indebted for the highest gifts, we pour out to God our thanksgivings and lamentations, and in Him, and before Him, we implore consolation, and courage, and strength, under sufferings; self-denial, clemency, and meekness, in prosperity.

Hitherto, however, we have considered the mass merely as a sacrificial oblation; but this view by no means embraces its whole purport. The assembled congregation declares, from what we have stated, that *in itself, without Christ*, it discovers nothing—absolutely nothing—which can be agreeable to God: nay, nothing but what is inadequate, earthly, and sinful. Renouncing itself, it gives itself up to Christ, full of confidence, hoping for His sake forgiveness of sins and eternal life, and every grace. In this act of self-renunciation, and of entire self-abandonment to God in Christ, the believer has, as it were, thrown off himself, excommunicated himself, if I may so speak, in his existence, as separated from Christ, in order to live only by Him, and in Him. Hence he is in a state to enter into the most intimate fellowship with Christ, to commune with Him, and with his whole being to be entirely absorbed in Him. For the unseemliness of the congregation no longer communicating every Sunday (as was the case in the primitive Church), and of the priest in the mass usually receiving alone the body of the Lord, is not to be laid to the blame of the Church (for all the prayers in the holy sacrifice pre-suppose the sacramental communion of the entire congregation), but is to be ascribed solely to the tepidity of the greater part of the faithful. Yet are the latter earnestly exhorted to participate, at least spiritually, in the communion of the priest, and, in this way, to enter into the fellowship of Christ.*

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* L. c. Sess. XIII. c. viii. "Quoad usum autem, recte et sapienter patres nostri tres rationes hoc sanctum sacramentum accipiendi distinxerunt. Quosdam enim docuerunt sacramentaliter duntaxat id sumere, ut peccatores, alios autem spiritualiter, illos nimirum, qui, voto propositum illum cœlestem panem edentes, fide vivâ, quæ per dilectionem operatur, fructum ejus et utilitatem sentiunt; tertios porro sacramentaliter simul et spiritualiter: hi autem sunt, qui se prius probant et instruunt, ut vestem nuptialem induti," etc.

Who will not name such a worship most Christian, most pious, and real:—a worship wherein God is adored in spirit and in truth? Indeed, how can a carnal-minded man, who will not believe in the incarnation of the Son of God,—for the most powerful obstacle to this belief is in the fact that man clearly perceives, he must be of a godly way of thinking, so soon as he avows that God has become man—how can such a man look upon the mass as other than mere foolishness? The mass comprises an ever recurring invitation to the confession of our sins, of our own weakness and helplessness. It is a living representation of the infinite love and compassion of God towards us, which he hath revealed, and daily still reveals, in the delivering up of His only begotten Son: and therefore it contains the most urgent exhortation to endless thanksgiving, to effective mutual love, and to our heavenly glorification. Hence an adversary to such a worship must be one whose thoughts creep exclusively on the earth, or of the whole act understands nought else, but that the priest turns sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, and is clothed in a motley-coloured garment. On the other hand, he who misapprehends the wants of man, and the high objects of our Divine Redeemer, in the establishment of the sacraments; he who, like the Manicheans, rejects the sacraments as coarse, sensual institutions, and follows the track of a false spirituality, will regard the Catholic dogma as incomprehensible. In the opinion of such a man, a worship is in the same degree spiritual, as it is untrue. He lays before his God the lofty conceptions that have sprung out of the fulness of his intellectual powers, his holy feelings and inflexible resolves; these have no reference to the outward historical Christ, but only to the ideal one, which is merged in the subjectivity of these feelings and ideas; while yet, by the fact of the external revelation of the Logos, internal worship must needs obtain a perpetual outward basis, and, in truth, one representing the Word delivered up to suffering, because it was under the form of a self-sacrifice for the sins of the world that this manifestation occurred. How, on the other hand, any one who has once apprehended the full meaning of the incarnation of the Deity, and who with joy confesses that his duty is the reverse—namely, to pass from seeming to real and divine existence, and has accordingly attained to the perception that the doctrine of a forgiveness of sins in Christ Jesus, of an exaltation of man unto God, and of a communication of divine life to him, through our Lord, must remain unprofitable until it be brought before us in concrete forms, and be made to bear on our most individual relations—how any one, I say, who clearly perceives all this, can refuse to revere in the Catholic mass a divine institution, I am utterly at a loss to conceive.

After this exposition, we are probably now enabled to give a satisfactory solution to the chief objection which the Protestant communities have urged against the Catholic sacrifice of the mass. It is argued, that by the mass the sacrifice of Christ on the cross is abolished, or that, at any rate, it receives a detriment, since the latter is considered as incomplete, and needing a supplement. Now, it is self-evident, that the sacrifice of the mass, by keeping the oblation of Christ on the cross, or rather his whole ministry and sufferings, eternally present, presupposes the same, and in its whole purport maintains the same; and so far from obliterating, it stamps them more vividly on the minds of men; and, instead of supplying the bloody sacrifice of the cross with some heterogeneous element, it brings that sacrifice in its true integrity and original vitality to bear the most individual application and appropriation throughout all ages. It is one and the same undivided victim,—one and the same High Priest, who on the mount of Calvary and on our altars hath offered Himself up an atonement for the sins of the world. But, as this view is so obvious, and as the Reformers nevertheless constantly repeated their objections, and impressed them so strongly on the minds of their followers, that, down to the present day they are repeated, something deeply rooted in the constitution of Protestantism itself seems to lurk under these objections, and requires to be dragged to light. The decisive, conscious, undoubting faith, that Christ before our eyes offers himself up for us to his eternal Father, is quite calculated to produce an effect piercing into the inmost heart of man—far below the deepest roots of evil, so that sin in its inmost germ should be plucked from the will, and the believer be unable to refuse to consecrate his life to God.* This ordinance of divine compassion necessarily leads, along with others, to the doctrine of internal justification; as, on the other hand, the mass must be rejected with a sort of instinct, wherever that doctrine is repudiated. If such great and living manifestations of the Redeemer's grace be unable thoroughly to purify the heart of man; if they be incapable of moving us to heartfelt gratitude and mutual love, to the most unreserved self-sacrifice, and to the supplication, that God would accept the oblation of ourselves; then we may with reason despair of our sanctification, and abandon ourselves to a mere *theory of imputation*. Now, perhaps, we may understand the full sense of the above-cited prayer, which the Catholic at the elevation of the host utters to his Saviour: "To thee let my whole life be consecrated!"

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* Luther (de captivit. Bab. opp. ed. Jen. tom. ii. p. 279, b. and 280) still expresses the glorious reminiscences of his Catholic education, which, however, became always feebler, till at last they were totally extinguished. "Est itaque missa, sed secundum substantiam suam, proprie nihil aliud, quam verba Christi prædicta: 'accipite et manducate,' etc. Ac si dicat: ecce o homo peccator et damnatus, ex merâ gratuitâque charitate, quâ diligo te, sic volente misericordiarum patre, his verbis promitto tibi, ante omne meritum et votum tuum, remissionem omnium peccatorum tuorum et vitam æternam. Et ut certissimus de hac meâ promissione irrevocabili sis, corpus meum tradam et sanguinem fundam, morte ipsâ hac hanc promissionem confirmaturus, et utrumque tibi in signum et memoriale ejusdem promissionis relicturus. Quod cum frequentaveris, mei memor sis, hanc meam in te charitatem et largitatem prædices et laudes et gratias agas." (Here, however, it is merely the subjective, and not the objective part which is brought forward.) "Ex quibus vides, ad missam digne

Yet it ought not to be overlooked, that the Reformers might be led into error through various, and some ex-

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habendam aliud non requiri quam fidem, quâ huic promissioni fideliter nitatur, Christum in suis verbis veracem credat, et sibi hæc immensa bona esse donata non dubitet. Ad hanc fidem mox sequetur suâ sponte dulcissimus affectus cordis, quâ dilatatur et impinguatur spiritus hominis (hæc est charitas, per Spiritum Sanctum in fide Christi donata), ut in Christum, tam largum et benignum testatorem, rapiatur, *fiatque penitus alius et novus homo.* Quis enim non dulciter lacrymetur, imo præ gaudio in Christum pene exanimetur, si credat fide indubitatâ, hanc Christi promissionem inæstimabilem ad se pertinere? Quomodo non diliget tantum benefactorem, qui indigno et longe alia merito tantas divitias et hereditatem hanc æternam præveniens offert, promittit et donat?" Compare Sancti Anselmi orationes n. xxv.-xxxv. opp. edit. Gerberon. Par. 1721, p. 264, seq. But at page 281 of this work Luther says: "Ita possum quotidie, imo omni horâ, missam habere, dum quoties voluero, possum mihi verba Christi proponere et fidem meam in illis alere," etc. This is indeed true, but to overlook every other consideration, such an idealism would render the sacraments utterly unnecessary, and *public* worship useless, since something external *must* always form the foundation of the latter.

tremely scandalous, abuses, especially an unspiritual, dry, mechanical performance and participation in this most mysterious function. Moreover, in default of historical learning, the high antiquity and apostolic origin of the holy sacrifice was unknown to them. If it cannot even be denied, that their whole system, when regarded from one point of view, should have led them rather zealously to uphold, than to disapprove of the sacrificial worship; yet they instinctively felt that, in that worship, there lay something infinitely more profound than all the doctrinal foundations of their own theological system; and, accordingly, they were driven by an unconscious impulse into a negative course.

There are now some particulars which remain to be considered. The doctrine of the change of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ occupies an important place in the Catholic system of theology. Who doth not immediately think of that true, moral change which must take place in man, so soon as he enters into communion with Christ, when the earthly man ceases, and the heavenly one begins, so that not we, but Christ liveth in us? In the Lord's supper Luther could not find Christ alone,—bread and wine ever recurred to his mind, because, in the will of those regenerated in Christ, he saw a permanent dualism, a perpetual co-existence of a spiritual and a carnal inclination, so that the latter—evil principle in man—could never be truly converted into the former. Moreover, the doctrine of transubstantiation is the clearest representation of the objectivity of the food of the soul offered to us in the sacraments; and, if we may dare to speak of the internal motions of the Divine economy, we should affirm that, by this transubstantiation, wrought through a miracle of God's omnipotence, the strongest barrier is raised against any false subjective opinion. This doctrine, which most undoubtedly was at all times prevalent in the Church,* though at one time more clearly, at another less clearly, expressed, according as occasion seemed to require, was, in the Middle Age, laid down as a formal dogma, at a period, when a false pantheistic mysticism, which we have elsewhere described, confounded the distinctions between the human and the divine, and identified the Father with the world, the Son of God with the eternal idea of man, and the Holy Ghost with religious feelings. Several Gnostic sects, and afterwards, Amalrich of Chartres, and David of Dinant, inculcated these errors. They regarded the historical revelation of God in Christ Jesus as a self-revelation of man, and the sacraments were, therefore, in the eyes of these people nought else than what man chose of himself to attribute to them. Hence, they rejected them as useless; and, identifying with God the energies of the world, they conceived it singular that those powers, which in themselves were thoroughly divine, should receive, from any external cause, a divine nature or property. In this juncture of time, it appeared necessary to point out, more clearly than had been done at any previous period, the primitive doctrine that had been handed down, and to set it in the strongest light with all the consequences deducible from it. The doctrine of a change *of substance* in created powers, to be applied as a divine and sanctifying nourishment of the spirit, most clearly established the opposition of Christianity to the fundamental tenet of these sects, which took so much pleasure in the world as to confound it with the divinity; failing to observe that, through the creative energy of the Redeemer only could a new world be called into existence, and that, consequently, it was impossible for him to be engendered by the world. Moreover, out of the general movement of the age sprang a peculiar form of the most solemn adoration of the Eucharist (*festum corporis Christi*), so that it should be no longer possible to confound the internal acts of the human mind with the historical Christ; for, by the very nature of the festival, Christ was represented as *extraneous* to man, and neither as one in himself with us, nor as evolved out of us, but as coming to us only from without.* In the doctrine of transubstantiation, Christianity with its entire essence exhibits itself as an external, immediate divine revelation. At the period of the Reformation, therefore, it was the more necessary to bring out this doctrine, and the ecclesiastical rites connected with it, in the most prominent form; as an empty, erroneous spirituality was everywhere manifesting itself.

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* In the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom (*Goar Euchology*. p. 77) we meet with the following forms of prayer; "*Εὐλόγησον δέσποτα τὸν ἅγιον ἄρτον.*" "Bless, O Lord, the holy bread," saith the deacon; hereupon the priest saith: "*ποίησον τὸν μεν ἄρτον τοῦτον τίμίον σωμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ σοῦ.*" "Make this bread the venerable body of thy Christ." Then the deacon calls upon the priest to bless the wine; whereupon the latter saith: "*Τὸ δὲ ἐν ποτηρίῳ τούτῳ τίμιον αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ σοῦ.*" "Make what is contained in this chalice the venerable blood of thy Christ." Then over both the priest saith: "Converting them through thy Holy Spirit," "*μεταβαλών τῷ πνεύματί σοῦ τῷ ἁγίῳ.*" The Liturgy of St. Basil has the same forms, with even a verbal coincidence. (p. 166.)

In Renaudot's *Collectio Liturgiarum Orientalium* (tom. i. p. 157), we read as follows in the Liturgy of the Alexandrine Church: "*Ἔτι δε ἐφ' ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρτους τούτους, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ποτήρια ταῦτα τὸ πνεῦμὰ σου τὸ ἅγιον, ἵνα ταῦτα ἁγιάσῃ καὶ τελειώσῃ, ὡς παντοδύναμος θεός. Καὶ ποιήσῃ, τον μεν ἄρτον σῶμα....τὸ δὲ ποτήριον αἷμα τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης αὔτου τοῦ κύριοῦ καὶ θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος, καὶ παμβασιλέως ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*" "Send down upon us, and upon these breads, and upon these chalices, thy Holy Spirit, that he may consecrate and consummate these as the omnipotent God; and that he may make the bread the body, and the chalice the blood, of the New Testament of him our Lord, and God, and Saviour, and universal King, Jesus Christ."

The so-called universal canon of the Ethiopians says, loc. cit. p. 504: "Ostende faciem tuam super hunc panem et super hunc calicem, quos proposuimus super hoc altare spirituale tuum: benedic, sanctifica, et purifica illos; et transmuta hunc panem, ut fiat corpus tuum purum, et quod mistum est in hoc calice, sanguis tuus pretiosus." Hereupon Renaudot observes (p. 527): "Veram mutationem significat vox Æthiopica, rei scilicet unius in aliam, ut agnoscit ipse Ludolfus in lexicis suis, multique scripturæ loci in quibus usurpatur, palam faciunt. Si vel levissima de ejus significatione esset dubitatio, vox Coptica, cui respondet, et versiones Arabicæ illam plene discuterent."

Lastly, in the Catholic Church the custom prevails of receiving communion only under one kind:—a matter, as is evident, belonging to discipline, and not to doctrine.† It is well known that this custom was not first established by any ecclesiastical law; but, on the contrary, it was in consequence of the general prevalence of the usage, that this law was passed in approval of it. It is a matter of no less notoriety, that the monasteries in whose centre this rite had its rise, and thence spread in ever wider circles, were led by a very nice sense of delicacy to impose on themselves this privation. A pious dread of desecrating, by spilling and the like, even in the most conscientious ministration, the form of the sublimest and the holiest, whereof the participation can be vouchsafed to man, was the feeling which swayed their minds. Some may hold this opinion for superstitious; and, according as they see in the consecrated elements but mere material species, the more easily will such an opinion occur to their minds. But the Catholic who, even in this formality, proves that it is not with him a mere matter of form when he abstains from the consecrated chalice, and who, taught by examples in Scripture, or, at any rate, by the authority of the primitive Church, thinks himself justified in so abstaining, without becoming alienated from the spirit of Jesus Christ, or losing any portion of his Eucharistic blessings:—the Catholic, we say, rejoices that, though in his Church there may be men of a perhaps exaggerated scrupulosity, yet none are found so carnal-minded as to desire to drink in the communion not the holy blood, but the mere wine, and often, on that account, protest, among other things, against what they call a mutilation of the ordinance of Christ. We regret the more to be obliged to call the attention of our separated brethren to this abuse in their Church, as we must add, that the number of those in their communion is not less considerable, who forego the partaking of the sacred blood, not from any spiritual dread of desecrating it by spilling, but from a mere sensual feeling of disgust at the uncleanliness of those with whom they are to drink out of the same cup. When even the Zuinglians complain of this mutilation,—they who have taken away the body with the blood of Christ, and left in room of them mere bread and mere wine,—it is difficult not to think of that passage in Holy Writ, wherein the Redeemer reproaches the Pharisees, that they strain at gnats, but swallow camels. However, we should rejoice, if it were left free to each one to drink or not of the consecrated chalice: and this permission would be granted, if with the same love and concord an universal desire were expressed for the use of the cup, as, from the twelfth century, the contrary wish has been enounced.

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* That it was not in the Middle Age, as a frivolous ignorance has often asserted, that the adoration of the Eucharist first arose, numberless authorities can prove. For example, to pass over the testimonies of the much more ancient Origen, we read in the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom (Goar's Euchог. p. 81), at the elevation of the Host, the following words: "*εἶτα προσκυνεῖ ὁ ἱερεὺς, καὶ ὁ διάκανος, ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν τόπῳ· λέγοντες μυστικῶς τρίς· ὁ θεὸς ἱλάσθητὶ μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ. Καὶ ὁ λάος ὁμοίως πάντες μετ' εὐλαβείας προσκυνοῦσιν.*"

TRANSLATION.

"Then the priest and the deacon worship, each in the place where he stands, saying in secret three times: 'O God! be propitious to me a sinner.' And the people in like manner all worship with reverence."

† Concil. Trident. Sess. xxi. Can. i-iv. Sess. xxii. Decret. sup. concess. calicis.

§ xxxv.—Doctrine of the Lutherans, Zwinglians, and Calvinists, on the Eucharist.

The Reformation had run its course but for a few years, when there arose among its partisans, in relation to the holy Eucharist, very important points of difference. Luther taught a real and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the holy communion, without, however, adhering to the doctrine of transubstantiation, which he rejected, not on exegetical grounds, but on account of an expression accidentally thrown out by Pierre d'Ailly.* But we have already observed that Carlstadt, a colleague of Luther's in Wittemberg, drew from those very opinions which Luther and Melancthon had put forth, upon the nature of the sacraments, conclusions which, according to the principles of those Reformers, could not be easily invalidated. The exegetic proofs, on the other hand, which Carlstadt adduced in support of his views, were most feeble, nay, perfectly contemptible: but what he was unable to accomplish, Zuingle and Œcolompadius, who hastened to his assistance, attempted with much dexterity to effect. If the first Swiss Reformers in more than one respect evinced a shallowness without example, this was here more preeminently the case. They saw in the holy Eucharist a mere remembrance of Christ, of his sufferings and his death; at least, whatever traces of a deeper signification they might yet find in this mystery, were so feeble as to be rarely discerned by any one.* Moreover, Zuingle and Œcolompadius variously interpreted the well known classical passage in Matthew, though they agreed in the result. The former maintained that εστι (is) was the same as "signifies:" the latter took εστι in its proper sense, but asserted that σῶμα

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* Even the tenth article of the Augsburg Confession teaches: "De cœnâ Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in cœnâ Domini, et improbant secus docentes." The words "sub specie panis et vini," were originally inserted, but, as early as the year 1531, Melancthon suppressed them. See Salig's complete history of the Augsburg Confession (in German), vol. iii. c. 1, p. 171. In the copy of the Confession presented to the Emperor Charles V, in the year 1530, the tenth article ran thus: "Touching the Lord's Supper, it is taught, that the true body and blood of Christ are, under the form of bread and wine, truly present, given, distributed, and taken in the Eucharist. On which account the contrary doctrine is rejected."

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* Huldrichi Zwinglii Op. t. ii. In the essay (Illustrissimis Germaniæ Princip. in Conciliis Aug. Congreg. p. 546, b.), he gives an explanation not unworthy a Rationalist of our time, how it came to pass that Christians said, Christ is present in the Eucharist: "Quo factum est, ut veteres dixerint corpus Christi vere esse in cœnâ; id autem duplici nomine, cum propter istam, quæ jam dicta est, certam fidei contemplationem, quæ Christum ipsum in cruce propter nos deficientem nihil minus præsentem videt, quam Stephanus carnalibus oculis ad dexteram Patris regnantem videret. Et adseverare audeo, hanc Stephano revelationem et exhibitionem sensibiliter esse factam, ut nobis exemplo esset, fidelibus, cum pro se paterentur, eo semper modo fore, non sensibiliter, sed contemplatione et solatio fidei." P. 549: "Cum paterfamilias peregre profecturus nobilissimum annulum suum, in quo imago sua expressa est, conjugi matrifamiliæ his verbis tradit: En me tibi maritum, quem absentem teneas, et quo te oblectes. Jam ille paterfamilias Domini nostri Jesu Christi typum gerit. Is enim abiens ecclesiæ conjugi suæ imaginem suam in cœnæ sacramento reliquit."

(body) was put metaphorically for "sign of my body." Luther had then indeed already rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation; but he still continued, with his accustomed coarseness and violence, yet with great acuteness and most brilliant success, to defend against Zuinglius the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. For, whenever the doctrinal truth is in any degree on his side, he is always an incomparable disputant; and what he put forth on this subject in his controversial writings is still well deserving of attention.

Between the Saxon and the Helvetic opinions, Capito and the pliant Bucer attempted to steer an untenable middle course, without being able to reduce their ideas to clear, simple forms of expression.* More successful was Calvin in holding such a middle course; and his acuteness would not have failed finding the most fitting expression for his ideas, had he not purposely preferred a certain obscurity. He taught that the body of Christ is truly present in the Lord's Supper, and that the believer partook of it. But he only meant that, simultaneously with the bodily participation of the material elements, which in every respect remained what they were, and merely signified the body and blood of Christ, a power, emanating from the body of Christ, which is now in heaven only, is communicated to the spirit.* He had the pleasure of seeing his opinion adopted in the "Agreement of Zurich" by the Swiss Reformed; and the later Calvinistic formularies of faith in like manner all adhere to it.†

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* Confess. Tetrapolitan, c. xviii. p. 352. "Singulari studio hanc Christi in suos bonitatem semper deprædicant, quâ is non minus hodiè, quam in novissimâ illâ cœnâ, omnibus qui inter illius discipulos ex animo nomen dederunt, cum hanc cœnam, ut ipse instituit, repetunt, verum suum corpus verumque suum sanguinem verè edendum et bibendum, in cibum potumque animarum, quo illæ in æternam vitam alantur, dare per sacramenta dignatur, ut jam ipse in illis, et illi in ipso vivant et permaneant, in die novissima in novam et immortalem vitam per ipsum resuscitandi," etc. But as even Zuinglius made use of the expression, "Christ is truly present in the Lord's Supper," and the cities of Upper Germany were in close connexion with him, no one confided in this declaration of the formulary. Compare Salig's complete history of the Augsburg Confession (in German), vol. ii. c. 12, p. 400: "The praise," says he, "cannot be refused to the Confession of the four cities, that on many points it has a good and Christian bearing; but in the article of the Lord's Supper, it was very ambiguously worded, so that it might be interpreted in favour of Zuingle's, as well as of Luther's doctrine......Hence must the aforesaid article of this Confession be understood and explained from the previously cited correspondence between Bucer and Melancthon."

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* Calvin. instit. lib. iv. c. 17, fol. 502; Consens. Tig. Calvin. opp. tom. viii. p. 648.

† Confess. Helvet. II. art. xx. xxii. p. 99, et seq. "Cœnam vero mysticam," it is said (art. xxii.), "suis vere ad hoc offert, ut magis magisque in illis vivat, et illi in ipso: non quod pani et vino corpus Domini et sanguis vel naturaliter uniantur, sed quod panis et vinum ex institutione Domini symbola sunt, quibus ab ipso Domino, per ecclesiæ ministerium, vera corporis et sanguinis ejus communicatio, non in periturum ventris cibum, sed in æternæ vitæ alimoniam, exhibeatur. Hoc sacro cibo ideo sæpe utimur, quoniam hujus monitu in crucifixi mortem sanguinemque fidei oculis intuentes, ac salutem nostram non sine cœlestis vitæ gustu et vero vitæ æternæ sensu meditantes, hoc spirituali, vivifico intimoque pabulo ineffabili cum suavitate reficimur, ac inenarrabili verbi lætitiâ propter inventam vitam exultamus, totique ac viribus omnino nostris omnibus in gratiarum actionem, tam pro admirando Christi erga nos beneficio effundimur," etc. This form belongs properly to the category of the Tetrapolitana. Confess. Gall. art. xxxvi. p. 123: "Affirmamus sanctam cœnam Domini, alterum videlicet sacramentum, esse nobis testimonium nostræ cum Domino nostro Jesu Christo unitionis, quoniam non est duntaxat mortuus semel et excitatus a mortuis pro nobis, sed etiam vere nos pascit et nutrit carne sua et sanguine, ut, unum cum ipso facti, vitam cum ipso communem habeamus. Quamvis enim nunc sit in cœlis, ibidem etiam mansurus, donec veniat mundum judicaturus; credimus tamen eum

We must however examine this subject more nearly. The disputes prevailing between the Wittemberg and Helvetic Reformers could, for many reasons, be viewed only with the greatest pain by the advocates and friends of the ecclesiastical revolution. Independently of the fact, that, from the existence of such disputes, the Catholics not unsuccessfully drew conclusions against important principles of the Reformers, these controversies prevented the union of all the Protestant Churches in one common struggle against their adversaries,—a struggle which threatened ever more and more to terminate in a bloody civil war; and of what importance in the latter case must not concord prove! Most critical was the situation of the Sacramentarians —such was the name given by Luther to the disciples of Zuingle, Carlstadt and others; for their party was confined to only four cities within the whole compass of the German empire; and therefore, abandoned to themselves alone, they could make no vigorous resistance. Hence, at the celebrated diet of Augsburg, in the year 1530, they exerted every imaginable effort, and, under the guidance of Bucer, employed every

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arcana et incomprehensibili spiritus sui virtute nos nutrire et vivificare sui corporis et sanguinis substantiâ per fidem apprehensâ. Dicimus autem hoc spiritualiter fieri, non ut efficaciæ et veritatis loco imaginationem aut cogitationem supponamus, sed potius, quoniam hoc mysterium nostræ cum Christo coalitionis tam sublime est, ut omnes nostros sensus totumque adeo ordinem naturæ superet: denique quoniam cum sit divinum ac cœleste, non nisi fide percipi et apprehendi potest." Confess. Anglic. art. xxxviii. p. 137: "Cœna domini non est tantum signum mutuæ benevolentiæ Christianorum inter sese, verum potius est sacramentum nostræ per mortem Christi redemptionis. Atque adeo rite, digne, et cum fide sumentibus panis, quem frangimus, est communicatio corporis Christi: similiter poculum benedictionis est communicatio sanguinis Christi."

subterfuge of equivocation, in order to be received into the association of the German Protestants. But all their endeavours failed, especially through the German honesty of Luther, who expressed himself in the harshest strain against their evasions. Even in the religious peace of Nuremberg, it was only to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession that final quiet was granted.

If the middle opinion respecting the Eucharist, framed under these circumstances, was originally far more the result of political embarrassment, than the fruit of a sincere conviction obtained by earnest investigation, it now began to make its way, and include an ever greater number of Lutherans among its supporters. Even Melancthon, who was not entirely a stranger to it, had the complaisance to make, in the later editions of the Augsburg Confession (that appeared subsequent to the year 1540), some important changes in its favour; just as if his having composed this public formulary of faith gave him the right to dispose of it according to his good pleasure!* As the advocates of this new opinion employed without hesitation the expression, that Christ is really present in the Eucharist, and his body and blood given to believers for participation, and as the altered edition of the Augsburg Confession favoured a certain indefiniteness of meaning, it was unhesitatingly asserted after Luther's death, that the opinion of the innovators was, even according to the principles of the Saxon Reformation, perfectly orthodox. If John à Lasko, who was so ill treated by the English, Danish, and German Protestants, deserves to be forgiven for having, contrary to all the laws of historical interpretation, affixed his own meaning to the original formulary delivered to the emperor, because, by this expedient, he thought to ensure his temporal safety; the two-faced conduct of Melancthon, on the other hand, will remain an eternal stigma on his memory; and all the apologies attempted in his behalf can proceed on no other principle, than that his pretended good intention sanctified the means employed. With the most touching confidence did the remotest communities apply to him, to learn with certainty from his own lips the true Lutheran doctrine; and yet he could bring himself to meet that confidence with crafty and evasive replies, that were perfectly inconsistent one with the other. A few months only before his death, when he had nothing more to fear for his own personal safety, he declared himself decidedly for Calvin's view. This hypocrisy of Melancthon was imitated by his disciples, the professors of theology in Wittemberg, as well as many others; and we might call the fate which, on discovery of their undoubtedly shameful deception, they met with at the hands of the elector of Saxony, a merited chastisement, had it not been in some respects too severe.

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* The following is the difference between the unchanged and the changed Augsburg Confession; but what we shall have occasion to relate subsequently will best illustrate this difference. The unchanged edition: "De cœna Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi *vere adsint et distribuantur* vescentibus in cœna Domini, *et improbant secus docentes.*" It is to be observed, that even here the "sub specie panis et vini" is already wanting, but which, as Salig says, was no change in *realibus.* (Vol. iii. c. i. p. 477.) The changed edition: "De cœna Domini docent, quod *cum* pane et vino vere *exhibeantur* corpus et sanguis Christi, vescentibus in cœnâ Domini."

It was now the object of the Lutherans not only to assert against the Crypto-Calvinists the original doctrine of their Church, but to express it in the most definite forms. This occurred in the following manner: Calvin having spoken indeed of a true partaking of the body of Christ, but acknowledging only a certain spiritual reception of it, which, at the same moment when the bread is taken in by the mouth, is by means of faith enjoyed by the soul, and having, accordingly, connected only by time the spiritual food with the participation of the material elements, the orthodox Lutherans decreed in the "Formulary of Concord," that the body of Christ is administered *in*, *with*, and *under* the bread. Further, it is well known that, according to Calvin's theory, it is only the justified who are in a communion of life and faith with Christ,—in other words, the elect only that can receive the body of the Lord, while the unbeliever receives only bread and wine. Against this theory the "Formulary of Concord" teaches, that the unworthy communicant also receives the body of the Lord, yet to his own judgment. Lastly, an argument was answered, which the Calvinists had constantly alleged as one in itself of great weight. Against the bodily presence of Christ in the sacrament of the altar, they observed that the doctrine which inculcated that, from the moment of his ascension up to heaven, Christ sat at the right hand of God, was incompatible with the one, according to which he was at the same time present on earth in the Eucharist. In conformity with this, Beza, at the religious colloquy of Poissy, which the Lutheran theologians, in the course of their disputes on the sacrament, often adverted to, had declared that Christ was as far removed from the Eucharist as heaven from earth. In answer to this objection, Luther and his disciples had long asserted that Christ, even according to his humanity, was everywhere present (*ubiquitas corporis Christi*). This strange opinion, which the inhabitants of Wurtemberg, in defiance of those of the Palatinate, had, at the instigation of the Reformer Brentius, already admitted into their confession of faith, was now consecrated by the "Formulary of Concord," and raised to a formal article of faith. The objection of the Calvinists was met by observing that, in reference to God, there could be no question of a right or left side, since He was everywhere present; and that, in the same way, Christ, even according to his humanity, was in every place. With this was closely connected the much-handled doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum,* which had long been a subject of strife: for the Calvinists brought the charge of Monophysitism against the Lutherans, and were by the latter in turn accused of the heresy of Nestorius.*

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* Solid. Declar. pp. 659, 691, 724.

APPENDIX.

Note A, *referred to at page* 328.

Salig, in his *Complete History of the Augsburg Confession* (book II. c. 8, § 7, p. 297), gives an account of a scene which occurred in the general committee appointed at Augsburg to bring about a reunion of the Churches; from which it will appear that Luther originally, so far from rejecting ecclesiastical punishments, reproached his adversaries with their remissness in imposing them. Salig says: "I cannot, meanwhile, pass over in silence what Cochlæus has related respecting the transactions of the first and second day, touching the matter of satisfaction in penance. On the first evening, when the difference on this point could not be reconciled, it was agreed that Cochlæus on one side, and Melancthon on the other, should the next morning discover something to bring about an understanding. Cochlæus accordingly adduced a passage, where Luther wrote as follows: 'Our mother, the Christian Church, when from kindness of heart she will obviate the chastening hand of God, punishes her children with some penances of satisfaction, lest they fall under the Divine rod. Thus the Ninivites, by their self-imposed works, anticipated the judgment of God. This voluntary punishment is not every thing, as the adversaries will have it, yet it is still necessary. For either we, or men, or God, punish sins; but this the adversaries by their indulgences totally set aside. If they were pious pastors, they would rather impose punishments, and, according to the example of the Churches, go before the judgment of God, as did Moses, when, on account of the golden calf, he slew some Israelites [this example is not very relevant]. But the very best thing of all were, if we would chastise ourselves.'" This was an earnest, energetic language on the part of Luther, widely removed from those effeminate maxims subsequently introduced by his doctrine on Faith, which exacts of man nothing disagreeable—I might almost say, nothing incommodious. Salig continues: "This passage of Luther's, which Cochlæus had communicated, Dr. Eck read from a schedule before the committee. Cochlæus relates, that the seven Lutheran deputies looked each other in the face, and for a while observed a dead silence. Melancthon, who sat thereby, reddened, and said, 'I am aware, indeed, that Luther wrote this.' And as he could say nothing more, the elector, John Frederick, asked, 'At what time did Luther write this?' 'Perhaps, about ten years ago.' The Catholics then replied, that it was immaterial when Luther wrote this passage, but it was enough that such was his opinion on this doctrine. Hereupon Brentius and Schnepfius became indignant, and said: 'They were there not to defend Luther's writings, but to assert their Confession.' Melancthon then delivered his opinion in writing, to the following effect: 'We may hold penance to consist of three parts,—contrition, confession, *yet so that in this we look in the first place to absolution*, and believe in the same; and next satisfaction, to wit, that worthy fruits of penance follow.' In one point all were agreed, that on account of satisfaction sin was not forgiven as to its guilt. But whether in respect to the penalty, satisfaction were necessary to the forgiveness of sin, still remained matter of dispute. So far Cochlæus. Now I will not entirely call in question his account," &c. The account cannot be at all called in question. This passage of Luther's is still to be found in the *Assertio*, 41 Art. *contra Indulgent.* Art. 5, as Salig himself after Cochlæus has cited them in his work, *de actis et scriptis Lutheri*, p. 200. That the deputies of the Protestant States should have fallen into some embarrassment, was in the nature of things; for in Luther's Church his variations were never contemplated with pleasure. Melancthon's expressions, however, perfectly coincide with larger passages in the *Apology*, wherein he likewise enumerates three component parts in penance. "Art. v. Si quis volet addere tertium, videlicet dignos fructus pœnitentiæ, hoc est mutationem totius vitæ ac morum in melius, non refragabimur."

It is, indeed, surprising that he will *only not be opposed* to what harmonizes very well with his doctrine on faith, which will not establish a necessary inward connexion between faith and the *mutatio totius vitæ*. From all this it is clear that Melancthon annexed to *his* satisfaction a very different notion from Catholics, as, in the negociations which took place at that period between the two religious parties, there occurred from laudable motives, though not without reluctance, a sort of mutual self-delusion. In the Catholic Church the purpose of amendment of life is included in contrition, and is the first, not the last, act of the sinner in the sacrament of penance. But as, among the Lutherans, contrition has a very different signification from that which it bears among Catholics, consisting merely in fear,—and as from this fear man is liberated through absolution, and then only ensues newness of life, the latter, according to Melancthon, forms the third part of penance, and consequently is not the Catholic satisfaction. This third part the later Lutherans entirely threw aside, because, if amendment of life were made an *integral* portion of penance, the whole Lutheran doctrine on faith would fall to the ground. Here, as on other points, Melancthon became entangled in contradictions, for he always sought to patch up the defects in the doctrines of his Church, without renouncing her fundamental principles. So in this narrative of Cochlæus, after admitting that in penance there were three parts, he turns round and says, that "we should look *in the first place* to absolution;" as if all did not exist, and claim our attention, in a *like* degree.

Note B, *referred to at page* 336.

To bring our explanation of the Christian sacrifice more vividly before the minds of our readers, it may be useful to give a few extracts from the liturgies of the eastern and western Churches, and to cite some of the principal forms. In regard to the oriental liturgies, they usually bear the name of the founders of the Churches wherein they were used. So, for instance, the liturgy of the Church of Jerusalem is called the liturgy of St. James; that of the Alexandrine Church, the liturgy of St. Mark:—or they are entitled after some celebrated bishop, who made use of them, as St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, St. Cyril, and the rest. As to their age, this is a matter which cannot be so accurately determined. Certain it is, that in the fourth century they were already in existence, since the Monophysites of Syria and Egypt, who in part separated from the Catholic Church in the latter half of the fifth age, make use of these liturgies, as well as the orthodox Greeks. Moreover, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, in his catechetical discourses, appeals to many passages in the liturgy of St. James; and St. Chrysostom, who in his homilies often explains and employs portions of the liturgy, presupposes them to be things of long standing. The latter father lived towards the close, the former about the middle, of the fourth century. In general there is such a striking conformity between the oriental and the western liturgies, whereof great numbers, through a gracious Providence, have been rendered accessible to us; and this coincidence is so manifest even in the forms, that their formal groundwork indisputably belongs to a period, where old Christians were yet confined within a small space. Already, in the second century, St. Irenæus makes mention of the ἐπίκλησις; and the preface with the *Sursum corda*, ἄνω τὸν νοῦν, or τὰς καρδίας, which recurs in every liturgy, St. Cyprian speaks of in the middle of the third century. (Compare Bona rer. liturg. tom. ii. c. 10, where several passages of a like kind are brought together.) Respecting the antiquity of the liturgies in general, see the excellent dissertation by Renaudot, *Dissertatio de Liturg. orient. orig. et auctor.* forming an introduction to his *Collectio Liturg. orient.* tom. ii. Paris, 1716. A brief summary of all the investigations, pertaining to this subject, the reader may see in *Lienhart de antiquis liturgiis.* Argentorati. 1826.*

In the liturgy of St. Chrysostom (in Goar's *Euchologium sive Rituale Græcorum.* Paris, 1647, p. 70) the first prayer of the faithful (in the *Missa fidelium*) runs thus:

"Εὐχαριστοῦμέν σοι, κύριε ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων, τῷ καταξίώσαντι ἡμᾶς παραστῆναι καὶ νῦν τῷ ἁγίῳ σου θυσιαστηρίῳ, καὶ προσπεσεῖν τοῖς οἰκτιρμοῖς σου ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τοῦ σου λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων. Πρόσδεξαι ὁ θεὸς τὴν δέησιν ἡμῶν, ποίησον ἡμᾶς ἀξίους γενέσθαι προσφέρειν σοι δεήσεις καὶ ἱκεσίας, καὶ θυσίας ἀναιμάκτους ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ σου, καὶ ἱκάνωσον ἡμᾶς, οὓς ἔθου εἰς τὴν διακονίαν σου ταύτην, ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος σου τοῦ ἁγίου ἀκαταγνώστως καὶ ἀπροσκόπτως ἐν καθαρῷ μαρτυρείῳ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἡμῶν ἐπικαλεῖσθαί σε ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ τόπῳ, ἵνα εἰσακούων ἡμῶν, ἵλεως ἡμῖν εἴης ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῆς σῆς ἀγαθότητος."

While the seraphic hymn of the *sanctus* is being uttered, the priest, among other things, recites the following prayer (p. 72):—

"Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ προσφέρων καὶ προσφερὸμενος καὶ προσδεχόμενος καὶ διαδιδόμενος, Χριστὲ ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν, καὶ σοὶ τὴν δόξαν διαπέμπομεν, σὺν τῷ ἀνάρχῳ σου πατρὶ, καὶ τῷ παναγίῳ, καὶ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ ζωοποίῳ σου πνεύματι· νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰώνας τῶν αἰώνων· ἀμὴν."

Further on (p. 75):—

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* The translator begs to refer the reader to Dr. Rock's learned and interesting work, the *Hierurgia*, where he will find copious information respecting the purport, arrangement, and antiquity of the various liturgies.—*Trans.*

The Priest. Στῶμεν καλῶς στῶμεν μετὰ φόβου, πρόσχωμεν τὴν ἁγίαν ἀναφορὰν εἰς εἰρήνῃ (?) προσφέρειν.

The Choir. Ἔλεον εἰρήνης, θυσίαν αἰνέσεως.

The Priest. Ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πατρὸς, καὶ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, εἴη μετά πάντων ἡμῶν.

The Choir. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματός σου.

The Priest. Ἄνω σχῶμεν τὰς καρδίας.

The Choir. Ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν κύριον.

The Priest. Εὐχαριστήσωμεν τῷ κυρίῳ.

The Choir. Ἄξιον καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι προσκυνεῖν πατέρα, υἱὸν, καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τριάδα ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἀχώριστον.

The Priest. Ἄξιον καὶ δίκαιόν σὲ ὑμνεῖν, σὲ εὐλογεῖν, σὲ αἰνεῖν, σοὶ εὐχαριστεῖν, σὲ προσκυνεῖν ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ τῆς δεσποτείας σου, σῦ γὰρ εἶ θεὸς ἀνέκφραστος, ἀπερινόητος, ἀὁρατος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἄει ὢν, ὡσαύτως ὢν κ. τ. λ.

In the Liturgy of St. Basil (in Goar's Euchologium, p. 162) the first prayer of the faithful runs thus :

"Σὺ κύριε κατέδεξας ἡμῖν τὸ μέγα τοῦτο τῆς σωτηρίας μυστήριον, σὺ κατηξίωσας ἡμᾶς τοὺς ταπεινοὺς καὶ ἀναξίους δούλους σου, γίγνεσθαι λειτούργους τοῦ ἁγίου σου θυσιαστηρίου. Σὺ ἱκάνωσον ἡνᾶς τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος εἰς τὴν διακονίαν ταύτην, ἵνα ἀκατακρίτως στάντες ἐνώπιον τῆς ἁγίας δόξης σου, προσάγωμέν σοι θυσίαν αἰνέσεως. Σύ γὰρ εἶ ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι. Δὸς κύριε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων, δεκτὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν θυσίαν ἡμῶν, καὶ εὐπρόσδεκτον ἐνώπιόν σου."

The Prayer at the Offertory, p. 164:—

"Κύριε ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν ὁ κτίσας ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἀγαγὼν εἰς τὴν ζώην ταύτην, ὁ ὑποδείξας ἡμῖν ὀδους εἰς σωτηρίαν, ὁ χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν οὐρανίων μυστηρίων ἀποκάλυψιν, σὺ εἶ ὁ θέμενος ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν διακονίαν ταύτην ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος σου τοῦ ἁγίου. Εὐρόκησον δὴ κύριε τοῦ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς διακόνους τῆς καινῆς σου διαθήκης, λειτουργοὺς τῶν ἁγίων σου μυστηρίων· πρὸσδεξαι ἡμᾶς προσεγγίζοντας τῳ ἁγίῳ σου θυσιαστηρίῳ, κατά τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ἐλέους σου· ἵνα γενώμεθα ἄξιοι τοῦ προςφέρειν σοί τὴν λογικὴν ταύτην, καὶ ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων· ἣν προσδεξάμενος εἰς τὸ ἅγιον καὶ νοερὸν σου θυσιαστήριον, εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδὶας, ἄντικατάπεμψον ἡμῖν τὴν χάριν τοῦ ἁγίου σου πνεύματος· ἐπίβλεψον ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἔπιδε ἐπὶ τὴν λατρείαν ἡμῶν ταύτην, καὶ πρόσδεξαι αὐτὴν, ὡς προσέδεξω Ἀβὲλ τὰ δῶρα, Νῶε τὰς θυσίας, Ἀβραὰμ τὰς ὁλοκαρπώσεις, Μωσέως καὶ Ἀρὼν τὰς ἱερωσύνας, Σαμουὴλ τὰς

εἰρηνικάς· ὡς προσέδεξο ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων σου ἀποστόλων τὴν ἀληθινὴν ταύτην λατρείαν· οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἡμῶν τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν πρόσδεξαι τὰ δῶρα ταῦτα ἐν τῇ χρηστότητί σου κὺριε· ἵνα καταξιωθέντες λειτουργεῖν ἀμέμπτως τῷ ἁγίῳ σου θυσιαστηρίῳ, εὑρώμεθα τὸν μισθὸν τῶν πιστῶν, καὶ φρονίμων οἰκονόμων, ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ φοβερᾷ τῆς ἀνταποδόσεώς σου τῆς δικαίας."

In the Alexandrine liturgy of St. Mark, (Renaudot, Liturg. Orient. Coll. t. i. page 145), the priest thus prays at the canon :—

"*Πάντα δὲ ἐποίησας διὰ τῆς σῆς σοφίας, τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, τοῦ μονογενοῦς σου υἱοῦ, τοῦ κυρίου καὶ θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησὸυ Χριστοῦ· δὶ οὗ σοι σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι εὐχαριστοῦντες, προσφέρομεν τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἀναίμακτον λατρείαν ταύτην, ἣν προσφέρει σοι κύριε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἡλίου καὶ μέχρι δυσμῶν· ἀπὸ ἄρκτου καὶ μεσημβρίας· ὅτι μέγα τὸ ὄνομὰ σου ἐν πᾶσὶ τοῖς ἔθνεσι, καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ θυμίαμα προσφέρεται τῷ ὀνόματι ἁγίῳ σου, καὶ θυσία, καὶ προσφορά.*"

In the liturgy of St. James, used by the Jacobites or the Syrian Monophysites, in common with the Church of Jerusalem, the priest says as follows (Renaudot, t. ii. p. 30) :

"Deus pater, qui, propter amorem tuum erga homines magnum et ineffabilem, misisti filium tuum in mundum, ut ovem errantem reduceret, ne avertas faciem tuam a nobis, dum sacrificium hoc spirituale et incruentum celebramus: non enim justitiæ nostræ confidimus, sed misericordiæ tuæ. Deprecamur ergo et obsecramus clementiam tuam, ne in judicium sit populo tuo mysterium hoc, quod institutum nobis est ad salutem; sed ad veniam peccatorum, remissionem insipientiarum, et ad gratias tibi referendas, per gratiam, misericordiam et amorem erga homines unigeniti Filii tui, per quem et cum quo te decet gloria."

Further below (p. 32) the priest continues :—

"Memoriam igitur agimus, Domine, mortis, et resurrectionis tuæ e sepulchro post triduum, et ascensionis tuæ in cœlum, et sessionis tuæ ad dexteram Dei patris: rursumque adventus tui secundi, terribilis et gloriosi, quo judicaturus es orbem in justitia, cum unumquemque remuneraturus es secundum opera sua. Offerimus tibi hoc sacrificium terribile et incruentum, ut non secundum peccata nostra agas nobiscum, Domine, neque secundum iniquitates nostras retribuas nobis; sed, secundum mansuetudinem tuam et amorem tuum erga homines magnum et ineffabilem, dele peccata nostra, servorum nempe tuorum tibi supplicantium. Populus enim tuus et hæreditas tua deprecatur te et per te et tecum patrem tuum, dicens," etc.

In the Gothic Missal (in Mabillon de Liturg. Gallic. Paris, 1729) we read, among other things, at p. 210 :—

"Sacrificiis præsentibus Domine quæsumus intende placatus ; quibus non jam aurum thus et myrrha profertur, sed quod iisdem muneribus declaratur, offertur, immolatur, sumitur (scil. Christus)."

In the Missal of the Franks, lib. cit. p. 38.—

"Sacrificium, Domine, quod desideranter offerimus, etc.—P. 319. Hanc igitur oblationem servitutis nostræ, sed et cunctæ familiæ tuæ, quam tibi offerimus," etc.

In the old Gallican Missal, (lib. cit. p. 334), we read the following prayers :—

"Sacrificium tibi Domine celebrandum placatus intende ; quod et nos a vitiis nostræ conditionis emundet, et tuo nomini reddat acceptos : et communicatio præsentis osculi perpetuæ proficiat charitati.—P. 385. Descendat, precamur, omnipotens Deus, super hæc quæ tibi offerimus, verbum tuum sanctum ; descendat inæstimabilis gloriæ tuæ Spiritus ; descendat antiquæ indulgentiæ tuæ donum ; ut fiat oblatio hæc Hostia spiritualis in odorem suavitatis accepta : etiam nos famulos tuos per sanguinem Christi tua manus invicta custodiat. Libera nos ab omni malo, omnipotens, æterne Deus : et quia tibi soli est præstandi potestas, tribue, ut hoc solemne sacrificium sanctificet corda nostra, dum creditur ; deleat peccata, dum sumitur."

Decorum requires us now to cite some forms of prayer from the Roman Liturgy :—

"Suscipe, sancte Pater, omnipotens æterne Deus, hanc immaculatam hostiam, quam ego, indignus famulus tuus, offero tibi Deo meo vivo et vero, pro innumerabilibus peccatis et offensionibus et negligentiis meis, et pro omnibus circumstantibus, sed et pro omnibus fidelibus Christianis, vivis atque defunctis ; ut mihi et illis proficiat ad salutem in vitam æternam.

"Offerimus tibi Domine calicem salutis, tuam deprecantes clementiam ; ut in conspectu divinæ majestatis tuæ pro nostra et totius mundi salute cum odore suavitatis ascendat.

"In spiritu humilitatis et in animo contrito suscipiamur a te Domine : et sic fiat sacrificium nostrum in conspectu tuo hodie ut placeat tibi Domine Deus.

"Suscipe, sancta Trinitas, hanc oblationem, quam tibi offerimus ob memoriam passionis, resurrectionis et ascensionis Jesu Christi Domini nostri, etc. Suscipiat Dominus hoc sacrificium de manibus tuis ad laudem et gloriam nominis sui, ad utilitatem quoque nostram, totiusque ecclesiæ suæ sanctæ.

"Te igitur, clementissime Pater, per Jesum Christum filium tuum Dominum nostrum, supplices rogamus ac petimus uti accepta habeas et benedicas hæc dona, hæc munera, hæc sancta sacrificia illibata, imprimis quæ tibi offerimus pro ecclesia tua sancta catholica, quam pacificare, custodire, adunare, et regere digneris toto orbe terrarum, etc. [This prayer occurs in all the Liturgies.] Memento, Domine, famulorum famularumque tuarum et omnium circumstantium, quorum tibi fides cognita est et nota devotio, pro quibus tibi offerimus, vel qui tibi offerunt, hoc sacrificium laudis pro se suisque omnibus, pro redemptione animarum suarum, pro spe salutis et incolumitatis suæ ; tibique reddunt vota sua æterno Deo, vivo et vero."

More or less detailed representations of the principal actions in the life of Christ, prayers for the living and the dead, and the mention of saints, occur in every Liturgy from the earliest ages of the Church. But want of space prevents us from citing, in proof of this, any longer passages.

Translation of the Extracts from the Greek Liturgies.

In the liturgy of St. Chrysostom (in Goar's Euchologium sive Rituale Græcorum, p. 70. Par. 1647), the first prayer of the faithful in the Missa fidelium runs thus :—

"We give thee thanks, O Lord God of Hosts, who hast judged us worthy both to assist now at thy holy altar, and to supplicate thy mercy on account of our own sins, and of the errors of thy people. Receive, O God, our prayers, make us worthy to offer unto thee prayers and supplications and unbloody sacrifices in behalf of all thy people, and make us, whom thou hast ordained for this thy holy ministry, worthy to invoke thee, in all places, and at all times, by the power of thy Holy Spirit, without blame and without offence, and according to the pure testimony of our conscience, that thou mayest hear us, and be propitious unto us, according to the multitude of thy mercies."

While the seraphic hymn of the *sanctus* is being uttered, the priest, among other things, says as follows (p. 72): "Thou art, O Christ our God, the offerer and the offered, the receiver and the distributed, and we render glory to thee together with thy eternal Father, and with thy most holy and righteous and life-giving Spirit, now and for ever, and for ages of ages. Amen."

Further on, p. 75.

The Priest saith: "Let us stand up in holiness; let us stand up with awe; let us endeavour to offer up in peace the holy oblation."

The Choir. "The victim of peace, the sacrifice of praise."

The Priest. "May the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God the Father, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all."

Choir. "And with thy spirit."

Priest, "Let us raise up our hearts."

Choir. "We have raised them up to the Lord."

Priest. "Let us give thanks to the Lord."

Choir. "It is most meet and just to worship the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, one consubstantial and undivided Trinity."

Priest. "It is meet and just to celebrate thee, to bless thee, to praise thee, to give thee thanks, to worship thee in every place of thy dominion; for thou art a God ineffable, imperceptible, invisible, incomprehensible, everlasting, and always the same," etc.

In the liturgy of St. Basil, in Goar's Euchologium, (p. 162), the first prayer of the faithful runs thus: "Thou, O Lord, hast revealed to us this great mystery of salvation; thou hast vouchsafed to make us, humble and unworthy servants as we are, ministers of thy holy altar. Make us, by the power of thy Holy Spirit, worthy of this ministry, that, standing without condemnation in the presence of thy divine glory, we may offer unto thee the sacrifice of praise. Thou art who in all things workest all. Grant, O Lord, that, on account both of our sins, and of the errors of thy people, our sacrifice may be received, and become well-pleasing in thy sight."

The prayer of the Offertory, p. 164.

"O Lord, our God, who hast created us, and hast brought us into this life, who hast shown us the path to salvation, who hast vouchsafed to us the revelation of celestial mysteries; it is thou who, by the power of the Holy Spirit, hast ordained us for this ministry. Be pleased, O Lord, that we may become ministers of thy New Testament, and dispensers of thy holy mysteries. Receive us, O Lord, approaching to thy holy altar, according to the multitude of thy mercies, that we become worthy to offer unto thee this reasonable and unbloody sacrifice in behalf of our own sins, and the errors of thy people. Receive this sacrifice upon thy holy and reasonable altar, for a sweet-smelling fragrance, and send us down in return the grace of thy Holy

Spirit. Look down upon us, O Lord, and regard this our worship, and accept it, as thou didst accept the gifts of Abel, the sacrifices of Noah, the holocausts of Abraham, the sacred oblations of Moses and Aaron, and the peace-offerings of Samuel. As thou didst receive from thy holy apostles this true sacrifice, so also in thy benignity accept, Lord, from our sinful hands these gifts ; in order that, being found worthy to minister without offence at thy holy altar, we may meet with the reward of faithful and prudent stewards in the tremendous day of thy just retribution."

In the Alexandrine liturgy of St. Mark (Renaudot Liturg. orient. coll. t. i. p. 145), the priest saith in the offertory: "Thou hast created all things by thy wisdom, the true light, thy only-begotten Son, our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ ; through whom rendering thanks unto Thee, together with him and the Holy Ghost, we offer up this reasonable and unbloody sacrifice, which all the nations offer up to thee, O Lord, from the rising of the sun unto the going down thereof, from the North and from the South ; for thy name is great among all the nations, and in every place incense and sacrifice and oblation are put up to thy holy name."

LONDON, RICHARDS, 100, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.

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ERRATA TO VOL. I.

Page 42, 19th line of note, for "consequently the image," read, "consequently *such* the image."

Page 263, line 24, for "in the hog-trough and horse-pond," read, "in the hog-sty and on the dung-heaps."

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